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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This doctoral research is about the EU and the ASEAN regarding with their 
developments of policy, politics and polity for transformation of different types of 
governance in their own way. The EU is regarded as the most successful regional 
integration project in the modern world because of its unique characteristics like 
Single Market, European Monetary Union (EMU), its single currency (Euro) and 
etc. Due to this sui generis character of the EU, some argued that there is no other 
possibly comparable instance of international integration in the global political 
scene. However, whether or not the EU is a motivating factor and admiring object 
for all other late comers of regional integration projects, it is undeniable that there 
are also relatively successful regional integration projects in the world outside the 
EU realm, for example, the ASEAN in Southeast Asia. It is also very interesting 
how heterogeneous members of the ASEAN manage to form a regional 
organization encompassing all countries in the region even though there is a great 
disparity of development and growth and also deep variances of own interests. At 
least the ASEAN can also be compared with the EU in the sense to explain why 
there is absence of war among member states by using both organizations as 
independent variable in terms of their economic, political and security 
cooperation.  This study is a comparative analysis of different approaches to 
regional integration between the EU and the ASEAN as well as their changing 
modes of governance resulting from these approaches respectively.  For the 
comprehensive understanding of politics and policy-making in the EU and the 
ASEAN, an analytical study of institutional designs, structures and organizational 
developments was carried out.  Focus is to explain the major differences between 
the EU and the ASEAN and also to study internal factors and major processes, 
which determine the achievements, failures and stagnations of both organizations 
in the past decades. For analysis of policy-making and governance in the EU and 
the ASEAN, case studies on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
EU, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, ASEAN political and security 
cooperation, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) are conducted. It also examines the critical question whether 
the EU is in fact a system of governance with its own sui generis polity or 
whether it is just a useful instrument of its member states. Simultaneously, this 
study attempts to give a comprehensive view of the governance approach that has 
played an important role in the vitalization of regional integration studies in the 
recent years. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This study is a comparative analysis of different approaches to regional integration 
between the EU and the ASEAN as well as their changing modes of governance resulting 
from these approaches respectively.  For the comprehensive understanding of politics and 
policy-making in the EU and the ASEAN, an analytical study of institutional designs, 
structures and organizational developments was carried out.  Categories of analysis 
consist of macro, meso and micro levels of observations relating to policy interests, 
decision-making processes, institutional and structural changes of both organizations. 
Focus is to explain the major differences between the EU and the ASEAN and also to 
study internal factors and major processes, which determine the achievements, failures 
and stagnations of both organizations in the past decades. For analysis of policy-making 
and governance in the EU and the ASEAN, case studies on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, 
ASEAN political and security cooperation, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will be conducted. 
 
1.1 Explaining the Research Topic and Objectives of the Dissertation 
 
This doctoral research is about the EU and the ASEAN regarding with their 
developments of policy, politics and polity for transformation of different types of 
governance in their own way. The EU is regarded as the most successful regional 
integration project in the modern world because of its unique characteristics like Single 
Market, European Monetary Union (EMU), its single currency (Euro) and etc. Due to this 
sui generis character of the EU, some argued that there is no other possibly comparable 
instance of international integration in the global political scene. However, whether or not 
the EU is a motivating factor and admiring object for all other late comers of regional 
integration projects, it is undeniable that there are also relatively successful regional 
integration projects in the world outside the EU realm, for example, the ASEAN in 
Southeast Asia. It is also very interesting how heterogeneous members of the ASEAN 
manage to form a regional organization encompassing all countries in the region even 
though there is a great disparity of development and growth and also deep variances of 
own interests. At least the ASEAN can also be compared with the EU in the sense to 
explain why there is absence of war among member states by using both organizations as 
independent variable in terms of their economic, political and security cooperation.   
 
• The principal aim of this research is to obtain profound knowledge about regional 
integration and its impacts after studying the politics and governance of the EU and 
the ASEAN in comparative perspective. 
• To understand comprehensively the policies and politics between two regionally 
integrated organizations in terms of their policy-making, polity development, 
institutional bargaining upon their external relations and degree of interdependence.  
• To study institutional designs and structures which are mainly based on their political 
culture and dynamics of regional integration.  
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• To analyze the problems of cohesiveness and governance of both institutions for their 
successful regional integration in the age of globalization. 
• To find the fundamental differences between two organizations depending upon their 
own interests and future prospects. 
 
 
1.2 What is governance? Origin, Numerous Definitions & Endless Debates   
   
The term governance has been introduced not very long ago into political science and, 
more recently, in the debate of practical political discourses when it becomes obvious that 
the traditional model of the nation-state is no longer sufficient to encounter more and 
more complex socio-political problems or steering reform policies. The nation- state is 
facing new challenges like the increasing complexity of social problems, the 
differentiation of societies accompanied by the rise of new organized interests, the 
overload and inflexibility of hierarchical structures and the growing international 
interdependence and competition.1 
 
And governance ranks high on the research agenda of political science and international 
relations and has attracted considerable attention in academic debates. It is not surprising 
that, because of this expanding interest, there is little agreement on the meaning of the 
term governance even though this catch-all-phrase term is still to be seen as widely used 
in many subjects of social science. In international relations, governance has been 
introduced to exemplify the particularities of governing without governments. In 
comparative politics, it has the connotation of catching in-depth changes in the way 
governments exert political power and enter into close relations with societal actors. The 
term was sometimes used to describe a new process of governing in a polity still 
dominated by the policy-making of government.  Governance is also linked to the 
operation of governments for analytical and normative grounds by explaining that 
government still plays a leading role in political steering and decision-making 
mechanisms.2     
 
Even though governance is becoming a word widely used in many interdisciplinary 
subjects of social science, this word itself has a rather ambiguous meaning. The free 
encyclopedia Wikipedia explains governance as the word deriving from Latin origins that 
                                                 
1 Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos (2006): “Introduction: Governance and democracy: concepts and 
key issues”, in Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos (ed): “Governance and Democracy: Comparing 
national, European and international experiences”, Routledge, New York, pp. 2-3.  
2 Beate Kohler-Koch (2003): “Interdependent European Governance” in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed): “Linking 
EU and National Governance”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 10-11. *(For more elaborated and 
thorough discussions about governance development in interdisciplinary research agenda, see Rhodes 
(1997): “Understanding Governance: Policy networks, Reflexivity and Accountability”, Buckingham, 
Philadelphia, Open University Press; Kooiman (2002): Governing as Governance, London, Sage; 
Kersbergen / Waarden, (2004): “Governance as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration 
regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy, in European 
Journal of Political Research 43, pp. 143-171; Benz, Lütz, Schimank, Simonis (ed) (2007): “Handbuch 
Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder”, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 1. Auflage Juni 2007; Nuscheler (2008): “Die Konjunktur des Governance-
Begriffes”, Duisburg, Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF), Uni Duisburg-Essen.)      
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suggests the notion of “steering” although this sense of steering with the traditional top-
down approach can be distinguished between governance’s “power to” and government’s 
“power over”.3 As a word from English language, governance is defined as “the act or 
manner of governing” by the Concise Oxford Dictionary.4  
 
However, governance is not synonymous with government. Both refer to purposive 
behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule, but government suggests 
activities that are backed by formal authority, like use of force by police powers to ensure 
the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities 
backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed 
responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance 
and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon 
than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also brings informal, non-
governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its range 
move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants. Governance is, therefore, a system 
of rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned 
constitutions and charters. To be more precise, governance is a system of rule that works 
only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects), 
whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their 
policies. Hence it is possible to conceive of governance without government – of 
regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though 
they are not endowed with formal authority.5   
 
In terms of global arena, governance rests on different forms and levels of international 
coordination, cooperation and collective decision-making, with international 
organizations taking on these coordination functions and contributing to the development 
of global modes of perception. Regimes are used to translate the will to cooperation into 
internationally binding rules. In such regimes states enter into agreements governing the 
way in which common problems are dealt with. Therefore, these regimes could rightly be 
termed as core elements of governance without government. Even hegemonic powers are 
willing to accept such regimes because they regulate states of affairs that promote their 
own well-being and which they are unable to regulate on their own.6 
 
Philippe C. Schmitter defined governance as a method or mechanism for dealing with a 
broad range of problems/conflicts, in which actors regularly arrive at mutually 
satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with each other and 
cooperating in the implementation of these decisions. The core property of governance 
consists of horizontal forms of interaction between actors, who have conflicting 
objectives, but who are sufficiently independent of each other, so that neither could 
                                                 
3 For more details, See “Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governance. 
4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1990), 8th Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
p. 511.  
5 James Rosenau (1992): “Governance, Order, and Change in world politics”, in James Rosenau and Ernst-
Otto Czempiel (ed): “Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics”, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 4-5. 
6 Franz Nuscheler (2002): “Global Governance, Development, and Peace”, in Paul Kennedy, Dirk Messner 
and Franz Nuscheler (ed): “Global Trends and Global Governance”, London, Pluto Press, p. 160.  
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impose a solution on the other and however still sufficiently interdependent, so that both 
would lose if no solution were found. As witnessed nowadays in modern and globalized 
societies the actors involved in governance are usually non-profit, semi-public, and, at 
least, semi-voluntary organizations with leaders and members. It is noteworthy that these 
organizations do not have to be equal in their size, wealth, or capability, but they have to 
be able to hurt or help each other mutually. At this point, it is the insertion of these 
organizations into something approximating a civil society that is crucial for the success 
of governance.7     
 
As a global organization responsible for regulating good financial governance, the World 
Bank defines governance at country level as “the exercise of political authority and the 
use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems and affairs for development”.8 
However, World Bank itself that initially promoted the idea of governance insisted that 
its recommendations for good governance were apolitical and had nothing to do with 
interfering in the domestic politics of member states. Making such a claim would not 
make any sense, for instance, for a regional organization like the European Union since 
its very nature of the EU is to penetrate deeply within the politics of its member states 
and to bring about a convergence in their policies across a wide range of issues.9 For 
better understanding of governance at European level, the European Commission in its 
White Paper defined governance as “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability and coherence”.10 Therefore, governance at different levels 
and extent of feasibility would provide separate approaches and divergent 
understandings. 
 
Jan Kooiman attempted to sum up the intertwined meanings of governing, governance 
and governability in his book “modern governance: new government – Society 
Interactions” for better understanding of various concepts. Governing can be regarded as 
goal-oriented interventions of political or social actors with the intention to create a more 
or less predictable and somewhat stable pattern of interaction within a social-political 
system that is as much as possible in accordance with the wishes or objectives of the 
intervening actors. Governance can be viewed as the pattern or structure that emerges in 
a social-political system as common result or outcome of the interacting intervention 
efforts of all involved actors. Moreover, this pattern cannot be reduced to one actor or 
group of actors in particular because political governance in modern societies can no 
longer be conceived in terms of external governmental control of society but emerges 
from a plurality of governing actors. In other words, this emerging pattern forms the rules 
of the game within a particular system or, the medium through which actors can act and 
try to use these rules in conformity with their own objectives and interests. Governability 
                                                 
7 Philippe C. Schmitter (2006): “Governance in the European Union: a viable mechanism for future 
legitimation?” in Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos (ed): “Governance and Democracy: Comparing 
national, European and international experiences”, Routledge, New York, pp. 161-162. 
8 World Bank (1991): “Managing Development: The Governance Dimensions”, Washington DC, World 
Bank, August 29, 1991, p. i. 
9 Schmitter (2006), p. 164. 
10 European Commission (2001): “White Paper on European Governance”, COM (2001) 424, Brussels, EU 
Commisson, p. 8.   
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as the last concept can be described as the total quality of a social-political system to 
govern itself within the context of broader systems of which it is a part. Therefore, 
governability combines qualities of governing and of governance in interaction.11 
 
There is one concise definition of governance, which comes closest to the concrete 
fulfillment of overall conceptual understanding of this opaque term. Arthur Benz, the 
political scientist and co-author of the “Handbook of Governance” from University of 
Hagen (Germany), defined governance as the entirety of all forms of collective regulation 
upon societal circumstances that exists in parallel with each other: ranging from 
institutionalized civil societal self-regulation over different forms of cooperation of state 
and private actors to the level of sovereign action of state actors.12 This definition 
clarified that governance without government is not the end of the nation-state but the 
transformation of decision-making process to represent all interests as the state itself is 
not only policy-taker, but also continues to be a policy-maker.13 
     
As Renate Mayntz correctly argued, problems of governability are related to the dynamic 
and complex character of modern society and actual power distributions as well as to the 
capacity of highly organized policy fields in resisting political guidance. In short, 
governing is an action whereas governance is a mode of social coordination and order for 
explaining to overcome the conceptual haziness resulting from the mixture of different 
meanings. In this way, governance is more structural and process-related, which is no 
longer a hierarchical top-down steering.14  
 
In order to avoid ungovernability, therefore, the plurality of competing interests and 
preferences has to be organized through horizontal coordination and cooperative policy-
making covering across institutions, sectors and territories. Accordingly, institutions, 
forums, or procedures are created at various levels; for example, policy networks, 
intergovernmental roundtables, conferences, expert committees, and so on, whose major 
objective is to produce coordination by transcending what could be labeled as insular 
attitudes. Simultaneously, public bodies lack the sufficient resources like finance, 
knowledge, organization or authority to produce social coordination through steering 
from the hierarchy above. Under these circumstances, governance aims to enhance public 
resources concerning knowledge (learning about complex and uncertain causal relations), 
organization (ensuring adequate expertise and capacity to implement policy choices), and 
authority (avoiding blackmailing by veto groups and inducing compliance by policy-
takers) in policy-making. Consequently, governance entails the inclusion of non-
                                                 
11 Jan Kooiman (1993): “Findings, Speculations and Recommendations” in Jan Kooiman (ed): “ Modern 
Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, Sage Publications, London, pp. 257-259. 
12 Arthur Benz, Susanne Lütz, Uwe Schimank, Georg Simonis (2007): “Einleitung”,  in Arthur Benz, 
Susanne Lütz, Uwe Schimank, Georg Simonis (ed): “Handbuch Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und 
empirische Anwendungsfelder”, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1. Auflage Juni 2007, p. 
21. 
13 Franz Nuscheler (2008): “Die Konjunktur des Governance-Begriffes”, Duisburg, Institut für Entwicklung 
und Frieden (INEF), Uni Duisburg-Essen, pp. 1-14. 
14 Renate Mayntz (1993): “Governing Failures and the problem of governability: some comments on a 
theoretical paradigm”, in Jan Kooiman (ed): “ Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, 
Sage Publications, London, pp. 9-20.  
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governmental actors in policy networks, and collaborative relations with them that can be 
taken into the form of delegation, contracts or partnerships. It can be described as a 
structure of policy-making that consists of several independent decision-making 
centers.15 
 
Owing to its unique network-like, non-hierarchical, flexible, boundary-crossing 
characteristics, governance is frequently regarded as politics and policy-making outside 
institutions, as ‘governance without government’. Nonetheless, this is only partially 
correct because institutions are relevant for the understanding of governance for several 
reasons. Firstly, there is mostly an institutional framework that defines who is included 
and who is not, and which shapes power relations and guides the interactions of actors. 
Secondly, different actors normally represent collective entities and are subject to the 
institutional rules governing internal organizational structures and processes. Finally, it is 
the interplay of formal and informal patterns that formulates the dynamics of governance. 
Therefore, political institutions are pivotal and should be taking into consideration with 
regard to governance discussions. Institutions define who is authorized to act and to make 
collectively binding decisions; they make actors’ behaviour predictable and visible; and 
they link those who hold power to those who are to be subjected. For this reason, it is 
noteworthy that governance is not just politics beyond the nation-state; rather it is, in 
many various instances, coupled to the institutions of the nation-state. At the national and 
sub-national level, the nation-state sets up the institutional framework for governance. At 
the European and international context, national institutions influence the linkage 
between actors from member states and other transnational or private actors, and in that 
level, of course, European institutions and international regimes are key actors as well. In 
any level of governance, the degree of institutionalization and of conflict potential 
between cooperative networks and formal institutions varies. For a better understanding 
of complexity of governance, therefore, research works that includes different types of 
governance embedded in different forms of institutional frameworks are essential.16 
 
Many factors concerning structures, actors and modes of policy-making are the most 
relevant for a systematic portrait of the major characteristics of governance. In terms of 
structures, governance implies a plurality of decision centers and it is designed to 
regulate conflicts between social groups, organizations or individuals without a sovereign 
centralized government. There is no clear hierarchy between these various centers even 
though structures of governance can be embedded in a formal hierarchy. The core 
element of decision structures consists of networks, which are relatively stable 
relationships among formally autonomous organizations or different actors. Actors in 
governance include experts, public actors (government officials and state administrators) 
who represent different territorial levels, and representatives of private interests (of 
business groups, lifestyle communities, and so on, depending on the policy area). In spite 
of the fact that decision-making processes and networks involve individual actors, those 
who define issues and preferences and who actually exert power are collective actors. 
The participation of interest groups is a crucial feature in governance, so that governance 
                                                 
15 Benz and Papadopoulos (2006), p. 2. 
16 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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signified the rise of corporate actors.17 This public-private partnership, which is in 
horizontally and vertically networked structures, explains why global governance is not a 
project involving only governments or international organizations. It also calls for more 
state-organized multilateralism as well as more cooperation of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors from the local to the global level.18 Eventually, governance 
normally belongs to less formal modes of decision-making, within structures that are 
rarely visible to the public and that are not congruent with the official institutions of 
representative democracy causing sometimes democratic deficit.19 Given the complexity 
and meanings of governance, here it claims not to cover all topics of academic 
discussions but only attempts to reveal the potential for interdisciplinary relevance of 
ongoing debates on governance relating to the fields of research agenda within political 
science.   
 
 
1.3   Major Research Questions and Research Methodology 
 
The major research questions and research methodology used in this study are briefly 
mentioned as follows.  
 
• What are the strategies and tactics of integration in the EU and the ASEAN and 
how do they differ to reach their own destination?  
• Are there any effects to the relations between the EU and the ASEAN from the 
impact of the changing developments of European Governance? 
• Is the ASEAN becoming a regional community after its enlargement? How it will 
move forward to reach a success story of regional integration with its own planning of 
a regional community building efforts? 
• To which direction is the EU heading with its eastern enlargement and will the 
EU keep on growing without becoming obsolescent, meaningless and fragmented? 
• Will there be any kind of similar patterns in changing way and development of 
Governance in Southeast Asia?  
• What will be the future role of the regional organizations in world politics by 
examining the EU and the ASEAN?  
• What will be the future prospects of the regional organizations in the age of 
globalization? 
• How important is supranational institutionalism in contrast with 
intergovernmental support in promoting regional integration? 
• What kind of political system is the EU and how political processes in the EU 
function? How can integration and governance be defined in reflecting the present 
developments of the EU and the ASEAN? 
• At what point, and in what sequences, do the various phenomena associated with 
integration assert themselves to produce and transform various modes of governance 
in different parts of the world? For this peculiar question, the transformation and 
                                                 
17 Benz and Papadopoulos (2006), pp. 2-3. 
18 Nuscheler (2002), p. 161. 
19 Benz and Papadopoulos (2006), pp. 2-3. 
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development of EU and the ASEAN institutional structures and governance are taken 
into consideration. 
 
This is an empirical study, which is mainly based upon the analysis of two regional 
organizations: the EU and the ASEAN. This research will be performed by using the 
methods of quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis together to assess 
developments, successes, shortcomings and future prospects about the integration within 
and between two organizations. Henceforth the theories of integration and governance 
approaches will be applied to understand both organizations as a close interplay between 
theory and real developments after collecting data, facts and figures.  Content analysis of 
relevant literature and close examination of written materials will also be applied in its 
research methodology.  It will also include rational choice analysis to portray how 
choices are made between different possible courses of action depending on the rationales 
of the different actors. The research design will include the following elements: 
 
1. Categories of analysis consist of macro, meso and micro levels of observations in 
terms of regional integration, decision-making, policy processes, enlargement, 
institutional and structural changes of both organizations. 
2. Observations are made through primary and secondary literature sources as well 
as semi-structured interviews with some academic think-tanks and administrative 
staffs of both organizations to acquire some in-depth scope of political 
phenomena which are prevailing factors for regional cooperation and integration. 
3. Theories of integration, governance approaches and institutional analysis will be 
applied for thorough analysis of institutional developments so-called polity 
transformation in order to understand behaviour, variances and policy-making of 
two organizations. Empirical data will be wholly based on the work of primary 
sources and news reports concerning with the ASEAN and the EU. 
4. All findings and observations will be further developed into working hypotheses 
and propositions in building up a doctoral dissertation after reviewing the validity 
and generality of all facts and figures by testing and detesting. 
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1.4   Hypotheses and thematic outline of the comparative study 
 
 
Working hypotheses of this research agenda are as follows: 
 
 Changing mode of EU governance through its policy and policy-making structures 
emerges from the convergence of national governments’ preferences based on 
their own interests. By pooling sovereignty of member states through its sui 
generis EU polity, EU governance will continue to transform along the lines of 
supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy combining the elements of multilevel 
and network governance. 
 
 ASEAN still remains as a weakly institutionalized intergovernmental organization 
with limited capacity and effectiveness because of its member states’ 
overcautious preservation of their own interests and sovereignty. ASEAN’s most 
fundamental principle like the ASEAN Way actually hinder against implementation 
of an effective mode of regional governance and the creation of a strong regional 
community. 
 
  EU is moving toward further institutional changes in parallel with the increasing 
Europeanization of the institutional set up in the member states after its eastern 
enlargement. The interaction and exchanges between national and European 
institutions have become increasingly intensive and closely interconnected. 
National institutions of member states have to adapt their structures and 
procedures to be consistent with the activities at the EU level. 
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 Cooperation among European states has changed the system of state interaction 
and produced a new mode of governance that has partially eliminated state 
sovereignty. Integration occurs when sovereign states pursue their national 
interests by negotiating cooperative agreements and bargaining the maximum 
gains.  
 
 
 
The Thematic outlines of this comparative study have been structured in a brief form as 
follows. 
 
Chapter Outline   
 
Part ( I ): Introduction 
  
Part ( II ): Theories of regional integration and governance for the anatomy of the EU and 
                the ASEAN 
 
Part ( III ):  Governance in the European Union 
 
Part ( IV ): Governance in the ASEAN 
  
Part ( V ): Critical Review of the EU and the ASEAN : A Comparative Analysis.  
 
Part ( VI ): Bibliography. 
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II. Theories of Regional Integration and Governance for the anatomy 
of the EU and the ASEAN 
                                                                                              
International politics, like all forms of social life, involves a mixture of conflict and 
cooperation. In every relations of daily life, even with friends and family, actors both 
compete and cooperate. Usually in personal affairs the competitive elements are kept 
under control because it is so important to maintain the cooperative relationship. So do 
the states similarly in the international arena to avoid the unnecessary conflicts and 
situations of war. Since the end of the Cold War, scholars of international politics have 
searched for paradigms that can provide adequate and unique parameters about conflict 
and cooperation in global politics.20 According to some scholars, the everlasting struggle 
between rich and poor countries has become the dominant division in world politics, 
meaning that the old North-South cleavage has superseded the Cold War East-West 
division.21 Others argue that global conflict has become dominated by clashes between 
different civilizations of various parts of the world22 or that the dominant mode of 
conflict in global politics is between liberal democracies and non-democracies.23 Still 
others discern the rise of a counter-hegemonic bloc of states seeking to challenge the 
dominant power of the United States in the coming facets of international politics.24 
Some believe that realism is obsolete because its concepts of anarchy, self-help, and 
power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era since they have been 
displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas. New times call for new 
thinking. Changing conditions require revised theories or entirely different ones.25 
 
What kind of new theoretical changes or revision of old theories can distinctly reflect the 
international politics in the age of globalization? Obviously, conflicting and cooperating 
elements in the process of integration in parallel with globalization will be a prevailing 
phenomenon. So it is pivotal to the study of international politics for the identification 
and analysis of forces that contribute to the formation and integration of political 
communities.26 For better understanding of world politics at the beginning of new 
millennium, a thorough and careful study of integration theory should be revisited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Erik Voeten. (2000): Clashes in the Assembly, in: International Organization 54(2), p.185. 
21 Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett. (1996): The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations 
General Assembly, in: International Organization 50(4), pp.629-652.                                             
22 Samuel P. Huntington. (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in: Foreign 
Affaris 72(3), pp.22-49.                                       
23 Francis Fukuyama. (1992): The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, p.xi.    
24 Samuel P. Huntington. (1999): The Lonely Superpower, in: Foreign Affairs 78(2), pp.35-49. 
25 Kenneth N. Waltz. (2000): Structural Realism after the Cold War, in: International Security 25(1), p.5. 
26 James E. a Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (1990): Contending Theories of International 
Relations, A Comprehensive survey, Third Edition, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., P.431.                                                                                 
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2.1 Various Approaches and Definitions of Regional Integration 
 
Central to the development of integration theory, it is not sufficiently advanced that there 
exists either a commonly accepted definition of integration or general agreement on the 
relevant indicators of integration.27 There are also some academic controversies, and even 
different schools of thought, regarding the preferred methods and approaches to 
integration.28 Some scholars denote integration as a process toward political unity and 
economic prosperity among separate identities of the world while a few mentions as a 
condition or end product, which is resulted from the development of functional 
organizations. Before examining more details about integration, it is necessary to clarify 
some twin words such as cooperation, globalization, interdependence and amalgamation, 
which are comparatively used in related to the basic term integration.                                                                                   
       
First of all, cooperation is an interaction, where the problem lies not only in the 
identification of common goals and the methods of reaching them, but also in the 
achievement of these goals. This interaction, in which no conflict is involved, does not, 
properly speaking, come into the ambit of politics, which centres on conflict and power, 
but rather into that of administration. But administration is not only the outcome of 
successful politics but also offers a method of resolving conflict situations, especially 
when they are not really acute.29 Interaction of nation-states combines both antagonism 
and community of interests. This means that conflict is never fully separated from 
cooperation nor cooperation from conflict. Indeed, different periods of history combine 
the two in varying measures, and the difference between the states of peace and war lies 
merely in the degree to which one of these elements predominates.30 
       
Concerning with globalization, while it is thus evident that there can be no easy and 
uncontested definition of ‘globalization’, it is nevertheless possible to identify some of 
the major empirical processes and transformations, which are seen as manifestations of 
this new ‘age of globalization’. Arguably, a reference to ‘globalization’ contains the 
assumption that there has occurred an increase in the density of contacts between 
locations worldwide; that daily life is structured in such a way that social interactions are 
embedded in global networks; and that ‘local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa’.31 In an era of ever-increasing global 
interconnectedness of people, places, capital, goods and services, it is not sufficient, 
however, to define globalization only in terms of an increase in the density of contacts 
between locations worldwide; it must also be emphasized that many of those connections 
have become almost instantaneous.32 Since ‘in the globalized world of today people can 
                                                 
27 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. (1990): Contending Theories, pp.454-455. 
28 Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, (1978): “Introduction to International Relations: Power 
and Justice”, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., p.282. 
29 Joseph Frankel. (1988): “International Relations in a Changing World”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.108-109. 
30 Ibid., p.154.  
31 Anthony Giddens. (1990): “The Consequences of Modernity”, Cambridge, Polity Press,   p.64. 
32 Roland Axtmann. (1998) : “Globalization, Europe and the State: Introductory Reflections”, in : Roland 
Axtmann (ed.) : “Globalization and Europe, Theoretical and Empirical Investigations”, London, Pinter, pp.   
2-5. 
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by various means relate with one another irrespective of their longitudinal and latitudinal 
position, as it were on a “supraterritorial” plane’33, the definition of globalization as ‘a 
social process in which constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements 
recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding’ should be 
acceptable.34 
 
‘Interdependence’ is a term that has been intermittently in vogue for over a century. In 
contemporary usage it originated as a concept in economics, where it had a comparatively 
clear meaning, according to which two economies were interdependent when there was a 
rough equality of power between them and when their mutual interaction was such as to 
make each significantly vulnerable to actions by the other. Interconnection produced 
vulnerability and hence acted to restrain what others might do. In its classical form, this 
was indeed the idea that increasing trade between nations would strengthen peace, an idea 
common prior to the First World War but often heard since.35 Global interdependence lies 
at the heart of the internationalization of domestic politics. It poses a singular threat to the 
existence of nation-state. Interdependence expands the range of global issues while 
making their management more difficult, as mutual vulnerabilities reduce states’ 
autonomy and curtail their control of their own destinies.36  
       
Interdependence in world politics is sometimes seen as a cause of war and sometimes as a 
condition of peace.37 From one perspective, global interdependence may draw the 
world’s diverse components together in pursuit of mutual survival and welfare. 
Awareness of the common destiny of all, alongside the inability of sovereign states to 
address many shared problems through unilateral national action, may energize efforts to 
put aside national competition. Conflict will recede, according to this reasoning, as few 
states can afford to disentangle themselves from the interdependent ties that bind them 
together in the common fate on which their welfare depends. From another, more 
pessimistic perspective, interdependence will not lead to transnational collaboration, 
regardless of how compelling the need or how rewarding the benefits may be. Instead, 
contact and mutual dependence will breed conflict. Under conditions of fierce 
competition and resurgent nationalism, the temptation to seek isolation from foreign 
economic dependence by creating barriers to trade and other transactions may be 
irresistible. It may also be the temptation to use force.38  
       
Interdependence can be defined as a condition of mutual dependence among several 
persons or groups. It describes a social relationship that may have been formed casually, 
in the sense that no one planned for it to come about; it is probably the product of 
                                                 
33 Jan Aart Scholte (1996) : “Beyond the buzzword: towards a critical theory of globalization”, in : E. 
Kofman and G. Youngs (ed:) : “Globalization: Theory and Practice”, London, Pinter, p.45.   
34 Malcolm Waters. (1995): “Globalization”, London, Routledge, p.3.  
35 Fred Halliday. (1994): “Rethinking International Relations”, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, p.14. 
36 Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (1995): “World Politics, Trends and Transformations”, 
New York, St. Martin’s Press, pp.552-553. 
37 Jaap de Wilde. (1991): “Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence theory in the First Half of the 20th 
Century, A study on the causality between war and complex interdependence”, Aldershot, Hampshire, 
Dartmouth, p.1.  
38 Kegley and Wittkopf (1995): World Politics, p.553.  
  
 
14
unreasoned social and economic forces that no one controls. Moreover, those in large-
scale interdependent relationships may be only dimly conscious of that fact, knowing 
little or nothing about the individuals or groups with whom they are connected. They may 
or may not benefit materially from this connection, and so they may or may not find it to 
their liking. Since interdependence may actually encourage conflict, it is not clearly a 
prerequisite condition for peace.39 But conflicts under interdependence are characterized 
by all kind of constraints, and these constraints may stimulate more sophisticated forms 
of conflict management than the primitive killing or mutilating of people or the threat to 
destroy parts of their civilization.40 In generally speaking about integration, it is the 
usually purposeful process whereby two or more states merge their economic, social, and 
political systems to the point that they constitute a single community. An integrated 
community may be achieved, in the sense that its members generally can expect conflicts 
to be resolved peaceably among them, without the formal amalgamation of unified 
institutions of government.41 Integration implies a more conscious mixing of individuals 
and groups that have been separated. It also may not be a planned, rational process, but 
those affected almost certainly are aware of it, either approving or opposing this new mix 
of peoples in accordance with their own perceived interests.42 
       
Amalgamation is used to mean the formal joining of separate political groups through 
conscious governmental choice. It may or may not express the wishes of the majority of 
those joined together, but the end result is a new political entity that, in the terms of 
subject matter, constitutes a “sovereign” state. Historical examples abound: Texas was 
separated from Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century and, shortly thereafter, 
amalgamated into the United States. From 1958 to 1968, Egypt and Syria were 
amalgamated in a state called the United Arab Republic, but which, after Syria’s 
withdrawal, became two independent states again.43  
       
According to the above mentioned connotations, these processes or conditions namely 
cooperation, globalization, interdependence, integration, and amalgamation of peoples or 
nation-states are not only conceptually synonymous; but also they are simultaneously 
applied in a developmental way in the contemporary political, economic and social facets 
of the world. Cooperation encourages the process of globalization in its own essence of 
removing some forms of conflict. Interdependence describes a condition in world politics 
today, one that presents both positive opportunities and also negative prospects for 
human beings. But it should be acknowledged that the advantages of interdependence 
outweigh the disadvantages. On the other hand, integration and amalgamation are 
processes supported by at least some political actors. Integration may or may not lead to 
amalgamation of separate sovereign states. Conversely, amalgamation does not 
necessarily either reflect or help induce true social integration.44 
 
                                                 
39 Lloyd Jensen and Lynn H. Miller.  (1997): “Global Challenge, Change and Continuity in World Politics”, 
New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, p.332. 
40 Wilde ( 1991 ) : Saved from Oblivion, p.2. 
41 Jensen / Miller ( 1997 ) : Global Challenge,  p.430.  
42 Ibid., p.332. 
43 Ibid., p.332.  
44 Ibid., p.333. 
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2.1.1 Regionalist Approach 
 
Regionalist approach to integration based on the concept that nations situated in a 
homogeneous geographical area of sharing common concerns and interests can cooperate 
with each other through a limited membership organization to meet military, political, 
economic and functional problems. This concept provides a middle-level approach to 
problem solving, between the extremes of unilateralism and universalism.45 Regional 
cooperation through integration process to promote the wealth/welfare dimension has 
been one of the most distinctive features of macropolitics, and the UN system has been 
permissive.46 The United Nations Charter encourages regional integration as 
complementary to the world organization’s objectives and activities, but also provides 
that all regional actions must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations particularly to maintain world peace and security.47  
       
The proponents of the regionalist approach to peace usually argue that regional 
integration is a half way house between international anarchy (today’s reality) and world 
integration (tomorrow’s dream). They argue that the relative cultural, economic, political, 
and geographic affinity within a region lends itself to more effective organization. 
Moreover, nation-states participating in schemes of regional integration can organize – 
politically and economically – in continent-sized operations, thus minimizing the erosive 
influence of the superpowers. Functionally oriented regionalists concede that integration 
works better in the economic sectors of societies but are convinced that with time, 
patience, and wisdom economic cooperation will spill over into the political sectors.48 
Regionalism, however, is a hybrid, which may stay within the bounds of the existing state 
structure or become the embryo for a new state system. Region is a geographical concept 
and the doctrine of regionalism implies that geographical variables are a prime influence 
on behaviour. While the notion of region may be helpful in individual dimensions, it does 
not appear to be the great organizing principle when considering multidimensional 
phenomena.49 
       
One can group countries into regions according to a number of criteria – for example, 
language, religion, culture, population density, and climate. There are some the most 
commonly used criteria for denoting integration of units or nation-states into a region. 
They are as follows:50 
(1) Geographical criteria: grouping nation-states on the basis of their location in 
continents, subcontinents, archipelagos, etc. – for instance, Europe and Asia. 
(2) Military/political criteria: grouping nation-states on the basis of their 
participation in alliances, or on the basis of ideological and political orientation – 
                                                 
45 Plano, Jack C. and Roy Olton. (eds.) (1988): “The International Relations Dictionary”, Fourth Edition, 
Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Inc., p.309. 
46 Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham (1992): “The Dictionary of World Politics, A Reference Guide to 
Concepts, Ideas and Institutions”, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.282. 
47 Plano and Olton (1988): The International Relations Dictionary, p.309. 
48 Couloumbis and Wolfe (1978): Introduction to International Relations, pp.294-295. 
49 Olson, William C. and A. J. R. Groom. (1991): “International Relations then and now, Origins and trends 
in interpretation”, London, Harper Collins Academic, p.173. 
50 Couloumbis and Wolfe (1978): Introduction to International Relations, p.284. 
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for instance, the communist bloc, the capitalist bloc, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, 
and the Third World. 
(3) Economic criteria: grouping nation-states on the basis of selected criteria of 
economic development, such as gross national product and industrial output – for 
instance, industrialized versus transitional versus less-developed states. 
(4) Transactional criteria: grouping nation-states on the basis of volume and 
frequency of exchange of people, goods, and services, such as immigrants, 
tourists, trade, and messages – for instance, the United States and Canada, the 
Western European market area, and etc.               
       
Bruce M. Russett analysed and focused attention on the study of regions for the potential 
of regional integration and gave classification of regions as:(a) regions of social and 
cultural homogeneity, (b) regions of states that share similar political attitudes or external 
behaviour as identified by the voting patterns of governments in the United Nations, (c) 
regions of political interdependence where countries are joined together by a network of 
supranational or intergovernmental political institutions, (d) regions of economic 
interdependence as identified by intra-regional trade as a proportion of a state’s national 
income, and (e) regions of geographical proximity. Such analysis may contribute to the 
identification of those areas of the world where the potential for further integration is 
great, as well as areas with little prospect for further integration.51 
       
The prolific growth of limited-member organizations since the end of the Second World 
War has stemmed from a new emphasis placed on regional integration as a means for 
achieving national interest goals. However, the role of regional alliances has been the 
most controversial during this period, superimposing several balance of power systems 
upon the collective security approach of the United Nations. Observers differ as to 
whether military groups have added to the threat of war or contributed to the maintenance 
of peace and security. Functional organizations have received the most support and have 
been the least controversial outgrowths of regionalism, although increasing trade 
discrimination by rival groups could reverse the trend toward freer world trade. 
Psychologically, individuals are more likely to give their support to integrated 
organizations of their respective regions than to a distant world organization. Regional 
integration may prove to be a “gradualist” approach to the building of international 
communities and political federations beyond the nation-state.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990): Contending Theories, p.448. 
52 Plano and Olton (1988): The International Relations Dictionary, p.310. 
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2.1.2 Realist Approach 
 
Realist approach has its intellectual roots that can be traced back to the ancient world53 
together with its manifestations extending into, and perhaps beyond, the contemporary 
world. Any discussion of realist theory in its totality would not be adequate without an 
examination of endeavors to reinterpret and revise it in light of new circumstances of the 
current world while maintaining its enduring elements and theoretical assumptions. 
Therefore, this part of chapter will only portray abridged in form of core propositions of 
realist theoretical approach to international politics. Among the antecedents of realist 
theory is the work of Max Weber, whose writings concerned broadly not only with the 
nature of politics and the state, but also with power as central to politics. Although the 
richness of Weber’s political thought cannot be encompassed in a short description, it 
could not be wrong to suggest that, with respect to realist theory, many of the 
formulations contained in his work shaped subsequent generations in their scholarly 
writings. For Weber, as for later realists, the important characteristic of politics is a 
struggle for power. The power element of political life is especially visible at the 
international level because every political structure naturally prefers to have weak rather 
than strong neighbours. Moreover, as every huge political community is a potential 
aspirant to prestige, it is also a potential threat to all its neighbours; therefore, the huge 
political community is latently and constantly endangered simply because it is big and 
strong. According to Weber, among the dimensions of politics as a struggle for power is 
that of economics. In Weber’s thought, economic policy stands in a subordinate 
relationship to politics, because of the fact that the power political interests of nations 
encompass an economic struggle for existence.54    
       
No twentieth-century academic writer has had a greater impact on the development of 
realist theory than Hans J. Morgenthau. He developed many realist concepts such as 
power, rationally determined national interest, balance of power, and the management of 
power in an anarchic world. Morgenthau suggested that political relationships are 
governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature. Because these rules are 
impervious to people’s preferences, they can be challenged only at the risk of failure.55 
Morgenthau posited that political leaders ‘think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power’ and that historical evidence proves this assumption correct. This concept “interest 
defined as power’ is central to Morgenthau’s realist theory provides to evaluate actions of 
political leaders at different points in history depending on their diverse foreign policies 
of widely separated nation-states. In his point of view, international politics is a process 
in which national interests are accommodated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or 
war.56 According to Morgenthau, the concept of the national interest presuppose neither a 
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naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the 
pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it assumes 
continuous conflict and threat of war to be minimized through the continuous adjustment 
of conflicting interests by diplomatic actions.57 
       
Morgenthau explained that the meaning of interest defined as power is not easily 
determined. However, he argued that survival constitutes the minimum goal of foreign 
policy and the core national interest in a world in which sovereign nations compete for 
power feloniously. All nations are compelled to protect their territorial integrity, physical 
gains, political institutions and cultural identity against impingements by other nations. 
Therefore, national interest is identified with national survival in this way. As long as the 
world is divided into nations in an anarchic global setting, Morgenthau asserted, the 
national interest is indeed the last and ultimate word in world politics. Interest, then, is 
the essence of politics, which is defined as a struggle for power.58 
       
As applied to twentieth-century world politics, realism views nation-states as the 
principal actors in international politics, for they are not accountable to any higher 
political authority. Furthermore, conflicts of interests among them are assumed to be 
inevitable. Realism also emphasizes the way the perceived realities of world politics 
dictate the choices that foreign policy makers, as rational problem solvers of nation-
states, must ultimately make. States are the superordinate actors on the stage of the world. 
That purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment of anarchical 
world. Major argument is that no means is more important to that end than the acquisition 
of power. And no principle is more important than self-reliance – the ultimate 
dependence of the state on its own resources to promote its interests and protect itself. 
State sovereignty, a cornerstone of international law, encloses this perspective, providing 
heads of states and governments the freedom – and responsibility – to do whatever is 
necessary to advance the state’s interests and survival. According to classical realist 
belief, respect for moral principles is a wasteful and dangerous interference in the rational 
pursuit of national power.59 
       
To many realists, therefore, questions about the relative virtues of the values within this 
or that ism (ideological system) cannot be permitted to interfere with meaningful sense of 
policy-making. Hence, the ideological preferences of states are neither good nor bad; 
what matters most is whether one’s self-interest is served. Accordingly, the game of 
international politics takes place under conditions of permanent anarchy and revolves 
around the pursuit of power: acquiring, increasing, projecting, and utilizing it to bend 
others to one’s will. Not to be too long and oversimplified, the major message of realist 
approach to international politics can be summarized in the following ten assumptions 
and related propositions60: 
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1. A reading of world history teaches that people are by nature sinful and wicked. 
2. Among all of people’s evil ways, no sins are more prevalent, inexorable, or 
dangerous than are their instinctive lust for power and their desire to dominate 
others.  
3. The possibility of eradicating the instinct for power is just idealistic and utopian 
aspiration. 
4. Under such conditions international politics is, as the English sixteenth century 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes labelled it, a struggle for power, “a war of all 
against all.” 
5. The primary obligation of every nation-state in this world environment – the 
goal to which all other national objectives should be subordinated – is to 
promote the “national interest”, defined as the acquisition of power. 
6. The anarchical nature of the international system necessitates the acquisition of 
military capabilities for sufficient self-defence to deter attack by potential 
enemies.  
7. Economics is less relevant to national security than military might and is 
important primarily using as a means to acquiring national power and prestige. 
8. Allies might increase the ability of a state to defend itself, but their loyalty and 
reliability should not be assumed and taken for granted. 
9. Nation-states should never entrust the task of self-protection to international 
organizations or to international law. 
10. If all nation-states seek to maximize power, stability will result from 
maintaining a balance of power that is in turn created by continuous alliance 
groupings. 
       
The realist approach has undergone something of a revival in the past decades with the 
onset of neorealist work. It is mainly associated with Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics.61 For Waltz, the international system is better characterized by 
anarchy instead of hierarchy. Because it is composed of units that are formally and 
functionally equal states and the key variable is the distribution of capabilities across 
these units in a given international system. Therefore, state behaviour will vary with this 
distribution of capabilities so that structural change will alter patterns of conflict and 
cooperation. Anarchy could produce order, but it inhibits effective and long-standing 
cooperation amongst states because of the essentially competitive and rational nature of 
the interstate game. In other words, states (units) survival is always in prior question. 
Rational states realize this, and so seek to maximize the possibilities for their survival. 
This is not to say that cooperation never happens. The emergence of alliances and forms 
of cooperation is a well-established rational means to the end of survival and the nature 
of this balancing behaviour is consistent and bound up with the issue of relative 
capabilities. The interests and actions of the most powerful states constitute the nature of 
the system and any alteration in this distribution of capabilities is possibly to induce 
changes in unit behaviour.62 
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Waltz wrote that being unable to conceive of international politics as self-sustaining 
system, realists concentrate the behaviour and outcomes of that seem to follow from the 
characteristics they have attributed to men and states. Neorealists, on the other hand, 
rather than viewing power as an end in itself, see power as a possibly useful means, with 
states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. Weakness might invite 
an attack that greater power would dissuade an adversary from launching such attack. 
Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their armaments and pool their 
efforts for better defence. Power is a certainly useful means, and sensible statesmen 
attempt to have an appropriate amount of it. In crucial situations, however, the ultimate 
concern of nation-states is not only for the attainment of power but also for the guarantee 
of security that becomes an important revision of realist theory.63 
 
2.1.3 Federalist Approach 
 
The federalist school of thought conceives of integration in legal and institutional terms 
to reach the destination of global government. For federalist scholars, integration is an 
end product rather than a process. It stands for a political union among previously 
sovereign and independent territories, such as was formed in the United States and 
Switzerland.64 In federalism the stress is upon a constitutional instrument setting out the 
relationship and competence of the federal and local bodies within a defined territorial 
area. It is appropriate for units with cleavages such as language, religion or ethnicity, 
which nevertheless wish to establish or maintain an element of political unity.65 World 
federalists recommend the adoption of federalism on both a regional and a global scale, 
and they consider the anarchic nation-state system to be primarily responsible for war. 
They discount arguments that federalism on a global scale is impractical and utopian. 
They feel that with a reasonable amount of discussion and education, enough people will 
be convinced that a rational plan for the regulation and governance of humankind should 
be adopted. Transition to a mutually acceptable model of federalism, according to 
federalist scholars, should follow a large-scale world conference similar to the one that 
gave birth to the United Nations.66 
       
World federalism represents a frontal attack on the nation-state by proposing to replace it 
with some central authority. Federalists follow Albert Einstein’s conviction that “there is 
no salvation for civilization, or even the human race, other than the creation of a world 
government.” If people value survival more highly than relative national advantage, as 
federalists argue, they will willingly transfer their loyalty to a supranational authority to 
dismantle the multistate system that produces war and threatens to annihilate the human 
species. “World government,” world federalists believe, “is not only possible, it is 
inevitable because it appeals to the patriotism of men who love their national heritages so 
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deeply that they wish to preserve them in safety for the common good”. It is not 
surprising that ardent nationalists have vociferously attacked the revolutionary federalist 
“top-down” peace plan since it was first advocated. Because the plan seeks to subvert the 
nation-state system, it threatens many entrenched interests. Likewise, they challenge the 
assumption that “necessity” will lead to global institutional innovation, for the need for 
something will automatically bring it into existence. Although still actively promoted by 
the United World Federalists (an international nongovernmental pressure group), 
aversion to war and raised consciousness of its dangers have not mobilized widespread 
grass-roots enthusiasm for a world government. Other approaches to reforming the world 
political system have attracted more adherents.67 In the study of international relations, 
therefore, proponents of world government have often seen in the monopolization of 
power at the international level the key to the reduction of violence, and political realists 
have argued that world government is not possible without the development of far greater 
consensus at the global level about the scope, purpose, and control of such an 
international order than has existed in this or preceding centuries.68 
 
2.1.4 Functionalist School of Thought 
 
The concept of functionalism has a great influence upon the succeeding generation in the 
study of integration theory. Functionalism is a theory of international organization and 
can be characterized as an issue-specific approach to politics. The idea is to deal with 
social problems by looking first at their so-called technical aspects. The purpose of this is 
to sidestep the obstacles formed by nationalistic ideologies and by anachronistic 
governmental mechanisms. Functionalism is a reaction to the emergence of global 
interdependence, and its emphasis on the technical management of issues is an attempt to 
go beyond political boundaries and divisions without disputing them.69 
       
Central to functionalism is the work of David Mitrany, whose writings greatly influenced 
subsequent integration theorists. Mitrany wrote during the years between the two world 
wars, as well as in the generation following World War II. He suggested that the growing 
complexity of governmental systems had increased greatly the essentially technical, non-
political tasks facing governments. Such tasks not only created a demand for highly 
trained specialists at the national level, but also contributed to the emergence of 
essentially technical problems at the international level, whose solution lies in 
collaboration among technicians, rather than political elites. The growth in importance of 
technical issues in the twentieth century is said to have made necessary the creation of 
frameworks for international cooperation. Such functional organizations could be 
expected to expand both in their numbers and in scope as the technical problems 
confronting humankind grew in both immensity and magnitude. As a result, 
organizations for functional collaboration might eventually supersede, or make 
superfluous, the political institutions of the past.70 
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The functionalist strategy urges the development of piecemeal non-political cooperative 
organizations, which are established most effectively at the regional geographical level 
and in the economic, technical, scientific, social, and cultural sectors. These sectors are 
referred to collectively as functional sectors. The functionalists assume that it is easier to 
establish narrow-in-scope functional organizations ( in sectors such as energy production 
and distribution, transportation and communications control, health protection and 
improvement, labour standards and exchanges, and custom unions ) than to try to develop 
grandiose political institutions that jeopardize the national sovereignty of member-states. 
Governments find it difficult to oppose the growth of functional organizations since these 
non-political bodies are mutually advantageous for the participating states and do not 
appear to constrict national sovereignty.71   
       
In Mitrany’s theory there is a doctrine of “ramification,” whereby the development of 
collaboration in one technical field leads to comparable behaviour in other technical 
fields. Functional collaboration in one sector generates a felt need for functional 
collaboration in another sector. The effort to create a common market, for example, gives 
rise to pressure for further collaboration on pricing, investment, transport, insurance, tax, 
wage, social security, banking, and monetary policies. Mitrany assumed that functional 
activity could reorient inter-national activity and contribute to world peace. Eventually 
such collaboration would encroach upon, and even absorb, the political sector. Hence, 
functionalism contrasts sharply with realist theory, which places emphasis upon 
competition and conflict as a principal, if not the dominant, feature of international 
politics.72 In contrast, functionalism begins by questioning the assumption that the state is 
irreducible and that the interests of governments prevail, and proceed to the active 
consideration of schemes for cooperation; it is peace-oriented and seeks to avoid a win-
lose stalemate framework.73 
       
On this reason, the most insightful critics of the security/conflict conception of inter-
national politics should be referred to as functionalists’ approach to integration.74 When 
the integration of states is looked upon as the ultimate solution of the war-problem, 
functionalism can be regarded as the best strategy to achieve that solution.75 
Functionalism has been presented as an operative philosophy that would gradually lead to 
a peaceful, unified, and cooperative world. The functionalists begin their argument with 
the assumption that wars are the product of a crudely organized international system. This 
system, they maintain, is founded on suspicion and anarchy and considers war an 
accepted means of settling thorny international disputes. Sovereignty, national 
exclusivism, and others forms of arbitrary fragmentation of the globe are viewed by the 
functionalists as an anachronistic and dangerous heritage of the pre-industrial age. They 
grant that governments have vested interests and that nation-states will not be dismantled 
voluntarily. Hence, they advocate a gradual approach toward regional or global unity, an 
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approach designed to isolate and eventually render obsolete the stubborn but inadequate 
institutional structures called nation-states. Functionalists, as a matter of strategy, tend to 
emphasize cooperative aspects of international behaviour and sidestep conflictive aspects. 
They look at the globe in terms of the politics of cooperation and reason rather than the 
politics of conflict and irrationality. Gradually, they hope, with the accumulation of a 
large variety of functional organization linking people and their interests across national 
boundaries, a transformation in both national attitudes and institutions will take place.76 
Ultimately, this strategy will strive a normative end for the creation of a “working peace 
system” in which nation-states coexist and interact peacefully for multilateral interests as 
Mitrany emphasized “the historical task of our times is not to keep the nations peacefully 
apart but to bring them actively together”.77 
 
2.1.5 Transactional Communication Approach 
 
The communications approach to integration theory was utilized by Karl W. Deutsch and 
his associates. Deutsch refers to political integration as a process that may lead to a 
condition in which a group of people has “attained within a territory a sense of 
community and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for a long time, 
dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population.” He suggests that 
“integration is a matter of fact, not of time.”78 He also maintains that political integration 
can be compared to power, for we recall that power can be thought of as a relationship in 
which at least one actor is made to act differently from the way that actor would act 
otherwise (i.e., if this power were absent).79 At this point, Deutsch carefully analysed the 
connection between the process of integration and power with the mutual 
interdependence of nation-states.  
       
The study of Deutsch and his group is mainly concerned with the relationship between 
communications and the integration of political communities. They believed that 
communication is the cement that makes organizations. Communications among people 
can produce either friendship or hostility depending upon the extent to which the 
memories of communications are associated with more or less favourable emotions. 
Nevertheless, in Deutsch’s scheme political systems endure as a result of their ability to 
abstract and code incoming information into appropriate symbols, to store coded 
symbols, to disassociate certain important information from the rest, to recall stored 
information when needed, and to recombine stored information entered as an input into 
the system. The building of political units depends upon the flow of communications 
within the units as well as between the unit and the outside world.80 Communications 
approach seeks to measure the process of integration by watching the flow of 
international transactions, such as trade, tourists, letters, and immigrants. It expects, 
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further, that such transactions will eventually lead to the development of “security 
communities” or integrated socio-political systems.81 
       
Deutsch’s major substantive contribution to integration theory is found in his work on the 
conditions for political community in the North Atlantic area. Research and analysis 
undertaken in this work yielded several important conclusions about conditions for 
forming of security communities. Deutsch and his associates set forth two kinds of 
security communities: amalgamated, in which previously independent political units have 
formed a single unit with a common government; and pluralistic, in which separate 
governments retain legal independence.82 Both are characterized by the absence of intra-
community wars. The United States is a good example of an amalgamated security 
community for it has a single federal government exercising central political control over 
a continent-sized region. Pluralistic security communities, on the other hand, have no 
central political authority, but the national units that make up these communities do not 
expect to fight one another and thus do not fortify their borders. Pluralistic security 
communities are usually larger areas, such as the North American continent and Western 
Europe.83  
       
For as a political community becomes more fully amalgamated, its constituent political 
units cease to be sovereign states, or even states at all, and political relations among them 
turn into domestic politics involving merely different provinces, countries, or peoples.84 
A number of conditions, however, appear to be essential for the successful establishment 
of amalgamated security communities: (1) the main values held by the politically relevant 
strata in all the participating units should be compatible. Sometimes this compatibility 
includes a tacit agreement to prevent other incompatible values from acquiring political 
significance; (2) a distinctive way of life, that is, a set of socially accepted values and of 
institutional means for their pursuit and attainment; (3) an increase in the political and 
administrative capabilities of the main political units to be amalgamated; (4) superior 
economic growth, compared to the recent past of the territories to be amalgamated or 
compared to neighbouring areas; (5) expectations of joint economic rewards and of 
strong economic ties as a result of amalgamation; (6) free mobility of persons prior to, or 
concurrent with, amalgamation; (7) a multiplicity of communications and transactions; 
(8) a broadening of the political elite in the course of the amalgamation movement. An 
example of this necessity can be the shift in leadership in Prussia from nobles like von 
Manteuffel, who was unwilling to work with the middle classes, to someone like 
Bismarck, who retained the respect of his fellow aristocrats but also knew how to attract 
and keep middle class support; (9) there must be particular groups or institutions that 
form unbroken links of communication between several social strata within one unit and 
between some of the politically relevant strata in several of the units. An example of 
unbroken links of social communication would be the German financial and industrial 
                                                 
81 Couloumbis and Wolfe (1978): Introduction to International Relations, p.283. 
82 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990): Contending Theories, pp.435-436. 
83 Karl W. Deutsch (1979): “Tides among Nations”, New York, The Free Press, p.283. 
84 Ibid., p.182. 
  
 
25
community that came to link major interests in the Rhineland, Berlin, Darmstadt, Leipzig, 
and other German centres and states during the 1850s and 1860s.85 
       
For the formation of pluralistic security communities three conditions were found 
essential: (1) compatibility of values among decision-makers, (2) mutual predictability of 
behaviour among decision-makers of units to be integrated, and (3) mutual 
responsiveness. Governments must be able to respond quickly, without resort to violence, 
to the actions and communications of other governments. There are some factors which 
can also lead to the disintegration of amalgamated political communities. These 
conditions appear equally effective regardless of whether they occur in large or in small 
political units within the political community. These are: (1) excessive military 
commitments; (2) an increase in political participation on the part of a previously passive 
group; (3) the growth of ethnic or linguistic differentiation; (4) prolonged economic 
decline or stagnation; (5) relative closure of political elites; (6) excessive delay in social, 
economic, or political reforms; and (7) failure of a formerly privileged group to adjust to 
its loss of dominance.86  
       
In Deutsch’s conception the integrative process is not unilinear in nature. The essential 
background conditions do not come into existence simultaneously, nor are they 
established in any special sequence. “Rather it appears to us from our cases that they may 
be assembled in almost any sequence, so long as all of them come into being and take 
effect.”87 According to him, pluralistic security communities have succeeded repeatedly 
where amalgamated communities failed. Requiring far less stringent conditions for 
success, pluralistic political communities thus seem to offer a particularly promising 
pathway toward the establishment of widening areas of peace and security in 
contemporary world.88 Therefore, for the communications school of thought, integration 
can be seen both as a process leading toward political unification and as the end product 
of that process like amalgamated and pluralistic security communities.89 
 
2.1.6 Neofunctionalist Approach 
  
Although neo-functionalism is often regarded as the latter descendant from the preceding 
hypotheses of functionalism, it also represents to question, review and refine 
inadequacies and limitations of the older one as well as to generate some more accurate 
conception about integration. Neo-functionalists envisage the outgrowth of integration 
not only as a process but also as a final outcome. They doubted the functionalist 
assumption of the ever-growing technical collaboration in all sectors could later bring 
about the peaceful solutions of political and economic disputes. Neo-functionalists’ 
contributions include the writings about the development of European institutions like 
those of Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg as well as those of Joseph Nye who analysed not 
only the Western European integration but also that of other regions of the world. 
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Ernst Haas defines integration as a process “whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities 
toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states.”90 He conceives of a process of integration in which states cease 
to be wholly sovereign and so mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours as to lose the 
actual attributes of sovereignty.91 Haas postulates that the decision to proceed with 
integration, or to oppose it, depends upon the expectations of gain or loss held by major 
groups within the unit to be integrated. So the values and interests of participants in the 
process of integration are far more important than the idealistic intentions of the process 
itself.92                        
       
Haas assumes that integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in the 
governmental and private sectors, who support integration for essentially pragmatic 
rather than altruistic reasons. Elites having expectations of gain from activity within a 
supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out similarly minded elites 
across national frontiers. Haas attempts to refine functionalist theory about integration. 
Criticizing Mitrany for having taken insufficient account of the “power” element, Haas 
argued that power is not separable from welfare. He advances the proposition that 
“functionally specific international programs, or organizationally separated from diffuse 
orientations, maximize both welfare and integration.” Such programs give rise to 
organizations whose “powers and competences gradually grow in line with the expansion 
of the conscious task, or in proportion to the development of unintended consequences 
arising from earlier task conceptions.”93 
       
Central to Haa’s work is the concept of spill-over, or what Mitrany called the doctrine of 
ramification. This is the concept similar to the demonstration effect, which is applied in 
economics. In his examination of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Haas 
found that among European elites directly concerned with coal and steel, relatively few 
persons were initially strong supporters of the ECSC. Only after the ECSC had been in 
operation for several years did the bulk of leaders in trade unions and political parties 
become proponents of the Community. Moreover such groups, as a result of gains that 
they experienced from the ECSC, placed themselves in the vanguard of other efforts for 
European integration, including the Common Market. Thus there was a marked tendency 
for persons who had experienced gains from supranational institutions in one sector to 
favour integration in other sectors.94   
       
In a study of the International Labour Organization, Haas developed a model to which an 
international organization can transcend national boundaries and thus transform the 
international system. Governmental policies, the product of the interaction of national 
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actors and their environment, constitute inputs into the international system. The 
organizations and accepted body of law form the structure of the international system. 
The structures receive inputs and convert them from tasks into actions. Collective 
decisions are the outputs of the international system. Such outputs may change the 
international environment in such a way as to produce either integrative or disintegrative 
tendencies within the international system. If the weak structures of the international 
system are inadequate to the tasks given them, their outputs enter an international 
environment in which national actors are predisposed either to strengthen or to weaken 
institutions for collaborative action at the international level. In either eventuality, the 
purposes (defined as consciously willed action patterns) of the actors are likely to 
produce new functions (defined as the results of actions that may bring unintended 
consequences). Purposes and functions may transform the international system by (1) 
producing a form of learning that enhances the original purposes of the actors and thus 
leads to integration; and (2) resulting in a learning experience that contributes to a 
reevaluation of purposes and thus leads to disintegration. In summary, although Haas has 
developed an integration framework that embodies features of systems theory and 
functionalism, he has sought to point up some of the major limitations as well as the 
potential utility of functionalism in explaining integration at the international level. 
Therefore, in addition to his own work on international organizations and integration, 
Haas provided a critique and elaboration of functionalism.95    
       
Making use of Haa’s definition, Leon N. Lindberg, one of the distinguished scholars of 
neo-functionalism, in his work on the European Community, defines integration as “(1) 
the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key 
domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or 
to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their 
expectations and political activities to a new centre.” Subsequently, Lindberg viewed 
political integration as part of a broader process of international integration in which 
“larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence, and 
in which there is “joint participation in regularized, ongoing decision-making,” as a 
result, or as part of “the evolution over time of a collective decision-making system 
among nations.”96 The level of collective decision-making – of integration – at any 
specific time is the product of the past decisions of the system, a system within which 
decisions are made.97 
       
Lindberg also pointed out that study of integration should be necessary to further 
recognition of integration as a multidimensional phenomenon. The neo-functionalists of 
recent decades have drawn upon systems theory and decision theory for the study of 
integration – for the analysis of what Leon Lindberg identifies as the “multiple properties 
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of collective decision-making systems.”98 Thus, Lindberg views integration as an 
“interactive multidimensional process” that must be identified, compared, measured, and 
analysed. The integrative process contains properties that “bear a systematic relationship 
to each other at any given point in time and, as will be seen later, over time as well.”99 
       
Lindberg sets forth a number of variable properties that are applied to describe the extent 
to which a group of nations engages in collective decision-making for integration 
process: (a) functional scope of collective decision-making; (b) the stage in decision-
making at which collective processes like the choice of options and their implementation 
are involved; (c)the importance of collective decision-making in determining public 
allocations; (d) the extent to which demands are articulated into the collective arena for 
action; (e) the degree to which collective decision-makers have available resources that 
are adequate to their needs; (f) the continuity and strength of leadership at the level of the 
collectivity; (g) the extent to which the bargaining modalities of the system help 
maximize the individual interests of nations or enhance those of the collectivity; ( h) the 
effect of collective decision on the behaviour of individuals; (i) the degree to which 
collective decisions meet with compliance, apathy, or outright opposition; and (j) the 
distributive consequences of collective decisions.100   
       
Building upon the work of Haas, and of Mitrany before him, Joseph Nye, a well-known 
scholar about theory of interdependence, tried to refine neo-functionalist theories of 
integration. Nye sets forth a theoretical framework based upon a neo-functionalist 
approach that, to a greater extent than that of Haas or Mitrany, is not “Eurocentric.” Thus 
Nye bases his conceptualisation upon an analysis of the conditions for integration drawn 
specifically from European and non-Western experiences and modifies greatly the 
notions of “automatic politicisation” and “spill-over.” His contribution lies in developing 
a neo-functionalist model based upon “process mechanisms” and “integrative 
potential.”101 
       
Nye suggests that neo-functionalists literature contains seven “process mechanisms,” 
around which he reconceptualizes and reformulates neo-functionalist theory. These 
mechanisms are namely: (1) functionalist linkage of tasks, or the concept of spill-over; 
(2) rising transactions; (3) deliberate linkage and coalition formation; (4) elite 
socialization; (5) regional group formation; (6) ideological-identitive appeal; and finally 
(7) involvement of external actors in the process. Central to Nye’s neo-functionalist 
model is what he terms “integrative potential” – that is, the integrative conditions 
stimulated by the “process mechanisms.” He sets forth four conditions that are said to 
influence both the nature of the original commitment and the subsequent evolution of an 
integrative scheme. These conditions are: (1) symmetry or economic equality of units; (2) 
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elite value complementarity; (3) existence of pluralism; and (4) capacity of member states 
to adapt and respond.102  
       
According to Nye, there are four conditions which tend to characterize the integration 
process over time: (1) politicisation, or the means by which problems are resolved and 
competing interests are reconciled or the extent to which the resultant benefits are 
sufficiently widespread to ensure broadening and deepening support; (2) redistribution, 
with the crucial issue being the phasing of the changes in status, power, and economic 
benefits among groups within the integrating unit. Central to the integrative process is the 
extent to which redistribution, benefiting some regions more than others, is compensated 
by growth to the benefit of the unit as a whole; (3) redistribution of alternatives or the 
extent to which, as the integrative process proceeds, decision-makers face pressures to 
increase the level and the scope of integration and conclude that the alternatives to 
integration are less satisfactory; and (4) externalisation, or the extent to which members 
of an integrating unit find it necessary to develop a common position on issues in order to 
deal with nonmembers, as has happened with the European Community in its various sets 
of negotiations with outside parties, including the United States. Nye hypothesizes that 
“the further integration proceeds, the more likely third parties will be to react to it, either 
in support or with hostility.”103 
       
A neo-functionalist model such as that developed by Nye provides a framework for 
comparing integrative processes in more developed and less developed regions of the 
world, and for assessing the extent to which microregional, or functionally specific, 
economic organizations hold potential for further development toward federations. More 
likely, neo-functionalist model-building can provide, and has provided, more explicit 
theoretical propositions essential to understanding the limits, as well as the potential, of 
this segment of theory both in explaining integration and providing a strategy for 
advancing an integrative process.104 
 
2.1.7 Neoliberal Institutionalist Approach 
 
Neoliberal institutionalism is a school of thought in international relations that seeks to 
account for the growth of institutionalization in world politics without losing sight of the 
centrality of states and the operation of rational self-seeking action.105 It begins with 
assertions of acceptance of several key realist assumptions but they end with a rejection 
of realism and furnish with claims of affirmation of the central tenets of the liberal 
institutionalist tradition. Neoliberal institutionalist approach is particularly associated 
with Robert Keohane’s work, which attempts to cope with the obvious acceleration of 
institutionalization in world politics. According to Keohane, the stuff of contemporary 
international relations is evidently rather more than sovereign self-interested states 
clashing in line with the billiard ball analogy of classical realism. Institutions can take 
several forms along the line with nation-states. They may be purposive quasi-
                                                 
102 Ibid., pp.442-445. 
103 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990): Contending Theories, pp.445-446. 
104 Ibid., p.446. 
105 Rosamond (2000) op. cit., p. 202. 
  
 
30
constitutional orders such as the EU, they may also be issue-specific regimes or they may 
be simply established norms for interstate interactions. What is crucial for Keohane is 
that levels of institutionalization affect state behaviour. He emphasized that prevailing 
institutional arrangements can affect state actions by influencing the flow of information 
and opportunities to negotiate; the ability of governments to monitor other’s compliance 
and to implement their own commitments – therefore their ability to make credible 
commitments in the first place; and prevailing expectations about the solidity of 
international agreements. In other words, neoliberal institutionalism seeks to add or more 
precisely integrate institutions into this explanatory equation. By this account, nation-
states pursue their interests within an anarchic environment, but one notably modified by 
the presence of institution.106 
       
Neoliberal institutionalist theory also agrees to the basic realist assumptions that states 
are the principal actors; that states act in accordance with their conception of national 
interest; that power remains an important variable; and that the structure of world politics 
is anarchic. According to Keohane, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, if they are 
attempting to understand international relations, need to find whatever common ground 
exists between them on the role of institutions. Keohane, himself in the neoliberal 
institutionalist camp, acknowledges the fact that international institutions are used by 
states to pursue their national interests does not demonstrate how significant they will be 
when interests change. He further goes on to give an assertion that realists and liberal 
institutionalists agree that without a basis either of hegemonic dominance or common 
interests, international institutions cannot long survive. In addition, both camps also agree 
that possibilities exist for international cooperation, but they diverge on the likelihood of 
its success.107 
       
Neoliberal institutionalist conceptualization of progress in terms of human freedom and 
the importance attributed to liberal democracy, free trade, cognitive changes, 
communications, and moral norms all indicate that liberals regard individual human 
beings as the primary international actors. Neoliberalists view states as the most 
important collective actors in the present era, but they are seen as pluralistic actors whose 
interests and policies are determined by bargaining among themselves and other actors 
like international institutions. A key point of this proposition, according to Keohane, is 
that liberalism is an approach to the analysis of social reality that begins with individuals 
as the relevant actors and seeks to understand how organizations composed of 
aggregations of individuals interact.108 
       
Moreover, neoliberalists assume that states define their interests in strictly individualistic 
terms. It is still possible that states may nevertheless work together while these actors 
pursue their own interests. Keohane founds his analysis of international cooperation on 
the assumption that states are basically atomistic actors. He argues that states in an 
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anarchical context are, as microeconomic theory assumes with respect to business firms, 
rational egoists. Rationality means that states possess consistent, ordered preferences, and 
calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action available in order to maximize 
their utility in view of these preferences. In sequence, he defines utility maximization 
atomistically; egoism, according to Keohane, means that utility functions of states are 
independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or 
losses of others.109 
 
 
2.1.8 Constructivist Approach 
 
Constructivism has become difficult to neglect in the scholarship of contemporary 
international relations certainly since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps the introduction 
of constructivism to the EU studies and current debate was the most interesting 
development in integration theory in the late 1990s. With so much to draw on, it is hardly 
surprising that rather than there being a single constructivist approach, there are 
numerous constructivists with different emphases. Constructivist approach represents the 
link of international theory with long-standing sociological concerns and the social 
construction of reality. In addition, constructivist approach connects international 
relations to some important strands in social theorizing.110 Constructivists hold that 
political actors – including nation-states – do not always make decisions based on 
calculations of material benefit. In their view, decision-makers formulate their opinions 
and take action in a social context – in relationship with other people. These groups 
operate according to certain norms of behaviour; they consider some ideas are more 
acceptable than others; and they agree on certain facts about the world. Constructivists, in 
sum, explore the ways group norms, ideas, and even cultures shape, and sometimes 
change, the identities and interests of political actors.111 
       
Constructivists argued that structural properties such as anarchy are not fixed and 
external to the interaction of states. Instead, anarchy is a social construct, something that 
is inter-subjectively understood by states and which is reproduced through their 
interactions. Therefore, state behaviour does not just derive from the anarchic 
international environment; it also helps to make it.112 So all constructivists agree that the 
structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions, that states are not 
static subjects, but dynamic agents, that state identities are not given, but reconstituted 
through complex, historical overlapping and often contradictory practices – and therefore 
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variable, unstable, constantly changing; that the distinction between domestic politics and 
international relations are tenuous.113 
       
Social interaction is the mechanism for the reproduction of structures in international 
system. This means that constructivists object to the rationalism that characterizes the 
mainstream perspectives in international relations. This is because constructivists treat 
the interests and identities of actors as endogenous to interaction. Constructivists, to be 
precise, treat interests as socially constructed – as derivatives of processes of social 
interaction. They also maintain that identities are socially constructed, that actors’ 
accounts of self and other and of their operational context are also the products of social 
interaction.114 
       
It also starts to show how constructivists’ approaches might make a difference in the 
study of EU governance. The linkages between constructivist investigation and the fluid 
image of multilevel governance offers an obvious way in which the insights of a branch 
of international relations can connect with policy work that deals with symbols, norms, 
understandings and belief systems. Thomas Christiansen argued that the emerging reality 
of post-territorial, multilevel governance in Europe couldn’t be captured by conventional 
concepts. It is crucial, he continues, to depict the fluidity of the system that is structured 
through institutions, the economy and identity: and whose agents operate at and between 
several levels of actions.115 
       
Constructivists call the constitutive effects of social norms and institutions as crucial 
factors. They point out that many social norms not only regulate behaviour, they also 
constitute the identity of actors in the sense of defining who we are as members of a 
social community. The norm of sovereignty, for example, not only regulates the 
interactions of states in international affairs, it also defines what a state is in the first 
place of its existence. Constructivists focus on the social identities of actors in order to 
account for their interests. Constructivism holds that collective norms and understandings 
define the fundamental rules of the game in which they find themselves in their 
interactions. However, it does not mean that constitutive norms cannot be violated or will 
never change. Major argument is that the properties of social agents cannot be described 
without referring to the social structure in which they are embedded.116 
       
As a result, the EU as an emerging polity is anticipated not just to constrain the range of 
choices available to nation-states, but the way in which they define their interests and 
even their identities. EU membership matters particularly because that membership 
influences the very way in which actors see themselves and are seen by others as social 
beings. For example, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are no longer 
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individual European states in simple sense. They are EU states in the sense that their 
statehood is increasingly defined by their EU membership. The EU constitutes states in 
Europe as long as it maps the political, social, and economic space enabling private and 
public actors to define their interests and go about their business. EU membership implies 
the voluntary acceptance of a particular political order as legitimate and entails the 
recognition of a set of rules and obligations as binding force among its members. It 
includes that the EU law is the constitutional order without constitution and also, 
therefore, the law of the land. In this way, constructivists emphasize that the EU deeply 
affects discursive and behavioural practices of its member nation-states and it has become 
part of the social furniture with which social and political actors have to deal on a daily 
basis. Such point of view implies that EU membership imposes socialization effects. At 
least but not last, actors need to know the rules of appropriate behaviour in the EU and to 
take them for granted in the sense that norms become normal.117   
       
In short, there are at least three ways in which social constructivism contributes to a 
better understanding of the European Union. Firstly, accepting the mutual constitutive 
relation of agency and structure allows for a much deeper understanding of 
Europeanization including its impact on statehood in Europe. Secondly, stressing the 
constitutive effects of European law, rules, and policies enables to understand how 
European integration shapes social identities and interests of actors. Thirdly, emphasizing 
on communicative practices permits us to examine more closely how Europe and the EU 
are constructed discursively and how actors try to come to grips with the meaning of 
European integration.118 Constructivist insights might also be useful to generate 
theoretical propositions, for example, on collective identity constructions, their causes 
and their effects on the integration process.119 
 
2.2 Governance Approaches to Regional Integration 
 
In recent years, the term governance has received much attention in research on regional 
integration. Concepts of governance are also increasingly used in domestic politics and in 
international relations. However, tremendous usage of this term goes daily hand in hand 
with a loss of precise meaning in itself.120 Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch viewed that 
governance should be narrowly defined in a way that does not include all kinds of goal-
oriented action irrespective of its social context although it does not belong only to the 
acts and omissions of governments within territorial states. For this purpose, they defined 
governance as ‘the continuous political process of setting explicit goals for society and 
intervening in it in order to achieve these goals’. Governance therefore includes setting 
goals and making decisions for the whole collectivity, consisting of individuals and 
groups that have not explicitly agreed to them.121 
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Changes in governance also transform the course and trend of regional integration. The 
way policy is made will change the institutional framework in a broader sense. In the case 
of the EU, for example, regional integration implies not only the explicit constitutional 
decisions about the relationship between the EU and its member states but also 
incremental and informal changes in that relationship. In this sense, the EU itself acts as a 
unique institution in which all member states are embedded through a system of 
information and assessment in almost every field of politics and policy-making. As a 
consequence, member states need to observe each other mutually and constantly remind 
one another of their obligations and duties as members of a larger community. However, 
this does not mean that those obligations and duties are always perfectly observed even 
though there is pressure for mutual information and congruity in such a system of 
multilevel governance. In short, the structure of the EU polity ceteris paribus is 
responsible for the way political processes occur and what policy outcomes come about. 
For this reason, it can be argued that polity determines politics and policy.122 In the 
following parts, it will attempt to explore the various approaches of governance and their 
core prepositions: liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational governance, multilevel 
governance and network governance. It also points out the fact that the contribution of 
governance perspective can provide a more comprehensive and better understanding of 
very modern phenomenon in regional studies like the development of the EU polity 
comparing with other approaches such as classical regional integration theory. 
 
2.2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach 
 
Among attempts to theorize European integration as a two-level game, the ultimate 
example may be the one provided by Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist 
analysis. Moravcsik thoroughly utilizes a model of a two-level game to explain European 
integration consisting of a liberal theory of national preference formation and an 
intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining between states. The former, which 
theorizes the demand side that is the demand for integration results, views national 
preferences arising in the contexts provided by the domestic politics of the member 
nation-states. This again represents a clear departure from classic intergovernmentalism, 
which sees national interests arising in the context of the sovereign state’s perception of 
its relative position in the states system. For Moravcsik, national interests are best 
regarded as consequences of a state-society interaction. He elaborated that national 
interests emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for 
political influence meanwhile national and transnational coalitions form and new policy 
alternatives are possible for governments. Therefore, an understanding of domestic 
politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction 
among states.123 
       
As formulated by Moravcsik, interests are then bargained in an intergovernmental fashion 
i.e. the supply side. While the demand side of the process focuses the advantages of 
cooperative activity and the coordination of policy, the supply side demonstrates the 
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restricted range of possible integration outcomes. At the center of Moravcsik’s 
framework is – an assumption of state rationality. This is a preposition shared with realist 
perspective, but Moravcsik further developed the idea that rational state behaviour does 
not emerge from fixed preferences, but rather from dynamic political processes in the 
domestic polity.124 
       
Moravcsik presented three assumptions about the particular bargaining environment of 
the EU. Firstly, it is a situation that states enter into voluntarily and which is non-
coercive, particularly since the major history-making decisions are made by unanimity 
rather by qualified majority voting (QMV). Secondly, repeating institutionalism, 
interstate bargaining in the EU takes place in an information-rich setting. The 
environment is rich of information in two ways: there is widespread knowledge about the 
technicalities of the EU policy-making and states have a clear idea of the preferences of 
and constraints upon other states. Thirdly, the transaction costs of EU bargaining are low 
because of the long timeframe of negotiations and the innumerable possibilities for issue 
linkages, trade-offs and sub-bargains.125 
       
Liberal intergovernmentalism therefore sets up concrete propositions on the determinants 
of preference formation, bargaining, and institutional choice in European integration. 
Moravcsik examined whether national preferences have been driven by general 
geopolitical ideas and interests or by issue-specific economic interest, whether 
substantive integration outcomes have been shaped by supranational entrepreneurship or 
intergovernmental bargaining, and whether EU institutions reflect federalist ideology, the 
need for technocratic management, or an interest in securing credible member state 
commitments.126 Liberal intergovernmentalism generally argued that European 
integration could be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national 
leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities originating from the 
economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in 
the international system, and the role of institutions in strengthening the credibility of 
interstate commitments.127 
       
Liberal intergovernmentalism maintains that the preferences of national governments in 
European integration are mainly issue-specific. As long as main engine of European 
integration has been predominantly economic, so have state preferences. While the 
general interest in European integration resulted from the pressure to cooperate for 
mutual benefit from economic gains in an expanding and globalizing international 
economy, concrete preferences emerged from a process of domestic conflict in which 
specific sectoral interests, adjustment costs and sometimes, geopolitical concerns played 
a critical role and reflected primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic 
procedures in market integration and secondarily the macro-economic preferences of 
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ruling governmental coalitions – as it was shown in the case of monetary integration.128 
Put another way, domestic interests, reflecting mainly the competitiveness of the national 
economy, acted as a filter between the structural incentives of the international economy 
and the national preferences in European integration. As a result, governments pursue 
integration as a means to secure commercial advantages for producer groups, subject to 
regulatory and budgetary constraints. This driving force of integration generates 
distributional conflict among the member states.129 
       
Liberal intergovernmentalism portrays the most relevant bargaining processes in 
European integration as processes of intergovernmental bargaining concerning with the 
distribution of gains from substantive cooperation. To be more precise, they have in the 
past consisted of hard interstate bargaining, in which credible threats to veto proposals, to 
withhold financial side-payments, and to form alternative alliances excluding recalcitrant 
governments carried the day. The outcomes contemplated the relative power of states – 
more precisely patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. Henceforth, those who gained 
the most economically from integration compromised the most on the margin to realize it, 
whereas those who gained the least or for whom the costs of adaptation were highest 
imposed conditions.130 
       
In this way, institutional choice is driven by member governments – and by their concern 
about each other’s future compliance with the substantive deals concluded. In other 
words, by transferring sovereignty to international institutions, governments effectively 
remove issues from the influence of domestic politics, which might build up pressure for 
non-compliance if costs for powerful domestic actors are high. They also remove issues 
from decentralized intergovernmental control, which may be too weak to secure 
compliance, in particular if powerful member states violate the rules.  Liberal 
intergovernmentalism holds that state governments call the tune in European integration. 
They pursue diverse interests generated at the national, domestic level; they engage in 
hard interstate bargaining; and they are in driving seat of the integration process.131 
       
As Frank Schimmelfennig labeled, liberal intergovernmentalism is a theoretical school 
with no disciples and a single teacher: Andrew Moravcsik. There are a number of salient 
characteristics of liberal intergovernmentalism. Firstly, it constructs on 
intergovernmentalism, a traditional school of thought in European integration studies, but 
provides a much more sophisticated and rigorous theoretical underpinning. Secondly, it 
becomes a grand theory seeking to explain the major steps of European integration in 
historical milestones like historic Treaty-makings. Thirdly, it is a kind of parsimonious 
theory that can be summarized in a few general propositions, which clam to explain the 
core of European integration. In addition to all the foregoing, there is widespread 
agreement that liberal intergovernmentalism is able to explain much of state behaviour in 
the EU.132 
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2.2.2 Supranational Governance 
 
In 1990s the growing emphasis on governance rather than integration and the recognition 
of segmentation and diversity across the policy spectrum in the EU studies has produced 
a new theoretical approach developed by Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz namely 
supranational governance.133 They embedded their framework as a less state-centric 
approach and more supranational alternative to the influential work on liberal 
intergovernmentalism developed by Andrew Moravcsik. For this reason, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz deploy the image of demand and supply sides to integration. The role of 
transnational exchange is mostly central to generating demands for regulation and 
governance capacity at the European level. Supranational institutions usually work to 
supply these things. The emphasis on transnational exchange and the development of 
social interaction between actors across borders recalls Karl Deutsch’s concept of 
community building in the international system.134 
       
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz are less interested in the extent to which these transactions 
create identities or have major cognitive impacts in the process of European integration. 
Rather, they are more concerned with how these transactions become institutionalized 
and, therefore, how they create effective channels for demands to be generated. This is 
the key variable in their analysis of supranational governance. Variability in levels of 
transborder transaction and intra-EU exchange might help to explain why some policy 
areas are more supranationalized than others. However, differing levels of transnational 
interaction do not explain patterns of supranationalism in their own right. Demands 
generated in the transnational domain stimulate a response from the decision-making 
institutions. Again, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz borrow from the institutionalist 
vocabulary to consider how institutions can reproduce tendencies to expand governance 
and rule-making. They viewed intergovernmental bargaining and decision-making as 
embedded in processes that are provoked and sustained by the expansion of transnational 
society, the pro-integrative activities of supranational institutions, and the growing 
density of supranational rules. As a consequence, these processes gradually, but 
inevitably, reduce the capacity of the member states to control outcomes.135 
          
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz employed a continuum (see Figure.1) that stretching from 
intergovernmental politics through to supranational politics. Intergovernmental politics 
represents the ideal type of international bargaining among states where the EU operates 
as an international regime in the strictest sense of that terminology. On the other hand, 
the supranational end of the continuum represents centralized control of governance 
capacity over policy areas across the constituent member states. Different policy domains 
could therefore be placed at relevant points along the continuum in relations to three 
variables: (1) the intensity of formal and informal EU-level rules, (2) the EU-level 
governance structures and (3) the level of development of transnational society. Then, 
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growth in one element of the supranational trio factors creates conditions that favour the 
growth of the other two.136  
 
 
Figure (1):  Governance in the European Union 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
+   +   +  +    + 
Intergovernmental     Supranational          
politics                                           politics   
 
 
Note: From left to right, the continuum measures the increasing influence of three factors 
on policy-making processes and outcomes within any given policy sector. These factors 
are: (1) the intensity of formal and informal EU-level rules, (2) the EU-level governance 
structures and (3) the level of development of transnational society. 
 
(Source: heavily leaned on Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (eds.) (1998): 
“Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European 
Polity”, in: Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (eds.): “European Integration and 
Supranational Governance”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 8.) 
 
       
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz put a lot of emphasis on the role of non-state actors operating 
in transnational space. A mixture of cross-border interactions and organized interest 
group activity is regarded as an important stimulus for change largely because actors in 
rational pursuit of their interests begin to engage in various forms of transnational 
activity. Therefore, firms engaging in significant amounts of cross-border activity have 
an interest in the regionalization of various relevant aspects of economic governance. In 
the same way, transnational activity is the generator of spillovers because the growth of 
supranational rules and the increased responsiveness of central institutions of governance 
reduce the costs of transactions. In addition, the existence of particular patterns of rules 
and decision-making creates a strong institutional logic for persistence of those patterns. 
There is also an emphasis on external economic stimuli, most remarkably in the form of 
changes to the global economic environment that are captured by the idea of 
globalization. Transnational actors are viewed as the agents who bring forward the 
agendas set by globalization into the EU system of polity. Perhaps, firms that are facing 
competitive threats on the world markets may lobby for the further liberalization of the 
European market space. This emphasis on transnationalism also poses a direct challenge 
to intergovernmental accounts of EU governance. At the heart of Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz’s argument is the claim that instead of being the generator of integration, 
intergovernmental bargaining is more often its product. This is a challenging proposal for 
a research agenda to test the extent to which non-state actor transactions drive through the 
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growth of European level governance. It is much interesting about the way in which 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz incorporate elements of earlier integration theory to 
emphasize governance rather than integration as the dependent variable and seek to 
generate something similar to a grand theory.137  
 
2.2.3 Multilevel Governance 
 
The general purpose the EU studies are supposed to fix up something about politics more 
broadly, rather than developing a series of specific claims about the EU. However, 
despite the numerous attempts to use the EU for answering broader and more general 
questions about politics, it still remains persistently distinctive. Therefore, the arrival of 
the governance turn in EU studies may reflect an alternative answer to the enduring 
question: ‘Of what is the EU a matter?’. All studies of the EU thrown into the disciplines 
of comparative politics and policy analysis also find it out the observation that the EU is 
not necessarily a precise analogue for the processes of politics within nation-states. In 
reality, the EU may be read as a hybrid form: neither political system nor international 
organization, but something in-between. Attempts to combine a reading of the EU in 
policy process terms with recognition of its peculiarities are collided with the compelling 
metaphor of multilevel governance. The multilevel governance point of view seeks to 
avoid two traps: state-centrism and the traditional supranational treatment of the EU as 
only operating and functioning at the European level in the institutional arena of Brussels 
and Strasbourg.138 
       
A number of scholars have started to establish an alternative approach to the EU in 
response to the inability of the state-centric approach to recognize or explain the 
independent influence of supranational institutions and the mobilization of domestic 
actors directly in the European arena. Instead of a bifurcated model of politics across 
state-centric and supranational levels, they conceptualize the EU as a single, multilevel 
polity.139  
       
The vivid point of departure for this multilevel governance approach is the existence of 
overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of 
political actors across those levels. The executives of the member states i.e. heads of the 
governments, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European 
polity. States are not a sole and only exclusive link between domestic politics and 
intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Instead of the two level game assumptions 
adopted by state centrists, advocates of multilevel governance posit a set of overarching, 
multilevel policy networks. Moreover, the structure of political control is variable, not 
constant, across policy areas.140 
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The multilevel governance approach does not deny the view that national governments 
and national arenas are important, or that these still remain the most important pieces of 
the European jig-sawed puzzle. Nevertheless, when one asserts that the state no longer 
monopolizes European level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests, a 
very different polity with three distinct characteristics comes into focus. Firstly, 
according to the multilevel governance approach, decision-making competencies of the 
EU are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by national 
governments of member states. In other words, supranational institutions – above all, the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice – 
have independent influence in policy-making that cannot be usually derived from their 
role as agents of national executives. National governments play a very important role, 
however, as stated by multilevel governance model, the independent role of European 
level actors should also be analyzed to explain European policy-making.141 
       
Secondly, it is important to note that collective decision-making among states involves a 
significant loss of control for individual national governments. Lowest common 
denominator outcomes are available only on a subset of EU decisions, particularly those 
concerning the scope of regional integration. Decisions concerning rules and regulations 
to be enforced across the EU have a zero-sum character and necessarily involve gains or 
losses for individual states.142 
       
Thirdly, political arenas are interconnected with each other rather than nested. While 
national arenas remain crucial arenas for the formation of national government 
preferences, the multilevel governance model rejects the view that subnational actors are 
nested exclusively within them. Rather, subnational actors operate in both national and 
supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the process. National 
governments could no longer monopolize links between domestic and European actors. 
In this perspective, complex interrelationships in domestic politics do not stop at the 
national state but extend to the European level by far. The separation between domestic 
and international politics, which lies at the heart of the state-centric model, is rejected by 
the multilevel governance approach. National governments are an integral and powerful 
part of the EU, but they no longer render the sole interface between supranational and 
subnational arenas, and they share, rather than monopolize, control over many activities 
that take place in their respective territories.143 In sum, for multilevel governance, 
authority is shifted away from national governments in a tripartite way: upwards, as the 
most direct result of European integration; downwards, due to subnational empowerment; 
and sideways to, for example, public-private partnerships. So states are just one 
participant among a variety of actors influencing decision-making at various levels, and 
do not necessarily posses a final say by definition.144 
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Theoretical attempts to the EU that engage with the notion – the normal politics of 
sovereignty is a politics of absolutes – usually fall into the trap of imagining either the 
withering away of the state or sticking with its stubborn resilience. As mentioned above, 
multilevel governance does not hold that nation-states are unimportant. In fact, multilevel 
governance approach is consistent with a rather more pluralistic view of the state as an 
arena in which different agenda, ideas, and interests are contested. Autonomy and control 
may be at stake but states remain crucially important even though they are melded into 
the multilevel polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous subnational and 
supranational actors. However, proponents of multilevel governance approach 
acknowledged that they do not have particular expectations of the dynamics of the EU 
polity beyond a sense that the boundaries between various levels of governance 
(European, national, regional, local and etc) as shown in the Figure (2), will become less 
clear-cut. Nevertheless, multilevel governance is an attempt to depict complexity as the 
principal feature of the EU’s political system and its emphasis on variability, 
unpredictability and multi-actorness tends to set adherents of this approach in opposition 
to the contemporary intergovernmentalists.145 
       
Overall, multilevel governance approach entails a concept of the EU as consisting of 
overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of 
political actors across these levels. In addition, multilevel governance pulls the private 
sphere into the political arena. Simultaneously, it leads to a loss of the so-called gate- 
keeping role of the nation-state, as the traditional representation via state executives is 
curtailed. Hence multilevel governance eradicates the conventional distinction between 
domestic and international politics.146 In sum, multilevel governance appears to combine 
insights from intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. However, as it seems to stand 
in between, rejecting the ‘either-or’ discussion with interstate bargaining and 
transnational coalition-building as mutually exclusive option and regarding the EU as an 
intermediate arrangement in its own right.147 
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Figure (2): Multilevel Governance in the European Union (Context and Dimensions) 
 
 
Source: José M. Magone (2003): “Introduction: The Role of the Regions in European 
Union Multilevel Governance”, in: José M. Magone (ed.): “Regional Institutions and 
Governance in the European Union”, Connecticut: Westport and London, Praeger, p. XX. 
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2.2.4 Network Governance 
 
In the past decades, the EU has been transformed immensely and the result is that the 
scope and the density of its rules have been increased and its institutions have been 
extensively reformed. As a result, many EU analysts even come to remark the EU as a 
new form of institution in international relations. Undoubtedly, the EU activities have 
reconstructed the traditional architecture of territorial disposition in Europe. To an ever 
growing extent, the EU institutions are becoming responsible for the authoritative 
allocation of values. Nonetheless, there is also overwhelming agreement that the EU 
neither qualifies as a state, as it lacks legal sovereignty, nor can be reduced to an 
international organization since its rules take precedence over domestic laws. Moreover, 
the institutional configuration of the EC differs from both nation-states and international 
organizations. The EU is a sui generis political system in this sense. In such a political 
system, such critical questions should be examined how values are legitimately allocated 
in the European Union and how the ways and means of allocation, that is, the governance 
of the EU, impinge upon the member states.148 
       
It needs to clarify first what is meant when the term governance is talked in the EU. 
According to Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch, “governance is about the structured 
ways and means in which the divergent preferences of interdependent actors are 
translated into policy choices ‘to allocate values’, so that the plurality of interests is 
transformed into coordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved”. They 
further argued that governance is not synonymous with a new process of governing and 
proposed to distinguish between different ideal-types in terms of modes of governance: 
statism, corporatism, pluralism and network governance. Among these different modes of 
governance, network governance is peculiar one, for Eising and Kohler-Koch, because it 
bears several new characteristics. Constructing on the debates in international relations 
and comparative politics, these ideal types can also be distinguished by the ways in which 
they combine four elements that are at the core of any kind of governing: the role of state 
as compared to other actors, the rules of behaviour, the patterns of interaction and the 
level of political action. These are further detailed as shown in the Table (1) of traditional 
identification of core elements of governance types.149 
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Table (1): Traditional Identification of core elements for governance types 
 
 
 
 Statism Pluralism Corporatism Network 
Role of the 
State 
Authority Referee Mediator Activator 
Dominant 
Orientation 
Pursuit 
of common 
national 
interests 
Pursuit of 
individual 
interests 
Integrating/conflicting 
group interests 
Coordinating 
Related 
interests 
Patterns of 
Interaction 
Command 
and 
control 
based on 
majority 
rule 
Competition 
and 
bargaining 
Negotiations for 
reaching consensus 
Multilateral 
negotiations 
to 
approximate 
positions 
Dominant 
actors 
States State 
actors and 
multitude 
of interest 
groups and 
parties 
States actors and 
functional associations 
State actors 
and 
multitude of 
stake 
holders 
Level and 
scope of 
political 
allocation 
Central 
level 
covering 
all issue 
areas 
Overall and 
issue 
specific at 
respective 
government 
level 
National or sub-
national level covering 
specific issue areas 
Functionally 
specific 
agreements 
cutting 
across 
different 
levels 
 
 
Source: Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999: 6). 
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The core idea of network governance is that political actors consider problem-solving the 
essence of politics and that the setting of policy-making is defined by the existence of 
highly organized social sub-systems in a given political setting. In such a political setting, 
efficient and effective governing has to pay tribute to the specific rationalities of these 
sub-systems. Eising and Kohler-Koch explained that the ‘state’ is vertically and 
horizontally segmented and its role has changed from authoritative allocation ‘from 
above’ to the role of an ‘activator’. Governing the European Union involves bringing 
together the relevant state and societal actors and building issue-specific constituencies. 
Therefore, in these patterns of interaction, state actors and a multitude of interest 
organizations are involved in multilateral negotiations about the allocation of functionally 
specific ‘values’. As a consequence, within the networks the level of political action 
varies from the central EU-level to decentralized subnational levels in the member states. 
The dominant mode of orientation of the all actors involved is towards the upgrading of 
common interests in the pursuit of individual interests. Incorporated in this concept is the 
idea that interests are not given as it is assumed in ideal-type assumptions about pluralism 
and corporatism, but that they may evolve and get redefined in the process of 
negotiations between the participants of the network governance.150 
      
As Beate Kohler-Koch wrote, governing is about fitting new regulatory mechanisms into 
an environment that is functioning according to its own regulatory logic and has so far 
been unwilling or unable to change. European integration, therefore, is a project of 
transformation in a highly complex constellation. Unilateral steering cannot alone do 
introducing new and sometimes quite deviant regulatory principles. Neither the 
institutions nor the predominant ideas of European cooperation provide a hierarchical 
system of governance. The Community is likely to be a negotiating system, specifically a 
negotiating system with a variable geometry because, depending on the issue at stake, 
different actors have to be taken into account. Therefore, it is not only member 
governments who negotiate; various public and private actors are also part of the game.151 
 
   
2.3 Critical Notions for the process of integration 
 
Critical examination of integration through its dimensions and behaviour in international 
politics is far more complex than general debate about academic clarifications for its 
definition. Concerning with this task, a number of questions will be raised on the 
classification and conceptualisation of integration. The most crucial questions will be 
these namely: (1) What are the major causes for the outgrowth of integration? (2) Can 
integration be regarded as a multidimensional or unidimensional phenomenon? (3) What 
are the basic types of integration by which theory can be interpreted differently and how 
these types relate with each other? (4) Is the process of integration consisting of various 
types applicable to all regions or only to a specific part of the world? (5) What are the 
major criteria for successful integration? By attempting to answer these questions, it can 
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be derived a number of important notions about the process of integration. Among these 
questions, the most fundamental one is whether integration is a unidimensional or 
multidimensional phenomenon. Most of the early theoretical work conceived of 
integration as a unidimensional phenomenon, which could be measured on a single 
aggregate continuum. However, later scholars such as Leon Lindberg and Joseph Nye 
questioned this assumption and seem to have persuaded that integration cannot be 
adequately described in unidimensional terms. As Donald Puchala put it, “We have come 
to recognize that regional integration is a multidimensional phenomenon, much more 
complex than originally imagined.” Hence those attracted to this interpretation began to 
apply multivariate measurement procedures for the purpose of delineating the dimensions 
of the phenomenon, which could be used to classify it. Nevertheless, others have 
questioned the empirical foundation of this posture and contended that all available 
empirical evidences indicate that international integration is unidimensional, i.e., all of 
the ‘subdimensions’ are in fact highly interrelated.152 Whether integration is a 
multidimensional or unidimensional situation, it definitely has its own salient features 
like major purposes or causes that lead to integration, certain types or forms, degrees and 
limitations for its formation. For the classification of basic types or dimensions of 
integration, there may also be some disagreements for plausible categorization. Even 
when it can be possible to classify concrete types of integration, it will further need to 
establish some universal norms for the successful implementation of integrated process. 
 
2.3.1 Causes and types of Integration  
 
The major purposes leading to the process of integration in world politics can be 
generally outlined as follows: (1) regulations of multilateral relations primarily through 
techniques of peaceful settlement of disputes among nation-states of the integrated 
community; (2) minimization or, at the least, control of international conflict (war) 
among members of the integrated community; (3) promotion of cooperative, 
development activities among nation-states for the social and economic benefit of certain 
regions or of humankind in general; and finally (4) collective defence of a group of 
nation-states through the integrated community against external threat.153  
            
It also needs to refer essentially two contradictory assumptions that explain the 
fundamental causes for political integration. First, political systems gain and retain 
cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general 
agreement about the framework of the system. Such systems are based on procedural 
consensus, or general agreement about the political framework and the legal processes by 
which issues are resolved, and substantive consensus, or general agreement about the 
solutions to problems the political system is called upon to solve. If there is greater the 
procedural and substantive consensus, there will have greater the integration of the 
political system. Second, as an alternative assumption different from the first one, it has 
been argued that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or 
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threat, of force. On this ground, political realists emphasized for recognition of the 
importance of coercive power in the integration of political communities.154   
 
Assuming that integration is indeed multidimensional, what components of integrative 
behaviour are the most significant and meaningful empirically and, furthermore, what 
relationships obtain among these dimensions? Here again, the literature is fraught with 
disagreement. Some theories suggest that it is most meaningful to categorize integration 
in a tripartite fashion which differentiates economic, social and political integration as 
distinct basic types; others posit a political amalgamation/intergovernmental 
cooperation/mass community differentiation for the concept; and still others submit that 
regional integration should be subdivided and demarcated in a framework which 
separates cohesion, communications, power, and structure of relationships as essential 
types of integration.155  
             
Recognizing that the conceptualisation of integration posed a major analytic problem, 
Joseph Nye sought to avoid the excessive generality of integration connoted by common 
definitions by “disaggregating the concept of integration into different types and 
developing specific indices for the various subtypes.”156 His resultant typology broke the 
concept down into three basic dimensions: economic integration (formation of a 
transnational economy), social integration (formation of a transnational society), and 
political integration (formation of transnational political interdependence). These types 
were further disaggregated into subtypes, each of which could be associated with a clear 
measurement of the condition of integration for that subtype at a given point in time.157  
             
Depending upon these dimensions, after reviewing regional integrated organizations that 
have arisen since World War II, these can be apparently divided into two basic types and 
perhaps a third, hybrid type. The first type is regional defence organizations, such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact). The second type comprises 
economic organizations (also referred to in the literature as functional organizations), 
such as the European Communities (EC), the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CEMA), and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Hybrid regional 
organizations carry out multifunctional activities. Sometimes it is difficult to determine 
whether these are primarily political, economic, military, or cultural. Examples of the 
hybrid type are general-purpose institutions such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Hybrid organizations contain elements of political 
and economic and occasionally military and cultural cooperation.158  
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Furthermore, it can also be fabricated into three major types of regional integration 
namely (a) societal interdependence, (b) attitudinal integration, and (c) intergovernmental 
cooperation. The first and most important type of regional integration is intersocietal 
interdependence. It is important to note that this type is composed of both economic and 
political involvement, at both the governmental and subnational levels: Trade ties, service 
exchanges between domestic groups, and both institutional and security integration 
between polities of respective regions. In this type, the level of economic integration co-
varies with, and is highly interdependence with, the level of political integration. 
Secondly, attitudinal integration constitutes a separate category of integrative behaviour. 
It refers clearly to the extent to which attitudes of friendship and identity exist between 
states. Two important variables in this type are mass (social) integration and political 
affect, and both refer to the images citizens of states hold toward foreign societies and 
polities. But it also suggests that attitudinal integration may be independent of societal, 
economic, or political integration; two societies may be integrated “attitudinally” while 
concurrently achieving a low level of political or functional integration. Finally, 
intergovernmental cooperation type reflects to the extent to which the governments of 
states are able to cooperate in diplomatic arenas other than the central organizations, 
which link their states together. Two influential variables in this type are the level of elite 
social interaction and the frequency of official intergovernmental consultation. The level 
of intergovernmental cooperation at the diplomatic level may be unrelated to the level of 
both attitudinal evaluations and economic interdependence.159  
 
2.3.2 Characteristics, limitations and degree of Integration 
 
An integrated political community must possess certain structural characteristics. Firstly, 
integration among states will typically produce a collective configuration of decision-
making that will be closer to the supranational ideal type rather than the international. For 
instance, collective decisions might be taken by a majority of the membership and the 
strict unanimity principle would be abandoned. The need for policy integration will be 
particularly important if the nascent community is responsible for the allocation of goods 
and services between the constituent units. This will certainly be the case in those 
instances where political community building is predicted upon economic integration via 
custom unions and common markets.160  
             
In the second place, at a minimum, integration presupposes the existence of a security 
community, that is to say a system of relationships which has renounced force and 
coercion as means of settling disputes among the ingredients of the integrated unit. 
Beyond this requirement, economic interdependence will encourage the participants to 
engage in the kinds of collective action referred to above in order to promote mutual 
interests. Regionalism – expressed both in terms of similarity and proximity – will further 
enhance these tendencies. As integration proceeds, new tasks, responsibilities and 
mandates will be taken on by the central institutions. This ‘organizational task 
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expansion’, as it has been called, will be positively correlated with the integration 
process.161 
              
Thirdly, in an integrated community, political processes will take on characteristics often 
associated with intrastate, rather than interstate, politics. For instance, political parties 
and interest groups will start to press demands and articulate interests at the centre as well 
as at the periphery. Indeed, eventually they will prefer to concentrate upon the former 
locus of power. Groups representing economic, social, environmental and religious 
interests will develop in addition to more traditional party arrangements. If economic 
integration has been a key preliminary to political community building then these groups 
may well be associated with wealth-welfare issues. The ‘rules of the game’ for these 
groups will broadly include a willingness to work within the system in order to achieve 
their goals and specifically a commitment to pluralism as a political style. This pluralistic 
characteristic of the political processes will give rise to transnational politics as an 
increasingly significant section of the population within the member states perceive that 
more and more of their expectations and aspirations are being met within the integrated 
structure.162 
               
As a final characteristic, a political integrated community should possess the capability to 
command the loyalties and affections of the majority of the population of its constituent 
units. Historically in the formation of nation-states, nationalism provided the ideological 
and attitudinal infrastructure for this loyalty transfer. Contemporary efforts at building 
communities ‘beyond the nation state’ have the double task of providing a new focus 
while combating the centrifugal impulses of nationalism. Functionalism and neo-
functionalism have paid particular attention to this aspect of integration; the 
functionalist’s logic tries to suggest that there will be a progressive transfer of loyalty 
away from the constituent states towards the new community on the basis of a utilitarian 
calculation of where the wealth-welfare policy issues are really being handled.163 
               
Although integration in world politics is still firmly representing as a prudent concept to 
establish a perpetual peace and development, there are some major weaknesses and 
limitations about the theoretical framework of integration. These limitations came out of 
the two leading concepts about integration – functionalism and neo-functionalism. 
Among the alleged deficiencies of functionalism are the following: (1) that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to separate the economic and social tasks from the political; (2) that 
governments have shown themselves unwilling to hand over to international authority 
tasks that encroach upon the political; (3) that certain economic and social tasks do not 
“ramify” or “spill-over” into the political sector; and (4) that the road to political 
integration lies through political “acts of will,” rather than functional integration in 
economic and social sectors. In another critique of functionalism, it was also concluded 
that at least in light of the Western European experience since World War II, there is little 
evidence to suggest that technology and economic growth, in a shrinking world, by 
themselves will produce integration through functional cooperation. Moreover, political 
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influences and pressures have proven to be of major importance in effecting the 
integrative process because there has been little or nothing that is “non-political” in 
nature in the integration process of Western Europe.164 The record, moreover, indicates 
that even where conditions are conducive, there is no guarantee that the sector integration 
will proceed automatically. Even in Europe, high hopes have alternated with periods of 
disillusionment. When momentum has occurred, spillover, involving either the deepening 
of ties in one sector or their expansion to another to ensure the members’ satisfaction 
with the integrative process, has led to further integration. But there is no inherent 
expansive momentum in integration schemes. Spillback (when a regional integration 
scheme fails) and spillaround (when a regional integration scheme stagnates or its 
activities become encapsulated) are also possibilities.165 
               
In the critique of neo-functionalism, it differs from functionalism in a number of 
important respects. First, it is a theory of regional rather than global integration, and 
specifically a theory of how this process has been achieved in Western Europe since 
1945.The main weakness inherent in the regional concentration is that a certain breadth 
of vision is thereby lost. Secondly, neo-functionalists have been much more concerned 
with institution building than were the original functionalists. On this reason, Mitrany 
criticized neo-functionalists as ‘federal-functionalists’. Notwithstanding, neo-
functionalism is distinctly oriented towards the political aspects and implications of 
integration.166 But it is also not adequate for the study of Third World integrative 
systems. In contrast to industrialized countries, Third World developing states are likely 
to have fewer goals that can be satisfied by integration. For example, expectations of 
economic gains from rising levels of trade, facilitated by the lowering or removal of tariff 
barriers, have furnished a major motivation for the formation of customs unions, 
especially in Western Europe. However, the structure of trade and production in much of 
the Third World, based historically upon the supply of agricultural products and raw 
materials to advanced industrialized states, has hindered the prospects, at least in the 
short run, for economic complementarity of a level sufficient to promote integration 
within the Third World by the formation of customs unions or Common Markets 
comparable to the European Community. Even in areas such as Latin America and the 
Arab world, where the existence of a common language and common cultural values 
would appear to be conducive to integration, the fact that national economies are oriented 
outward toward the industrialized areas of the world rather than toward each other poses 
a serious obstacles to regional integration. Therefore, integration modes adequate to 
Third World conditions differ substantially from those having relevance for industrialized 
states. Depending upon these weaknesses, Ernst Haas, a leading scholar in the neo-
functionalist school of thought, also criticized that some proponents of neo-functionalism 
are obsolete because they do not address “the most pressing and important problems on 
the global agenda of policy and research.” But neo-functionalism is not considered to be 
wrong, but instead to be inadequate in light of the “turbulent field” of international 
relations, with its numerous global issues in the late twentieth century. Finally, it can be 
assumed that there is no widely accepted deductive model about integration in which 
                                                 
164 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990): Contending Theories, pp.458-459. 
165 Kegley and Wittkopf (1995): World Politics, p.544-545. 
166 Evans and Newnham (1992): The Dictionary of World Politics, p.215. 
  
 
51
definitions and conditions for integration as well as processual steps and transformation 
rules are universally set forth.167 
             
Degree of integration is also an important symbol for the development of integrated 
process. Some stressed that degree of integration adds a significant dimension to socio-
political strength of the integrated community by referring simply to the sense of 
belonging and identification of peoples of the individual participants. At the state level, 
this often translates into nationalism. In most cases, the greater the degree of 
homogeneity and uniformity, the greater the degree of perceived integration. This, in 
turn, contributes to a sense of belonging among individual units in the process. 
Homogeneous ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural background adds to a sense of 
identity and to achieve inter-societal integration. On the other hand, technical and 
organizational identity as well as shared values for mutual interests are also important 
particularly for perceived economic integration.168 The level of economic interaction 
between and among nation-states of the community can serve as a reliable indicator of 
their degree of political integration.169 Although it is generally true that great integration 
leads to an enhanced sense of identity between and among integrated units but a lack of 
integration need not necessarily imply a lack of identity. There are numerous cases where 
a low degree of integration leads to an uncertain or questionable degree of unity that is 
disintegration. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are two cases in point. In both countries, 
immense internal diversity led many citizens to identify more with their own ethnic group 
than with the state itself. This sense of allegiance to a group other than the Yugoslav or 
Soviet state led to secession, the collapse of the Yugoslav and Soviet states, and warfare 
between ethnic groups. Both cases prove that too low a degree of integration can be 
disastrous for a state. However, it is impossible to specify how and why a sense of 
identity develops, or what the key factor or factors are influential upon a sense of 
belonging. In some cases, a low degree of integration across a wide number of variables 
will be sufficient to lead to a sense of belonging. In other cases, a high degree of 
integration in a single area will be necessary.170 
             
Degree of integration can be fluctuated depending upon three categories of its aimed 
tasks: (1) that which has, as its essential function, to take advantage of opportunities, or 
deal with problems, within the ambit of the existing state system; (2) that which 
envisages the rebuilding of the existing state system; and (3) that which goes beyond or 
escapes from either the existing or a refurbished state system. Within the existing state 
system there is a variety of ways in which a greater degree of integration can be sought 
without substantial structural impact. At the lowest level, cooperation involves an 
agreement to undertake a specific task without any thought of task expansion or spillover 
into other areas. Where there is a process of continuous adjustment by governments, 
through a process of intensive consultation within an international institution designed to 
serve important goals that can only be achieved together, then coordination results, while 
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harmonization involves the joint setting of standards and goals, again, frequently, in an 
institutional framework. However, this is not usually the case in parallel national action, 
where complementary or compatible legislation and practices are instituted separately by 
different actors in order to reduce the impact of frontiers. Association, on the other hand, 
is usually more formal and has greater structural implications. Paradoxically, it can 
enable both integration and separation to be pursued at the same time, promoting 
integration in certain domains, but restricting it in others, thereby denying the ‘functional 
imperative’ of task expansion and spillover.171 The amalgamation of these processes can 
produce and sustain a Concordance System172 at the international level – that is, “an 
international system wherein actors find it possible consistently to harmonize their 
interests, compromise their differences, and reap mutual rewards from their 
interactions.”173 In such a system governments remain important actors, but so do actors 
from the subnational, transnational and supranational arenas. Attitudes of the actors tend 
to be pragmatic and characterized by a high degree of mutual sensitivity and 
responsiveness, with a willingness to acknowledge, and act to promote, the greater good 
of the whole. Moreover, a concordance system depends, for its successful operation, upon 
a large degree of popular support – a permissive climate.174 Another analysis suggested 
that greater degree of political integration has generally implied a relationship of 
community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together 
by mutual ties of one kind or another, which give the group a feeling of identity and self-
awareness. Others pointed out that the degree of integration can be reflected by the 
process of the formation and development of institutions through which certain values are 
authoritatively allocated for a certain group of political actors or units. In short, 
integration at the international level is conceptualised as the institutionalisation of the 
political process among two or more states. These reflect a growing sense of inter-
relatedness between, or among, political or economic structures. The degree by which 
integration occurs can be measured by using indicators of the growth of decisional 
capabilities within a specific unit.175 
 
2.3.3 Criteria for successful Integration 
 
With commendable caution, integration theorists attempted to find out a concrete 
statement of which factors or conditions must be considered “necessary and sufficient” to 
bring about successful integration. They doubt that the successful isolation of a number 
of recurrent historical themes amounts to a truly “scientific” statement of a process. If 
certain conditions are regarded as ‘essential’, that means success seems to be extremely 
improbable in their absence. Though essential, these factors may also be insufficient: 
even if all of them were present, it cannot be definitely known whether any other 
conditions might be required which should also be necessary to count down. A similar 
consideration applies to those conditions that can be named helpful but not essential: it is 
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because integration occurred in their absence, and might well recur in this way in future 
cases.   
            
Within the context of critical examination for these factors, the general findings are as 
follows. Successful integration is attained when the subjective criterion of certain elite 
expectations is met: if the expectations of key elites in the region converge toward 
demands for peaceful change and other benefits thought to be obtainable only through the 
union, integration is underway. Objectively speaking, integration can be considered 
achieved when the states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another, a 
condition which can be easily verified from military statistics and plans. It could be said 
that the “integration threshold” is passed when both criteria can be positively met, but 
since the subjective index is not considered easily verifiable, not much practical value is 
expected of the concept.176 In general, integration theorists hold that persons adopt 
integrative behaviour because of expectations of joint rewards or penalties. Initially, such 
expectations are developed among elite groups both in the governmental and private 
sectors. Successful integration depends upon a people’s ability to “internalise” the 
integrative process – that is, for member elites, rather than external elites, to assume 
direction of an integrative process.177 
            
A range of conclusions was also derived for successful integration from the concept of 
social communication. First of all, successful integration is held to depend on the 
prevalence of mutually compatible self-images and images of the other actors 
participating in the process of unification. This involves first and foremost successful 
predictions on the part of one nationally identified elite of the behaviour pattern of other 
elites active in the region. It is this type of sympathy feeling among the crucial actors 
which is held of importance, not verbal commitment to common symbols and 
propositions, such as “freedom,” “peace” or “welfare.” Further, successful integration 
tends to take place around a “core area,” a region possessing superior administrative 
skills, military power, economic resources and techniques, as well as capacity for 
receiving and assimilating the demands of other regions so as to satisfy them. Actors in 
the weaker areas look to the core area for leadership and help in the satisfaction of their 
demands; sympathetic response on the part of the elites active in the core area then begets 
progressive integration without in the least implying any “balance of power” among 
participating units. A great deal of stress is placed on the “capacity” of the administrative 
system and the attitudes prevailing in the core area actively to respond to the needs 
expressed by others. According to communication approach, successful integration 
equals the balance of load and capability in the network of social communication.178  
            
Successful integration for all types of integrated communities is more likely if 
improvement of the communications network takes place before the actual burdens are 
spelled out in terms of political demands. They note also that war among the participating 
actors should cease to be a respectable mode of policy before the achievement of political 
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union. Further, the nature of the elite structure is singled out as being of crucial 
importance. It is desirable for successful integration that a broadening of elites vertically 
in each political unit take place before the act of union, that rigid social stratification be 
weakened, that mass participation in public life increase. But it is equally desirable that 
horizontal contacts among elites of similar status and outlook in all the political units be 
made to flourish. Hence internal democratisation was a prerequisite for the successful 
integration. Moreover, close “international” ties among political parties, trade 
associations, labour unions, religious organizations and the like are essential for larger 
regional integration. In other words, the conditions and consequences associated with 
democracy and pluralism in modern western society emerge as crucial elements in the 
process of international integration.179 
            
The record of integrative experiments demonstrates that the factors promoting or 
inhibiting successful integration efforts are many and their mixture complex. It is not 
enough that two countries choose to interact cooperatively. Research indicates that the 
probability that such cooperative behaviour will culminate in integration is remote in the 
absence of geographical proximity, steady economic growth, similar political systems, 
supportive public opinion led by enthusiastic leaders, cultural homogeneity, internal 
political stability, similar experiences in historical and internal social development, 
compatible forms of governmental and economic systems, similar levels of military 
preparedness and economic resources, a shared perception of a common external threat, 
bureaucratic compatibilities, and previous collaborative endeavours. Although not all of 
these conditions must be present for integration to occur, the absence of more than a few 
considerably reduces the chances of success. The integration of two or more societies is, 
in short, not easily accomplished.180 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical Relevance to Two Regional Organizations 
 
Having stated that, many theoretical and governance approaches over the years attempted 
to examine and figure out what is regional integration and what kind of governance it 
generates in different forms in various parts of the world. It is, however, not only the 
purpose of theoretical insight that varies, but also the area, or the object of particular 
approaches, which emphasize on specific function like institutional set-up or member 
states cooperation. Moreover, theoretical approaches may be different along the lines of 
so-called 3 P: polity, policy and politics.181 
 
(1) Theory tackling with polity. Polity refers to the political community, political 
structures and its institutions. For example, approaches falling into this category 
in the EU studies are those analyzing the nature of the beast i.e. those explaining 
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how the EU’s institutional structure came about, or those trying to find 
constitutional alternatives on the basis of normative considerations. 
(2) Theory handling with policy. Policy concerns with the actual measures taken to 
tackle concrete problems, and theoretical approaches in this area analyze and 
compare their content, or critically reflect on them. It includes aspects such as 
policy style, policy-making modes, the general problem-solving approach and 
policy content. 
(3) Theory dealing with politics. Politics comprises the process of policy-making and 
the daily struggles and strategies of political actors in negotiating and 
encountering with each other for their own interests. It is about the bargaining 
among many participants like governments, particular interest groups, or 
supranational institutions for the dominance of a specific style of how decisions 
are reached.  
       
As shown above, it would empirically difficult to stick strictly to one of those areas. Any 
discussion of polity is likely to involve constitutional frames in which policy-making 
takes place, or which limits the content of policy, as well as the implication of 
constitutional arrangements for politics. Nevertheless, approaches are likely to emphasize 
one or the other, and not deal with all three poles of politics in same treatment. Moreover, 
to the extent that they desire to explain, they will use polity, policy and politics either as 
the explanandum (what is to be explained) or the explanans (the explaining factor).182  
       
As a result, deciding which theory is right and most suitable is not the case of deciding 
which theory’s assumptions about actors, institutions and information are closest to the 
reality. How good a theory is depending on the fact how much and how efficiently it can 
explain a particular set of facts. However, some theories are good, some are more 
efficient and some are more extensive, and all tend to be good and useful at explaining 
different spectrums of broader international relations and political science. For instance, 
the liberal intergovernmentalist approach uses some simple assumptions, and from these 
assumptions it produces a rather persuasive explanation of the major history-making 
bargains. However, this theory is unlikely to explain effectively the more complex 
environment of day-to-day politics in the EU. The institutionalist approach also aims for 
parsimony over extensiveness, with some simple assumptions being applied to a limited 
set of case studies, and it is good at predicting outcomes when the rules are fixed and 
information is complete. The supranational governance approach uses a more complex 
set of assumptions and is more able to explain a broader set of policy outcomes from the 
EU system. As a result, the power of the different theories can only be judged where they 
produce clearly identifiable and opposing sets of predictions about the same empirical 
phenomenon. Unfortunately, however, as Simon Hix noted, this situation is rare in the 
EU politics as it is in many areas of social science.183 
       
Furthermore, it has been argued that the uniqueness of the EU is also a barrier to 
theorizing the EU in general terms. Therefore, some argued that the most appropriate way 
to view the EU is as a new polity rather than as a phenomenon of international relations. 
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In fact, no single theory could adequately explain and capture all developments and 
dimensions of the emerging EU polity. In recent years, the study of regional 
organizations particularly the EU has, to a large scale, shifted from the study of 
integration to the study of governance. This idea has significant purchase in international 
relations, but it also has been a huge theme in recent policy analytical literature. The 
governance turn in the EU studies is certainly about deploying policy analytical tools to 
the EU, but it also encourages serious thinking about the application of the conventional 
categories of politics. Therefore, while the theoretical literature on governance treats the 
EU as a polity, it also uses the EU as a laboratory for the exploration of possible 
transformations in policy-making on a much wider scale.184 
       
In the late 1990s, while the emphasis of regional integration studies shifting from grand 
integration theories to governance approaches, the EU itself at the end of the century 
looked less and less like a system of cooperating nation-states and more and more like a 
domestic political system with some rather unique characteristics.185 As a result of these 
developments, many began to speak of European governance as a special political 
phenomenon that demanded adequate explanation. On the other hand, the ASEAN is still 
no more than a struggling system of cooperating various nation-states in Southeast Asia. 
Traditional theoretical insights of realist, neoliberal institutionalist, liberal 
intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches could well explain and capture 
virtually all of ASEAN’s formation and latest developments in the new century. 
       
There should have no doubt about the revival of integration theory in current studies of 
regional organizations particularly concerning with governance turn. Indeed, it was not 
always so (for example, demise of integration theory was witnessed in 1970s and early 
80s concerning with then European Community studies) and the recent phase of 
theoretical reflexivity and innovation owes much to the spillover effects into EU studies 
of creative and different way of thinking across the political sciences. Theories of 
integration and governance approaches are also important because they grapple with one 
of the most remarkable experiments of the twentieth century. As Rosamond concluded, 
contemplating the sources of apparently radical dislocations in patterns of governance in 
Europe and elsewhere in the world and seeking to shed lights upon the processes of 
institutional creativity and economic enmeshment that have been occurring is a vitally 
important enterprise – not just an academic game in contemporary studies of political 
science.186 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Integration is a highly persuasive process in the contemporary macropolitical system. 
Integration is both a process and an end state. The aim of the end state sought when 
actors integrate is a political community. The process or processes include the means or 
instruments whereby that political community is achieved. There is an important proviso 
that must be fulfilled necessarily. The process of integration should be voluntary and 
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consensual. Integration, which proceeds by force and coercion, is imperialism. Although 
historically empire-building has some of the characteristics currently attributed to 
integration, most integration theorists has been insistent that the process of integration 
should be regarded as non-coercive. Taking a historical perspective, the most significant 
attempts at building political communities in the past have been directed towards the 
creation of nation-states. Moreover, national sentiments have often preferred to describe 
this as unification rather than integration. Current study with its emphasis upon 
integration between state actors, can present comprehensive view of the process if 
necessary caution is paid to the nation-building purposes of earlier eras.187 Therefore, 
lessons should be taken from the past in which most of political integrated events 
happened due to the more prevalent way through coercion or by force. But it should not 
be confused about integration with the coercive political unification. Process of 
integration should only be referred to the peaceful ways and means for the creation of 
possible new types of human communities, which can bring together future developments 
in their economic, political and social infrastructure. 
       
It will also be rather formidable subject to assess integration of nation-states whether it 
can provide a pathway to peace and prosperity in global order. According to Immanuel 
Kant’s vision of “perpetual peace” which was expressed more than two hundred years 
ago, the three elements: democracy; economic interdependence; and international law 
and international organizations will eventually lead to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
Each element is essential to maintain the structure of stable peace. If each of three 
elements lacks, the achievement of peace would be less hopeful. This vision can provide 
a possibility of peace through the collaboration and integration of nations-states, which 
are driven by democratic polities consistent with the fundamental norms and standards of 
international society. The immediate effect of this process will furnish most peaceful and 
pragmatic techniques for the change of international system from anarchy to a rational 
and proper global order.  
       
For those who are not optimistic about the feasibility of supranational integration and a 
possible new world order, but who despair of the ability of nation-states to solve their 
security problems in the nuclear age and achieve the welfare of their people in an age of 
overpopulation, scarcity of food, and environmental pollution, integration within and 
among nation-states might be a reasonable outlet with stable peace for a world without 
borders, a unified global society. In short, the advocacy of integration frequently tends to 
become a plea for a world beyond the contemporary nation-state. It is an excuse for 
changing international behaviour and building a better, more cooperative, and more 
harmonious world order, for subordinating power politics to welfare politics and national 
interests to planetary interests, for recognizing before it is too late that humanity shares a 
common destiny. For this reason, the implementation of integration for a better and less 
conflict-prone ‘world politics’ – while acknowledging the continued existence of states – 
will produce behaviour among them as if they had already been abolished. On the other 
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hand, the process of collective cooperation and problem solving through integrated 
community will overcome the defects of the state system.188  
       
At the same time, attempts to force integration will only heighten the resistance of those 
who are the ingredients of the community. It is because they fear that they will be treated 
unfairly in local, national, regional, or global contexts. If large numbers of people feel 
alienated from increasing political integration because they are destitute, they will not 
support movement toward more global governance. Thus the future of world peace 
requires addressing “the structures of mass destitution” no less than the weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, the drawbacks of integration may also generate recurring 
pressures for disintegration. Simultaneously, the shortcomings of an overly decentralized 
political system in a world that is functionally interdependent generate pressures for 
integration. The state is only one of many actors in this process, whether the pressure is 
for more global governance or more subnational control. The state’s territorially limited 
and narrow definition of self-interest and sovereignty makes it sometimes an obstructive 
force for the successful implementation of integration process.189 However, with the end 
of the Cold War and on the basis of the successful integrated experiences of the EU and 
other regional organizations in coming years will further promote the development and 
revival of integration theory in the international system.  
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III. Governance in the European Union 
 
 
3.1 The Formation of the EU in historical context 
 
The European Union (EU) is unique in contemporary world as a successful integrated 
organization in the context to which the economies of separate, highly developed 15 
Western European states have been systematically and thoroughly integrated into a single 
market. Formed in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty, The EU seeks to have its member 
states join together in a political and economic union; adopt a single common currency; 
share the same set of policies on social and domestic issues; and have a common foreign 
and defence policy. In short, the EU seeks to become a true United States of Europe. The 
EU did not just come into existence within a short time. Nearly a half-century of 
preparation preceded its creation. The EU began in the 1950s and 1960s as the European 
Community (EC), a group of Western European states that was primarily an economic 
entity.190  
             
At its inception, the EC consisted of three communities: the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) which was created in 1951, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) which was established in 1957, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) which was also formed in 1957. Since 1968, these three have shared 
common organizational structures. The members of the EU are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (who were the original “Six”), 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom who joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, and 
Portugal and Spain in 1986. In 1994, the EU reached agreement with Austria, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden on the terms of membership beginning in 1995. Each of these 
countries must hold a national referendum on EU membership in order to join it.191 Along 
this trend, it was expected that these efforts for further enlargement would bring all of 
Western European countries into the sphere of EU. However, people of Norway rejected 
the proposal to become a EU member in a national referendum and Switzerland could not 
reach agreement on its terms of accession. With the end of the Cold War, a number of 
Central and Eastern European countries from former communist bloc were also willing to 
join the EU. Intensive debates for further enlargement of the EU were dominant 
phenomena in the late 1990s as a major consideration for the existing members, candidate 
countries and for the organization itself. After a decade long preparations to meet the 
accession criteria for entering the EU, ten countries from Eastern and Southern Europe 
(Czech republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia) became new members in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria also joined the EU 
as the newest members in year 2007. At present, EU consists of altogether twenty-seven 
member states. 
             
The EU possesses great symbolic achievement compared with other regional integrated 
organizations because its degree of integration is far greater than that of a simple 
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common market. The EU embodies deep regional integration including harmonization of 
social welfare, environmental and other policies, as well as legal rules and standards. Co-
operation in transportation, energy, education and other infrastructure projects is 
undertaken under its umbrella. There has also been an ambitious pursuit of monetary 
union and a single currency. Political union is the ultimate goal of some members. The 
EU holds wide legislative powers and is presumed supreme to national laws in some 
areas. Tighter integration requires that a greater degree of national sovereignty be 
relinquished to the EU, a matter of much concern to some members such as the United 
Kingdom. The method behind the integration process has been to form a framework 
system first and then act according to it.192 
             
The EU is governed by a quadripartite institutional system, which is consisting of an 
Executive Commission, a Council of Ministers, a European Parliament, and a Court of 
Justice. The Commission is the EU bureaucracy and initiates the Union’s policies. It also 
proposes legislation, manages the budget of the EU, and represents the EU in 
international trade negotiations. The Council of Ministers is the most powerful political 
body which accepts or rejects the policy initiatives of the Commission only by 
unanimous agreement; unanimity is also required in the Council for certain important 
decisions. The Council of Ministers is comprised the representatives usually cabinet 
ministers drawn from the member states of the EU. The European Parliament is directly 
elected and acts more in an advisory and oversight role, although its power has been 
growing. The European Court adjudicates disputes concerning EU law.193 
             
Looking back over the EU’s history, several generalizations194 about the integrative 
process are clear. In the first place, the success to date of economic integration is perhaps 
best explained in terms of the competitive edge and profitability to be found in economics 
of scale for advanced industrial societies. That is, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, it was in the clear economics self-interest of the comparatively small states of 
Western Europe to combine their markets if they were to compete effectively with such 
economic superpowers as the United States (which has itself constituted a “common 
market” ever since the 1789 adoption of its Constitution that prohibited its states from 
creating trade barriers among themselves). The dynamics of a free market system 
produce a continual demand for ever-larger economic units in the modern world, with the 
fewest possible restraints on the wide-scale movement of capital, labour, and goods. The 
Common Market, therefore, has served the self-interest of its creators by adapting to the 
requirements of competitiveness in the modern world. 
             
Second, the European Union has been built from the very beginning upon a faith that 
gradualism could produce the organic growth of integration. The process started with 
what was simplest and most manageable, then provided an outline for beginning a far 
more complex process in the Treaty of Rome. That treaty amounts to a constitutional 
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agreement on broad structural arrangements within which policy continues to evolve. It is 
assumed that not all problems have to be solved at once. What was an insoluble issue of 
high politics in the early years may not seem so by tomorrow, simply because a social 
process of cooperative interaction has extended its roots more deeply in the intervening 
period. The goal of achieving a fully integrated internal market by December 1992 only 
became realistic in the late 1980s, when it could be built upon three decades of gradual 
movement in that direction.  
             
Third, European integration has also been based upon respect for political pluralism. 
Such respect is assumed in functionalist theory, which opposes the potentially coercive 
amalgamation of high politics traditionally associated with conquest and imperialism. 
Within the European Union, important political differences remain among the elites and 
among different ideological groups. Some have viewed the EU’s relationship with certain 
third world countries as increasingly one of economic imperialism. Others on the political 
right have feared that integration will centralize ever more economic decisions in a 
distant bureaucracy of “Eurocrats” unmoved by considerations of nationalism. At the 
moment, it is impossible to know whether these kinds of objections can ever gain the 
support necessary to pull the EU apart; but it should be noted that a diversity of political 
interests is always assumed to exist within a pluralistic, democratic society. The issue is 
whether they can be peacefully accommodated in ways that are at least minimally 
acceptable to all. If that does happen within the EU, then it can be concluded that enough 
spillover has occurred to produce a measure of political, in addition to economic, 
integration.  
             
Fourth, integration would presumably move forward to the point that the members 
constitute what Deutsch and his associates defined as a pluralistic security community. 
Individuals and groups throughout the European Union now possess “dependable 
expectations of peaceful change” when political conflicts arise between them. No one 
suppose warfare will break out between them, as it had several times among many of 
them in the not-so-distant past as the history witnessed. 
             
Many would argue that the EU’s dynamism, and particularly its goal of completing its 
integration as a common market by 1992, helped accelerate the sudden collapse of 
communism throughout Eastern Europe in 1989. By the same token, these dramatic 
developments to the East instantly confronted the EU with unprecedented challenges, for 
it immediately became a magnet attracting most, if not all, the states of Europe into its 
orbit. Yet, because of the great differences in their recent economic histories, the two 
halves of Europe cannot merge economically without difficult, perhaps painful, periods 
of adjustment for which earlier enlargements of the EU are not appropriate models. While 
most, if not all, the reformed states of Eastern Europe seek closer ties with the EU, most 
observers believe that admission would first entail the creation of some kind of associate 
status for these nations until they are ready, economically and politically, for full 
membership. 
             
The EU also has some other issues to be handled with great caution. One problem is how 
to designate its future shape when it makes its major task for widening and deepening of 
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further integration. The establishment of monetary union throughout common market will 
also be a tackled issue. Monetary union entails significant challenges in the reconciliation 
of the vast differences in financial strength and macroeconomic policy within the EU. 
Developing effective corrective measures for an operational monetary union will require 
considerable inventiveness. Moreover, the pursuit of deep integration is met with an 
absence of consensus in public opinion. Members who resent the tight bureaucracy of and 
interference from EU in national standards and ways of doing things often resist any 
reduction in national sovereignty. Fears of German domination are also present among 
some EU members as the process of deepening integration continues.195  
             
Another big issue of the EU will be concerned with defence. The key question is whether 
the European Union can and will create its own defence identity without undermining 
NATO, the backbone of Western security upon which most EU countries have relied. 
This topic will lead to a controversial debate between the EU and the USA who is the 
chief architect of the NATO. Most of the leading countries of the EU regard the European 
integration process will also determine the future viability and role of the major 
organizations in Europe – the United Nations and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO. They also viewed that in the absence of a 
Common Defence, and with uncertainty over NATO’s role, cooperation among European 
nations within those multinational bodies will be confined to ad hoc responses in a 
situation of progressive renationalisation of security and defence policies – in particular 
on the part of those nations whose cooperation is required most. Depending upon these 
considerations, NATO’s future viability in Europe will be largely determined by how it 
accommodates an emerging European defence entity and develops into a more binary 
organization built around a stronger and broader EU-US relationship.196                  
             
In less than forty years, the EU has transformed the economic and political life of Europe 
in many respects. Whether it is also transcending the nation-state system by inventing 
post-Westphalian political structures remains an intriguing question. While the 
economies of member states are increasingly integrated into a single market, the 
amalgamation of their separate political systems is much less certain. That is largely 
because the integration effort has been pursued via the approach of functionalism, which 
deliberately avoids attacking the high political issues of amalgamation head-on.197 
Similarly, the EU has often been characterized as being inward-looking, reactive rather 
than proactive and less dedicated to the cause of multilateralism due to its internal 
preoccupation.198  
             
Although the EU incorporates some supranational elements, the term ‘pooled 
sovereignty’ better captures its essence, because states remain paramount in its 
institutional structures and decision-making procedures. Through their participation in the 
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supranational integrated organ on the one hand, pooled sovereignty of member states 
characterizes a central property of the EU on the other. Indeed, no transfer of authority to 
a central body has occurred. Instead, critical decisions are still made in the Council of 
Ministers, where states dominates, and most decisions of the EU still depend on national 
governments for implementation. Sovereignty is nonetheless shared, in the sense that 
decision-making responsibility is now spread among governments and between them and 
the EU’s institutions.199  
             
Therefore, it may be useful to define integration and unity as they applied to the EC 
before 1993 and now to the EU. Integration was the process of reducing barriers to trade 
and other forms of interchange between EC members and of creating EC political and 
economic institutions that could aid in this process. When the EC evolved into the EU in 
1993, this process of integration had moved a long way. Unity, by comparison on the 
other hand, was and is the objective of having all EU states have common political, 
economic, social, foreign, and defence policies, that is, of creating a true United States of 
Europe. Despite the change in name from the EC to the EU, and despite the considerable 
progress that has been made in European integration, neither the EC nor the EU achieved 
unity.200   
 
 
3.1.1 Institutional Structure, Major Actors and Basic Socioeconomic and Political Data of 
the EU 
 
The EU has grown out of three originally separate Communities (ECSC, EEC, and 
Euratom), each with its own institutional structures. These were formally merged in 1967 
as a single collective organization. The major elements originally comprised of: a 
collective executive of kinds – the European Commission; a collective forum for 
representatives of member governments – the Council (of Ministers); a mechanism for 
binding arbitration and legal interpretation – the European Court of Justice (ECJ); and a 
parliamentary chamber – the European Parliament (EP) – with members of elected from 
the political parties of the member states, which was later by direct election. In addition, 
the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) provided a forum for consulting other sectors 
of society. The powers, main duties and responsibilities of these actors are set out in the 
EU’s various treaties, and have been periodically revised.201 These EU institutions 
function the process of governing in collaboration with the member states’ governments. 
       
Among the EU institutions, the Council brings together the governments of the member 
states, and is organized into several sectoral councils of national ministers, for instance, 
the Council of Agriculture Ministers). The Council performs both executive and 
legislative functions: it sets the medium and long-term policy agenda, and is the dominant 
so-called second chamber in the EU legislative process. The Council made its decisions 
usually by unanimity, but applies a system of qualified majority voting (QMV) on a 
number of important issues (where the votes of the member states are weighted according 
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to their size and a large majority is needed for decisions to pass). Also each government 
in the Council chooses its members of the Commission, and the governments collectively 
nominate the Commission President.202 National officials in the committees and working 
groups of the Council are usually responsible for preparing meetings of ministers. 
Traditionally, the most important of these committees has been the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper), composed of the heads and deputies of the member 
states’ permanent representatives resided in Brussels. These committees meet each other 
weekly at least to agree items on the Council agenda, and to identify those that need to be 
discussed as well as endorsed by ministers.203 
       
The European Commission is comprised of a political college of 27 commissioners (one 
from each member state) and a bureaucracy of 36 Directorates-General (DG) and other 
administrative services. The Commission is responsible for initiating policy proposals 
and monitoring the implementation of policies once they have been adopted, and is hence 
the main executive body of the EU.204 
       
The other major representative institution in the EU is the European Parliament (EP). The 
EP is made up of 785 MEPs, who are selected in European wide elections every five 
years. The EP possesses various powers of legislative consultation, amendment and veto 
under the EU’s legislative procedures. The EP can also amend the budget of the EU. The 
EP can also scrutinize the exercise of executive powers by the Commission and the 
Council, votes on the Council’s nomination for the Commission President and the full 
Commission College, and also has the power to overthrow the whole Commission with a 
vote of censure. The highest judicial authority in the EU is the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which works closely with the national courts to oversee the implementation of the 
EU law. The EU also has an independent monetary authority – the European System of 
Central Banks – that includes the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks of 
the member states in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).205 
       
The European Council began its existence in the occasional summit meetings of heads of 
states and governments of the EU member states. From 1974 onwards, under the pushing 
of Giscard d’Estaing, then French President, European Councils were put on the agenda 
to a regular basis, meeting at least twice a year. Successive treaty reforms have brought 
the European Council on to a more formal basis. However, it remains the case that the 
European Council operates to an extent outside the main institutional structure of the EU. 
The location and preparation of its meetings, together with the drafting of its conclusions, 
depend essentially on the presidency-in-office of the Council, and therefore the agenda of 
its sessions is much influenced by the preferences of the government in the presidency.206 
      These institutions produce five types of policy in the EU207: 
 
                                                 
202 Hix (2005) op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
203 Wallace (2000): “The Institutional Setting”, p. 17. 
204 Hix (2005) op. cit., p. 8. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Wallace (2000): “The Institutional Setting”, p. 20. 
207 Hix (2005) op. cit., p. 8-9.  
  
 
65
• Regulatory policies: these are rules on the free movements of goods, services, 
capital and persons in the single market, and concerns with the harmonization of many 
national production standards, such as environmental and social policies, and common 
competition policies. 
• Expenditure policies: these policies involve the transfer of resources through the 
EU budget, and include the Common Agricultural Policy, socioeconomic and regional 
cohesion policies, as well as research and development policies. 
• Macroeconomic policies: these policies are pursued in the EMU, where the ECB 
manages the money supply and interest rate policy, while the Council is responsible for 
exchange rate policy and the coordination and scrutiny of national tax and employment 
policies. 
• Citizen policies: these are rules that extend and protect the economic, political and 
social rights of the EU citizens and include cooperation in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA), common asylum and immigration policies, police and judicial 
cooperation and the provisions for EU citizenship. 
• Foreign policies: these are aimed at ensuring that the EU speaks with a single 
coherent voice on the world stage, and include trade policies, external economic 
relations, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
 
 
 
Table (2):  The Basic Socioeconomic and Political Data of the EU Member States 
 
Basic Socioeconomic Data Political 
Data 
Representation in the EU 
Member state 
Date 
joined 
Population 
in Million 
(2003) 
GDP per 
head in 
Euro 
Territorial 
Structure 
Votes in 
the 
Council 
under 
QMV 
No. of 
Comm-
issioners 
Members of 
European 
Parliament 
(2004) 
Austria 1995 8.1 27700 Federal 10 1 18 
Belgium 1952 10.4 26570 Federal 12 1 24 
Bulgaria 2007 7.8 7450 Unitary 10 1 18 
Cyprus 2004 0.7 19690 Unitary 4 1 6 
Czech 
Republic 
2004 10.2 15880 Unitary 12 1 24 
Denmark 1973 5.4 27700 Unitary 7 1 14 
Estonia 2004  1.4 11020 Unitary 4 1 6 
Finland 1995 5.2 24910 Unitary 7 1 14 
France 1952 59.6 25770 Regional 29 1 78 
Germany 1952 82.5 24940 Federal 29 1 99 
Greece 1981 11.0 18700 Unitary 12 1 24 
Hungary 2004 10.1 13970 Unitary 12 1 24 
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Ireland 1973 4.0 30590 Unitary 7 1 13 
Italy 1952 57.3 23960 Regional 29 1 78 
Latvia 2004 2.3 9530 Unitary 4 1 9 
Lithuania 2004 3.5 10800 Unitary 7 1 13 
Luxembourg 1952 0.4 46560 Unitary 4 1 6 
Malta 2004 0.4 17450 Unitary 3 1 5 
Netherlands 1952 16.2 26900 Unitary 13 1 27 
Poland 2004 38.2 10920 Regional 27 1 54 
Portugal 1986 10.4 17100 Unitary 12 1 24 
Romania 2007 21.8 7460 Unitary 14 1 35 
Slovakia 2004 5.4 11970 Unitary 7 1 14 
Slovenia 2004 2.0 17450 Unitary 4 1 7 
Spain 1986 40.7 21770 Regional 27 1 54 
Sweden 1995 8.9 25700 Unitary 10 1 19 
United 
Kingdom 
1973 59.3 27080 Unitary/ 
Regional 
29 1 78 
        
EU 15  379.4 25210   15 570 
EU 27  453.7 22940  345 27 785 
 
 
Source: Eurostat & Hix (2005) op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
 
Table (2) shows some basic socioeconomic and political data of the EU member states 
and their representation in the EU institutions. As the data demonstrate, no member state 
is either physically in size or economically or politically powerful enough to dominate 
the EU. In this sense, every member state is a minority in the EU political system.208 
 
3.1.2 Positive and Negative Integration of the EU 
 
As mentioned above, the EU is a sui generis regional orgainization in the contemporary 
world. Its uniqueness also belongs to its special characters of positive and negative 
integration. Negative integration – the removal of national barriers – can be distinguished 
from positive integration, which can be defined as the establishment of common ways of 
intervening in economies of member states. Though the EU possesses both types of 
integration, it must be acknowledged that the EU itself has more success in the former but 
not that much in latter. Since the time of revival of European integration in mid-1980s, 
the strategy chosen by European elites in driving the momentum of the EU was quite 
successful because it relied on negative rather positive intervention. Completion of Single 
market also reinforces this insight by witnessing the then EC Commission publishing a 
paper calling for measures under certain categories: the removal of physical, technical 
and fiscal barriers.209 
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Positive integration requires the introduction of an active, supranational policy for its 
success. Typically, the EU has negotiated a policy format, and the task is to put it into 
operation in the member states. Positive integration often entails market-correcting rules 
in economic policy areas. It means that policy is designed to limit damaging effects of 
market processes. Key aspect is the agreed policy template needs to be downloaded to the 
member state level and the Commission has to ensure that legislation is properly 
implemented. Otherwise, the Commission has authority to refer laggard governments to 
the ECJ if it is necessary. The supremacy of European law is indicative of the hierarchical 
nature of this type of positive integration. There also exists a pronounced coercive 
dimension in these arrangements and it is the member governments that have to ensure 
that market correction is put into practice effectively.210 
       
Unlike positive integration, negative integration relates to areas where the removal of 
national barriers suffices to create a common policy. National legislation is often not 
required to impose policy into practice. In fact, European legislation is even unnecessary 
in some cases as the rules may be embedded in the treaties themselves. The Commission 
is delegated extensive powers and the jurisprudence of the ECJ can be relied upon to 
enforce the framework of rules, such as those formulated in the supranational treaties. 
Negative integration is, in this sense, typically concerned with market making. Put 
another way, EU level rules are designed to allow the efficient functioning of the market. 
In short, the market-making character of negative integration creates a much more 
horizontal process of policy adjustment in member states associated with 
Europeanization. In negative integration it is the competition amongst rules or amongst 
socio-economic actors that accounts for Europeanization rather than the need for national 
policy to comply with EU policy templates, like under positive integration.211 
 
 
3.1.3 Trade Integration in the EU 
 
In accordance with supranationalist argument of increasing volume of transnational 
activities as a parameter of regional integration, trade integration of the EU and intra-EU 
trade in particular should be taken a look to view how the EU pursues its economic 
integration. The brief analysis of the EU trade integration also shows the economic 
rationality of economic integration in the EU concerning with the establishment of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The costs and benefits of forming a single 
currency union differ depending on the degree of economic integration of the states 
involved in that regional project. The benefits of monetary union increase as trade 
between the member states increases. More economic integration means removal of the 
transaction costs of currency exchange among member states. Moreover, as trade 
increases the cost of surrendering the exchange rate as an instrument of national 
macroeconomic policy declines. As the structural conditions of the economies level out, 
with the more efficient allocation of resources due to the single currency and the gradual 
synchronization of economic cycles, the likelihood of asymmetric shocks falls. 
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Therefore, as trade integration increases, the need to use an independent exchange rate 
falls back.212 
       
In the middle of 1990s the level of imports and exports of goods (excluding services) 
between the member states varied considerably as shown in Table (3). For the larger 
economies intra-EU trade accounted for less than a quarter of total GDP, while for many 
of the smaller economies intra-EU trade claimed for more than half of total GDP. For 
example, Germany, the core economy of the EU, trade with the rest of the world was 
almost as large as trade with the rest of the EU. Put it other way, when the decision was 
taken to launch EMU, on the basis of simple economic cost-benefit calculations the 
smaller states were more likely to benefit than the larger states. The empirical data also 
suggests that between 1994 and 2001 trade integration in the EU progressed faster for the 
Euro zone states than for the non-Euro zone countries, as shown in the case of the UK 
where there was even a decline in trade with the rest of the EU as a percentage of the 
GDP of the UK. As Hix pointed, the economic benefits of EMU membership might be 
endogenous to the creation of EMU. Therefore, once a political decision has been made 
to join EMU, the economics will follow and trade integration will increase as a result of 
adopting the single currency.213 
       
In sum, economic logic might be able to explain why EMU was launched in the 1990s, 
but it only offers a partial explanation of why certain states joined and others did not. 
Economic data suggests initially that EMU should have been launched only between the 
core member states. Empirical data could not be able to explain why Spain and Italy 
joined when they had comparatively low levels of trade integration and potentially 
divergent economic cycles, meanwhile Denmark did not join despite its comparatively 
high level of trade integration. These questions are more conveniently and convincingly 
answered only by politics rather than economics.214 
 
 
Table (3):  Trade integration in the EU (1994 ― 2004) 
 
 Intra-EU trade 
(value of imports plus 
exports as % of GDP) 
 
Non-EU trade 
(value of imports plus exports as 
% of GDP) 
 
“Euro 12” 1994 2001 1994 2001 
Belgium 83.6* 113.5 29.3* 44.5 
Luxembourg ― 94.5 ― 20.0 
Ireland 80.2 83.0 34.1 46.8 
Netherlands 65.0 75.3 27.7 39.0 
Austria 33.7 49.6 16.8 26.8 
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Portugal 39.6 44.8 12.5 13.4 
Finland 30.4 36.2 24.0 26.3 
Spain 22.8 31.9 11.5 14.4 
Germany 23.1 31.8 16.3 25.5 
France 23.6 31.1 13.5 18.2 
Italy 20.9 23.9 14.5 19.4 
Greece 20.8 16.5 11.4 16.2 
     
“Other EU states”     
Denmark 35.4 40.9 17.3 20.2 
Sweden 33.6 37.7 23.8 25.6 
United Kingdom 24.1 22.6 18.7 19.7 
 
* Belgium and Luxembourg combined. 
 
Source: Hix (2005) op. cit., p. 322. 
 
 
 
3.2 Determinants of Policy Processes in the European Union 
 
The EU is an emerging polity in which policy processes, decision-making procedures and 
policy-making have significant impact on its member countries and also determine ‘who 
gets what, when and how’215 in present day European society. The EU is not a ‘state’ in 
the traditional Weberian meaning of the word because it lacks a ‘monopoly on the 
legitimate use of coercion’ as this power of coercion such as police and security forces 
still remains in the hands of the national governments of the EU member states. Indeed, 
the EU is a new and complex political system produced by the process of European 
integration. This EU political system is highly decentralized and diffused on the basis of 
voluntary commitment of the member states and its citizens in administering various 
forms of nation-state’s power.216 
 
Decisions are, according to David Easton, the outputs of the political system, which is 
based on the idea of political life as a boundary maintaining set of interactions embedded 
in and surrounded by other social systems that continually influence it.217  Moreover, 
political interactions can be distinguished from other sorts of interactions by the fact that 
they are oriented primarily toward a process by which values are authoritatively allocated 
within a society.218 Peterson and Bomberg defined decisions as choices or solutions that 
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end some uncertainty or reduce contention. Whenever there is a choice, the end result is a 
decision. However, a decision is not the same as a policy, which is an action or inaction 
by public authorities facing choices between alternative courses of public action. 
Therefore, policies are product of decisions about what to do, how to do it, and how to 
decide what to do. In short, decisions can be labeled as the building blocks of policies.219  
Decision-making can simply be defined as the act of choosing the best option among 
available alternatives about which uncertainty of losses and gains coexist. In terms with 
the constructivist approach, decisions are socially constructed and therefore decision 
makers construct their national interest within the boundary of their understanding of 
their environments, nature of their domestic and foreign policy objectives and security 
goals as well as relations among the various important states, international institutions 
and other actors.220  
       
The policy process in the EU is the product of a competition between the national and the 
transnational arenas to provide effective or authoritative results in regional and global 
dimensions. The sense of movement in the policy process and a kind of uncertainty about 
its outcomes are the usual phenomena of policy pendulum which swings between the 
national political arenas of the participating member countries, on the one hand, and the 
transnational arena, with its regional and global context on the other hand.221 There are 
multiple issues embedded in the policy process and the consequence is a policy-making 
process characterized by conflicts of distributional nature, resource dependencies and 
various nested games for the centralization of governance functions.222    
       
It will always be an interesting question how complex it is to generalize in which way the 
EU functions on daily basis connecting national, sub-national, intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions and actors interacting with each other in bringing collective 
forms of decision-making at different levels for achieving variety of their own interests. It 
will enable to understand more about the jigsaw puzzle of modern time regional 
organization like the European Union. The close analysis of decision-making and policy 
processes in the EU will be worthy for having a better understanding of regional 
integrated communities in the globalized world. At this point, determinants of and 
differentiation in the policy processes, which in turn come out of different decision-
making procedures, will also be examined in the EU. The ongoing debate about 
democratic legitimacy, reform politics and accountability in the EU will also be explored. 
       
As Helen Wallace pointed out, the policy process of the EU political system operates like 
a kind of ‘political market place’. There is no clear structure of authority or hierarchy of 
power in this system. There are no visible fundamental rules about who can participate in 
the policy process or how or when. To be sure formal procedures provide a sort of 
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structure; however, it is the informal politics that determine the outcomes. Apparently, it 
sounds like a common understanding of the fact that all politics originated from a mixture 
of the formal and the informal, and most political processes in democratic countries 
depend on bargaining and brokerage. But the balance between these formal and informal 
politics is distinctive in the context of European integration. These formal procedures 
have become increasingly complicated over the years and the dense web of committees 
that have emerged to advise the Commission, and to help in its implementation of policy, 
known as nowadays ‘comitology’, symbolizes this procedural complexity. They are 
subject to recurrent redefinition and constantly vulnerable to the changes of political and 
economic context. As a result, the informal processes have to bear rather more political 
weight than in a long-established polity with firmly established rules and practices.223  
       
One of the defining characteristics of the EU is the openness of opportunities for access, 
opportunities taken by a great number of national officials, by many representatives of 
organized sectoral interests, by regional and local authorities, and a range of other interest 
groups, even individuals who think that they have something to contribute and can 
benefit from the process. A question that arises at this stage is whether the outcome is to 
make policy formulation, which is particularly vulnerable to strategic manipulation by 
those who are able to define their preferences coherently and to bargain them through 
effectively.224 
        
The EU decision-making and policy processes are multifaceted in nature and it is difficult 
to cover the sheer range and complexity of its processes: a host of actors, operating 
within the context of numerous EU and national level institutions, interact with one 
another on the basis of an array of different rules and procedures. In order to bring an 
overall perspective to the complexity of the EU policy processes, several factors can be 
identified as being important in determining the particular intermingling of actors and 
channels in any specific context. Neill Nugent analyzed these determining factors in 
details as follows: (1) the treaty base, (2) the proposed status of the matter under 
consideration, (3) the degree of generality or specificity of the policy issue, (4) the 
newness, importance, controversiality or political sensitivity of the issue in question, (5) 
the balance of policy responsibilities between EU and national levels, and (6) the 
perceptions of prevailing political and economic circumstances.225  
       
In short, the EU policy process is the one that produces varied outcomes, with significant 
differentiations among member states. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the national 
institutional settings as to get a grip on the EU-level institutions for better understanding 
of the EU policy processes as a whole. In other words, the EU policy process requires to 
be viewed through several sets of spectacles. Different lenses may be necessary 
depending on the division of powers and influences between these different levels and 
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arenas of policy developments. Certainly it should focus on what happens in and through 
the EU institutions and how far do the particular features of the EU’s institutional system 
produce a distinct kind of policy process. Therefore, a peripheral vision will be useful to 
look at thoroughly the country-level processes (both national and local), regional and 
global level for understanding a fluid and dynamic way of policy processes in the EU.226 
 
3.2.1 Treaty bases 
 
Treaties of the EU are written monuments, which rule the operation of decision-making 
and policy processes of its political system. The EU does not yet have a formal 
constitution and ambitious efforts for establishing such a legal framework still need to 
overcome many obstacles. There are three ‘founding treaties’ of the EU: the Treaty of 
Paris and the two Treaties of Rome. These founding treaties were added and amended by 
three further subsequent treaties in the 1960s and 1970s in ways that affected the powers 
of the institutions of the EU. One of them merged the Commissions and the Councils of 
the three Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom) in 1967, while the other two in 1970 
and 1975 were related to the budgetary provisions. Since then there were no major 
revisions of the Treaties for another decade. From the mid-1980s, however, there were 
four new treaties: the Single European Act (SEA), the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty consequently.227  
       
Moravcsik argued that the making of treaties and their subsequent reforms are the 
outcome of careful bargaining and agreement among the member state governments in 
intergovernmental conferences.228 One consequence of multiple contending actors in the 
EU is that the treaties provide ample room for interpretation. The treaties are discussed 
vehemently to reach a solution or an agreement in interstate negotiations, in which there 
is a powerful incentive for allowing deliberate ambiguity on points of contention so that 
each government can claim success in representing national interests. The basic treaties 
of the EU have provided legitimacy for Commission initiatives in several policy areas, 
yet they are not clear enough to give the Commission wider authority in designing 
institutions. This has been mentioned as a ‘treaty base game’ in which the Commission 
legitimates its preferences by referring to a prior treaty commitment.229  
       
At its outset, the requirement of unanimity procedure in the EU tends to produce lowest 
common denominator treaty bargains. However, the process of European integration has 
been able to proceed because different governments have placed different focus on 
various issues, and therefore have been prepared to lose on some issues in return for 
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winning on other issues that are more important to their national interests. In this way, the 
resulting package deals have steadily added more and new competences to the EU and 
also delegated increasing executive powers to the Commission. For instance, the Treaty 
of Paris (signed in 1951 and came into effect in 1952), which founded the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), was in essence a deal between France and Germany. 
France sought to acquire a framework for planned production and distribution in its own 
coal and steel industry as a return for its allowance to German reconstruction and 
reindustrialization. For securing these objectives, the member state governments 
delegated certain powers to a new supranational body: the High Authority, the precursor 
of the Commission. The idea was mainly to ensure the decision-making efficiency by 
delegating to a supranational body for taking responsibility to generate policy ideas and 
management of policy on daily business. This idea of combining intergovernmental 
decision-making with policy initiative and management by supranational executive – the 
so-called ‘Monnet Method’ – offered the model for the making of future treaties.230 
       
The Treaties of Rome (signed in 1957 and came into effect in 1958), which established 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), was again a bargain between the German goal of a common 
market and the French aim of protection for agricultural products through the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EEC. For achieving these aims, the EEC treaty 
delegated policy initiation in the common market and administration of the CAP to the 
Commission. The package of the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 by 
European heads of government and came into effect in 1987. Its main economic goal was 
to establish a single market by 31 December 1992. The Commission played a crucial 
leading role by detailing how the single market could be achieved and by preparing treaty 
reforms. The SEA also introduced provisions for intergovernmental cooperation in 
foreign policy, which is known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), although 
member states decided that the Council should hold the executive authority.231 As 
Moravcsik correctly noted, the SEA was the new impulse toward European integration 
with optimism and new institutional momentum by replacing malaise and stagnation of 
an era of Europessimism and Eurosclerosis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The SEA 
linked further liberalization of European trade with some institutional procedural reforms. 
It expanded more use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers to 
regulatory issues connecting with the realization of the internal market by the 1992 
deadline. The SEA also granted slightly greater powers to the European Parliament by 
introducing a new legislative procedure know as the cooperation procedure.232 
       
In terms of EU treaties, the EU is mainly based on the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
which was signed in 1991 and came into effect in 1993. The TEU also institutionalized 
the Commission’s plan for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the new currency 
of Euro. The TEU is made up of several components – Common Provisions, the Treaties 
of the three European Communities (EC) (known as the first pillar of the EU), Provisions 
on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) officially known as the second pillar 
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of the EU, Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
known as the third pillar of the EU, and a series of protocols and declarations. One of the 
most crucial points in its functions of the TEU is the formulation of several different 
decision-making procedures and specification of the circumstances in which they are to 
be used. Therefore, the TEU plays the role of fundamental importance in shaping the 
nature of the EU’s policy processes and in determining the powers exercised by 
institutions and actors within the processes.233 
       
The Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997 and came into effect in 1999) modified the TEU 
in various ways and introduced several institutional reforms, High Representative for 
CFSP, and provisions for enhanced cooperation. In particular, it moved policy on visas, 
immigration and asylum from the third pillar to the first EC pillar, and it renamed the 
third pillar as ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’.234  
       
The Nice Treaty (signed in 2001 and came into effect in 2003) was principally aimed at 
reforming the EU institutions in preparation for the enlargement of the EU and accession 
of Central, Eastern and Southern European countries. It also introduced reform of 
Commission and Council in terms of voting weights, European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and expansion of majority voting. Finally, the ‘Treaty establishing a EU 
Constitution’ (signed in 2004 but not yet ratified; indeed glimmer of hope for revival in 
process after France and the Netherlands voted against it in mid-2005) would formalize 
the allocation of policy competences between the EU and the member states. The 
Constitution would also introduce some more reforms in the decision-making procedures 
among institutions like the weighting of votes in the Council, two new offices (a single 
chair of the European Council and an EU Foreign Minister), the number of 
Commissioners, and the power of the European Parliament in the legislative and 
budgetary procedures.235 
       
In fact, the ratification process of the ‘Treaty establishing EU Constitution’ even showed 
the highlight of a member state’s threat of unilateral noncompliance. Probably the most 
effective sanction against supranational institutions may be the revision of mandate given 
authority to them. In order to do so, the ability of member states to control supranational 
institutions by reforming the rules and procedures in their mandate depend critically on 
the voting rules for institutional change and the default condition in the event that 
member states fail to agree on such a change. The threat of treaty reform and revision is, 
to some extent, sounds like the ultimate threat, but the institutional barriers to carrying 
the threat through – calling of an intergovernmental conference, agreement by unanimity 
procedure, ratification by member states, are high. For this reason, the threat of treaty 
revision is essentially the nuclear option – excessively effective, but difficult to use this 
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option in reality – is therefore, a relatively ineffective and non-credible means of member 
state control.236 
       
The development of the EU treaties is about the history of selective delegation of political 
and administrative powers by the member state governments to the Commission. Member 
states learned from past mistakes, which further suggest for treaty reforms in the EU. 
When signing treaties, governments are not able to predict the precise implications of 
treaty provisions and new decision-making rules, or exactly how the Commission will act 
when granted new powers. It was evident in the cases of Treaties of Rome and the SEA. 
As a consequence, the governments were more reluctant during the period of interstate 
negotiations in the TEU, Amsterdam and Nice for delegating more powers to the 
Commission in new or highly sensitive policy areas. It even turned out that they reformed 
the legislative procedures to restrict the agenda-setting powers of the Commission in 
those areas where policy initiative has already been handed over to the Commission.237 
 
 
3.2.2 Differentiation in the EU Policy Processes 
 
The EU policy processes vary over the years because the EU is distinctly a highly 
differentiated polity.238 Further enlargement of the EU with the inclusion of Central and 
Eastern European countries and successful launching of the Economic and Monetary 
Union will even make the EU’s governance more complex and transform its policy 
processes more unconventional. As Peterson and Bomberg argued, the challenge of 
understanding the EU is best handled by examining decision-making and policy 
processes at different levels of governance using different lenses or theoretical models. 
Two kinds of contrasts are visible. Firstly, different actors and factors govern the making 
of different types of EU decisions and policy processes. Secondly, there exists a vast 
amount of differences between policy sectors from their initiation, formulation and 
implementation, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU policies are the outcome of numerous 
sequential decisions taken at different levels in a multi-level system. It is an important 
task for any analysis of the EU to explain how the decision-making and process processes 
of the EU change over the time. The EU’s tendency of unpredictability faithfully 
corresponds to these changes, which are needed to break through political impasse among 
member state governments.239 Therefore, EU decision-making should be approached as 
‘actor-centered’ with clarification derived from the different interests and varied 
strategies of numerous actors in the EU policy process.240 
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The differentiation of EU policy processes occurs because of the nature of decision-
making beyond the nation-state and it swings back and forth between the country and the 
transnational arenas. The transnational arena includes both European and broader global 
or multilateral frameworks, which provide chances for the resolution of policy problems 
beyond the state. Choices are made depending on different kinds of factors to assign and 
to affect policy responsibilities. These factors are the contextual – when and where; the 
functional – what; the motivational – why; and the institutional – how. To explain more 
in details, contextual factors derive from the broad circumstances in Europe over the 
decades since the end of Second World War like transformation of nation-state with 
European integration and globalization. Functional factors derive from some of the core 
functions of politics that recur across the Europe to meet demands for socio-economic 
adjustment. Motivational factors concern with the rationales of the actors involved in the 
EU to achieve specific goals or to resolve specific problems. Institutional factors relate to 
particular patterns of institutions, both formal and informal, political, but also judicial, 
which are formed around the EU. EU institutions render both opportunities and 
constraints in channeling and structuring the behavior of political actors from the 
participating countries. Therefore, institutional factors are crucial for understanding the 
EU policy processes over the time.241  
 
3.2.3 Decision-making Procedures of the EU 
 
There are two types of decision-making procedures in the EU: (1) the budgetary 
procedure, which adopts the annual budget of the EU and (2) the various legislative 
procedures. The budget is divided into compulsory and non-compulsory items of 
expenditure. Compulsory expenditure consists mainly of agricultural expenditure, which 
remains the largest single item in the budget. The European Parliament (EP) can only 
propose modifications to the compulsory items by an absolute majority of its members. 
However, it has the right to amend the draft budget for non-compulsory items with the 
effect that the EP has a final say on these items of expenditure within the constraints 
imposed by the multi-annual financial perspectives. The balance between compulsory 
and non-compulsory expenditure in the budget is obviously of considerable importance in 
determining the level of influence that the EP can exercise.242  
       
The Commission initiates the budgetary procedure by presenting the Preliminary Draft 
Budget to the Council of Ministers. The Council adopts the Draft Budget and then sends 
it back to the EP for a first reading. It is entitled to propose modifications to compulsory 
expenditure and amendments to non-compulsory expenditure. Once adopted by the full 
members of the EP, the Draft Budget goes back to the Council for its second reading. At 
this stage, the Council has the final word on compulsory expenditure but returns the Draft 
to the EP, indicating its position on the EP amendments to non-compulsory expenditure. 
At its second reading, the EP has the final word on non-compulsory spending within the 
limits of an agreed maximum rate of increase, a percentage determined by the 
Commission each year on the basis of the level of economic growth, inflation, and 
government spending. Then the EP has to adopt or reject the Budget. If it is adopted, the 
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EP President signs it into law and then the Commission has the responsibility for 
implementing the budget.243 
       
There are four main legislative procedures under the EC pillar: consultation; cooperation; 
co-decision; and the assent procedure. Co-decision is now the most common procedure 
for EC legislation, although consultation and cooperation remain for some matters. The 
assent procedure covers measures for which the agreement of the EP is required. The 
Economic and Social Council (ESC) provides a formal input into EC decision-making for 
organized economic and social interests. The Committee of the Regions and Local 
Authorities (CoR) allows a formal input into decision-making for the representatives of 
member states’ regional and local authorities.244 
 
3.2.4 The Efficiency and Effectiveness of the EU Policy Processes 
 
The diversity of competing interests across the member states, reinforced by the nature of 
the EU’s complex decision-making system, means that successful policy development is 
most of the time heavily dependent on key actors, that is, member state governments. If 
these key actors are not very keenly prepared to compromise, effective decision-making 
will be very difficult. As compromises render the bases for agreements in policy 
processes and decision-making, package deals are often formulated by linking one policy 
arena to another to guarantee the various interests of all participants.245  
       
The EU policy processes are often criticized for being bulky, slow and difficult to handle. 
But it is not always so and there exist different procedures for allowing certain types of 
decisions to be made when it is necessary. Decision-making is likely to be at its slowest 
point when a proposal creates difficulties of principle for a state or states, and this 
combined with a decision-making process, which is not subject to a fixed time schedule 
and in which QMV cannot be applied in the Council of Ministers. In such a situation, it 
will be very difficult for progress to be made. The EU does not have a fixed, central 
authoritative point where general priorities can be formulated and alternatives between 
competing options can be made. There is no adequate framework or mechanism for 
determining and implementing an overall policy view in which the requirements of 
various policy sectors are evaluated and measured carefully in relation to one another in 
terms of available resources. One important point is the critical judgments about how the 
EU functions, decision-making and policy processes ought to be placed in the context of 
the very considerable degree of cooperation and integration that has been achieved so far. 
There is also no comparable international scheme where individual nations have 
voluntarily transferred so many policy responsibilities to a collective organization of 
states and in doing so, have surrendered extent amount of their national sovereignty. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising to see in such a sui generis form of institution like the EU for 
having a lot amount of tensions, competitions, pressures and desires in cooperation and 
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integration which are so often challenged by caution, uncertainties, conflicts and 
competition.246 
 
 
3.2.5 Europeanization as a salient feature of the EU 
 
The European Union like other international organizations is made up of a number of 
member states. They are key actors in making EU as a new form of political system, and 
their role in this process is central to understanding the integration process and policy-
making. Simultaneously, European integration also has had serious impacts upon the 
member states – the phenomenon – that has come to be termed ‘Europeanization’. This 
phenomenon is also a very salient characteristic of the EU comparing with other regional 
organizations. This fuzzy word is, therefore, all about regional integration and its impact 
on member states. It usually based on the proposition that integration creates a new 
multilevel politics thereby recalibrating how domestic actors respond to integration. 
Although there are numerous definitions of Europeanization in analyzing EU and its form 
of governance, the renowned and well-accepted one says that Europeanization is the 
process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ 
policies and political and administrative structures. It comprises the following elements: 
the European decisions, the processes triggered by these decisions as well as the impacts 
of these processes on national policies, decisions processes and institutional structures.247 
       
For EU member states, Europeanization even represents an even greater economic 
challenge than globalization since it involves integrating in a single market – and not 
simply opening to external competition – national markets for goods, capital, services, 
and labour in addition to eliminating national currencies in favour of a single currency 
Euro. As a consequence, it has often intensified the competitive pressures from 
globalization as it has added its own specifically European pressures.248       
       
Regarding with Europeanization, member states have responded quite differently to 
identical EU input even under similar external and internal context conditions. The most 
obvious reason is that national and subnational actors have considerable variations of 
interests when implementing an EU policy and therefore that costs of adaptation and 
outcomes differ. It makes a difference whether alterations are restricted to modifications 
within a given pattern of sector regulation or whether they have effects at the core of 
national administrative traditions. Moreover, the specific problem-solving approach of a 
particular country and its capacity for administrative reform are important. Decades long 
EU attempts for a harmonized and competitive system have left a stigma on national 
systems but they have had no unifying effect. It all applies to policy regulation and 
administrative structures. Certainly, policy-making at the EU level has forced 
                                                 
246 Nugent (1994): “The Government and politics of the European Union”, pp. 334-338. 
247 Bulmer and Lequesne (2005): “The European Union and its Member States: An Overview” op. cit., pp. 
1-12. 
248 Vivien A. Schmidt (2005): “The Europeanization of National Economies?”, in: Simon Bulmer and 
Christian Lequesne (eds.): “The Member States of the European Union”, Oxford and New York, Oxford 
University Press, p. 367. 
 
  
 
79
governments to adapt. It also shows the intensity of participation of national institutions 
in the processes of preparing, negotiating, implementing, and controlling European level 
decisions. However, the shift in attention and resources and the requirements of 
adaptation have not led to dramatic changes and modifications in the overall system 
design of the member states. Traditional national patterns are resilient and apparently 
flexible enough to be capable of sufficiently coping with the challenges from the 
European level.249 
 
     
3.3 The EU as a Community of Policy-Making 
 
The EU is a genuine community in the view of transactional communication approach to 
regional integration, associated most distinctly with the works of Karl W. Deutsch.250 
Regional integration becomes the achievement of a sense of security within a specific 
region, so that war is no longer possible as a means of resolving international conflicts 
and differences although nation-states are not necessarily dissolved. Therefore, regional 
integration is defined as being about the achievement of security within a region or 
among a group of nation-states. In that way, successful regional integration is about the 
radical reduction of possibility of war and eliminating the likelihood of states using 
violent ways to resolve their disputes and differences.251 The focus was on the operation 
of security communities – mainly political communities within which the expectation of 
war was diminished. The definition of security community was bound up in scope with 
the concept of regional integration emphasized by Deutsch and his colleagues. Security 
communities are defined as groups of people that had become integrated. Moreover, 
integration was clarified as the attainment within a territory of a ‘sense of community’ 
and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a 
durable period, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population.252 
       
The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies253 made a famous distinction between 
‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ regarding with this view of international politics 
relating to regional integration as community building. Gemeinschaft (community) was 
defined as a situation when people are held together by common sentiments and common 
loyalties. Relationships with non-members of the group are considerably less significant 
that the sense of kinship that develops within the group. Gesellschaft (society) denotes a 
condition that binds people less through trust and more through a mixture of self-interest, 
division of labour and contract. The major difference is often through of as equivalent to 
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that between non-contractual allegiance and quasi-contractual obligation. Deutsch 
stressed Gemeinschaft as a condition of regional integration. The end result of 
integration, from this perspective, is a sense of community – a qualitative leap from 
pacts, treaties and alliances among nation-states. The principal argument of this approach 
to regional integration was that a sense of community among states would be a function 
of the level of communication between states.254 Therefore, the routine to construct a 
regional or international Gemeinschaft is to establish a network of mutual transactions 
among nation-states through a polity of policy-making for common interests. Mutual 
transactions or communications were for Deutsch a necessary, but still insufficient, 
prerequisite for the development of a political community. Henceforth, trade, travel, 
telecommunications and postal links might, in themselves, lead to mutual relevance but, 
without creating mutual responsiveness, would fail to engender a sense of community. 
The transactional communicative approach was much widely criticized for its 
methodological focus on transaction flow indices that did not provide a sufficient picture 
of the multi-faceted integration process, which marches on its full strength after the Cold 
War. However, this approach highlighted the crucial role of the socio-psychological 
aspects of community formation.255 
 
Deutsch’s emphasis of political integration did not insist on the presence of any specific 
institutional structure but rather depended on a historical process of social learning in 
which individuals, usually over several generations, learn to become a people.256 For 
Deutsch, mutually learning responsive transactions resulted from a complex learning 
process from which shared symbols, identities, habits of cooperation, memories, values 
and norms would emerge.257 Deutsch mostly relied on the analytical separation of the 
legal state from the sociological nation. This imposed a direct challenge to traditional 
realist conceptions that tended to conflate the ideas of nationhood (identity) and statehood 
(government) through the perspectives such as the national interest. In such a view, 
governments oversee peoples in a complex known as the nation-state. For realists, 
countries are united by common interests on the international stage and these interests are 
determined considerably by governments although there may have some 
characterizations of internal diversity amongst countries. Contrary view, which was much 
developed by Deutsch, is that common identities are the product of intensive transactions 
and communications. It emphasized that the development of multiple interactions among 
different peoples may be the basis for increased mutual understanding and, therefore, of a 
widespread sense of security.258 
       
The policy-makers who made the model of an integrated European Community a reality 
have related to the idealized rhetoric as their conceptual framework in creating a stable 
structure for bargaining in international arena. Therefore, there have confusion about the 
term regional integration. The working definition employed by Deutsch and his 
colleagues is of the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of 
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interaction among previously autonomous units. These patterns may partly be concerned 
with economic in character, partly social, and partly political: definitions of political 
integration all imply accompanying high levels of economic and social interaction. The 
question of expectations, of common identity or consciousness, of the emergence of a 
‘sense of community’, is the most contending, because it is the most difficult to 
measure.259 The development of functional linkages through informal economic and 
social interaction among separate West European countries time after time creates socio-
psychological tendencies and learning processes that in turn lead to assimilation of 
integration of a single community. In the course of time, these phenomena induce elite-
led attempts to institutionalize and formalize the initial functional linkages. This formal 
institution-building is a means to preserve the community that creates intense patterns of 
communication reciprocally.260 Daniel Frei viewed this as an essential component of 
political integration along side with social interaction and institutionalized political 
decision-making.261 
       
William Wallace further argued by distinguishing between formal and informal 
integration, which suggest that in certain cases region-building is accomplished in the 
first instance by informal economic interactions that states later consolidate and 
develop.262 Wallace made a distinction between informal and formal integration. Informal 
integration consists of those intense patterns of interactions that develop without the 
impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, 
communication networks, and social change. Formal integration comprises those changes 
in the framework of rules and regulations, which encourage – or inhibit, or redirect – 
informal flows. Informal integration is a continuous process or in other words, a flow: it 
creeps unawares out of the myriad transactions of private individuals pursuing private 
interests. Formal integration is discontinuous process: it proceeds only decision by 
decision, bargain by bargain, and treaty by treaty.263 
       
European integration has proved throughout the time to be a more continuous process 
than earlier studies suggested. The Eastern enlargement of the EU not only provides a 
major challenge for the EU itself, but also a puzzle for conventional theories of European 
integration. The major question is why EU member states particularly bigger three like 
Germany, the UK and France should decide in favour of the EU enlargement. A majority 
of EU member states had initially opposed to enlargement including France and all 
southern European states. However, the 1993 Copenhagen European Council formulated 
conditions of admission and agreed that the associated countries should become members 
of the EU if they fulfill the required standards, which are later known as Copenhagen 
criteria.264  
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Schimmelfennig argued that the EU is composed of a liberal community of states 
committed to the rule of law, human rights, democracy, and to a social market economy. 
His major argument quite resembles with the concept of security communities based on a 
collective identity of its member states like transactional communicative approach. Since 
the values of the community consist of its members, the members undertake a normative 
obligation to become states that share the collective identity of an international 
community and adhere to its constitutive values and norms.265 In this way, these states are 
entitled to join the community. Putting it differently, the collective identity of the EU as a 
liberal community explains the puzzle of eastern enlargement to a larger extent. 
Rhetorical commitment to community values entrapped EU member states to offer 
accession negotiations to the CEECs despite the initial objections against the eastern 
enlargement. These initial and materially derived preferences also explain why the 
enlargement negotiations are such a bothersome process and why there still lacks of 
necessary policy and institutional reforms of the EU to prepare the community for 
twenty-five or more new members.266 
 
The EU as a community of policy-making operates neither as a political ‘market’ – 
characterized by arms-length transactions among independent entities – nor as a 
‘hierarchy’, in which the dominant mode of regulation is authoritative rule. Instead, the 
EU best suits to the example what sociologists refer to as a network form of organization, 
in which individual units are defined not by themselves but in relation to other units. 
Actors in a network have a preference for interaction with one another, rather than with 
outsiders, partly because of intense interactions that create incentives for self-interested 
cooperation and for the maintenance of reputations for reliability. The community policy-
making can best be visualized as an elaborate set of networks, closely linked in some 
ways, partially decomposed in others, whose results depend on the political style in the 
ascendant at the moment. When conditions are favorable and leadership strategies 
appropriate, as they have been since 1985 for overall policy-making in the EU, the 
political style of supranational character will be able to make connections between points 
in the network, and allow an expanded conception of tasks. When the conditions are less 
benign or strategies become inappropriate like the recent rejections of French and Dutch 
voters to the EU constitution in 2004, the results are policy stagnation and separation of 
policy spheres for effective reforms.267 
       
Although the process of policy-making in the European Union as a regional community 
is supranational, all of the interstate bargaining and coalition building continue to take 
place within the context of agreements between member state governments. The revival 
of a supranational style of decision-making and the strengthening of EU institutions in 
recent years by one treaty to another resulted most immediately from decisions by 
member state governments to push for their own interests, for instance, in removing 
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internal economic barriers and implementing some institutional changes that would allow 
further more reforms and effective policy-making. However, it is not to conclude that a 
state-centric perspective will ever be enough to provide utmost satisfactory explanation 
of the whole puzzle about the EU and how it functions. Although such an explanation 
should begin with intergovernmental prerogatives, the analysis must eventually go 
beyond these interstate bargains to the domestic political processes of the member states, 
on the one hand, and to the constraints of international institutions, on the other. 
Nevertheless, these interstate bargains will still remain as the necessary preconditions for 
European integration in parallel existence with supranational institutions in foreseeable 
future.268 
 
 
3.3.1 Interests, ideas, institutions and issues of EU policy 
 
Post Second World War initiatives for European integration project mainly rested on a 
number of explicit factors, which their proponents claimed as core European values: 
plural societies, limited and democratic government, mixed private and public 
economies. On this core foundation was constructed not only the framework of formal 
institutions which defined Europe and the rising tide of informal interactions which this 
open framework permitted and enhanced, but also a rhetoric of European identity and 
community intended to underpin the hard bargaining of economic and political interests 
with a symbolic ‘cement’ of shared loyalty and purpose.269  
       
For better understanding of the process of EU policies development, it will be necessary 
to examine the incentives to cooperate, which induce policy-makers to attach their own 
goal satisfaction to the creation and sustaining of EU policy regimes. Therefore, interests, 
ideas, institutions and issues of EU policy should be taken a closer look to understand the 
ways in which institutional setting of the EU has been shaped and these various goals are 
pursued. Deviating from much of the literature on EU policy integration that focus on 
policy convergence as either a prerequisite or a desired outcome of agreement, Helen 
Wallace emphasized instead the importance of congruence, that is to say the 
compatibility of the policy actors’ preferences as the rudiment for establishing a shared 
policy regime. Various policy actors may have different preferences, but none of them 
choose the same collective action. Congruent preferences imply conditional commitments 
to collective regimes while convergence of preferences may produce longer-term stability 
of policy regimes. Persistently different, but congruent preferences and purposes would 
help to look for differences between one member state and another in the way that 
collective regimes are implemented. Interests define some preferences and purposes; but 
they only explain partially why EU policies have emerged in some domains, but not in 
others. Ideas play a role as well and help to understand the impact of ideas on the process 
of EU policy-making. Thus it needs to identify not only when and how a particular set of 
congruent interests favor a collective EU policy, but also the impacts of particular ideas 
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or doctrines in fostering EU policy cooperation and modifying institutional setting. 
Policy-makers have to react to issues when they arise and to events as they happen. Even 
though contingent issues are sometimes the prompt to policy-makers, issues and events 
cannot always be thoroughly defined in terms of pre-existing interests or ideas.270 
 
3.3.1.1 Interests 
 
It is widely agreed that interests and self-interests have often played a crucial role in 
determining the outcomes of the EU policy-making. In each area of policy debate, 
therefore, it is necessary to establish where the different interests of the different 
participants set the parameters for the agreements that may be struck – or resisted. 
Interests inform the calculated reasoning of the policy actors in relation to particular 
policy predicaments, in connection to the costs and benefits of the available courses of 
action, and regarding with the nature of the institutional arrangements as well. According 
to Helen Wallace, there are five assumptions implied to the kinds of interests that bear on 
European policy-making:271 
(1) Interest satisfaction is a major element of the process. The development and 
sustainability of European policies require the satisfaction of multiple interests depending 
on the range of actors involved. Positive cost-benefit analyses of particular policies – and 
their achievement – incline to generate a willingness to develop the policy regime further. 
(2) National interests or state interests are existing in the process, necessarily 
because the governments of the member states are powerful participants, and it is among 
the functions of governments to articulate the interests of the member states that they 
represent. Nevertheless, governments are also the incumbent power-holders, and have 
more partisan concerns, using the EU arena for narrow ends of domestic party 
competition sometimes. Moreover, it is not always easy to establish agreement within 
countries where the national interest lies. 
(3) Plural nature of organized interests is engaged in efforts to influence the EU 
policy process, some of which have easier access to the process than others. This 
differentiation in access may prejudice the process towards the recognition of some 
interests rather than others. 
(4) Nested games play a crucial part in the process, because the same actors are 
frequently involved in bargaining at different locations for political action, i.e. positions 
in EU discussion may be designed to influence outcomes in national discussion. The 
interests that are relevant in one location of political action will be different from those 
relevant in a different one. A particular course of action may be rational at one stage, 
however, irrational at another level. 
(5) Actors in the EU policy-making often tend to settle for satisficing, rather than 
optimizing, strategies, suggesting a fluidity to their definitions of interests, partly because 
bargaining is iterated, partly because factors other than calculus of interest may influence 
their choices of action. In particular, calculations of benefits and costs tend to be spread 
over time and across policy domains in a form of assumed diffuse reciprocity, and not 
specific reciprocity. 
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3.3.1.2 Ideas 
 
Ideas have an important influence in explaining the outcomes of the EU policy-making. 
The early neofunctionalist studies highlighted to the relevance of shared bodies of ideas 
in structuring policy debate. For instance, the role of the EU in its early days as an agent 
of modernization and the embedding in the EU of a kind of cross-class compact between 
Christian and social democrats emerging from contending ideas that shaped policy 
indeed. These ideas defined the range of conceivable policy regimes and forged the 
policy agenda in particular directions. Over the years different ideas have taken ground 
and been pursued through the EU policy-making. An distinct example was the shift in 
1980s towards the widespread acceptance of a form of neo-liberalism as the basis for 
pushing market integration forwards, although it never completely banished the doctrine 
of social responsibility as a guide for policy.272 
       
In this way, the role of ideas is probably more important in the EU than in any other 
system of governance, given the Union’s ambitions to transform and modernize European 
political economies. To put it explicitly, ideas are ‘shared causal beliefs’273: accepted 
knowledge about which policy measures will cause desirable outcomes to happen. In 
particular, neo-liberal ideas such as inflation and wage control, stable interest rates, 
monetarism encouraged and inspired the decisions to launch the so-called 1992 project to 
complete the internal market. In the same way, the creation of the Euro and EMU was 
underpinned by the emergence of a new consensus opposed to demand management and 
wedded to the idea of sound money as the single most important goal of economic 
policy.274 
       
More recently there has been the emergence of a new variant of European social 
democracy being articulated through the EU institutions. It still remains to be seen 
whether and how this might generate a new prevailing idea or a softer version of neo-
liberalism. Another alternative possibility is that the EU policy process may be acquiring 
the more programmatic features associated with the policy and political processes inside 
the member states. The socio-economic ideas that have impacts on particular policy 
decisions, and they have also shaped approaches to policy-making more generally, not 
least in terms of the emergence of a distinctive EU approach to market regulation. 
Similarly, it can be observed in other areas the impact of ideas in shaping policy 
preferences. Ideas and paradigms have been in contention in the debates and 
controversies about which policy to pursue, sometimes subjected to empirical tests and 
the weight of expertise, and at the other times held hostage to political judgments and 
even political prejudices. Therefore, ideas, beliefs, values, and worldviews have 
permeated the EU policy-making and its process, even though their impact has often been 
implicit rather than explicit.275 
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3.3.1.3 Institutions 
 
Institutional settings make a significant difference to the ways in which EU policies are 
developed and implemented. The institutional dynamics have varied over time and they 
operate in different ways for different member countries. These dynamics facilitate and 
sometimes enhance certain kinds of policy modes or substantive outcomes rather than 
others. The EU has already attained a number of specific institutional configurations that 
set the parameters for how interests are defined, ideas are propagated, and issues are 
addressed. The institutional structures of the EU vary considerably from one case to 
another – both in the narrow sense that, for instance, the Commission is heavily engaged 
in some domains and not others, and in the broader sense that the same institutional 
structures operate differently or have different impacts depending on the case. 
Notwithstanding, the institutional dynamics and inertias play a critical role in shaping the 
policy-making process of the EU. One possible explanation for this institutional 
variations may lie in the mix of institutions and functions that can be seen in any given 
policy domain. Another may be related to the differences between the policy actors who 
are involved in the domain in process. Different accounts of the EU are presented as a 
kind of competition between different institutional approaches. Rather different 
institutional approaches rest on and generate different logics of appropriateness in 
relation to the policy dilemmas for which they provide the institutional settings.276 
       
Evidently, ‘institutions matter’ in the EU context and its policy-making. This role of the 
EU institutions is recognized both from proponents favoring an intergovernmentalist 
perspective and from those who emphasize the central role of semi-autonomous 
supranational institutions. Institutions have been characterized in a number of ways: as 
passive structures; as actively shaping expectations and norms; and as purposive actors 
seeking to influence the development of the EU policy-making. Traditionally, analyses 
that focus on the role of supranational institutions have been described as leading to 
direct conflict with analyses, which adopt an intergovernmental approach. Nevertheless, 
this can no longer be the case in present day because of more and more sophisticated role 
of the EU institutions in its day-to-day politics. The notion of institutions recognized as 
passive structures, that is as providing the norms, values and procedures, changeable only 
with unanimous consent, within which the daily business of policy choices and major 
constitutional decisions are taking, is quite consistent with the intergovernmentalist 
perspective that focuses predominantly on the structural leadership exerted by national 
governments in international negotiations.277 
       
EU institutions provide a framework within which to negotiate major ‘history-making’ 
decisions by ensuring a shared negotiating forum, joint decision procedures, a set of 
shared legal and political norms, institutions to monitor cooperation and defection and, 
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not least, by disseminating ideas and information to all participants in the process of 
policy-making. In consistent with international regimes theory, the critical role played by 
the EU institutions in providing a passive structure that enhances the efficiency of 
intergovernmental decision-making is recognizable.278 
       
The most interesting debate on the significance of the EU institutions is not about 
whether or not they have a role to play in the EU’s policy-making. Rather, the important 
question is whether the role played by the EU institutions is simply that assigned to them 
by national governments of the EU member states, and strictly limited by these member 
states, or whether the EU institutions have developed a role for themselves which extends 
beyond that delegated authority to them by member states. Even within the liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach, the decisions of supranational institutions like the 
European Court of Justice are acknowledged to have had a greater impact than many 
national governments either expected or desired.279 However, the EU institutions also 
operate under similar constraints in the same way like national governments which do not 
always possess full or adequate information with which to accurately predict the impact 
of past policy participation and the processes of learning and adaptation within the policy 
process are crucial weapons in the various actors’ battle to minimize losses and maximize 
profits by reducing any surprises. Therefore, the understanding of the importance of 
policy learning and adaptation, in informing the actions of both the EU institutions and 
those of the member states in the process of policy-making, is important for any rounded 
explanation of the manner in which European integration has proceeded.280 
 
3.3.1.4 Issues 
 
It is the issues of policy, and the impact of events, that test the capacities and reveal many 
of the key features of the process of European policy-making. It is only when faced with 
choices over specific issues that policy-makers are forced to consider whether the 
European policy arena is likely to be more or less productive and more or less acceptable 
than the available possible options. When issues arise, or events unfold, policy-makers 
draw their attention on prevailing ideas and paradigms, assess their interests, define the 
range of possible response, and begin to formulate their preferences about where and how 
to set up policy actions. Neither the previous policy nor the existing accumulation of 
ideas, or the prevailing paradigms, will necessarily provide a useful guide to policy 
responses and action for the current issues. The EU sometimes has difficulties in 
responding certain issues when the prevailing paradigm had been shattered. Such 
situations can be seen during Former Yugoslavia break-up and accession negotiations for 
eastern enlargement. Issues sometimes produce knee-jerk responses, or are the pretext for 
a reappraisal of ideas or of interests. Some issues get on to the agenda for the necessity of 
possible European level resolution. Some issues have been driven from the European 
arena itself while others by the emergence of a body of ideas; some by events, some by 
external pressures, and some by a combination of several impulses. A variety of issues 
will be necessary to be examined for specifying the ways in which interests and ideas 
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generate preferences, or to assess the varying ways in which different issues are 
channeled through the EU institutions.281 
       
Comparing with the most national systems of governments, the EU seems to be a 
relatively open market for influence and access. Such open competition for scarce 
resources leads to shifting coalitions and few frozen cleavages that lead to permanent 
coalitions.282 It is plausible to suggest that most EU policy networks remain relatively 
unstable issue networks, or the polar opposites of policy communities. The memberships 
of issue networks are not drawn from a stable community but rather they are fluid and 
defined by specific issues that arise on the EU’s agenda. Comparing with their national 
equivalents, EU policy networks seem to be more complex, multi-participatory and 
unstable.283 
 
 
3.3.1.5 Initiation of Policy in the EU: National or Institutional Orientation? 
 
Policy-making in the EU spills across the boundaries of member nation-states by 
penetrating deep into previously domestic aspects of national politics and administration. 
According William Wallace’s words, policy-making within the EU should be described 
as ‘post-sovereign’. This post-sovereign politics embodies the principle of mutual 
interference in each other’s internal affairs, now even extending to mutual inspection of 
each other’s judicial procedures. It rests much on mutual trust and collective consent for 
implementing European law and regulation through national administrations. Member 
states represented by respective national governments remain central to the EU policy-
making. However, they are no longer the only significant actors – and are not always the 
predominant actors in its process. Their actions are constrained by institutional 
frameworks, and even weakened sometimes by the intervention of institutionally 
autonomous actors such as the Commission, the ECJ, even at the margins the EP. More 
important is they are constrained by their diminished control of their own governments, 
administrations, and national political processes, as information on their own negotiating 
objectives being traded in transnational and transgovernmental interactions in return for 
information on the intentions of others in order to obtain best possible outcomes.284 
       
In the traditional areas of the EU policy, which are subject to traditional Community 
methods, the formal right of policy initiative and policy design rests with the 
Commission. However, the Commission does not formulate policy proposals itself alone. 
Normally, its officials draw on a wide range of sources in developing policy ideas and 
crafting policy proposals deriving from suggestions put forward at some stage by one or 
other governments. Again, these national suggestions are flanked by ideas emanating 
through other channels within the system. The Commission operates a system of advisory 
committees and expert groups through which it collects opinions on possible course of 
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policy initiatives and promotes processes of deliberation. Many of these include experts 
from the member states precisely in order to ascertain that the policy experiences and 
preferences of the member states are fed in to the deliberative process of policy-making. 
Moreover, the services of the Commission comprise officials who are seconded national 
experts from the member states again, precisely to ensure that relevant knowledge and 
experience is incorporated into policy formulation and policy design. This channel of 
expertise renders opportunities for member governments to feed their preferences into the 
process in an effective way, if they so choose. One of the essential skills of successful 
negotiation is the ability to shape the foundations of the proposal on the table for 
achieving own national interests. Some governments may exert for exporting their ideas 
to the Commission, in the hope that a proposal, formally articulated by the Commission, 
can incorporate their preferences in the framework of collective interest. Other 
governments may play a lesser role in the phase of policy-making, either sitting on the 
fence until proposals become fully articulated or listing problems rather than attempting 
to solve them.285 
 
In the EU, policy-making is part of a wider political process, and politics permeates the 
way that EU policies are made. In traditional type of nation-state public policy-making, 
governmental bodies are responsible for devising and delivering suitable public policies, 
and are held accountable through the electoral process for what they have achieved, or 
failed to achieve. In contrast, in the contemporary EU case, the provision of public policy 
is diffused between country and transnational levels of activity with very specific and 
extensive public policy powers attributed to EU institutions. Moreover, the normal 
channels of political accountability are lacking, or at least in only a weakened form. 
Therefore, it is important to note that some aspects of the EU as a policy arena make a 
significant difference to its politics comparing with traditional nation-states. In many 
European countries, this political arena encompasses different levels and layers of 
politics; and that arena is invaded increasingly by cross-boundary influences and 
interactions. However, the center of the political process is still country-based. 
Simultaneously, those who exercise political power, or who seek to influence those with 
political power, often have to seek their policy instruments from outside the political 
territory in which they are mainly located. At the same time, the transnational public 
policy processes are embedded in political institutions that are less clearly defined, and 
much less authoritative, that those of a traditional state. As Helen Wallace pointed out, 
the policy process of the EU is as the junction-box, that is as a concentrated point of 
intersection, interaction, and filtering, between country-based institutions and processes, 
and the wider international context. Hence, the institutions of the EU provide the 
interface between the many policy inputs on one hand and demands from across the 
member states of the EU, and from the global arena on other hand.286    
       
Looking across the broad range of Community policy-making of the EU, it reveals the 
imprints of national governments’ successes in setting the agenda for policy initiation and 
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design. These successes depend to some extent crucially on how far governments, or 
parts of governments, exploit their points of access to the formative phases of policy 
development. These include generally the channels to particular parts of the Commission 
– an individual Commissioner and her/his cabinet, a particular directorate-general, or a 
specialized service. In this way, there is a risk that the Commission could find itself 
captured by the pressure emanating from the member states and lose its institutional 
independence. The formal procedure is that Commissioners on taking office have to 
swear an oath of independence and not to take instructions from the governments of the 
countries from which they come, and the same principle applies to officials in the 
services of the Commission. Nevertheless, this deliberate neutrality came under 
amounting challenge during the Constitutional Convention discussion about how the 
composition of the college should be determined. The insistence from some member 
governments on having only one Commissioner from each member state evoked that the 
college should have a representative character, and those Commissioners might be 
expected to act on behalf of the countries from which they come. Proposals designing to 
reduce the size of the college to somewhat fewer than the number of member states were 
intended to counteract this view of incorporating national representation within the 
Commission. By reaching out a commitment to retaining the current system of one 
Commissioner per member state until 2014, the 2004 October agreement on the 
Constitutional Treaty sought a balance between these different approaches.287 
       
There are two major views looking at the EU in terms of its nature. The first argument is 
that the EU is an intergovernmental organization and therefore the Commission is only an 
agent of the member states, acting on their behalf and in accordance with their will. On 
this view, the Commission is the like the secretariat of any other international 
organization and its function is to make it easier for member state governments to find 
agreement on the details of cooperation with each other. For helping this assertion, other 
EU institutions such as the EP and the Court of Auditors also monitor the activities of the 
Commission, providing member states with the information that they need to keep a 
check on it. Second argument as another alternative to the first view is that the 
Commission is the prime mover of the process of European integration and it can act and 
does act autonomously to provide policy leadership to the EU. Proponents of this 
argument pointed out key factors that allow the Commission to do so: for example, the 
Commission has the sole right of initiative in the legislative process of the EC, its ability 
to locate allies among influential interest groups, and it powers under the competition 
clauses of the Treaties to act against monopolies. Moreover, the Commission can also act 
to put the Europeanization of policy sector onto the agenda of governments. By including 
domestic interests at the EU level through instruments such as advisory committees, the 
Commission attempts to win converts to the idea that an issue can best be handled at the 
European level. However, any action to Europeanize a policy sector will produce 
counter-pressures from groups that benefit from the status quo. The Commission can find 
a solution to break down the opposition by threatening the use of existing powers under 
the competition clauses of the Treaties if actors of the sector will not cooperate to find a 
negotiated way forward.288 
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Sometimes the Commission has been fiercely criticized in its role as manager of EC 
policies and finances. Since policy implementation is never straightforward within 
member states, it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve policy objectives in a union of 
twenty-five member states, where the Commission also needs to depend on national 
governments and national administrations for effective compliance. Therefore, it has been 
noted that the Commission is better adapted to proposing policies and legislation than to 
implementing them once they were agreed. Still, the debate over the role of the EU 
institutions particularly the Commission in policy-making remains central to explanation 
about the nature and momentum of European integration. If the Commission can reveal 
itself as an autonomous actor, the argument that the EU is an intergovernmental appliance 
will be eroded. The debate is still inconclusive until right now even after the EU’s 
enlargement and it further opens to the future empirical studies for attaining definite 
answer. Furthermore, the multiple increase of actors involved in the policy process, 
giving rise to the term governance, has created the Commission’s task even more 
difficult. However, the impact of these factors will lead to the wider debate about the 
legitimacy and management deficit of the EU.289 Even though there are a lot of ongoing 
discussions about the democratic deficit, Beetham and Lord pointed to the spectrum of 
legitimacy deficit, of which the democracy deficit was only one aspect. Another aspect as 
feeding the legitimacy deficit was performance as they identified: ‘the ability of the EU 
to deliver effective policy in the areas it undertakes, to meet some basic criteria of 
effective decision-making, and to demonstrate a capacity for correction and renewal in 
the event of failure’.290 
 
 
3.3.2 Policy Negotiation and Policy Coordination in the EU 
 
The phases of policy negotiation and policy coordination in the EU are essentially 
important for sharing power and exercising authority to exert necessary influence by 
member states together with the EU institutions. These phases were mostly played out 
through the Council of Ministers and the European Council, including many preparatory 
working groups and high-level groups of national officials. Through these phases, 
member governments make their strenuous efforts to influence the outcomes for the best 
serving of their national interests in the policy-making of the EU. In this way, the 
national coordinating procedures of governments are mainly directed towards this phase 
of policy negotiation. Many meetings of working groups and committees that prepare the 
ministerial level of the Council provide the forums for most of the negotiations among 
officials from member governments on EU policies. They are indeed not only the most 
active and intensive interface for member governments within the EU system but also 
very large proportion of business transactions in more or less final form on EU 
legislation, policy coordination, and funding programs.291 
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Policy coordination served as a mechanism of transition from nationally rooted policy-
making to a collective regime binding for the whole EU. This policy coordination 
approach might be seen as a useful tool for the advocates of the strong EU. The approach 
rests very much on expertise and the accumulation of technical arguments in favor of 
developing a shared approach. It also depends on efforts to use expertise to promote 
modernization and innovation. The main characteristics of this approach are: (a) the 
Commission as the pathfinder of networks of experts or epistemic communities; (b) the 
engagement of independent experts as promoters of ideas and techniques; (c) the formal 
meetings of high-level groups in the Council, in brainstorming rather than negotiating 
mode; and (d) holding dialogues with specialist committees in the EP. This approach is 
later being developed not only as a transitional mechanism, but also as a policy mode of 
new governance in its own right. The major objective is not to establish a single common 
framework, but rather to share experience and to encourage the spread of best practice. 
This can also be expected to be a typical mode in future EU policy-making as an 
alternative to the formal reassignment of policy powers from national to EU level.292 
       
One particular example of policy coordination as a new mode of governance in the EU is 
the so-called ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). This method, which was formally 
approved by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, consists of the collective 
monitoring of the domestic policies of the member states. Coordination of each others’ 
domestic policies, particularly in the area of economic policy, had been regarded as a key 
part of member state decision-making since the Treaty of Rome. Nonetheless, the Lisbon 
European Council formalized the breadth and widened the operation of the OMC: 
through the agreement on basic policy guidelines by heads of governments, the 
presentation and monitoring of national policy plans, and provisions for the European 
Council and the Commission to warn member states if they violated formal rules and 
deviated too far from the guidelines. At the end of 2002, the OMC penetrated into a wide 
range of policy areas, including macroeconomic, employment, research, social, 
enterprise, education and pension reform. OMC is viewed as a departure from the 
conventional EU method of delegating, agenda-setting and monitoring to the 
Commission, decision-making by low-level meetings of the Council, and the possibility 
of formal sanctions by the European Court of Justice for breach of EU-level agreements. 
Decision-making under OMC is centralized in the European Council and the preparatory 
work is carried out by prime ministers’ personal offices, the secretariat of the Council and 
the relevant divisions of the Commission. Moreover, the policy guidelines are also not 
forcefully binding and the watchwords of the OMC are consensus, benchmarking and 
flexibility.293 
       
OMC itself attempts to initiate an interactive process of mutual learning on the basis of 
diverse national experiences with reform experiments. In addition, it also avoids strict 
regulatory requirements and allows experiments that are adapted to local circumstances, 
while fostering policy improvement, and possibly policy convergence, through 
                                                 
292 Helen Wallace (2000): “The Institutional Setting”, pp. 32-33. 
293 Simon Hix (2005): “ The political system of the European Union”, p. 37. 
  
 
93
institutionalized mutual learning processes. This method is also contrary to traditional, 
top-down and command and control-type regulation backed by hard-law sanctions.294 
       
OMC is principally concerned with two things. The first is the agreement of a common 
set of goals, which the member state governments have promised to achieve 
independently and without recourse to EU legal instruments. The second thing involves 
‘naming and shaming’, whereby the governments regularly monitor each other’s progress 
towards the agreed goals, and publicly appraise or rebuke each other as it is respectively. 
This has some consequence, as governments do not want to be embarrassed for their 
failures to honor commitments made to their EU colleagues. Nevertheless, governments 
are also reluctant to enforce and implement the agreement in a filed whereby voters or 
powerful vested interests such as liberalization of labor markets oppose a radical reform. 
As Simon Hix concludes, the record of OMC in the area of structural economic reform is 
mixed with the result of some governments such as Denmark and Finland undertaking 
quite radical reforms while others notably France, Germany and Italy lagging behind in 
many areas. The fact of the lack of recourse to the usual channels of enforcement via the 
Commission and the ECJ also has some implications to such a mixed result.295 
Consequently, policy convergence at the domestic level is unlikely to occur without 
having either collective interests or incentives or potential punishments for member states 
that do not share the common interest. In the same way, the final policy outcome in each 
member state whether it is through the OMC or the traditional method is always shaped 
by its domestic institutional structure and the interests, power and resources of the 
political actors within this structure.296 
 
 
3.4 Low Politics and High Politics of the EU: Assessing the EU’s multiple policy-making 
 
Throughout the historical development of European integration, member state 
governments constantly have considerable differences between the realms of ‘high 
politics’ and ‘low politics’.297 High politics concerns with issues that touch on the 
fundamental definition, national prestige, identity, foreign policy, security and defence of 
the nation-state. On the other hand, low politics covers issues of economic and welfare 
policies that are not as threatening to the viability of the nation-state, such as European 
economic integration, the single market program, and EU social and environmental 
regulation. Therefore, governments are more willing to allow supranational policy 
competences on low politics issues than issues in high politics arena. For example, 
formulation of common EU foreign policy, the free movement of persons and the related 
issues of immigration and policing are issues of high politics. It is because these policies 
are central to the definition of the nation-state, concerning with who is part of the social 
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contract between state and citizens, who has the rights to enjoy social welfare and 
freedoms of national citizenship, and who has the right to be protected by the forces of 
the state.298 
       
The process of European integration is a matter of ongoing profound interest for 
European governments and member states are still endeavoring to arrive at a consensus 
on the appropriate location of their new supranational entity in the global stage. 
Sometimes, tension comes up and it can be explained well by the fact that the stakes of 
integration were raised by incursions of supranationality into areas of controversy. Such 
occurrence led Hoffmann forty years ago to draw on the distinction between high and low 
politics to explain why integration was possible in certain technocratic and 
uncontroversial areas and why it was likely to generate conflict in matters where the 
autonomy of governments or national identity were at stake. For instance, the removal of 
national barriers to the operation of single market suited into the category of low politics 
because it would not threaten the position of national elites, and therefore particular 
definitions of ‘vital national interest’ are not menaced. In critical areas, where national 
interests were deemed to be at stake, Hoffmann argued that ‘nations prefer the certainty, 
or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty 
of the untested blender’.299 
       
Initially, the member state governments as part of the single market program were less 
willing to remove physical borders on the movement of persons than those against the 
movement of goods, services and capital. However, when the time comes they could no 
longer oppose the pressure for taking a common action, at which point they chose to 
cooperate through informal intergovernmental measures – first through informal 
mechanisms and then in a separate intergovernmental pillar in the EU. Under these 
negotiations and accommodations, arrangements were made to preserve national 
sovereignty in two ways: decisions are taken by unanimity, which permits any 
government to veto a measure that threatens a vital national interest; and decisions do not 
have direct effect in domestic law – they need to be transposed into domestic law by 
national parliaments and are justifiable to do so only in domestic courts.300  
       
Hoffmann claimed that high politics was virtually immune from the penetration of 
integrative impulses of spillover as argued by neofunctionalists. He viewed this as an 
autonomous sphere of political activity.301 In other words, governments were actually 
prepared to cooperate in the realm of low politics because it was a way of retaining 
control over areas where intersocietal as opposed to interstate transaction was becoming 
the norm.302  
       
However, Hoffmann’s arguments did not pass without criticism. Major attention was 
focused on his distinction between high and low politics. The vivid observation was that 
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his assertion of the autonomy of the high politics realm was thrown into doubt by the EC 
experience throughout the 1970s as European Political Cooperation (EPC) brought into 
existence in the sphere of foreign policy. Certainly, Hoffmann’s thesis might be further 
taken into question in the advent of the Treaty commitments agreed at Maastricht in 
1992. Both the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
commitment to enact Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within a scheduled specific 
period can be taken as examples where member states are willing to surrender their 
control over issues of central importance to national sovereignty. Hoffmann’s critique of 
the automatic process of spillover might still be correct, but the EU’s polity development 
was clearly something rather more complex than a straight intergovernmental system.303 
       
As Webb remarks, governments are not capable of constructing a consistently highly 
orchestrated and impenetrable national front all the time.304 Moreover, member state 
preferences are deeply immersed in a set of domestic level bargains and trade-offs and 
cannot be reduced to a simple set of national interests. Such observation is also consistent 
with the recent governance turn in theorizing about the EU.305 Therefore, it is plausible 
statement that the EU’s multiple policy-making is multinational or multilateral in 
character. It is a composite of many features derived from the different interests, 
traditions and rules of the participating countries. It is not only that the participants are 
numerous, but also that they bring to the forum different languages, different discourses, 
different cultures, and different habits of work. Over times a predominant style of 
behaviour in policy-making emerged on the basis of an amalgam of these various 
features. This renders the participants with some different ways of building opportunities 
for policy influence and encourages certain kinds of behaviour and constrains others. One 
of the features that make the EU salient from other transnational policy arenas is that it 
extends across so many policy domains. One important feature of this multiple policy-
making of the EU is that the policy process has some significantly different 
characteristics depending on the nature of the policy domain. The other consequence of 
the multifunctional nature of EU policy-making is that some of the bargaining involves 
cross-sectoral trade-offs among member states. Each of these domains involves different 
kinds of societal actors, different ways of viewing the relationships between the 
communal forces and the special interests to be satisfied, different kinds of governmental 
behaviour, and different kinds of electoral resonance.306 
       
Generally, there are two fundamental policy-making processes in the EU. Firstly, most 
regulatory and expenditure policies and some citizen and macroeconomic policies are 
adopted through supranational (quasi-federal) processes: where the Commission is the 
executive (with a monopoly on policy initiative); legislation is adopted through a 
bicameral procedure between the Council and the EP (the Council usually acts by QMV); 
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and law is directly effective and supreme over national law and the ECJ has full powers 
of judicial review and legal adjudication. Secondly, most macroeconomic, citizen and 
foreign policies are adopted through intergovernmental processes: where the Council is 
the main executive and legislative body (and the Council usually acts by unanimity rule); 
the Commission can also generate policy ideas but its agenda-setting powers are limited; 
the EP only has the right to be consulted by the Council; and the ECJ’s powers of judicial 
review are restricted.307 
 
3.4.1 Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP) 
 
3.4.1.1 Context and formation of CAP 
 
Agricultural policy looks like a minor issue comparing with foreign policy issues or 
economic development. However, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the largest 
item of EU expenditure and it was the first genuinely supranational policy of the EU. The 
reason is quite simple that several member states still maintain a sentimental attachment 
to rural society, and the EU public is increasingly concerned about food safety and 
animal rights. Consequence is that political stakes are high when it comes to the making 
and reform of the CAP. The Treaty of Rome set up the CAP as a central policy of then 
the European Economic Community (EEC). Article 33 of the treaty laid out its objectives 
as follows: (a) to increase agricultural productivity, by promoting technical progress and 
ensuring rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of 
the factors of production, particularly labor; (b) to ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture; (c) to stabilize markets; (d) to ensure the availability of supply; 
and (e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. These objectives are 
wholly consistent with public expenditure goals such as allocation and redistribution of 
resources and market stabilization.308     
       
The original goals of the CAP had been carried through and the allocation objective was 
no longer necessary as goods could be supplied by open market at cheap prices. 
Similarly, the redistribution of resources to farmers had made some farmers better off 
than others, and better off than many other sections of society. In addition, the markets no 
longer need to be stabilized and although the CAP consumed ever-greater share of 
resources i.e. the budget of the EU, its utility to EU taxpayers and small farmers had 
fallen while its counterproductive effects to global agriculture markets increased. As a 
result, the CAP was no longer sustainable in its original form in the early 1990s. There 
are more and more demands for reform of the CAP from consumer and environmental 
groups, several member state governments of the EU and a number of foreign 
governments.309 
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3.4.1.2 Reforming the CAP 
      
Initially the CAP attempts to provide an internal market and common prices for 
agricultural products. It is prominent amongst EU policies in its complexity, conflicting 
objectives and status as a cornerstone of the EU. Unlike almost all of the other EU 
policies, agriculture has been mostly unaffected to liberalization and marketisation. The 
CAP has never really attempted to make European farmers internationally competitive. 
Rather, it has evolved into a social policy to keep them on the land. In the same way like 
other social policies, the benefits that flow from the CAP have come to be seen as 
entitlements, which may be reduced only if compensation is given to so-called ‘losers’. In 
spite of some reforms in the 1990s, it is noteworthy how the CAP is unchanging 
throughout the times: no other major EU policy is defined by treaty articles which are in 
essence the same today as they were in 1957. Considerably, many EU member states 
have been able to neglect meaningful reforms of the CAP and therefore avoiding the ugly 
work of both satisfying the farm lobby and managing agricultural trade relations in an 
international environmental dominated by liberal multilateralism.310 
       
In 1992 the EU member states agreed the first major reforms of the CAP since 1957, 
which had been negotiated and drafted through the Agriculture Council by Ray 
MacSharry, then the Irish agricultural commissioner. Again in July 1997 the EU 
agriculture commissioner, Franz Fischler, disclosed proposals for further CAP reforms, 
as part of the Commission’s Agenda 2000 budget package to prepare for EU 
enlargement. Fischler proposed for extending the MacSharry reforms by increasing the 
price cuts on cereals and beef and introducing price cuts for milk, olive oil and wine. His 
major proposals also include to transform the CAP from a policy of price support to one 
of income support; and to strengthen the non-welfare objectives of the policy i.e. 
environmental protection, food safety and animal welfare.311 The EU’s eastern 
enlargement also challenged the CAP considerably. Fischler claimed that his 1998 reform 
package provided a ‘much-needed example to Eastern candidates for EU membership. 
The European model of agriculture no longer justifies artificially high prices’. This line 
of argument justified EU plans not to offer compensation payment schemes to east 
European farmers until 2006 at the earliest.312 
       
Policy-making of the CAP is made by an iron triangle of agriculture ministers, agriculture 
officials in the Commission, and European-level farming interests. Each element of this 
triangle has a sharing interest in defending the interests of the others; subsidies to 
farmers; the centrality of the CAP in the EU decision-making process for agriculture 
commissioners and the Agriculture Directorate-General; and the independence of the 
Agriculture Council and the protection of domestic supporters of the agriculture 
ministers.  In the contrary, there are few incentives for consumers to mobilize for 
attempting to break the iron triangle, as the cost of the CAP to each individual consumer 
or taxpayer is less than the cost of organizing an anti-CAP campaign. However, this 
status quo of relationship of the iron triangle has been undermined by two developments. 
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Firstly, social, economic and political changes in Europe have reduced the power of 
agricultural interests. There has been a dramatic change in the status of agriculture in 
national economies of member states since 1970s. Between 1970 and 2000 the share of 
agriculture as a percentage of the labour force of the member countries dropped from 
over 20 per cent in seven member states and 10 to 20 percent in three of the other states 
to less than 10 per cent in all member states but two (Greece and Portugal), with an 
average of just 4.3 per cent across the EU. In addition, income from agriculture only 
accounted for 1.7 per cent of EU GDP in 2001.313 
 
3.4.1.3 CAP and EU Budget: Claiming the lion’s share 
 
The CAP costs European taxpayers over Euro 40 billion ($47 billion) annually, or around 
40% of the total EU budget. This is a very large sum, given that farming accounts for less 
than 2% of the EU’s workforce. However, the share of the budget devoted to CAP 
spending has fallen remarkably: it was 70% twenty years ago. Furthermore, the CAP has 
been reformed significantly, most recently in 2003, when a deal was reached to complete 
the switch of most CAP subsidies from price supports to direct income payments. When 
these reforms have been fully implemented, some 90% of EU farm support will be 
classified as non trade-distorting. However, it has not lessened demands for more changes 
in the CAP. The world’s big agricultural exporters demand greater access to the EU 
market, meaning sharply lower tariffs on farm imports. Within the EU itself, countries 
such as Britain that get few farm subsidies want the radical changes in the CAP while 
those such as France that are big net recipients of the CAP determined to preserve it. The 
CAP is even criticized by people who want to protect Europe’s countryside and its small 
farmers. As much as 80% of its subsidies go to the richest 20% of farmers, and the 
biggest single recipients of CAP payments tend to be giant agribusinesses and big, 
wealthy landowners. France is Europe’s largest farm producer and also the biggest 
beneficiary from the CAP, taking around a quarter of the lion’s share of all EU farm 
subsidies. When there is a contentious debate for the EU budget in 2007-2013, the French 
government keeps saying, in both the EU budget and the Doha global trade negotiations, 
that it cannot touch the CAP, it is partly making a point about sticking to the October 
2002 deal. That deal was struck in October 2002 Summit between then German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac to freeze CAP 
spending in real terms until 2013. That deal was subsequently endorsed by all EU leaders 
including even British Prime Minister Tony Blair who has offered to reform the British 
rebate in exchange for a fundamental reform of the CAP in December 2005 EU budget 
negotiations. However, France stuck firmly to the 2002 deal as France’s Europe Minister 
Catherine Colonna said, “We all agreed to the 2002 reform and it cannot be changed until 
2013”.314 Under the mediation of German new Chancellor Angela Merkel, the budget 
deal was finally reached as all members agreed to keep spending on the CAP unchanged 
until 2013 but they also accepted the proposal for a review of the entire budget in 2008. 
In short, this budget was a characteristic exercise in national self-interest and splitting 
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differences. For many years, the salient features of the EU have included an obsession 
with detail, a preference for incremental change, an inability to do things until the last 
minute, habit-forming dependency on France and Germany, and a shaky commitment to 
enlargement sometimes.315 
       
In addition, some argued that the CAP also offends against the principle of subsidiarity. 
Since the principle of subsidiarity as well as the aim of fostering economic growth in all 
member states, it can sometimes justify financing things at the European level rather than 
national one. But the list is quite short and itt might include the European Commission 
itself, as policeman of the single market; a few pan-European transport projects; common 
border controls; research that tends often to be insufficiently funded nationally; and, 
probably, some foreign aid as a single EU aid budget could avoid much of the duplication 
that confronts recipients of European aid, although the EU aid program has frequently 
been criticized for being ineffectively delivered. As some of these items are now national 
concern, a sensible EU budget might even be bigger in certain areas. There are also 
arguments saying that most Europeans would be better off if there were no farm support 
at all. Nevertheless, if there is to be some cuts, it should certainly be dispensed nationally, 
because only national governments have the expertise and the political authority to 
administer what has increasingly turned into a personal income-support system for one 
particular interest group within the EU. Actually, as it showed quite often in the past, the 
CAP spending is not only divisive within the EU but also has helped to turn the whole 
EU budget into what the 2003 Sapir report316, “An Agenda for a Growing Europe”, 
memorably termed “a historic relic”.317    
 
3.4.1.4 CAP: Supranational venture or a realm of high politics 
 
As mentioned above, farming interests are strongly represented at the national and 
European levels. In most member states the corporatist relationship between national 
farmers associations and agriculture ministers ascertains that farmers play a central role 
in the making of national agricultural policies. At the European level, the Confederation 
of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) is the most well-funded, well-staffed 
and highly-organized among all the supranational sectoral associations.318 Nevertheless, 
the agrarian interest groups did not have the power or the means to influence the terms of 
the 1992 CAP reforms significantly, at either national or European level. Their 
representational monopoly made them capable to shape some aspects of agricultural 
policy-making by pointing out the possible economic and social consequences of 
decisions, but they have found it uneasy to influence the overall parameters of policy or 
to formulate their own alternative proposals. National elections have played much more 
important role and also pushed agricultural interests to work through national channels, 
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by focusing on individual members of the Council of Ministers. Hence, the role and 
power of COPA was more as a vector of the original CAP than as a channel for reform, 
despite its crucial importance in securing the acceptance of the CAP in the 1960s.319 
       
As the CAP depends on mostly representational monopolies, the formal structures for 
channeling organized functional interests into the policy process provide legitimacy. 
However, the classical instruments of public accountability, including judicial review, are 
virtually absent in the CAP, a policy sphere more normally typical of high politics. The 
mainly managerial and technocratic mode of policy-making creates the illusion that all 
problems can be resolved on the basis of technical considerations, assuming that the 
objectives of policy are settled. In this way, the process makes it virtually impossible to 
develop really redistributive policies or to address normative issues.320 
       
Although the CAP is one of the EU’s only genuinely common policies, making the sense 
that it effectively replaces national policies, it is in reality highly decentralized with 
considerable discretion held by national agricultural ministers and their ministries. In 
fact, logically, the main problem is a classic ‘pooled sovereignty, divided accountability’ 
problem: national administrations, not EU institutions, are mainly responsible for 
spending controls and the policing of fraud. The broader point of view is that regardless 
of the reputed virtues of governance by policy networks, the CAP is symbolic of the 
management and legitimacy deficits to which this form of governance can give rise.321  
       
Therefore, the CAP still sits in a kind of a halfway house between the intergovernmental 
and the truly supranational, marked by limitations, and fundamental contradictions. 
However, both the member state governments and the Commission have exploited these 
contradictions for their own purposes in contrary to many expectations. Indeed, the 
political paradoxes of the CAP are the main source of its stability, since it provides the 
means for member governments to defend nationally defined agricultural policies, with 
their persistent elements of protection, welfare, and electoral preoccupations. In addition, 
the most powerful organ of the EU, the Council of Ministers, is comprised of politicians 
with exclusively national constituents. Its dependence on forms of unanimity decision-
making gives a very effective guarantee to the status quo, while at the same time 
promoting compromises, which have secured continuation of commitment to European 
integration.322 
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3.4.2 Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) 
 
3.4.2.1 Context and formation of the CFSP 
 
In the early 1990s, the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU) are 
interchangeable terms referring to the same organization. Indeed, these two terms are 
totally different in their deep sense. The EC is a system for legislating due to the 
Community method of decision-making, which balances between member states and EU 
institutions. By contrast, the EU is a symbolic construct, created by the TEU or 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which itself made the EC as one pillar of a grander edifice 
known as the European Union. Two separate pillars established for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP, pillar II) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, pillar III) 
produce legislation relatively rarely. Decision-making within both pillars is essentially 
intergovernmental and almost always requires unanimity.323 
       
Analysis of foreign policy-making in the EU is further complicated by an institutional 
division between frameworks for making economic policy and for coordinating foreign 
policy. Responsibility for external economic relations has largely been entrusted to 
European Community bodies, while the member state governments have established 
some common positions on some foreign policy issues in an intergovernmental 
framework initially European Political Cooperation (EPC) and since 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, the CFSP. Decisions taken in both frameworks should be consistent. Simply 
speaking, consistency means that policies decided in both frameworks should not rule out 
each other, or pursue incompatible objectives. Consistency can also be seen as a two-step 
process: first a foreign policy is formulated in the CFSP framework; then the 
Community’s economic instruments and resources are used to implement it.324 
       
The institutional structure of the CFSP, as established under the Maastricht Treaty, is 
similar to that of EPC. The European Council sets the broad guidelines: the Council of 
Foreign Ministers takes decisions to implement them. The Political Committee prepares 
the work for the Council concerning with CFSP items and Coreper passes the Political 
Committee’s positions on to the Council. The Political Committee depends on the work 
of European foreign ministry officials and CFSP working groups. Some are joint EC and 
CFSP groups; others are CFSP only. The European Commission is fully associated while 
the EP is informed of the CFSP issues, and can make recommendations, but its views do 
not have to be incorporated into CFSP decisions. Moreover, the CFSP does not fall under 
ECJ jurisdiction.325 
       
What became the CFSP at Maastricht had used to then be EPC that was a process 
launched by the 1970 Luxembourg Report of the foreign ministers of the then EC six 
member countries, who decided for the necessity of intensified ‘political cooperation’ and 
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‘the mechanism in an initial phase for harmonizing their different views on international 
affairs’. EPC developed steadily to some operational level with meetings at official, 
ambassadorial, directorial and ministerial levels out of the framework of the European 
Treaties. Therefore, at that time, Foreign Affairs Council and the new European Council 
(meeting of heads of states and governments, held first in 1975) had to deal in two 
separate spheres: ‘in the Council of the Communities and in the context of Political 
Cooperation’. It was hence difficult for actual cooperation due to its very informal nature. 
These impractical complications were gradually removed remarkably in 1986 by the 
Single European Act (SEA). Still its major objective lay in creating the Single Market, 
the SEA also brought the informal European Council into the treaty structure with the 
ambitious objective to formulate and implement a European foreign policy. It was the 
first time that the EPC was indirectly mentioned in a treaty text. However, it was until the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that the CFSP was not yet created within the treaty framework. 
Maastricht also induced the concept of a common defence policy, possibly leading 
ultimately also to a common defence, and provided that the EU should have a military 
capability at its disposal through recourse to the entirely separate Western European 
Union (WEU; it was founded in 1948, one year before NATO and effectively succeeded 
as the basis for the defence of western Europe). The decision-making processes in CFSP 
remained undoubtedly intergovernmental as the Commission was only granted full 
associational status, which is lesser than that of the member states’ governments. This 
distinction made the CFSP setting apart as the second pillar with different decision-
making procedures applied from those in the first EC pillar. The Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties also further clarified and continued the existence of pillar system in the EU.326 
       
It is worthwhile to see what European foreign policy means in current world before going 
into details of the CFSP and assessing its stature as a common foreign policy. As defined 
by Christopher Hill, European foreign policy is ‘the ensemble of the international 
activities of the European Union, including output from all three of the EU’s pillars, and 
not just that relating to the CFSP’. But it cannot be assumed that this mass of activity will 
be in itself coherent all the time because it constitutes effective strategic choices of 
nation-states. However, there has also evidence that those who control the reins of 
decision-making, whether in the Commission, the Council Secretariat or the Presidency 
foreign ministry, are very aware of the necessity to pull the threads together and to avoid 
excessive inconsistency. Moreover, it can also be observed in national capitals of many 
EU member states that a kind of conscious aspiration and enthusiasm exists to achieve a 
common European foreign policy, across a wide range of substantive activity, involving 
bilateral and multilateral relations with third party states and organizations in the 
international system. Formulating a single foreign policy is still a long way; however, it is 
not unreasonable to talk of the European Union’s foreign policy existing alongside those 
of the member states and acting as a centripetal force.327 
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The milestone of the Amsterdam Treaty was not only introducing a new form of 
decision-making in Common Strategies but also the creation of the new post of High 
Representative for the CFSP, marking the beginning of the recognition that an effective 
CFSP needed more coherence and possibly even leadership than could be provided by 
six-month rotating presidencies of varying quality and priorities. Javier Solana, former 
Spanish foreign minister and more recently Secretary-General of NATO, was appointed 
as the first High Representative for the CFSP. However, guidance for the specific 
functions and about the level of the new created post was not given other than that it was 
to be combined with that of the existing Secretary-General of the Council and that it was 
to assist the presidency and the Council.328 Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty may lead to 
a significant extension of QMV within pillar II, particularly providing its new forms of 
flexibility. How the Treaty is implemented will determine more rather than what the 
Treaty mentions: whether the newly created Policy Planning Unit and High 
Representative ratchet up foreign policy cooperation, or end up being labeled as 
institutional gadgets, still open questions.329 Meanwhile, however, it is not easy to deny 
the argument of the former Belgin Prime Minister, Leo Tindermans, that, ‘Although it 
makes a number of technical improvements, the Amsterdam Treaty will not make any 
substantial difference to the CFSP’.330  
       
The major impact of the Nice Treaty on the CFSP was to give formal status to the EU’s 
new Military Committee and the senior/ambassadorial-level Brussels-based Political and 
Security Committee, which was to be responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
CFSP, with the possibility of decision-making authority being delegated to it from the 
ministerial level. This is the only level at which the EU decisions for the control of 
military operations are formally made. Therefore, the CFSP was and still remains to be an 
intergovernmental negotiating process in the charge of the six-monthly rotating 
presidency, with all the inefficiencies inherent in that.331 
 
3.4.2.2 CFSP and The NATO 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 by the United 
States and its allies bordering the North Atlantic. In post Second World War period, the 
twin problems of European security – ‘keeping the Russians out and the Germans down’ 
– were resolved by the NATO alliance under the hegemonic leadership of the United 
States.332 The original members of NATO, in addition to the United States who also 
signed the North Atlantic Treaty were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and Portugal. Later alliance 
was joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955 (the reunified 
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Germany after 1990 also remained in alliance) and Spain in 1982 respectively. France 
withdrew its forces from the NATO command in 1966 without withdrawing from the 
alliance. According to the treaty, the signatory nations agreed to consult together if the 
security of any member state was threatened and to regard a military attack against one as 
an attack against all. Further, the treaty committed the allies to use military force “to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 
            
Obviously, the primary purpose of NATO was and is to provide security for its members. 
Although it was not specifically stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO countries 
were primarily concerned about the threat of Soviet aggression, and NATO designed its 
policies to counter the USSR. In this sense, it was a purely integrated alliance 
organization for military purposes and can also be labelled as a pluralistic security 
community. But with the demise of the USSR, many people argue that NATO is an 
intergovernmental organization whose time has passed and that it should be disbanded.333 
With the end of the Cold War and without a common enemy that means the Soviet 
Union, the reason to consolidate the diverse member states for collective security is not 
an urgent necessity and the very existence of NATO became a subject of debate which 
raised a fundamental question – does NATO still serve a purpose.  
            
NATO’s advocates argued that even though the Soviet threat is gone, security threats to 
Europe remained and that NATO was a valuable vehicle for integrating the defence 
policies of its members.334 Some analysts reasoned that it was useful to preserve NATO if 
it were restructured not to contain enemies but to control allies. For that, all the countries 
in Europe would be required to coordinate their defence policies. This would incorporate 
the East European and former Soviet republics pursuing democratisations into a 
European-wide framework through their participation in the alliance.335 The existing 
value of NATO further reveals during the Bosnian conflict. Agreeing to the UN request 
for enforcing the “no-fly zone” over Bosnia and former Yugoslavia in 1993, and later in 
1995 taking over all functions of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia from the hands of 
the UN, NATO enhances regional peace and security and played a major role as a leading 
military alliance in Europe.  
            
NATO’s history as an integrated military organization during and after the Cold War 
points out the strengths and weaknesses of its existence. On the one hand, NATO’s 
military structure provides a degree of security for its member states that they, acting as 
individual sovereign entities, could not attain for themselves. Throughout the Cold War 
period, the NATO alliance, under the leadership of the United States, provided all 
member states with protection from a possibility of Soviet invasion. On the other hand, 
because of the continuing demand on the part of individual states for their rights of 
sovereignty, policies undertaken by NATO are often hesitant and ineffective. At the same 
time, the members of the alliance were consistently reluctant to involve NATO in “out of 
area” conflicts, like the one of Gulf War. More recently, NATO countries also disagreed 
on how best to respond to terrorism, whether Eastern European states should be admitted 
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to NATO, and what policies to adopt toward nascent conflicts in Europe. Eventually, 
NATO’s members worked out most of their differences on these issues, but only after 
extensive discussions.336  
            
The changing position of NATO can be seen in the conversion from a military alliance 
designed for defence against a predetermined enemy to a larger collective security 
community focused primarily on the political dimensions of security. At this point, 
NATO’s members generally varied more over how best to achieve their common 
objective – collective security – than over what that objective should be. The 1991 Rome 
Summit moved in this direction by drafting “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.” The 
Rome Declaration announced formation of a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) “to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.”337  
            
Complex issues also surround a future European security structure. In a dramatic move in 
response to the changing European geostrategic landscape, NATO offer limited military 
“partnerships” to virtually any European country that was interested, including Russia 
and the former Warsaw Pact states. It described the Partnership for Peace (PFP) proposal 
as a first step toward possible – not automatic – NATO membership for the old Soviet-
bloc states. The NATO defence ministers accepted this position, but stopped short of 
offering NATO’s former East Bloc full membership. The new partners will participate in 
NATO peacekeeping missions and crisis-management operations, but the plan does not 
guarantee the security of the new partners’ borders – a privilege NATO’s existing 
members enjoy. This decision to restructure NATO thus redirects NATO in a 
fundamental way and shifts East-West security relationships in a fundamentally new 
direction. But the ultimate consequences of the Partnership for Peace for European 
security are uncertain. Initiated at a time when NATO is rendering its role on a continent 
in political transition, the new plan raises fears among its opponents that it could disrupt 
and disintegrate the alliance itself.338 
              
These adjustments in role and mission reflected an effort, of course, to keep NATO alive 
even though the Cold War had died. The old NATO was built on the joint will to resist 
Soviet Aggression. The new NATO sought to survive by preparing to contain 
ethnonational conflicts and foster disarmament and by remaining a vehicle for preserving 
U.S. involvement in European security.339 However, given the novel requirements for 
deterrence as opposed to the mere defence of territory in the nuclear age, it was not 
enough to wait until an attack was imminent to activate NATO’s treaty provisions. All 
members recognized the need for consultation and military planning if the enemy were to 
be deterred from initiating a conflict; over time, that meant the considerable integration of 
troops and weapons systems as well as the planning of strategy, which required complex 
organizational structures unlike any known for earlier alliances.340  
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Further needs will drive the NATO for making some transformations to be more than a 
military alliance in its functional aspect. To strive as a collective security for the whole 
area of all participants, it needs more cohesiveness and less variance among its members. 
It is because all of next structural reforms will be necessary the unanimous political 
consensus of all members. It should avoid the actions, which can lead to the disruption of 
the relationship among members. For example, France’s withdrawal of its forces from 
NATO command in 1966 decreased the integrated strength of the military alliance. 
Indeed NATO combines dual aspects of functional interdependence in its political 
structure (the member states are politically sovereign and NATO only organizes 
consensus among its members) and integrated nature in its military functions (forces of 
member states are under central allied command and operate as a synchronized unit). 
Originally when it was established in 1949, NATO is just only an integrated military 
alliance organ. After fifty years later, NATO has become a structural condition of 
security necessity, which combined the functional style of political integrative behaviour 
together with integrated military interdependence. 
 
3.4.2.3 High Politics of the CFSP 
 
For Stanley Hoffmann, one of the most knowledgeable of post-war political scientists, 
foreign policy was the ultimate expression of high politics. Unlike welfare sectors where 
market economic integration was a viable policy goal, foreign policy marked out areas of 
key importance to the national interest in which nations prefer the self-controlled 
uncertainty of national reliance rather than the uncontrolled certainty of policy 
integration. In consistent with Hoffmann’s view, foreign policies indeed are still 
primarily national in orientation and widely perceived as the one of the ultimate 
expressions of national sovereignty.341 
       
Although the member states have been reluctant to surrender much power to the second 
pillar i.e. the CFSP, as they usually perceive it as the taking away of nation-state’s 
sovereignty, there are other challenges that presently exert pressure on the unity and 
sovereignty of the nation-state. In the EU, there are other challenges that arise from the 
growth of regionalism and ethno-nationalism that provide an alternative allegiance for 
citizens from the traditional nation-state. In addition, the growth of militant and 
politicized religious movements turning into violent means and ends beyond the borders 
of the EU member states (and within to some extent) also challenges the unity of the 
nation-state. Should some of these recent challenges remain unresolved or get worse, they 
are likely to spill over in the form of refugee flows, which will increasingly strain the 
cultural homogeneity of the traditional European nation-state. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the nation-state is continuously faced with tremendous challenges that have 
weakened its traditional grip of power. In that perspective, the CFSP within and beyond 
the borders of the EU may play a role in strengthening the nation-state.342 
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In generally speaking, the CFSP remained confined to diplomatic gestures or economic 
actions. The EU still lacks one of the essential prerequisites of great-power status: a 
military capability that could be deployed in the pursuit of political goals. More 
fundamentally, the CFSP continues to suffer from basic problems of identity, interests, 
and institutions. It was not still legitimated by any common European identity, shared 
between average Europeans, thus making it difficult for CFSP decision-makers to 
persuade their fellow citizens for relinquishing national for ‘European interests’. In 
institutional terms, the Monnet method simply did not function except in the first pillar of 
the EU. Still, foreign policy appeared to be high politics and responsible only to 
intergovernmental decision-making, when amenable to cooperation at all.343 For these 
reasons, it remains quite difficult to reject Hoffmann’s long standing claim that ‘there is 
no common European outlook. Nor is there a common project, a common conception of 
Europe’s role in international affairs’.344 
 
The operationalization of the CFSP, like the EPC as predecessor before it, has been often 
seriously hindered by very considerable discrepancies in power and interests between its 
member states. The most apparent variance is between so-called the EU Big Three: 
Germany, France and the UK, on the one hand, and all other member states on the other. 
After reunification, Germany becomes the largest EU member country and occupied 
critical geopolitical intersection as a bridge between the EU and the East European 
countries. Germany remained a benevolent major power despite restrictions on its ability 
to wield military capability. As the EU’s biggest net budgetary contributor by far, 
Germany’s inclination over the CFSP increased in line with decisions taken in the post-
Maastricht period usually to pay for the CFSP joint actions out of the European 
Community’s budget. In the meantime, France and the UK are still the EU’s only nuclear 
powers. While Germany pursues intensively for a permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), the British and the French are for the present privileged 
members of a powerful club restricted to China, Russia, the USA and themselves. So it is 
clear that no major diplomatic or particularly military initiative under the CFSP would be 
possible without large British and French support.345   
       
The pressures exerted on the nation-state through the first pillar are an extra reason for 
revoking more integration in the second pillar. Not only national interests and national 
differences that make it difficult to achieve a cohesive approach in foreign and security 
policy, but also there are also international systemic factors that make states unwilling to 
yield power in the second pillar policy-making of the EU. Overcautiousness for losing 
national interest has consistently hindered attempts at joint action, diminishing the 
credibility of the CFSP.346 Indeed, the loss of economic sovereignty as a result of 
economic integration and common trade policies in the first pillar has reinforced the 
resolve of the member states to maintain their solid control over foreign and security 
policies. The mixture of supranational and intergovernmental decisions rules, as set up by 
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the recent EU treaties like Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, may be capable to adopt 
common policies to some extent, but they are not adequate to produce decisive actions in 
the CFSP realm.347  
       
Although integration and fragmentation are contradictory impulses to each other, both 
seem to weaken the nation-state. Integration within the EU threatens to further diminish 
the nation-state’s role while fragmentation within the nation-state will ruin the unity and 
sovereignty of national power. A strengthened version of the CFSP could in reality serve 
multiple purposes like promoting greater regional stability and lessening the pressures 
placed on the nation-state. Nonetheless, essential to this key success will be the consent 
of the governed, without which nation-states cannot yield greater sovereignty to the EU. 
The development of a real European security and defence identity requires a vision of a 
common future together with the institutional machinery to assure its competency and 
effectiveness. It depends mostly on the capacity of European citizens to regard European 
integration as a legitimate and desirable goal for the member states, which in turn relies 
on efficiency and transparency in all three pillars of the EU.348 
 
3.4.2.4 Iraq Crisis and the CFSP 
 
As it has shown itself during the crisis leading up to war with Iraq, everything seems to 
be far from practice of a common EU foreign policy while it even embodies the essential 
characteristics of the concept of the CFSP and its latent weaknesses. The EU’s failure to 
develop a common policy over Iraq has been indifferent for many years and it has been 
humiliatingly exposed only when the crisis broke out in full scale. Previously Iraq issue 
was deliberately not brought forward within the EU discussions, either at ambassadorial 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives, Political and Security Committee) or at 
ministerial (Council of Ministers) level. There was ineffective superficial discussion and 
the occasional minimalist declaration to demonstrate that the EU was at least aware that 
there was an Iraqi problem. But the UK and France, two EU member states who possess 
permanent seats in the UNSC, made sure that the subject was confined for resolving only 
under the roofs of the UN in New York. The other member states also kept silent or 
neglect at their own irrelevance partly out of respect for the primacy of UN over the EU 
obligations for the UK and France. However, the more underlying motive was 
particularly because they knew that any attempt to forge a common EU position on Iraq 
would be more damaging than helpful to a still fragile CFSP which was making some 
progress in other conflict areas, notably the Balkans and even then Middle East.349 
       
The war against Iraq is supposedly part of the USA’s wider war against terrorism. Iraq 
was identified as a possible target for US military expansion in the US President’s state 
of the Union address delivered in 2002. In that speech, Iraq was along with North Korea 
and Iran labeled part of an ‘axis of evil’. This axis was referred to states that supported 
terrorism by providing save haven for terrorists and arming them in order that they may 
carry out their evil deeds especially attaching American interests far and near. These 
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states did not oblige to international law and sought to produce Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) technology. The US brought the case against Iraq to the UNSC in 
early February 2003. At that time, then the US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented 
the case at the UN for an invasion of Iraq. Mainly it was about Iraq’s violations of 
various UN resolutions; continuous efforts to develop WMD since the end of the Gulf 
War that liberated Kuwait in 1991. And Iraq never hesitated to use these WMD and was 
also known in the past to have done so. The US claimed that there were a plenty of 
evidence to suggest that Iraq was willing to or had shared weapons technology with 
terrorists like Al Qaeda. Despite huge criticism and strong opposition from governments 
around the world, including US’s close allies such as France and Germany, the Bush 
administration decided to go to war with the support of a coalition of the willing.350 
       
It would have been absolutely remarkable if the EU had been able to formulate and 
actively to pursue a cohesive united policy in dealing with the Iraq crisis. Iraq was, after 
all, an issue that concerned with taking positions on, inter alia, the choice between war 
and peace, the legitimate use of military action for an international crisis, democratic 
control, the nature of the transatlantic relationship, the viability and future of the UN, 
stability in the whole region of the Middle East, and the effects on the world economy 
since Iraq is the second largest oil exporting country – on top of all of the above-
mentioned points, namely the war against terrorism and the attempt to stop proliferation 
of WMD. More than anything else, the Iraq crisis also brought a familiar question that is 
the most difficult one to answer for European foreign policy: whether to accept the US 
leadership which has been the mainstay of the post-Second World War World and 
collaborate with it; or whether rather to develop an independent line of policy even in 
opposition to the US. For these reasons, it would be wrong to blame the EU not being 
able to set up an effective CFSP just because of the Iraq problem, which at this stage of 
the CFSP’s development was simply too tough a test.351 
       
It would be useful to take a look upon the attitudes of the US policy-makers in the Iraq 
crisis. Throughout the crisis, the US administration argues that time was running out. 
Above all, the only place time was really running out was in the socially constructed 
world created in mindsets of certain US policy makers. In their view, then Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to international peace and security by arming 
for an attack against the US or assisting terrorists to procure WMD. Regardless of how 
remote the possibility, finally the zero-sum view of the US neo-conservative views won 
out. With the goal of power maximization being the main component of realism, the 
concept could not sufficiently explain these actions of the US policy-makers. In turn the 
US lost some respect in the international community and also lost power in aggregate 
although it won the war at first stage. Moreover, the US administration provided an 
impetus for other major global rivals to emerge and challenge US hegemony, because it 
acted upon forcefully upon what turned out to be the minimal scale of risk to the US 
national security. The US administration’s many intelligence organizations filed reports 
indicating that Iraq was not an immediate threat to the American national security. In 
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spite of all these factors, the US policy-makers viewed Iraq as a real threat so they acted 
in that way. Power maximization, within the context of cultural realism may offer a better 
answer than traditional realist or neorealist approach to understand the US policy blunder 
in Iraq. It was in the minds of elites i.e. the US policy-makers that Iraq represented a 
threat to US power and security. Within this cultural strategic mindset, it may be easier to 
understand the US actions if things were looked at through that way. On the other hand, 
European elites, looking at the situation with the belief that conflict can be avoided, that 
negotiation is always an option and that use of force is not an effective policy tool, will 
build a different reality and a different strategy to solve the problem in sight.352 
       
The trouble is that Iraq is not the only issue on which the CFSP has been tested and found 
ineffective over time. For instance, at the same January 2003 meeting of the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council at which Iraq issue was so divisive, European 
ministers disagreed with each other in terms of foreign policy matter on so simple and 
hardly central an issue as whether the Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe should be 
invited to a Franco-African summit (and subsequently an EU-African Summit in 
Portugal). Such an invitation was certainly prevented by the spirit of the EU foreign 
policy, and would have been by the letter too, had the decision imposing sanctions not 
literally just expired, one year on from its introduction. As the situation in Zimbabwe in 
the meantime had only become worse, the failure to renew the sanctions in accordance 
with the EU’s approach up to that point was unlikely to be a consistent and thought-
through approach of the CFSP. If the EU could not maintain a common approach even on 
far less threatening international issue like Zimbabwe, critics argued what could be 
expected of it on Iraq, which is a far more complicated crisis and also raised far wider 
fundamental issues of global peace and security than violations of human rights and good 
governance, the issues in Zimbabwe.353 
       
The US insisted that the military operation would be multilateral and multinational. 
Looking back into history, throughout the Cold War, the US engaged in alliance politics 
pursuing multilateral solutions. There has been no ground recently for claims that the US 
acted unilaterally. The US acted in crises according to its preferences favoring support, 
which needs not to be institutionalized. Without the British and the various other nations 
composing the coalition, regardless of how negligible or small their contributions, the US 
would not have invaded Iraq. It can be argued that America’s strategic culture required, 
in a certain sense, that the US acquire partners regardless of their ability to contribute to 
the mission.354 
       
The CFSP was virtually silent throughout the Iraq crisis. The EU itself collectively has 
had the capacity neither to support the US position on Iraq nor to oppose it – despite the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of European opinion increasingly showed itself to be 
opposed to an attack on Iraq. It is not unreasonable to ask why there exists such a 
paralysis of the CFSP, when so many endeavors were being vested into the development 
of Europe’s foreign policy-making system, and into the acquisition of a common defence 
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capability. The most obvious reason is the divergence in domestic interests of the EU Big 
Three – Germany, France and the UK on their mindsets about Iraq – which make up an 
informal core of the EU for setting up the effective CFSP. For example, the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair used his dominance over Parliament and his own Labour Party to 
insist on allying and identifying with US policy. Without Blair’s personal conviction and 
determined support for Iraq war, it is hardly possible that even a pragmatic Labour 
Cabinet would have gone that much so far on awkward position for one of its ideological 
opponents. On the side of Germany from the very beginning of the crisis, then German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used public antipathy to both war and to American 
President Bush to help himself for re-election in September 2002. His choice of defiance 
to US policy made a very deep frost in the US-German relations and made it very 
difficult to reach agreement with the UK over Iraq as well.355 
 
However, news disclosures after the Iraq war showed the real nature of the power politics 
among the cooperation of nation-states. Countries that publicly opposed against the Iraq 
war privately facilitated it. For example, Germany secretly provided more significant 
intelligence assistance to the American military than its government has publicly 
acknowledged. It includes Iraqi government’s detailed defence plan, which was secretly 
obtained by the German intelligence shortly before the war. In the months before the Iraq 
war, the US Defence Ministry wrote a classified list of which nations had joined 
President Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing’ to topple Saddam Hussein and support the war. 
While Germany had loudly opposed the war, it did not obstruct the United States 
military’s efforts and even offered limited cooperation to American military. Therefore, 
Germany was listed as ‘noncoalition but cooperating’ in terms of Pentagon choice of 
word for that kind of list which is not public. Other examples are Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
that were more supportive but did not want to be perceived as facilitating the attack so 
they were labeled as ‘silent partners’ in that Iraq war.356 
       
During the Iraq crisis, French position is also very interesting. Initially, France chose a 
middle position logically because of its long-term holding interests in Middle East. As a 
permanent member of the UNSC, France was not about to give Bush and Blair carte 
blanche by supporting openly the war. In the same way, it did not wish to box itself into 
the corner of vehement opposition to military action, if it could be possible to avoid. In 
the events approaching to the war, the relentless pressure driven by Bush’s determination 
to overthrow Saddam Hussein and Blair’s equally important political necessity for UN 
legitimacy, finally has moved French cover and pushed France to side with one final 
definite choice. By making somewhat surprise of the Americans themselves, who had 
assumed that the French preference to realpolitik would finally lead them to side with the 
winners, President Chirac and then Foreign Minister de Villepin picked up the blunt 
opposition with Anglo-American stand. In order to do so, French allied with Germany 
and Russia, but split both NATO and the EU. As Hill classified, the motives for such a 
policy choice were probably a mixture of sincere belief in the dangers of a war; a desire 
to stay on side with Middle Eastern and domestic opinion; and a firm determination not 
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to allow London and Washington always setting the agenda of international politics. In 
doing so, they decided to accept the immediate damage to the image of European foreign 
policy for the possible longer-term gain of forging a distinctive European identity in the 
world, while heightening the awareness of European public of why the CFSP might be 
essential for them. On the other hand, however, it was apparently a political gamble, 
which put at risk the carefully constructed institutions and common political 
understandings which have held the West together over half a century.357  
       
In this way, it will not be wrong to conclude that the 15 member states of the EU truly 
vary in their views on the Iraq crisis, with Italy and Spain showing more sympathy for the 
US approach, and Greece and the other neutrals at the other end of spectrum. The pro-
Americanism of the accession countries demonstrated the weakness of the EU’s power of 
attraction once accession has been conceded. What this split in the EU shows is that the 
member states are neither regrouping around a common position, however cautious, nor 
renationalizing,358 in a sense that individual states returning back to their old backyards 
of fortifying their domestic interests with single actions. Rather, this Iraq crisis shows 
that EU disunity of a dramatic but possibly temporary kind, which is mostly among 
governments than peoples.359 
 
3.4.2.5 The CFSP as a civilizing project 
 
The CFSP policy regime is, according to Hanns W. Maull, transforming the EU foreign 
policy as a civilizing project in recent years. Since 1998, the EU has been developing an 
institutional framework and military capabilities to formulate and pursue a common 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This attempt was actually driven by 
policy failures of the EU in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. From previous crises, 
the lesson learned was that military intervention might be necessary under some 
circumstances to prevent large-scale atrocities and killings and to deal with the threats, 
which state failures and civil wars may pose to peace, stability and security in the 
neighbourhood of the EU. The logic of military preparation and intervention, which the 
ESDP has been pursuing henceforth, has not been part of a militarization of the CFSP, 
but a response to a new international environment marked by pervasive state failure and 
the emergence of new security threats like international terrorism and cross border 
crimes.360 
       
In this context, the EU has also been attempting to work for a better international order. 
This is indeed a normative project, but one rooted in universally accepted, cosmopolitan 
values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. The civilizing of international relations 
that has been the key aspect of European efforts to exert regional and international 
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influence via the EU has been based on normative values of principled multilateralism 
and support for international law and institutions. It has also been promoted largely 
through voluntary association. In reality, the most important contribution of the EU as a 
civilian power model for making a better international order has been its enlargement into 
Central and Eastern European countries. If the EU is to cope with future political and 
security challenges, it will be necessary to construct a vibrant and robust international 
order although it sounds too idealistic. However, any political order ultimately relies on 
its ability to enforce its norms. The challenge in politics for the CFSP is to domesticate 
both states’ and social actors temptation to choose the use of force. This is all about of 
civilizing politics and the EU is trying to this goal through a foreign policy role concept 
or building a kind of identity as a civilian power. Even if the EU fails to develop a 
capacity to promote and secure a civilized international order, it will have to take 
whatever alternatives the other world powers see suited.361 
 
However, there are also counterarguments to this civilizing power of the EU concept. The 
civilian power model is not unique in international relations: small countries tend to rely 
on persuasion rather than coercion. It is more unusual for states with considerable 
resources to choose to behave like civilian powers – for example, in the way Japan and 
Germany did in the post Second World War period. Moreover, it could be argued that 
rich and well-resourced countries – or collectivities of them like the EU – emanate power 
and could never truly engage in persuasion, which implies recognition of equality 
between the actors involved. However, there is nonetheless a continuum from persuasion 
to coercion, and what matters is where the EU will put itself on it in future.362 
       
The EU has the potential to play as a major force in shaping the global events. However, 
the EU has only utilized this potential more in the economic field rather than in the 
political and security spheres. The EU is the world’s largest trader, and through its 
Common Commercial Policy, the EU has used its power to promote global free trade. 
The Single Market has been established and opened to the world through multiple trade 
agreements with almost every region of the world. In addition, the EU has played a 
crucial role in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and worked intensively to defend 
and promote its legitimacy and identity. Nevertheless, the EU has still been less capable 
to speak with a single and coherent voice on global political and security issues. While 
the EU has taken action on a number of non-sensitive issues, such as political and 
economic support of the newly emerged democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, it 
has been incapable of acting consistently and decisively through the CFSP when it faced 
with critical challenges to the EU’s security, as witnessed during the crises of Yugoslavia 
break-up and Iraq war. However, having shown many incapacitated instances in which 
the CFSP cannot produce a common position for tackling major international crises, it is 
still remarkable to note that the nation-states of Europe with deep historical variances and 
legacies have agreed to establish common foreign policy under the collectivity of the EU. 
Time will judge how the ‘soft civil power’ that the EU aims to build up through its trade, 
aid, human rights, crisis management and peace-keeping missions throughout the world 
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may turn out to be just as influential in shaping the preferences of the EU member states 
and the events of the world as the more obvious ‘hard military power’ of the US.363 
 
3.4.2.6 The CFSP and Iran: Role of the EU as Soft Power 
 
Iran has mattered so much to Europe for many years. Especially for the past few years, 
Iran has become the biggest test of the EU’s ability to affect important global issues like 
nuclear proliferation and energy security. It is also challenging whether or not that most 
characteristic EU foreign policy instrument – soft power – can work out effectively 
beyond the immediate borders of the EU’s neighbourhood. For the proponents of the EU 
for such concept, soft power is a slower, more reliable and civilized way of exercising 
influence in global crises than the use of military force – hard power. The imminent 
question is how will the evidence with Iran strengthen or weaken this concept of the 
CFSP of the EU?364  
 
Indeed, soft power has also had some achievements in last years. It should be noted that 
Iran has conceded to soft power by agreeing to negotiate for its nuclear ambitions. It may 
have slowed Iran’s secret plans in the past years by delaying the confrontation over Iran’s 
nuclear programme to 2006 rather than 2003, a time when many European countries were 
so divided to get a common agreement with the US over the invasion of Iraq. The 
attempts of the EU to solve the nuclear problem with Iran have also soothed to remedy 
some of the transatlantic wounds left by Iraq war, which in its turn pushed to rally the 
Americans behind the EU. In fact, it could not have been predicted in 2003, when some 
members of the Bush Administration were thinking whether Iran should be the next 
target after Iraq. The decision of the so-called EU Three (Germany, France and the UK) 
in year 2003 to persuade Iran for giving up its efforts that the US and the Europe believe 
is aimed at making Iran a nuclear weapons power. On the side of Iran, it argued that its 
nuclear activities are aimed only at generating electricity, but this claim was disputed by 
the Americans and many Europeans, who quoted some 18 years of clandestine nuclear 
activity of Iran, and since that activity was discovered, an unwillingness to provide the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors with much of the information 
they have asked for.365 
       
Negotiations led by EU three with Iran and backed by the US collapsed in August 2005, 
when Iran resumed work to convert uranium ore to gas for later enrichment. In January 
2006, by removing IAEA seals on its pilot enrichment plant at Natanz, Iran stepped 
forward for more confrontation with the West. Growing evidence that Iran is working on 
ways to deliver nuclear warheads by missile, and calls by Iranian President for Israel to 
be ‘wiped off the map’ of the Middle East, have heightened the alarm at international 
community and also helped drag its traditional allies – Russia and China – off the fence. 
A Russian compromise, to enrich uranium on its soil for Iran so as to create more space 
for more talks, was brushed aside. In fact, Iran had used these talks for attempting to 
divide Russia and China from Europe and America. The consequence was the rare 
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diplomatic unity of the five permanent members of the UNSC – the US, the UK, China, 
Russia and France – agreed to call on the 35-nation board of the IAEA, meeting in 
emergency session, to report Iran’s past illicit nuclear activities to the UN. If Iran pursues 
and continues with its uranium enrichment program for bomb building, it can expect 
diplomatic isolation and even worse, economic and political sanctions.366 
       
Once the matter is to be discussed on the UNSC agenda, the US will certainly push for 
economic sanctions against Iran’ belligerency. However, European diplomats have said 
that a more moderate approach is also possible, beginning probably with a resolution 
calling Iran to do what it has failed to do until now: providing full access to its nuclear 
plants to IAEA inspectors, and also to make a full accounting of the work it has done 
until now, including the work it carried out during the 18 years when its program was 
clandestine. On the EU side, Europeans have long been wary of sanctions option, on the 
ground that they might have the effect of hurting ordinary Iranians without stopping 
Iranian regime and its nuclear weapons program. Moreover, sanctions would send the 
cost of crude oil even higher, imposing a steep economic cost on the West. 
       
As Iran case shows, EU soft power approach may have been effective at changing the 
behaviour of America, and possibly Russia and China. Although its original purpose was 
to change the behaviour of Iran by drawing it into a gentle web of mutual rights and 
obligations, it sustained itself as a policy. Critics of soft power also pointed out one issue 
as a major weakness that soft power has nothing to offer. If Iran wanted a security 
guarantee, then Europe, which has no significant military forces in the world and in its 
region, was in no position to provide such guarantee. For that purpose, only America 
could do that. However, this does not mean that the attempt to use soft power was not 
wholly effective although it might suggest that European soft power would never have 
worked alone on its own. There always had to be a hard power component, for example, 
perhaps an Iran-American deal on security to match an Iran-Europe one on trade and 
proliferation. But for supporters of soft power, the point is to supplant the brutal use of 
force in resolving world crises. It is a better way of managing global tensions by the EU 
as a rival to the US but not as the best deputy. In sum, the crisis with Iran has exposed 
rather than reconciled the old deep transatlantic differences. They are possibly to get 
sharper over near future when there is no progress for such a crisis. As Robert Kagan 
argued, both hard and soft powers have their own characteristic flaws. Hard power 
advocates can be too quick to pull the trigger and use the force as arguably as shown in 
Iraq case. On the other hand, for soft power proponents, diplomatic talking will never be 
ending, military action is inconceivable and there is never a trigger to pull – as in Iran 
case.367 
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3.5 Political Cultures, Democracy and Legitimacy in the EU 
 
Political cultures, democracy and legitimacy of EU institutions play critical role in the 
EU for long-term success of this unique experiment of regional integration in Europe. In 
general overview, a dominant mode of political culture in the EU can be classified as the 
liberal democratic principle intertwined with open market economy that sustains the 
European nation-states to their all round developments and full survival without having 
any kind of violence, war and conflict among its members since the end of Second World 
War. The so-called Copenhagen criteria for the accession of new member countries from 
the Central and Eastern Europe into the EU demand several political and economic 
requirements like guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for 
minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy; and capacity to withstand 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. It will be safe to conclude that 
accession criteria called for the establishment of a common political culture in Europe via 
regional integration project of the EU by pushing the candidate countries fulfilling the 
political commitment consistent with existing members of the EU. 
       
EU policy processes and decision-making spills across state boundaries, penetrating deep 
into previously domestic aspects of national politics and administration. It embodies the 
principle of mutual interference in member countries’ domestic affairs, even extending 
mutual inspection of each other’s judicial procedures. It works on the basis of mutual 
trust and collective consent for implementation of European regulations, laws and 
procedures through national administrations in collaboration with EU’s supranational 
institutions. States are no longer the only predominant actors although they behave a key 
role to the EU policy processes.368 Exactly at this point, the legitimacy problem begins in 
the EU as many of EU institutions that sit in the driving seat of its daily business are quite 
aloof from general European public and not necessarily bears the burden of direct 
accountability like national governments. 
 
3.5.1 Common Identity and Political Cultures for Regional Integration 
 
As major achievements in building a regional common identity, the EU is so far most 
successful regional organization in the world by attaining its internal market, its own 
Economic and Monetary Union and common currency: Euro. Therefore, the EU’s 
common identity has frequently been characterized as sui generis or unique organization 
in the world. Indeed, the EU’s distinctive identity building derives from its unusual 
institutions and decision-making procedures, which are totally different from national 
institutions although it lacks some basic components and identities of nation-states.369 
Virtually all actors in the EU policy process have multiple identities, and may play 
multiple roles. None of Commissioners or Commission officials wholly relinquishes their 
national identities, links and loyalties in making policy of the EU. EU Commissioners are 
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mostly recruited by national governments, and many return to national political life after 
serving their term of office.370 
       
Although the EU represents as a common visible identity of the whole Europe nowadays, 
there still exist numerous interests and traditions, which divide the lines among Europe’s 
nation-states and provide a complex pattern of national attitudes towards European 
integration. These national divisions can be categorized along the lines of cultural, 
economic and political differences. For instance, cultural differences are such as weak 
versus strong national identities, Catholic versus Protestant, North versus South, East 
versus West and homogeneous versus multi-ethnic societies. Economic differences refer 
to rich versus poor, urban versus rural, industrial versus agricultural, center versus 
periphery, high versus low employment, large versus small income inequalities, etc. 
Political differences are large versus small populations, long versus short democratic 
traditions, consensual versus majoritarian, liberal versus social/Christian democratic 
welfare states, Anglo-Saxon versus Rhineland models of capitalism. On the other hand, 
possessing a strong national identity will not necessarily mean to be ardent supporter of 
European integration. Actually, it may come out contrary.371 
       
As social constructivism insists, human beings do not exist independently from their 
social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings i.e. political cultures 
in broader sense. Many European integration studies from constructivist perspective, 
therefore, focus intensely on the EU as a two-way process of policy-making and 
institution-building at the European level on one hand whereas it in turn gives feed back 
into the member states, their political processes and structures. As a result, the EU as an 
emerging polity will not only limit the range of choices available to nation-states, but also 
meddle in the way they define their national interests and even their identities. On this 
assumption, EU membership matters most in the way in which actors see themselves and 
are looked by others as social beings. Germany, France, and Italy are no longer individual 
European states. They are the EU member nations in the sense that their statehood is 
increasingly defined by their membership in the EU.372 
       
The term ‘Europeanization’ may be helpful in explaining the impact of the EU on 
member states in terms of collective identity formation and accommodating contrast 
political cultures. It should not also be overlapped in their sense of meaning between 
European integration and Europeanization. The distinction is quite clear: European 
integration is concerned with political and policy developments at the supranational level 
whereas Europeanization refers to the consequences of this process mainly for member 
states and politics within them.373 Radaelli defined Europeanization as “processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
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norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies”.374 
       
Some argue that a European polity is impossible, because there is no European people, no 
common European history or common sharing myths on which collective European 
identity could be constructed. They quoted some fundamental concepts of collective 
identities taking cultural variables such as membership in ethnic groups as a given which 
then develop into national identities during the process of nation building. This argument 
went even further if the causal connection between culture and identity is seen as a one-
way street, then there is no possibility to build up such a supranational identity in Europe 
with the EU. Therefore, collective identities will still remain firmly with the nation-state 
as the best connection between territory and people on the basis of culture and history. 
However, Europe and European nation-states are both imagined communities and people 
could feel a common sense of belonging to be a part of both communities without 
necessarily choosing and affiliating to some primary identifications. It is true that many 
people in Europe still believe that Europe lacks a demos, one visible indicator of strong 
identification with common identity of Europe in public opinion. But ‘country first, but 
Europe too’, is the dominant mode in most of the EU member states, and people do not 
perceive this as contradictory. Therefore, it can be argued that the European polity does 
not require a demos which will replace a national with European identity, but one in 
which national and European identities coexist and complement each other.375 
 
3.5.2 Question of the Democratic Deficit 
  
Among the institutions of the EU, the European Parliament (EP) used one of the strongest 
arguments to ensure an increase in its powers by saying that the EU suffers a degree of 
democratic deficit which can only be remedied by giving more authority in decision- 
making to the only directly and democratically elected institution i.e. the EP. This 
argument even gained more force with the inclusion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 
into the Council of Ministers. As long as it is possible for any member state to use its 
veto power for rejecting any proposal, it could be argued that national parliaments, at 
least in principle, will be able to exercise democratic control by mandating their ministers 
not to accept the deals except under specified circumstances. Once such a control and 
indirect power of national parliaments on decision-making in the Council relinquishes, 
the debate about democratic deficit grew even wider and the argument for substituting it 
by increasing powers of the EP grew stronger.376 
       
There is no single concrete definition of the democratic deficit in the EU even though the 
thematic debate is overwhelming among all EU subjects. However, there is a standard 
version of depicting democratic deficit in the EU by describing some claims. Firstly, the 
EP is too weak and increases in the powers of the EP have not sufficiently compensated 
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for the loss of national parliamentary control because the Council still dominates the EP 
in the legislation process and adoption of the Budget, and EU citizens are not well 
connected to their members of the EP as to their national parliamentarians. Secondly, 
there are no European elections in which EU citizens can vote on EU policies, except in 
periodic referendums on EU membership or treaty reforms. National elections are 
competed on domestic agenda rather than European issues. And EP elections are also not 
about Europe since the media and political parties usually treat them as mid-term national 
contests. Thirdly, the EU is too distant from its citizens who normally don’t understand 
the EU’s way of doing business in policy processes and decision-making. Finally, there is 
policy drift in the EU because many EU policies are not supported by a majority of 
citizens in many member states.377 
       
Governance beyond the nation-state through international institutions like the EU can 
help improving social welfare and democracy at the same time. If it is so, the EU should 
not be a problem because it is even a part of solution to the problems of modern 
democracy. There are two ways of description for identifying a democratic deficit in the 
international institutions. One point is about institutional deficits in the EU and other 
international organizations that can be adjusted through meaningful reforms with the 
right political will. Another point rejects the democratic process beyond the nation-state 
simply on the fact that the EU cannot meet the social prerequisites for democracy. 
Michael Zürn laid out a third position, which agrees the necessity of social prerequisites 
but also at the same time focuses the dynamics and complexities of the relationship 
between political institutions and social attitudes. This position perceives the dynamics of 
relationship as the potential for enhancing democracy beyond the nation-state through 
institutional reform, which targets to meet the social prerequisites for democracy.378 
       
Zürn further questioned what kind of institutional policy would facilitate the development 
of democratic governance beyond the nation-state in the EU. He answered for that a 
policy combining a mixture of different democratic components. To obtain the ideal 
combination it needs to make two categorical distinctions: one pertaining to the 
constitutive processes of a democracy and the other to the constitutive actors of a 
democracy. The key point is to find out the appropriate mixture of components for a 
given political community. Moreover, it is necessary to focus on three aspects for the 
democratization of the EU – first, the democratization of territorial representation in 
international bargaining; second, the strengthening of other components of the 
democratic process; and finally, institutional solutions that would strengthen the 
transnational demos.379 Instead of assuming a European demos as a prerequisite for true 
democracy, European democratic identity can be constructed through the practice of 
democratic competition. In that scenario, citizens accept being on the losing side in one 
particular competition with the expectation that they will be on the winning side next 
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time in near future.380 In short, the EU polity can genuinely become democratic only if 
competitive elections determine the direction of the EU policy agenda.381 
       
Democratic deficit debate will continue to exist as long as the EU is viewed as a future 
nation-state. That problem can cease to exist, suggested by Vivien Schmidt, rather if the 
EU were seen as a regional state. She argued that such a regional state with shared 
sovereignty, variable boundaries, common identity, compound governance, and a 
fragmented democracy in which the EU level guarantees governance for and with the 
people through the measures of effective governing and consultation of diverse interests, 
while leaving to the level of national government by and of the people through the means 
of political participation and citizen representation. And that perspective will diminish the 
democratic deficit at the EU level. However, Schmidt also reminds that it should be 
aware of greater democratic deficit problems at the national level since there will have 
demands for national democratic practices for better ideas and political discourses.382 
 
3.5.3 Legitimacy and Accountability in the EU 
 
Theoretical approach for EU legitimacy considers from two fundamental points of view 
to the identification of legitimacy namely: input and output legitimacy. The first 
viewpoint focuses on the supranational institutional framework of the EU and the degree 
to which the European citizens identify themselves with it. The latter point concentrates 
on rational common interests and views the legitimacy of the EU as deriving from the 
degree to which it is able to produce policies that in turn serves the interests of the 
European citizens. Therefore, any approach of these two, which stresses only on 
institutional perspective, lacks another crucial source of legitimacy in the EU, namely its 
ability to address and propose good solutions to the issues that really matter to the EU 
citizens.383 According to this EU dual legitimacy principle, EU laws and policies derive 
their legitimacy, on one hand, from directly elected members of the EP at the EU level 
and on the other hand from the democratically elected governments of the member states 
who are accountable to their national demos. There have also been a long time efforts to 
make the EU more legitimate by rendering more powers to the EP.384 
       
As Helen Wallace pointed out, institutional loyalties depend more on cognitive 
attachment rather than on affective commitment. Many of those engaged in the 
institutional structures are members of one kind of elite or another. It means that the 
policy process operates at a distance from raw politics and the wider population of the 
political system. Legitimacy in such a system can only be attained mainly through the 
impacts of policy in fulfilling policy demands or resolving policy dilemmas of general 
public. Many of policy outcomes produce a kind of clientelism around the EU policy 
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process and its components based on member states. It should be further questioned how 
sustainable such pattern will be in future has already become a subject of lively debate 
among public asking across the Europe about legitimacy and accountability in the EU 
polity.385 The EU will still remain as a polity with many features, which can also found 
out within a fully developed democratic political system i.e. nation-state. Fritz Scharpf, 
therefore, portrays the EU’s character as the one resting on output-oriented legitimacy 
while lacking input-oriented legitimacy. He further argues that such characteristic 
provides government for the people, but does not necessarily represent government by 
the people. In other words, the absence of political accountability and lack of a strong 
sense of common political identity in Europe leads to the legitimacy of politically salient 
European decisions to depend on the effectiveness of policies in achieving consensual 
goals.386 
       
In the case of the EU, where Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) and the European 
Council meetings negotiate on virtually all internationalized issues areas, the problem of 
non-transparency is particularly visible. It is almost impossible for citizens to hold 
specific governments or representatives accountable for political outcomes. Zürn suggests 
that different persons, each having their own legitimacy, should represent different levels 
of the system in such a multilevel polity like the EU. This would mean that the national 
representatives of the Council of Ministers in the EU would be elected by their national 
constituencies directly in elections separate from that of national governments. It would 
make the Council of Ministers’ chain of legitimization shortened but it would transform it 
at the same time into a legitimate collective body. Both the national governments and the 
national representatives in the Council of Ministers then would have to be accountable 
for their policies individually to the public. This would definitely lead to occasional 
conflicts, which would have the much desired effect of promoting transparency and 
accountability, and make it clear to the public what their role is within the multilevel 
system. It would also make easier for the EU public of all member states to decide who is 
accountable for what policy on any failure.387 
       
The institutional outcome in the Amsterdam Treaty and the development of policies since 
then are products of deliberate strategies by supranational actors, not belonging to the 
control of national governments and administrative elites of member states. As a result of 
the activities and policy ideas over the years promoted by the EU institutions, the 
member state governments were persuaded to convince that replacing intergovernmental 
procedures with supranational mechanisms would improve the credibility and 
accountability of the EU decision-making and policy processes. When the new agenda-
setting powers were once delegated to supranational actors, these institutions at the 
European level have been eager to apply them to their maximum extent.388 A fully 
developed civil political community will facilitate democratic process, which is indeed 
also part of it. On this two-way causal relationship, democratic multilevel politics may 
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eventually create an orientation towards a public interest beyond the nation-state. 
However, democratic governance beyond the nation-state without having fully developed 
demos would fulfill the demand for a collective identity much less completely than did 
the nation-state.389 
 
3.5.4 Reforming towards a better EU 
    
A better EU can only become to exist through its effective and efficient institutions. 
During the Convention on the Future of Europe, a variety of alternative models for the 
EU reforms were proposed. These proposals consist of a classic parliamentary model, 
with a contest for the Commission President in the EP elections and the translation of the 
electoral majority in the European Parliament into the formation of the Commission; and 
a presidential model, with some form of direct or indirect election of the Commission 
President. Nevertheless, neither model was favorable for the member state governments, 
which perceived that the potential costs for any alternative democratic model of electing 
the Commission would be considerably higher than the value of benefits. These potential 
costs tend to be the loss of member states’ power to choose the members of the other 
branch of the EU executive, and the possible politicization of the Commission.390  
       
For this reason, the most relevant issue in the Convention for drafting the EU 
Constitution is still how to reform the institutions of the EU.  There is no doubt that the 
EU is characterized by a lack of political leadership with regard to prospective thinking, 
steering capacity and consistent action. But the debate soon indicated that the election of 
the Commission President would have to be balanced by the reform of the 
intergovernmental structures of the EU. The most controversial proposal was the 
appointment of the President of the European Council. This proposal could only get 
approval only if it would guarantee that the Commission and the EP would receive more 
powers. The issue was dominating the institutional debate for the reforms of the EU. 
Clearly, the EU needs a visible European executive. The powers for taking action in the 
EU of 25 countries and more will considerably depend on the ability of the political 
leadership to define goals, clarify agenda-setting and push for their implementation in 
daily business of the EU. The executive must have the authority to take the policy 
initiative and coordinate the actions of the member state governments. In the enlarged 
EU, reforms for both directly elected EP and the bureaucracy in the Commission, of 
course, is relatively imminent. Their institutional structures do not need to change 
dramatically while their numbers of composition must be kept in conformity with 
changing size of the Union. The same reform procedure does not imply to the Council of 
Ministers, where all the member states are represented, and the European Council above 
it, where heads of states and governments meet every three months. These organs are the 
most powerful set of institutions of the EU, sharing both executive and legislative 
powers. And it is apparent that they are in urgent need of institutional reforms. At this 
point the Convention has only achieved a mixed record – blocked by the member states 
themselves.391 
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In fact, EU’s institutions remain disconnected and each wastes energy on constant turf of 
wars with the other by sharing responsibility for the executive branch of the EU. This in 
turn makes it hard and almost impossible for the EU to produce coherent policies, 
especially in formulation of common foreign policy. The debate between dichotomy of 
‘intergovernmentalists’ who favor a stronger Council, and ‘supranationalists’ who prefer 
a bigger role for the Commission and the Parliament, have also been dominating the 
Convention. It seems that one of the major tasks of the Convention or the EU future 
reforms is certainly to look for ways and means of getting the various institutions to work 
more closely together in a pragmatic, results-driven spirit.392 
 
 
3.6 Reading the White Paper on European Governance of the European Commission 
 
The European Commission presented the White Paper on European Governance on 25th 
July 2001 to the general European public.393 It contains a set of recommendations on how 
to enhance democracy in Europe and increase the legitimacy of the institutions. 
Promoting new forms of European Governance is one of the Commission’s four strategic 
objectives. European Governance can be best understood as the rules, processes and 
practices that affect how powers are exercised at the European level. There are many 
challenges to be encountered by the European Union (EU) for better and more 
democratic European Governance. As a remedy to eradicate the democratic deficit in the 
EU, the White Paper proposes opening up the policy-making process to get more people 
and organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. In short, this White 
Paper mainly concerns with proposals suggesting how effective the EU can be in using 
the powers given by its citizens.   
 
3.6.1 White Paper and Reform Agenda 
 
There are five principles of good governance on which proposals for change are 
principally underpinned in the White Paper. They sustain democracy and the rule of law 
in the member states and they apply to all levels of government - global, European, 
national, regional and local. These principles are as follows:  
( 1 ) Openness: To work in a more open manner and actively communicate about what 
the EU does and the decisions it takes by using language that is accessible and 
understandable for the general public.  
( 2 ) Participation: To improve the quality of EU policies with greater participation by 
citizens, institutions, and governments concerned throughout the policy chain.  
( 3 ) Accountability: To take responsibility for what they perform in Europe not only 
from EU Institutions but also from Member States and all involved in policy-making 
process.  
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( 4 ) Effectiveness: EU policies must be effective and timely in order to meet its 
objectives. 
( 5 ) Coherence: Policies and actions must be coherent and implied with a consistent 
approach within a complex system. 
 
With the proposals based on these principles of good governance, the EU must also 
revitalise the Community method by following a less top-down approach and 
complementing its policy tools more effectively with non-legislative instruments like 
social dialogue, structural funding, and action programmes. The Community method 
guarantees both the diversity and effectiveness of the Union. It ensures the fair treatment 
of all Member States from the largest to the smallest. It provides a means to arbitrate 
between different interests by passing them through two successive filters: the general 
interest at the level of the Commission; and democratic representation, European and 
national, at the level of the Council and European Parliament. The Community method 
has served the Union well for almost half a century. It can continue to do so, but it will 
need to consider extending the Community method to areas currently ruled by 
intergovernmental decision-making procedures.  
 
3.6.2 Proposals for Change 
 
The proposals for change can be divided into four sections. The first one focuses on 
improving involvement in shaping and implementing EU policy. A second section 
emphasizes at improving the quality and enforcement of EU policies. A third one calls 
for a stronger link between European Governance and the role of the Union in the world. 
Finally, it examines the role of the Institutions of the EU.  
 
3.6.2.1 Better Involvement 
 
The process of EU policy-making must be more open and easily understandable to its 
citizens. For this reason, they must have access to reliable information on European 
issues and be able to scrutinise the policy process in its various stages. Providing more 
information and more effective communication are pre-conditions for generating a sense 
of belonging to Europe. The aim should be to create a transnational space where citizens 
from different countries can discuss what they perceive as being the important challenges 
for the Union. This should help policy-makers to stay in touch with European public 
opinion, and could guide them in identifying European projects which mobilise public 
support. Henceforth the White Paper proposed that the European Institutions should 
jointly continue to develop EUR-LEX as a single on-line point in all languages, where 
people can follow policy proposals through the decision-making process. Council and the 
European Parliament should make information available more rapidly about all stages of 
the co-decision process, particularly concerning the final, so-called conciliation phase. 
The Member States should promote public debate on European affairs. Another 
prerequisite is the participation of civil society, which plays an important role in giving 
voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people’s needs. Civil 
society includes trade unions and employers’ organisations; non-governmental 
organisations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots organisations; 
organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular 
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contribution from churches and religious communities. Civil society itself must follow 
the principles of good governance for better involvement.    
 
The current working system of the EU does not allow for adequate interaction in a 
multilevel partnership; a partnership in which national governments, their regions and 
cities fully involve in European policy-making. Therefore each Member State should 
foresee adequate mechanisms for wider consultation when discussing EU decisions and 
implementing EU policies with a territorial dimension. The Commission should organise 
a more systematic dialogue with representatives of regional and local governments 
through national and European associations at an early stage in shaping policy. It will 
definitely bring greater flexibility into how community legislation can be implemented 
in a way which takes account of regional and local conditions. As a more decentralized 
and flexible approach, the Commission recommends the launching of target-based 
tripartite contracts concluded between the Member States, the regional and local 
authorities and the Commission.  
 
The Institutions and national authorities must reinforce their efforts to consult better on 
EU policies. Better consultation will complement better policy-preparation and decision-
making of the Institutions. Prime necessity is a reinforced culture of consultation and 
dialogue; a culture which is adopted by all European Institutions and which associates 
particularly the European Parliament in the consultative process, given its role in 
representing the citizens. At this point, European political parties are also an important 
factor in European integration and contribute to European awareness and voicing the 
concerns of citizens. Creating a culture of consultation can be achieved by a code of 
conduct that sets minimum standards, focusing on what to consult on, when, whom 
and how to consult. Those standards will reduce the risk of the policy-makers just 
listening to one side of the argument or of particular groups getting privileged access on 
the basis of sectoral interests or nationality, which is a clear weakness with the current 
method of ad hoc consultations. These standards should improve the representativity of 
civil society organisations and structure their debate with the Institutions. The 
Commission must also establish partnership arrangements going beyond the minimum 
standards in selected areas committing the Commission to additional consultation in 
return for more guarantees of the openness and representativity of the organizations 
consulted. The Commission will also develop a more systematic and pro-active approach 
to working with key networks to enable them to contribute to decision shaping and policy 
execution. It will also examine how the framework for trans-national co-operation of 
regional or local actors could be better supported at EU level.         
 
3.6.2.2 Better policies, regulation and delivery 
 
Better policy-making, policy-formulation and policy-implementation is one of the 
proposals of White Paper. The policies and legislative procedures of the EU are getting 
increasingly complex. The level of detail in EU legislation also means that adapting the 
rules to technical or market changes can be complex and time-consuming. Overall the 
result is a lack of flexibility, damaging effectiveness. A slow legislative process is 
compounded by slow implementation. The Union needs to improve the quality of its 
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legislation, including better implementation and enforcement. If rules are not supported 
or inadequately enforced, the Institutions as a whole are called into question. As a more 
inclusive approach to policy shaping, the Union needs to boost confidence in the expert 
advice which plays an increasingly significant role in preparing and monitoring 
decisions. Recent food crises and some unprecedented moral and ethical issues arisen 
from the advent of bio-technology have highlighted the importance of informing people 
and policy makers about what is known and where uncertainty persists. These issues 
become more acute whenever the Union is required to apply the precautionary principle 
and play its role in risk assessment and risk management. The Commission will 
publish guidelines on collection and use of expert advice to provide for the 
accountability, plurality and integrity of the expertise used so that it is clear what advice 
is given, where it is coming from, how it is used and what alternative views are available. 
Over time these guidelines could form the basis for a common approach for all 
Institutions and Member States although expertise is usually organized at a national level. 
It is essential that resources be put together and working better in the common interest of 
EU citizens.   
 
The EU must pay constant attention to improving the quality, effectiveness and simplicity 
of its regulatory acts. Effective decision-making also requires the combination of 
different policy instruments through enhanced co-operation to meet Treaty objectives. 
The Commission acknowledged that time-consuming consultation is also necessary to 
avoid the tension between faster and better decision-making because investment in good 
consultation upstream may produce better legislation which is adopted more rapidly and 
easier to apply and enforce. Seven factors are necessary for achieving improvements.  
First, proposals must be prepared on the basis of an effective analysis of whether it is 
appropriate to intervene at EU level and whether regulatory intervention is necessary.  
Second, legislation is often only part of a broader solution combining formal rules with 
other non-binding tools such as recommendations, guidelines, or even self-regulation 
within a commonly agreed framework.  
Third, the right type of instrument must be selected and used for more effective 
legislation to achieve the Union’s objectives. In cases with a need for uniform application 
and legal certainty across the Union, the use of regulations should be considered. Texts 
so-called framework directives should be used to reach rapid agreement between the 
Council and the European Parliament. Whichever form of legislative instrument is 
chosen, more use should be made of primary legislation limited to essential elements 
(basic rights and obligations, conditions to implement them).  
Fourth, under certain conditions, implementing measures may be prepared within the 
framework of co-regulation. Co-regulation implies that a framework of overall 
objectives, basic rights, enforcement and appeal mechanisms, and conditions for 
monitoring compliance is set in the legislation. It combines binding legislative and 
regulatory action with actions taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their 
practical expertise. Co-regulation should only be used where it clearly adds value and 
serves the general interest. It is only suited to cases where fundamental rights or major 
political choices are not called into question. It should not be used in situations where 
rules need to apply in a uniform way in every Member State. Where co-regulation fails to 
deliver the desired results or where certain private actors do not commit to the agreed 
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rules, it will always remain possible for public authorities to intervene by establishing the 
specific rules needed.        
Fifth, Community action may be complemented or reinforced by the use of the so-called 
‘‘open method of co-ordination’’. This method is a way of encouraging co-operation, 
the exchange of best practice and agreeing common targets and guidelines for Member 
States, sometimes backed up by national action plans as in the case of employment and 
social exclusion. It relies on regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets, 
allowing Member States to compare their efforts and learn from the experience of others. 
It should not be used when legislative action under the Community method is possible.  
Sixth, a stronger culture of evaluation and feedback is needed in order to learn from the 
successes and mistakes of the past. 
Seventh, the Commission entrusted itself not to undermine the Treaty principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality or the proposal’s objectives because of inter-institutional 
bargaining. 
 
The Commission called for a comprehensive programme of simplification of existing 
rules - regrouping legal texts, removing redundant or obsolete provisions, and shifting 
non-essential obligations to executive measures. Simplification at EU level must be 
accompanied by a similar commitment from Member States for the simplification of their 
national rules, which give effect to EU provisions.  
 
The Commission proposed that the creation of further autonomous EU regulatory 
agencies in clearly defined areas will improve the way rules are applied and enforced 
across the Union. Such agencies should be granted the power to take individual decisions 
in application of regulatory measures.  They should operate with a degree of 
independence and the EU Treaties allow some responsibilities to be granted directly to 
agencies. This should be done in a way that respects the balance of powers between the 
Institutions and does not impinge on their respective roles and powers. Agencies can be 
granted decision making power in areas where a single public interest predominates and 
the tasks to be carried out require particular technical expertise (e.g. air safety). They 
cannot be given responsibilities for which the Treaty has conferred a direct power of 
decision on the Commission (e.g. in the area of competition policy) and in areas in which 
they would have to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, exercise political 
discretion or carry out complex economic assessments. The Commission will consider 
and define the criteria for the creation of new regulatory agencies on a case by case basis 
and set out the Community’s supervisory responsibilities over such agencies. The 
regulation creating each agency should set out the limits of their activities and powers, 
their responsibilities and requirements for openness. Currently, proposals are before 
Council and the European Parliament for three agencies: a European food authority, a 
maritime safety agency and an air safety agency with only the latter having a clear power 
to take individual decisions.  
 
The Union is based on the rule of law and EU law is part of the national legal order 
and must be enforced as such. Monitoring closely the application of Community law is an 
essential task for the Commission if it is to make the Union a reality for businesses and 
citizens. The Commission will therefore pursue infringements with vigour. In this 
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context, individual complaints about breaches of Community law are important. The 
Commission has already adopted measures to improve and speed up internal procedures 
for handling such complaints and these should now be codified and published.  It will 
propose twinning arrangements between national administrations to share best practice in 
implementing measures within particular sector, drawing on the experience with 
applicant countries, and promote the awareness on Community law among national 
courts and lawyers. Criteria will also be established and the Commission will use them in 
prioritising the investigation of possible breaches of Community law. For this purpose, 
Member States must step up their efforts to improve the quality of transposition and 
implementation. They must contribute to improving the knowledge of Community law; 
encourage national courts to take a more active role in controlling the application of 
Community rules. They should increase the capacity for dispute settlement through 
networks of ombudsmen or mediators.  
 
3.6.2.3 The EU’s contribution to global governance 
 
The proposals in the White Paper have been drawn up against the background of 
enlargement, but they also offer a useful contribution to global governance. The Union’s 
first step must be to reform governance successfully at home in order to enhance the case 
for change at an international level. In applying the principles of good governance to the 
EU’s global responsibilities, the Union should be more accessible to and improve the 
dialogue with governmental and non-governmental actors from other parts of the world 
when developing policy proposals with an international dimension. This is already part of 
its strategy for sustainable development, but it must go hand in hand with a commitment 
by such actors as to their representativity and that they will assume their responsibilities 
in responding to global challenges. It should aim to improve the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of global rule making, working to modernize and reform international and 
multi-lateral institutions in the medium to long term. The goal should be to boost the 
effectiveness and enforcement powers of multi-lateral institutions. In the short term, the 
Union should build partnerships with other countries in order to promote greater co-
operation and coherence between the activities of existing international organizations and 
increase their transparency. To achieve these objectives, the Commission proposes a 
review of the Union’s international representation under the existing Treaties in order to 
speak more often with a single voice and propose changes at the next Inter-Governmental 
Conference.  
 
 
3.6.2.4  Refocused policies and institutions  
 
Connecting the EU to its citizens means identifying clear policies and objectives within 
an overall vision of where the Union is going. People need to understand better the 
political project which underpins the Union. For this purpose, the Institutions and the 
Member States must work together to set out an overall policy strategy. They must 
refocus the Union’s policies and adapt the way the Institutions work under the existing 
Treaties.  
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Refocusing policies means that the Union should identify more clearly its long-term 
objectives. These may, with the overall objectives of sustainable development, include 
improving human capital, knowledge and skills; strengthening both social cohesion and 
competitiveness; meeting the environmental challenge; supporting territorial diversity; 
and contributing to regional peace and stability. Improved focus will help to guide the 
reform of policies in preparation for a successful enlargement and ensure that expanding 
the Union does not lead to weakening or dilution of existing policies.   
 
In setting priorities and ensuring coherence of the Union’s policies, the Institutions must 
guard against decisions on future policies which are inspired by short-term thinking on 
long-term challenges. This is a real risk as in the near future institutional reform, 
important policy choices, budgetary bargaining and enlargement could all coincide. It is 
likely to stretch the Union’s capacity to show leadership through a coherent vision of the 
future. The Union must also continue to ensure that it had adequate resources to carry out 
the tasks assigned to it. 
 
The Commission have taken important steps to strengthen its capacity for strategic 
planning and policy setting as one of the three pillars of the on-going administrative 
reforms. They are reflected through key events each year that promote a political debate 
within the framework of the Commission’s five year strategic objectives. Firstly, the 
Commission’s Annual Policy Strategy at the start of each year focuses on identifying 
strategic priorities with a 2 to 3 year horizon. It enables a medium term, more coherent 
approach, and provides an essential reality check to ensure that the necessary resources 
are available. Secondly, The Commission President in his annual State of the Union 
address in the European Parliament surveyed the progress made against the 
Commission’s strategic priorities and indicated new challenges on the horizon. This is 
complemented by the annual Synthesis Report to the Spring European Council which 
covers the Union’s economic, social and environmental policies. Thirdly, the annual 
report on the implementation of the Amsterdam Protocol on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality will be oriented towards the main objectives of European Union policies. 
It will investigate the extent to which the Union has applied the proportionality and 
subsidiarity principles in pursuing its main goals. The Commission also recommended 
that attempts to structure a better debate on policy coherence need to be built on a 
dialogue between the Institutions on future objectives and priorities for the Union.  
 
Refocusing the Institutions is necessary to deliver better policies. The Union must 
revitalise the Community method and all of its institutions should concentrate on their 
core tasks: the Commission initiates and executes policy; the Council and the European 
Parliament decide on legislation and budgets - whenever possible in Council using 
qualified majority voting, the European Council exerts political guidance and the 
European Parliament controls the execution of the budget and of the Union’s policies. 
This means changes in the way the Institutions work. A lot could be done already in the 
short term without amending existing Treaties.  
 
The Commission must focus on its Treaty tasks of policy initiation; execution; guardian 
of the Treaty; and international representation of the Community. It must establish an 
  
 
130
enhanced dialogue with European and national association of regional and local 
government, better and more open consultation of civil society, better use of expert 
advice, and better impact assessment will help to improve the quality of policy proposals. 
The Commission’s role in initiating policy and steering the long-term agenda can be 
particularly effective in preparing the European Council Summits. These Summits, 
which now take place four times a year, bring together the fifteen Heads of State and 
Government and the Commission President and formulate major guidelines for the 
Union. The European Council should strengthen its focus on strategic objectives for the 
Union in partnership with the Commission. It should not deal with the day to day detail 
of EU policies. The requirement for consensus in the European Council often holds 
policy-making hostage to national interests in areas which Council could and should 
decide by a qualified majority of Member States.  
 
The Council of Ministers should assume more its political responsibility for decision-
making within the Community method. A greater effort to ensure the consistency in 
different sectoral Councils is needed. The Council, in particular the General Affairs 
Council composed of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, has lost its capacity to give political 
guidance and arbitrate between sectoral interests, particularly where this involves 
resolving disputes between different home departments over the position to be taken on 
EU proposals. There is a need for the Council to develop its capacity to co-ordinate all 
aspects of EU policy both in the Council and at home. This would help the European 
Council to refocus its activity on shaping strategic objectives and monitoring more 
effectively the Union’s success in achieving them. The Council and the European 
Parliament must also make greater efforts to speed up the legislative process. When 
legally possible, Council should vote as soon as a qualified majority seems possible 
rather than pursuing discussions in the search for unanimity. In appropriate cases, the 
Council and the European Parliament should attempt to agree proposals in one rather than 
two readings with the assistance of the Commission. This may reduce the time needed to 
adopt legislation by six to nine months.  
 
The European Parliament and all national parliaments of the Union and the applicant 
countries should become more active in stimulating a public debate on the future of 
Europe and its policies. The European Parliament and its committees regularly seek 
public and expert views through consultation and public hearings, improving the quality 
of its policy deliberation. Member States should exchange best practice on the application 
of the Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union. The strong relationship between changes at national level, EU polices 
and global developments cannot simply find its response in Brussels. These changes 
should be discussed in a national context and in each national parliament. The 
Commission would welcome public debates, jointly organised by the European and 
national Parliaments, on the Union’s policies. Moreover, the European Parliament should 
enhance its control on the execution of EU policies and the implementation of the budget. 
This means departing from the present emphasis on detailed accounting with more 
policy-oriented control based on political objectives. The areas in which co-decision 
should apply must be reviewed in order to reinforce the role of the European Parliament.  
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It must also be clearer who is responsible for policy execution. This constitutes the pre-
condition for making the EU system more open and accountable to all European citizens. 
The main responsibility for executing policy and legislation by adopting implementing 
regulations or decisions is normally conferred on the Commission. The conditions under 
which the Commission adopts those executive measures should be reviewed. In the end, 
this should lead to a situation where (a) legislation defines the conditions and limits 
within which the Commission carries out its executive role, and (b) a simple legal 
mechanism allows Council and European Parliament as the legislature to monitor and 
control the actions of the Commission against the principles and political guidelines 
adopted in the legislation. This change would make decision-making simpler, faster and 
easier to understand. It would improve accountability, helping Council and the European 
Parliament to make political judgements on how well the executive process is working.  
 
The European Court of Justice guarantees respect for the rule of law and it has the final 
affirmation in interpreting the application of Community law to the Union and its 
Member States. Despite long-standing co-operation with the European Court of Justice, 
national lawyers and courts should be made more familiar with Community law, and 
assume responsibility in ensuring the consistent protection of rights granted by the Treaty 
and by European legislation. The Commission will continue to support judicial 
cooperation and the training of lawers and judges in Community law, but Member States 
themselves will have to step up their efforts in this field. Whenever there are possible 
breaches of Community law by a Member State, a lengthy legal action against that 
member state is not always the most practical solution. The main aim of taking action 
against an infringement is to oblige the offending Member State to remedy its breach of 
Community law. Yet even after a ruling by the European Court of Justice further legal 
steps may be required before national courts in order to enforce the compatibility of 
national law with fundamental Community principles. 
 
The Committee of the Regions should play a more proactive role in examining policy, 
for example through the preparation of exploratory reports in advance of Commission 
proposals. It must organise the exchange of best practice on how local and regional 
authorities are involved in the preparatory phase of European decision-making at national 
level. The Committee of the Regions should also review the local and regional impact 
upon certain directives of legislation, and to report to the Commission on the possibilities 
for more flexible means of application. The Commission will then consider a more 
systematic approach to allow such flexibility for some parts of Community law. 
 
The Economic and Social Committee must play a role in developing a new relationship 
of mutual responsibility between the Institutions and civil society, in line with the 
changes to article 257 of the EC Treaty agreed at Nice. According to these changes, the 
Economic and Social Committee shall consist of representatives of the various economic 
and social components of organised civil society, and in particular representatives of 
producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations, 
consumers and the general interest. In order to do this, its organisation and role will have 
to be reconsidered. Member States should take this new role into account when 
appointing members to the Committee. Like the Committee of the Regions, the Economic 
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and Social Committee should be more active by developing opinions and exploratory 
reports in order to help shaping policies at a much earlier stage that at present. The Treaty 
currently provides for both committees to give their opinion after, rather than before, 
proposals have been transmitted to the legislature, which minimises their impact. 
Working arrangements between the Commission and the Economic and Social 
Committee, similar to those under discussion with the Committee of the Regions, are 
currently being finalised to give effect to a more proactive role. 
 
If these orientations proposed in the White Paper are followed the need to maintain 
existing committees, notably regulatory and management committees which composed of 
Member States’ administrations assisting the Commission for the exercise of 
implementing powers, will be put into question. Therefore a review of existing 
committees would have to be undertaken and their continued existence assessed. This 
assessment should take account of the need for expert advice for the implementation of 
EU policies. This adjustment of the responsibility of the Institutions, giving control of 
executive competence to the two legislative bodies and reconsidering the existing 
regulatory and management committees touches the delicate question of the balance of 
power between the Institutions. It should lead to modifying Treaty article 202 that 
permits the Council alone to impose certain requirements on the way the Commission 
exercises its executive role. That article has become outdated given the co-decision 
procedure, which puts Council and the European Parliament on an equal footing with 
regard to the adoption of legislation in many areas. Consequently, the Council and the 
European Parliament should have an equal role in supervising the way in which the 
Commission exercises its executive role. The Commission intends to launch a reflection 
on refocusing institutions in the upcoming Inter-Governmental Conferences.  
 
3.6.3 From governance to the future of Europe 
 
The overall goal of the Commission in presenting the White Paper is to integrate the 
people of Europe while fully respecting individual national identities. In order to meet 
this goal, the major requirement is to reform the European Governance or to renew the 
European political process. Five political principles – openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence underpin the proposals in this White Paper. 
They should guide the Union in organising the way it works and in pushing reforms 
forward within the current Treaty, but they also provide markers for the debate on the 
future of Europe. Together they allow better use of the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity by using the right combination of instruments to deliver policies that are 
matched to the objectives pursued, by limiting legislation to its essential elements, and to 
the use of contracts to take greater account of local conditions. Carrying these actions 
forward does not necessarily require new Treaties. It is first and foremost a question of 
political will.  But what will really change if these proposals are implemented? At the 
heart of the proposed reform of governance is the refocusing of the Institutions - the 
Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament. This refocusing of institutional 
roles is an important step in preparing and managing a successful enlargement. Both the 
proposals in the White Paper and the prospect of further enlargement lead in one 
direction: a reinvigoration of the Community method. This means ensuring that the 
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Commission proposes and executes policy; the Council and the European Parliament take 
decisions; and national and regional actors are involved in the EU policy process.  
 
In setting out the consequence of better European governance for the Institutions, the 
White Paper is drawn into the debate on the future of Europe. Reforming European 
governance also sketches a path towards future Treaty changes at the next Inter-
Governmental Conference - it presents the outlines of a model for the Union’s future 
political organisations. Firstly, it proposes for dividing powers between the legislature 
and the executive, the model follows that of national democracies. At European level, 
separating these two roles would make it easier to apply the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. In the context of a gradual extension of the areas where decisions are 
taken jointly by the Council and the European Parliament (the so-called co-decision 
procedure),  those two Institutions should enjoy equal roles. At that same time, this 
clarification of roles must allow the Commission to assume full executive responsibility. 
Secondly, the Union needs clear principles identifying how competence is shared 
between the Union and its Member States. The White Paper has highlighted a tangible 
Europe that is in full development; a Union based on multi-level governance in which 
each actor contributes in line with his or her capabilities or knowledge to the success of 
the overall exercise. In a multi-level system the real challenges is establishing clear rules 
for how competence is shared - not separated; only that non-exclusive vision can secure 
the best interests of all the Member States and all, the Union’s citizens. This White Paper 
responds to the expectations of the Union’s citizens as a starting point of a process. It 
should enable them to see the Union as an instrument through which they can bring about 
change. The reflections on these reforms will now continue; they will be completed by 
the wider process of constitutional reform to be initiated at the future meetings of 
European Councils and Inter-Governmental Conferences. 
 
3.6.4 Critical Review 
 
The proposals of the White Paper stand as the very beginning of the long and 
complicated process of changing the way European Union works for its citizens. The 
White Paper provides open-ended political guidelines to those who will undertake this 
long and difficult work but it still lacks concrete measures how to implement its 
ambitious objectives. This Paper is a structured document followed from the 
consequences of unfinishing works in Nice. It also attempted to encounter some obstacles 
arising from the Treaty of Nice. The Nice declaration created the basis for the coming 
Inter-Governmental Conferences to revise the Union’s Treaties and prompted the general 
debate on future of Europe. The Nice declaration identifies four specific areas as 
necessary to be examined: (a) the role of the national parliaments, (b) simplification of 
the Union’s Treaties, (c) incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
Treaties and (d) more precise demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and the 
Member States.394 The White Paper called on the legitimacy of the national parliaments 
to be enhanced for better law-making by cooperating effectively between the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments. It also shows the Commission’s strong 
                                                 
394 Michel Barnier. (2001): Why Europe matters, Personal note from Michel Barnier, Brussels. pp. 3-4. 
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commitment to promote the participation of the local and regional players in the 
European decision-making process, through enhanced cooperation among the various 
levels of government. It is still difficult to make further simplifications of the Union’s 
Treaties without changing their meaning, which was stated by the Nice declaration. 
Indeed all of the present complexities are the outcomes of political choices made by 
different actors based on their different interests. Any simplification would call these into 
question and therefore it is necessary to make clear first among all participants as who 
wants what for whom in which way before starting future clarifications of present 
Treaties.395 
 
In its proposals for refocusing the Union’s Institutions, the White Paper maintains the key 
concept as emphasized by the declaration of Nice, which recognises the need to improve 
and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its 
Institutions. In order to do so, it emphasized to stabilise the triangular institutional 
balance between the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
To be more effective and democratic Union, the method of integration strongly 
recommended by the White Paper is the Community method. It also called for the 
stronger role of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee 
in shaping policy as observers between the civil society and the Institutions of the Union. 
The application of five principles of good governance will reinforce the political vision of 
the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, namely the willingness to take decisions at 
the most suitable level and, when they are proper to the European Union, to ensure that 
they reflect the local reality of each situation and respect the identity of each Member 
State. From the conception of policy to its implementation, the Union must tackle at 
subsidiarity issues with equal emphasis on proportionality. Nowadays, the European 
Union is changing its agenda by extending to foreign policy and defence, migration and 
the fight against terrorism. It will no longer be judged solely by its ability to remove 
barriers to trade or to complete an internal market; its legitimacy today depends on 
involvement and participation. This means that the linear model of dispensing policies 
from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and 
involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels.  
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IV. Governance in the ASEAN 
 
 
4.1 Formation of the ASEAN as a regional organization  
 
Before the outbreak of Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) can be regarded as one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the developing world after thirty years of its existence.  Despite there are 
some kind of its notable achievements in political, diplomatic, and economic spheres, it is 
also not exempt from flaws to be a good model for regional cooperative schemes.  
Currently the ASEAN is passing through a testing period of transition and 
transformation.  For the ASEAN, there are several major events occurred since the end of 
the Cold War.  These events include the enlargement of the ASEAN (from ASEAN-6 to 
ASEAN-10), the initiative and attempts for establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the proposals for the 
formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC). 
       
ASEAN was founded on 8th August, 1967 in Bangkok by five non-communist Southeast 
Asian countries namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
Their founding motto is an impressive one: to “accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress, and cultural development in the region” and to “promote regional peace and 
security”.  Since its establishment from 1967, the ASEAN invited all of the remaining 
countries in the region to join the Association.  However, it was almost impossible to 
achieve this ambitious goal due to the Indochina conflict which directly affected to 
Vietnam and Laos and at the time Myanmar (previously known as Burma) and Cambodia 
were members of the Non-aligned movement so afraid to participate in the ASEAN 
(which was informally known as Pro-West and anti-Communist organization in the 
region) at the cost of their neutral posture.  Brunei joined the ASEAN in 1984.  
Henceforth the decade long ambition was successfully implemented only after the end of 
the Cold War and countries that stood outside the orbit of the ASEAN finally joined the 
Association: Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 
respectively. 
       
The inclusion of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia into the ASEAN represents a 
distinct enlargement in the type of states within the organization and fulfils the long-term 
objective of the ASEAN founding fathers – to represent as an effective regional 
integrative organ for the whole region of Southeast Asia and to transform from ASEAN 6 
to ASEAN 10. This kind of combination can be labelled as the ‘unity in diversity’ since it 
is a project to be implemented in a region of heterogeneous entities. It is because its 
member states are very diverse in their political and economic structures. ASEAN is the 
combined organization of different political systems – democratic countries like the 
Philippines and Thailand together with communist centralized governments of Laos and 
Vietnam as well as semi-democratic or autocratic ruling machinery running countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Cambodia and also one military dictatorship country 
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like Myanmar and finally traditional form of monarchical government in Brunei.396  
Indeed, the general scene of Southeast Asia at the outset of ASEAN formation was 
deeply divided in many ways and not conducive to effective regional cooperation.  
Therefore, the viability of the ASEAN at its inception was largely doubted. 
       
After Cambodia became the tenth member country of the ASEAN in April 1999, the 
long-term objective of the ASEAN founding members to encompass the whole region of 
Southeast Asia into the circle of organization was finally fulfilled before the end of the 
twentieth century.  Nevertheless, this fulfillment of long-term objective also leads to new 
challenges that the ASEAN must address for its compatibility with the new century.  Due 
to vast differences in political, economic and institutional development of the new 
members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam: CLMV) comparing with the old 
members: ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), the enlargement of the ASEAN will have major political and economic 
impacts and implications for both sides.397  Therefore all ASEAN members should 
recognize the political, economic and security components of transformation into an 
enlarged association as well as develop a comprehensive vision that encompasses 
interests of both old and new members. 
       
Before going into a thorough study of a regional organization like the ASEAN it is 
necessary to review basic concepts, which influence its process and development in the 
past. It will never be inappropriate to take an abridged survey what is the difference 
between regional integration and regional cooperation to know whether such a regional 
organization is successful or not in achieving its purposes and objectives. It will also be 
requisite to evaluate its core values of strategic culture that prevails in making major 
decisions and policy-making for its own security. 
 
4.1.1 Cooperation and Integration 
 
Firstly it will be a rudimentary procedure to differentiate between cooperation and 
integration if one gets the impression that the study of regional integration is the same as 
the study of regional cooperation, of regional organizations, of regional systems and 
subsystems, or of regionalism.398 The study of regionalism or regional cooperation or 
regional organizations furnishes simply materials on important activities of actors or on 
their beliefs. The study of regional integration is concerned with the outcomes or 
consequences of such activities in terms of a “new deal” for the region in question even 
though these activities could of course be analyzed for other purposes as well.399  
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398 Ernst B. Haas ( 1970 ): “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing”, in: International Organization, Autumn/1970, p. 607.  
399 Ibid., p. 611. 
  
 
137
 
Integration is denoted by some scholars as a process toward political unity and economic 
prosperity among separate identities of the world while a few mention as a condition or 
end product which is resulted from the development of functional organizations. 
Cooperation is an interaction, where the problem lies not only in the identification of 
common goals and the methods of reaching them, but also in the achievement of these 
goals. This interaction, in which no conflict is involved, does not, properly speaking, 
come into the ambit of politics, which centers on conflict and power, but rather into that 
of administration. But administration is not only the outcome of successful politics but 
also offers a method of resolving conflict situations, especially when they are not really 
acute.400  Interaction of nation-states combines both antagonism and community of 
interests. This means that conflict is never fully separated from cooperation nor 
cooperation from conflict. Indeed, different periods of history combine the two in varying 
measures, and the difference between the states of peace and war lies merely in the 
degree to which one of these elements predominates.401 In generally speaking about 
integration, it is the usually purposeful process whereby two or more states merge their 
economic, social, and political systems to the point that they constitute a single 
community. An integrated  community may be achieved, in the sense that its members 
generally can expect conflicts to be resolved peaceably among them, without the formal 
amalgamation of unified institutions of government.402 Integration implies a more 
conscious mixing of individuals and groups that have been separated. It also may not be a 
planned, rational process, but those affected almost certainly are aware of it, either 
approving or opposing this new mix of peoples in accordance with their own perceived 
interests.403 
 
As Du-Chel Sin stated, “wenn man Integration als eine Spezialform der Kooperation 
darstellt, die, langfristig betrachtet, eine Auflösung des Staatensystems zur Folge haben 
kann, während bei der Kooperation gerade die Stärkung der Nationalstaaten im 
Vordergrund steht. Kooperation ist damit Voraussetzung für Integration”.404 Also 
Manfred Mols described that “ Regionale Integration ist daher nicht einfach ein einsamer 
Beschluß der Regierenden. Dies jedenfalls nicht unter dem Vorzeichen einer 
gewährleisteten Stabilität. Wo sich nicht an die eigentümliche Mischung aus Raum, 
Kultur und projektiven Interessen anknüpfen läßt, bleibt sie ein politisches Artefakt. 
Jeder konkrete Regionalismus symbolisiert immer diese Einheit, die geographisch, 
historisch-kulturell und zielgerichtet in einem ist. Reine politische Integration oder reine 
wirtschaftliche Integration bleiben für sich Kooperationskonglomerate ohne 
Tiefenstruktur. Für sich genommen ist Regionalismus also eine mehrfach abgesicherte 
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Identitätsgröße, regionale Integration damit ein Vorgang bzw. ein Interaktionsgeflecht, 
das die Identitätspotentiale handlungsleitend aktiviert. Wir könnten auch sagen: 
Regionale Integration ist die Ausstattung des Regionalismus mit einer adäquaten 
Organisationsform bzw. einem angemessenen Prozeß des Zusammenfindens”.405 
 
Haas wrote that the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and 
when states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, 
and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while 
acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. Regional 
cooperation, organization, systems, and subsystems may help describe steps on the way; 
but they should not be confused with the resulting condition. He considered integration as 
a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal 
terms.406 
 
The study of regional cooperation, for instance, may be considered as a part of the study 
of regional integration or as a separate interest. Regional cooperation is a vague term 
covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet 
some commonly experienced need. Such activities often contain lessons and data for the 
study of regional integration. But judgements as to whether cooperation is “successful” 
must be based on criteria very different from those appropriate to the study of 
integration.407  
 
The study of regional organizations sums up activities of interstate cooperative 
enterprises and links to these activities observations concerning institutional evolution. 
Integration studies derive much of their information from the activities of international 
organizations including non-governmental groupings. Some integration theorists even 
prefer to use measures of organizational tasks and institutionalization as indicators of 
integration or disintegration. Still, the study of organizations seeks to pinpoint the 
“success” of such entities in terms, which make the organizations the centers of concern 
rather than to focus on their impact on the members.408  
 
Integration studies must rely on the study of comparative politics and economics because 
the regional organizations through which integrative/disintegrative activity is carried on 
are properly considered intervening variables which help explain the real concern, the 
attainment of the possible later conditions in which the region may find itself. Some 
writers refer to regional subsystems and regional systems. If they mean an especially 
intense network of international links within a defined geographical compass, they are 
talking about regional cooperation, transactions, or organizations though at a higher level 
of abstraction. A “regional system” is no more than a figure of speech summing up and 
describing such interactions. To be useful for dealing with the essentially dynamic 
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concerns of the integration the portrait of the totality as a “system” must yield to the 
analysis of the separate strands of which the system is made up.409 
 
Regional “subsystems” involve descriptions of the particularly intense interactions in a 
given locale explained largely in terms of the inputs of the “system” that is the global 
network of international relations. Regional subsystems, then, are devices for explaining 
the interdependence between local ties and concerns and the larger world which constrain 
them. This may be terribly important in helping to explain why regional integration 
efforts do or do not progress; but since the basic concern is not the explication of 
integration, the concepts and measures appropriate in one realm do not carry over into the 
other. Further, the phenomenon of “regionalism” is sometimes equated with the study of 
regional integration. Regionalism can be a political slogan; if so, it is ideological data that 
the student of integration must use. Regionalism can also be an analytical device 
suggesting what the world’s “natural” regions are ( or ought to be? ). As such it has so far 
not helped students of the processes of regional integration or disintegration because the 
actors who make integrative decisions do not always worry about the naturalness of their 
region.410  
 
Henceforth there are many approaches to the study of integration and disintegration in 
international politics and they attempt to explain for the identification and analysis of 
forces that contribute to the formation and development of integrated communities. 
Inevitably conflicting and cooperating elements in the process of integration throughout 
many regions of the world will be a prevailing phenomenon in the study of international 
relations. For better understanding of world politics at the beginning of new millennium, 
a thorough and careful study of integration theory should be revisited. 
 
4.1.2 Institutionalist Perspective to Integrated Communities 
 
While the body of international institutions that promotes liberal values is a central 
dependent variable of liberal scholarship, it is also seen by liberals as an important 
independent variable that affects the likelihood of further cooperation. Such institutions 
take a variety of forms ranging from transactional values or belief systems to substantive 
regimes to international organizations. One approach contends that there is an 
international society of states held together by at least a minimal set of rules and formal 
institutions that are based on common interests and values. Within the international 
society school there is a “pluralist” position − states accept certain norms and laws for the 
mutual protection of sovereignty and the facilitation of commerce − and a “solidarist” 
position − states accept norms and rules to realize common values that go beyond self-
preservation and sovereignty.411 Whether there is any approach which is in conformity 
with pluralist or solidarist position, constructing integrated communities implies 
developing shared understandings about peaceful conduct, whereby interests previously 
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pursued through war are instead pursued through peaceful means. Such understandings 
that are major prerequisites in building up these communities can only be possible 
through the ways and means by focusing on institutions, norms and the intra-communal 
process of identity building. 
 
How do regionally integrated institutions play a role to the changing of states’ behaviour 
and interests? Neo-liberal institutionalist theories claim that institutions can mitigate 
anarchy and facilitate cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, 
helping to settle distributional conflicts and, most importantly, reducing the likelihood of 
cheating.412 This takes a rationalist, utility-maximizing and sanction-based view of how 
institutions may affect and transform state interests and behaviour. In this view, 
institutions do not merely ‘regulate’ state behaviour, they can also ‘constitute’ state 
identities and interests. Neo-liberal institutionalism accepts that institutions can constrain 
state action, but it does not concern itself with studying whether institutions may 
define/create or redefine/recreate the interests of states.413 The focus is restricted to how 
existing state interests are pursued by rational state actors through cost-benefit 
calculations and choice of actions which offer maximum gain ( utility maximization ). 
Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that state interests are not a ‘given, but 
themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialization.414 Such a kind of 
approach resembles more with a view of sociological than rational in its notion to 
institutional cooperation. 
 
One argues that by establishing, articulating and transmitting norms that define what 
constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behaviour, international organizations may be 
able to shape state practices. Even more remarkable, however, international organizations 
may encourage states and societies to imagine themselves as part of a region. This 
suggests that international organizations can be a site of interest and identity formation. 
Particularly striking are those cases in which regional organizations have been 
established for instrumental reasons and later and unexpectedly gained an identity 
component by becoming a new site for interaction and source of imagination.415 
 
This sociological approach to study the development of a regionally integrated 
community would mean going beyond the study of how states pursue or hope to realize 
their national interests through utility-maximizing functional measures ( such as 
reduction of tariffs, or creating a dispute-arbitration mechanism ) and investigating the 
extent to which the said regional institution also facilitates: 
• the development of trust, especially through norms of conduct; 
• the development of a ‘regional culture’ built around common values such as 
democracy, developmentalism or human rights; 
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• the development of regional functional projects that encourage belief in a common 
destiny ( examples include common currency, industrial projects ); and 
• the development of social learning, involving ‘redefinition’ and ‘reinterpretation’ of 
reality, exchange of self-understandings, perception of realities and normative 
expectations among the group of states and their diffusion from country to country, 
generation to generation.416 
 
Adopting such a framework does not necessarily lead to a more positive evaluation of 
institutions. But it certainly provides for a broader canvas. For example, rationalist 
assessment of ASEAN’s record has criticized it for never invoking its formal dispute-
settlement mechanism, the ‘High Council’ provided under the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation. But an adequate evaluation of ASEAN’s role in dispute settlement must 
look into its norms and processes of interaction, which are less tangible but may have a 
more significant impact in keeping intramural peace. By investigating the sociological 
and inter-subjective questions and linkages often ignored by rationalist theories, such an 
approach looks beyond the formal bureaucratic apparatus and legal-rational mechanisms 
of institutions. Earlier theories of international organizations and regional cooperation, 
especially regional integration theory, ‘remained closely tied to the study of formal 
organizations, missing a range of state behaviour that nonetheless appeared regulated and 
organized in a broader sense’. But as recent institutionalist theories (including neo-liberal 
theories) acknowledge, the existence of formal institutional structures or legal-rational 
modes of cooperation do not exhaust the possibility of multilateralism and community 
building. Multilateralism could involve the ‘less formal, less codified habits, practices, 
ideas, and norms of international society’. These could be developed through 
consultations, dialogue and socialization; indeed, the absence of formal legal-rationalistic 
cooperation may be more desirable (especially in the case of developing countries 
sensitive to the issue of sovereignty) than the establishment of a formal 
intergovernmental authority.417 
 
4.1.3 Behaviour and National Interests of Member States in the ASEAN 
 
Although the ASEAN prided itself on its ‘unity in diversity’, enlargement substantially 
increased its political and economic variety, and the diversity of strategic views among its 
members. The Association’s political spectrum broadened with the inclusion of the 
communist governments of Vietnam and Laos, and of Myanmar’s authoritarian military 
regime, just as liberal democracy was becoming more entrenched in the Philippines and 
Thailand. While original members exerted subtle pressure on Yangon for more reforms 
through ASEAN’s constructive engagement to Myanmar, the Association also 
acknowledged that the political profile of its new members could not be ignored. The 
limited institutional capacity of the new entrants, an important consideration given that 
the Association’s chairing responsibilities rotated between members, risked further strain 
on the ASEAN’s cohesion. Given their past international isolation, it was likely that the 
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newcomers would feel uncomfortable with the ASEAN’s familial atmosphere, and with 
its practice of consensus-building and compromise.418  
       
The merging of ASEAN-6 with CLMV into a new model of ASEAN-10 is indeed the 
process of combination and harmonization of different levels of development in political 
and economic structures of the Association. Meanwhile the ASEAN-6 has clearly 
recognized the potential strategic advantages and political and economic benefits of 
expanding the organization to the whole of Southeast Asia. Firstly, an enlarged ASEAN 
can increase its diplomatic and economic weight in the international community. 
Secondly, it is likely to beef up ASEAN’s strategic credibility, enabling it to address 
regional issues more effectively. Thirdly, ASEAN’s market size will increase by 38 
percent (in terms of population which will be around 500 million people) with the entry 
of the four new members, which can expand regional economies of scale. Fourthly, the 
regional division of labour is likely to intensify, which may stimulate greater productive 
specialization and efficiency, potentially reduce inflation pressures, and affect Southeast 
Asian migration patterns.419  
       
ASEAN’s enlargement promised to extend to the whole of Southeast Asia the peaceful 
and prosperous culture of cooperation established by the Association’s original members. 
ASEAN’s vast range of cooperative activities would open channels of communication 
between countries, benefit bilateral relations and emphasize shared interests. But 
enlargement’s expectations went beyond the original vision of achieving cooperation 
between former adversaries. It was intended to increase ASEAN’s diplomatic standing by 
allowing it to speak for the whole of Southeast Asia. It was also designed to bolster the 
Association’s standing in relation to China by incorporating the strategically significant 
and populous Vietnam, and by reducing Beijing’s influence in Myanmar.420 
       
Although there are some advantages of broadening the organization, the ASEAN-6 also 
fears the development of a dual-track system that could breed greater division and ignite 
latent animosities between the “haves” − the richer, more developed and older members 
of the ASEAN − and the “have-nots”, the newer members (CLMV). With the emergence 
of the Asian financial crisis from the second half of 1997, this previously simple equation 
has become complicated, as the growth path and political evolution of some of the older 
ASEAN members have been interrupted; and some like Indonesia and perhaps Malaysia 
are experiencing discontinuous change. Nevertheless, on the whole, the ASEAN-6 
remains far ahead of the newer members in terms of economic development (gross 
domestic product per capita and general living standards), institutional development, 
technologies, and integration in global trade and capital markets, among other things.421 
       
The two groups in the same organization (ASEAN-6 and CLMV) are also divided by 
geography − between mainland Indochina and Myanmar and archipelago Southeast Asia 
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(excluding Thailand) − history, and political / economic systems, which had led to 
hostilities in the recent past. The rise of a dichotomized ASEAN would affect its ability 
to work as an organization and to move towards its shifting objectives. It would also 
further erode its international credibility, particularly after the organization’s ineffective 
handling of high-profile regional problems in the 1990s, such as the persistent cross-
border “haze” outbreaks caused by fires in Indonesia, financial and economic crises, and 
its responses to challenges posed by membership of Myanmar and Cambodia.422  
       
The main concern of the older members about enlargement can be distilled into one 
fundamental question: Can an ASEAN-10 continue to function with a high degree of 
cohesion and trust built up among its original members in order to achieve its 
organizational objectives? Implicitly, the ASEAN-6 fears the evolution of a two-tier or 
dual-track system, which would have negative consequences for the organization as a 
whole and for the realization of the objectives of individual members. To reduce the 
probability of such a development, the older members have recognized that they must 
help the new members to accelerate the processes of growth and structural change, and to 
move from a central management to a market system as quickly as possible. 
Consequently, initiatives have been taken by the organization and its older members to 
establish training and assistance programs to integrate CLMV into the ASEAN and to 
catalyze institutional change in and improve domestic conditions of the CLMV.423 
 
 
4.2  Historical Retrospect of Conflict Resolution and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
 
In order to understand the conflict resolution and cooperation in Southeast Asia region, it 
will be necessary to focus the analysis on the patterns and categories of conflicts in the 
region; the ways and means of respective players’ cooperation and conflict management; 
and their mechanisms of cooperation in political, economic and security arena.  Conflicts 
in Southeast Asia can be typified into intraregional conflicts and intrastate conflicts.  
Some causes of intraregional conflicts are rooted in the colonial period while boundaries 
of states were drawn up by colonial powers irrespective of sheer differences in ethnic, 
religious and cultural affinities. Many of decolonized independent states of Southeast 
Asia inherited these disputes and carried forward to their present times added by the 
momentum of the power blocs’ rivalries and ideological conflicts in the Cold War period.  
These intraregional conflicts are, for example, Konfrontasi between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, Sabah issue between Malaysia and the Philippines, and also Cambodia conflict 
between ASEAN and Vietnam.  
       
Intrastate conflicts in Southeast Asia arise mostly from colonial legacies in the same way 
like intraregional conflicts. Intrastate conflicts can be roughly defined as conflicts among 
actors internal to a state.  Some of these conflicts belong to disputes over territories and 
boundaries while the others to secession movements of minorities that envisaged 
establishing a new state based on their communal identities. These conflicts are 
essentially identity-relating conflicts where state boundaries do not coincide with identity 
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groups, and where such groups want to have their own territories.  The common feature is 
that they involve complex issues such as communal identity, language, religion, culture, 
and economic and political survival of a particular group.  These issues are the reason in 
one way or another contributing to the increasing numbers of secession movements in 
Southeast Asia.  Intrastate conflicts can also arise when a political group in a country 
aims to change the existing government with a new form of government that is based on a 
new agenda like more political openness or democratization or economic liberalization.  
Vivid examples of such conflicts are East Timor crisis from 1999 to 2002 and 
democratization movement in Myanmar from 1988 to present.                                                                          
 
4.2.1 Konfrontasi, Sabah issue and the ASEAN 
 
Looking back to the historical development of the ASEAN, its formation was an attempt 
to institutionalize the reconciliation between Malaysia and Indonesia.  Most of countries 
are newly emerged independent states and decolonization status had left a number of 
territorial disputes behind and the most serious regional tension at that time in the region 
was the undeclared war - the Konfrontasi or Confrontation - launched by Indonesia’s 
President Sukarno against the new Federation of Malaysia between 1963 and 1966.  
Instead of an expansionist war, Indonesia waged the Confrontation intentionally to 
destabilize Malaysia through limited military action, economic sanctions and propaganda.  
It was purposed for domestic political reasons, and ended after Sukarno was replaced by 
Suharto.424  Michael Leifer noted that the ASEAN was contemplated in practical terms as 
a by-product of institutionalized regional reconciliation.425  Another underlying motive 
forming the association is to create a framework to build certainty and trust into relations 
within Southeast Asia - but its founding fathers had no definite and detailed plans for 
achieving this aim.  The Bangkok Declaration, the founding document of the ASEAN, 
claimed for the countries of Southeast Asia ‘a primary responsibility for strengthening the 
economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive 
national development’, and stated that ‘they are determined to ensure their stability and 
security from external interference’.426   
 
However, the viability of this ambitious objective was at the time welcome with 
scepticism because the region still lacked internal cohesion since most countries in the 
region suffered from internal instability or were only nascent states. Several members of 
ASEAN were involved in territorial claims against one another and the instability of the 
external environment, principally due to the Vietnam War, was tending to cause 
cooperation in the region almost impossible.427 Represented initially as an undertaking in 
economic cooperation, its governments have shown a primary concern with politically 
expressed security cooperation. ASEAN’s performance in such cooperation, which lacks 
a military dimension, may be assessed with reference to two interrelated spheres: the 
                                                 
424 Jeannie Henderson (1999): “Reassessing ASEAN”, Adelphi Paper 323, London: Oxford  University 
Press, p.15. 
425 Micheal Leifer (1989): “ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia”, London: Routledge, p. vii. 
426 Henderson (1999): “ASEAN”, p.15. 
427 May T. Yeung, et al (1999): “Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, The EU and ASEAN”, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp. 45-46. 
  
 
145
intramural, comprising its sub-regional membership and the extramural, extending within 
and beyond Southeast Asia.428                                                 
 
There were two unsuccessful attempts to form a regional organization in Southeast Asia 
before the establishment of the ASEAN.  These were the formation of the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and MAPHILINDO in 1963.  Both were failed because of 
prevailing bilateral tensions and disputes among participant countries.  The major default 
of the ASA was because of the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia for the 
possession of Sabah and the unsuccess of MAPHILINDO was due to the animosity of 
Indonesia through its policy of Konfrontasi to newly formed Malaysian Federation.  
Remarkably, intra-regional conflicts had claimed responsibility as for making regional 
organizations to be stagnated or disintegrated or dysfunctional. 
 
The ASEAN was created by its founding member countries with a common desire to 
establish a regional device for conflict resolution and prevention of war among each 
other.  The idea of ASEAN itself was originated in the course of intra-regional dialogue 
leading to the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia.  It was followed by 
the decision of Indonesia to relinquish the policy of confrontation and then a threat to 
regional stability was ended.  After modeling a regional order based on the principle of 
non-use of force in order to prevent recurrence of situations like Konfrontasi, the ASEAN 
faced a new challenge arising from a conflict among its members.  It was a boiling 
dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines for claiming to the ownership of former 
British colony of North Borneo (Sabah).  Sabah is a state within the Malaysian 
Federation and the claim of the Philippines for its possession made worse the bilateral 
relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila.  Although the dispute dates back to 1961, 
the immediate cause for inflaming an intense crisis between two countries was reports 
appearing in Manila press in March 1968 that the Philippines was preparing an imminent 
invasion of Sabah.  Though the government of the Philippines denied all of these alleged 
plot for its pursuit of Sabah, the relationship between two countries reached into a crisis.  
It was also a major test for the very survival of the ASEAN barely six months after its 
creation in August 1967.429   
 
Initially other ASEAN members stayed silent on the dispute and kept the issue separate 
from the ASEAN, hoping that this would limit the dispute’s damaging effects on the 
nascent regional organization.  Soon after bilateral talks between Malaysia and the 
Philippines in June 1968 collapsed, followed up by a suspension of diplomatic relations 
and Malaysia’s denial to participate in any further ASEAN meetings where the 
Philippines might raise the Sabah issue, the connection between the ASEAN and the 
bilateral dispute between its members could no longer be ignored.  At this point, Thailand 
and Indonesia played a critical role in mediating die-hard partners of the ASEAN and 
pushed them for exercising more restraint for the sake of their association.  At the end of 
1969, Malaysia and the Philippines resumed diplomatic relations and put behind the 
dispute.  Such a kind of flexibility from both sides reflected the priority given to the 
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existence of the ASEAN and gave the ASEAN a new confidence and sense of purpose.  
As Amitav Acharya noted, ‘the avoidance of any further escalation of the Sabah dispute 
was all the more significant because it took place at a time when the degree of economic 
interdependence within the region was not significant enough to serve as a constraint on 
interstate tensions’.  ASEAN members succeeded in the prevention of deeper crisis by 
means of direct and indirect measures of diplomacy, pressure, mediation and restraint.  
Therefore, the Sabah issue is a major milestone in the ASEAN’s history of conflict 
avoidance and also indicates an approach which was to be known later as the ASEAN 
Way of crisis management.430 
 
4.2.2 Cambodia Conflict and the ASEAN 
ASEAN's founding charter Bangkok Declaration states that membership is open to all 
countries in the region of Southeast Asia -- a warm gesture toward Hanoi though 
Vietnamese government repeatedly rejected it.  Before Vietnam's invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia in December 1978, integration of the three Indochinese states 
and ASEAN into a wider and larger regional organization was discussed within the 
ASEAN community as a viable solution to regional conflicts.  After its reunification, 
Vietnam requested observer status at ASEAN meetings and the official proposal to join 
the association was emerged at the ASEAN Summit meeting held in January 1976 in 
Bali.  However, it was understandable at the time that the inclusion of communist states 
within a grouping of free-market countries was unprecedented, and the idea was 
interpreted to be more a goodwill expression than a serious proposition.  
During the period from 1976 to 1978, ASEAN had many differences with Vietnam and 
these were not only symbolic but also real in substance.  For example, the ASEAN 
proposed in 1971 to establish Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) and invited Vietnam to support the proposal.  Hanoi refused but countered 
with its own proposal, calling instead for a region of peace, independence, and neutrality.  
Apparently, the Vietnamese objected to the term freedom because of their sensitivity and 
vulnerability to criticism on human rights issues.  The term independence, on the other 
hand, was promoted by the Vietnamese as a concept opposing all foreign military bases 
in Southeast Asia, an idea that some ASEAN countries like Thailand and the Philippines 
did not share.431  
Throughout the Second Indochina War, each ASEAN state pursued its own Vietnam 
policy.  Malaysia and Indonesia maintained strict neutrality, whereas Thailand and the 
Philippines contributed personnel and materiel support to South Vietnam.  Perceptions of 
Vietnam as a possible threat to the region also varied among member nations.  Indonesia 
and Malaysia viewed Vietnam as a buffer against Chinese expansionism, whereas 
Thailand, wary of possible repetition of historic patterns of confrontation with Vietnam, 
turned to China for protection following the war's end and the subsequent withdrawal of 
the United States forces from Thailand.  
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Following the Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia on 25 December 1978, the ASEAN 
members were united in their condemnation of Hanoi. They took the lead in mobilizing 
international opinion against Vietnam, and, in the UN General Assembly, they annually 
sponsored resolutions calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and for internationally 
supervised elections.  The ASEAN nations also were instrumental in preventing the 
Vietnam-sponsored Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh from taking over Cambodia's 
UN seat.  In June 1982, ASEAN played a crucial role in persuading three discordant 
Cambodian combating groups to merge into a coalition resistance government.  
ASEAN's position on Cambodia was important to Hanoi, because it was through 
ASEAN's efforts at the UN that the world's attention continued to focus on Cambodia in 
the late 1980s.  The Vietnamese government, therefore, realized that ASEAN as having 
the power to confer upon them or to deny them legitimacy in Cambodia. Vietnamese 
diplomats sought to convince the ASEAN countries that the invasion of Cambodia was 
intended to eliminate the threat posed by Pol Pot's alignment with China.  Rather than 
have its activity in Cambodia perceived as potentially damaging to ASEAN's security, 
Vietnam wanted to assure ASEAN members that it was in the group's interest to join with 
Vietnam in countering the Chinese threat to the region.  Cultivating goodwill with key 
ASEAN members was an important part of this strategy.  Thus, in 1978 Vietnam and the 
Philippines agreed to negotiate but failed to settle their conflicting claims to the Spratly 
Islands.  Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, during a late-1982 visit to 
Indonesia, took a conciliatory position in discussing Vietnam's and Indonesia's competing 
claims to the Natuna Islands, and in 1984 Hanoi made a similar gesture to Malaysia in 
order to help resolve their conflicting claims over Amboyna Cay.  In 1987, however, 
resolving the war in Cambodia remained the key to any further resolution of differences 
between Vietnam and ASEAN.432 
The Cambodian conflict during the period of Vietnamese’s decade-long invasion and 
occupation posed a considerable threat to the ASEAN since the time of its formation.  
Differences among ASEAN members how to deal with the crisis also seriously 
challenged the ASEAN’s dedicated norm of peaceful settlement of intra-regional disputes 
without interference from outside powers.433  In many aspects, Cambodian conflict is 
typical of the conflicts arisen in the regions of strategic interests for the major powers of 
the world in the culmination of Cold War.  Even though the prime culprit of this conflict 
has been a third world developing country i.e. Communist Vietnam, rival groups of Cold 
War and regional powers fuelled the intensity of crisis and prolonged it unresolved.  
At the beginning, the conflict was bilateral (Khmer-Vietnamese) and domestic (Intra-
Khmer), but later it became internationalized by the dynamics of deep-seated Thai-
Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese antagonisms, and global Sino-Soviet and Soviet-
American rivalries.434   Vietnam’s ambition to become the predominant power in 
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Southeast Asia and to neutralize the Chinese threat required political, economic and 
military resources far beyond its means. For this reason, Vietnam entered into an alliance 
with the Soviet Union.  For the Soviets, this alliance had the potential to create insecurity 
for China on its southern rim, and Moscow tried to become a major player through Hanoi 
in Southeast Asia.  Access to military facilities in Vietnam also facilitated Soviet strategic 
competition with the United States.  Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet rivalries therefore 
sustained the Cambodian conflict.435   
Vietnam’s invasion also challenged the ASEAN’s principle against military cooperation 
within the grouping because this principle was under pressure as the ASEAN members 
perceived a direct military threat to one of their member countries from the instability in 
Indochina.  It also ceased Cambodia’s existence as a buffer between Thailand and 
Vietnam and cross-border operations into Thailand by Vietnamese forces in chasing 
Khmer guerrillas made Thailand the frontline state of ASEAN in that conflict.  The 
exodus of ethnic-Chinese refugees from Indochina to the shores of Indonesia and 
Malaysia was seen by respective countries as the paramount instability to their delicate 
social and demographic balances, leading to calls within ASEAN for some forms of 
collective military response to Vietnam.436 
There were different approaches held by ASEAN members for solving the Cambodia 
conflict.  One is a regional approach strongly supported by Malaysia and Indonesia 
reflecting in the so-called Kuantan agreement after Indonesian President and Malaysian 
Prime Minister met on 26-28 March 1980 in the Malaysian town of Kuantan.  In their 
view, China is a real long-term threat to the region and therefore Vietnam could be a 
stockade against the Chinese aggrandizement in Southeast Asia.   The Kuantan 
agreement includes elements of a possible trade-offs between the security interests of 
ASEAN and those of Vietnam.  Main point is that Vietnam was to oblige ASEAN’s 
desire to end its dependence on the Soviet Union and in return ASEAN will support to a 
political settlement of the Cambodia conflict as recognition to the security interests of 
Vietnam in Indochina.  This regionalist outlook conflicted with another approach 
representing strategic perspectives of Thailand and Singapore, which were labelled as the 
hard-liners against Vietnam in the ASEAN group.  Both countries viewed Vietnam 
supported by the Soviet Union as a regional troublemaker and major threat to regional 
peace and security of Southeast Asia.  Thailand as a frontline state in the conflict and 
Singapore as a small and vulnerable country for security threats attempted to 
internationalize the conflict with a view to isolate and punish Vietnam with the help of 
China, the USA and the international community rather than emphasizing on a regionalist 
approach.  Therefore, this gulf between two approaches underscores an intra-ASEAN 
divide for conflict resolution.437   
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After the regionalist approach based on a formula of accommodation with Vietnam 
preferred by Malaysia and Indonesia became ineffective, ASEAN moved closer towards 
its strategy of internationalizing with the help of great powers to reach a final settlement 
to the conflict.  A peace agreement ending the conflict in Cambodia was eventually 
adopted at the reconvened Paris Conference on Cambodia in September 1991.  While the 
Cold War was drawing closer to an end and major shifts in policy assessments and 
positions of great powers like the US, China and Soviet Union, the international context 
provided a more conducive solution to the conflict.  ASEAN as a regional group in its 
own involvement and efforts for peace process was somewhat mangled due to its 
intramural disunity and external pressures although there were two Jakarta Informal 
Meetings sponsored by ASEAN and two meetings of the Paris Peace Conferences on 
Cambodia in 1989 and 1991. 
Moreover, ASEAN’s actions during the Cambodian conflict also symbolically 
undermined the proposal of ZOPFAN which asserted ASEAN’s perception of building a 
regional order free from the interference of outside powers and regional autonomy i.e. 
regional solutions to regional problems managed by the ASEAN states.  To encounter the 
threats posed by the Soviet Union and Vietnam during the conflict to the region, ASEAN 
itself aligned with China and the US because it could no longer manage its regional 
security domain on its own means.  It also clearly revealed the limitations and restraints 
on the conflict resolution skills of small powers like ASEAN states in achieving their 
professed goals.438 
On one hand, ASEAN’s handling of Cambodia conflict underscored the diverse 
individual interests of member states and the need to define institutional principles for the 
ASEAN to articulate a coherent organizational position.  The necessity to policy 
coordination greatly improved the ways and mechanisms of consultation, consensus and 
cooperation which later became the basic fundaments of the ASEAN way of conflict 
resolution.  However, at the same time, the Cambodia conflict was also a major threat to 
the regional cohesion and ASEAN’s unity itself due to diverse strategic perspectives 
between its member states, particularly between Thailand and Indonesia.439  Thailand 
rejected the regionalist approach of Indonesia and acted on its own way defined in the 
parameter of its national interests.  Indeed these steep divisions among members of the 
ASEAN are real dangers of an effective regional community building and integration.  
According to Ali Alatas, then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, it is ‘a widespread but 
historically incorrect assumption that Cambodian conflict is the cement of ASEAN’.  In 
his own view, ‘the Cambodian issue had been divisive to the ASEAN’.440 
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4.2.3 ASEAN’s Constructive Engagement and Intransigent Myanmar  
 
Admission to Myanmar as a new member became a major challenge to the ASEAN’s 
non-interference policy in the era after the Cold War.  In September 1988 a military 
government came into power after crushing a wave of nationwide pro-democracy 
demonstrations against the former Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) regime 
headed by General Ne Win. The junta formed a new government under the name of the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) { which was renamed again as the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 }. The junta allowed the first 
parliamentary elections in three decades in May, 1990 and there was a landslide victory 
won by the country’s democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (who won Nobel Peace Price in 1991). However 
the SLORC did not recognize the election results and refused a transfer of power to the 
civilian government.   
 
These domestic developments in Myanmar occurred at a time when ASEAN’s own 
leadership in the Cambodian peace process was being undermined by intra-mural 
differences and also overshadowed by the role of the Great Powers and the UN. ASEAN 
also had begun to face questions about its unity and relevance in the post-Cambodia 
conflict. The situation in Myanmar and the question of democracy and human rights it 
posed, seemed to be a recipe for potential discord between ASEAN and its dialog 
partners. Although the rise of new military dictatorship in Myanmar led to an 
international outcry and condemnation especially from Western countries like USA and 
the European Union, ASEAN countries saw the Myanmar situation in very different 
terms. Western condemnation of the SLORC’s abuse of human rights and violation of 
democratic process was viewed by the ASEAN as outside interference in the internal 
affairs of a regional country. ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar situation was to put 
forward the concept of ‘constructive engagement’ previously employed in a different 
context in the case of South Africa.441 
 
The decision in May 1997 to allow the entry of Myanmar into ASEAN, which took place 
in July of that year after considerable international debate and lobbying by both 
proponents and opponents, was the culmination of over half a decade of Myanmar’s 
interest in the organization after two decades of studious avoidance. This was a major 
foreign policy change by the SLORC, which had moved away from the essentially 
isolationist perceptions of the BSPP regime. At that time, and before the SLORC seemed 
almost perpetually frozen in its authoritarian mold, there were those who would have 
welcomed such membership because Myanmar had been so secluded for about thirty 
years from most international dialogue that exposure to outside views and more 
transparency in international relations would have been conceived as progress, even for a 
regime that had come to power in a bloody coup.442 About Myanmar’s participation in 
the organization and its underlying motive, some critics also argued that Myanmar want 
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to refrain the political and economic pressure from the Western powers by activating 
under the integrated shield of the ASEAN. 
 
However, ASEAN has not achieved the goals that it set for Myanmar’s incorporation in 
1997. It was hoped that participating in ASEAN would ease Myanmar away from its 
isolationist stance and could, over time, encourage greater openness in its society. 
Through its membership, Myanmar is exposed to over 250 meetings a year, including at 
head-of-government and ministerial levels. Nonetheless, the country has been a relatively 
silent partner in ASEAN’s major forums.443 Also, there are no positive political 
developments deviating from the authoritarian and undemocratic trend after being a new 
member of the ASEAN for seven years. Therefore, the main objective of the ASEAN for 
accepting Myanmar as a new member to persuade for undertaking political liberalization 
has not yet succeeded. 
 
Among the ASEAN members, ASEAN operated through an informal system of 
consensus based on coordination and non-interference policy in the internal affairs of the 
member states. By including Myanmar in their orbit ASEAN’s member states saw 
opportunities for trade and investment that could be pursued within their context. Led by 
Thailand, they developed the rather ambiguous slogan of “constructive engagement”, 
which theoretically was to transform Myanmar into a more open society through 
increasing trade, investment, and economic relations, but which in practice seemed more 
devoted to pursuing short-term profit-making than to fostering long-term political reform. 
Most member states themselves could not be accused of devout adherence to an 
international (or Western) standard of democracy, and military rule in Myanmar may 
have seemed to some of those governments a better alternative than the chaos or 
communist control that the SLORC continued to stress would have taken place had it not 
come to power.444 
 
ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement had its basis also in the concerns of some of 
its members regarding the growing international criticism of their record in the area of 
human rights and democracy. The Myanmar crisis unfolded at a time when human rights 
and democracy were emerging as a major issue in the relationship between the ASEAN 
members and their Western ‘dialog partners’. Some also pointed out that ASEAN’s 
diplomatic engagement of the Myanmar regime was limited and half-hearted. While 
officials in ASEAN responded to the criticism of constructive engagement by arguing 
that the policy had delivered results in extracting concessions from the regime, such as 
the release of some political prisoners, some argued that the policy had actually little to 
show for itself. Whether or not this policy is productive in dealing with Myanmar, critics 
argued that the real driving force behind the policy was the economic interests of some 
ASEAN members, such as Thailand and Singapore,445 in taking profits from the natural 
resources of Myanmar which is the world’s largest exporter of teak and has some amount 
of offshore oil and gas deposits. 
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While ASEAN had consistently applied its non-interference doctrine in justifying its 
engagement policy, there were more other political and strategic considerations at work 
behind the decision for granting membership to Myanmar.  One of the major concerns 
was with the growing Chinese influence in the country, witnessing closer economic and 
military ties between the two countries over the years since the end of the Cold War. By 
accepting Myanmar as a member, ASEAN was attempting to prevent that country from 
sliding into a Chinese sphere of influence and at worse, becoming an arena of Sino-
Indian competition. Another important factor that appeared to have helped ASEAN to 
overcome intramural differences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose sanctions 
against Myanmar. The US action also made the ASEAN almost impossible to delay its 
admission since that would mean surrendering to US pressure and thereby compromise 
its goal of regional autonomy.446  
 
A distinct irony of ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement is that it could not be 
regarded as strict non-interference. Notably, it implied a particular kind of interference in 
support of Myanmar’s authoritarian regime. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the 
decision to admit Myanmar would not further strengthen the domestic position of military 
government vis-à-vis the intra-state pro-democratic opposition. Instead, a strict policy of 
non-interference would have meant taking a neutral position towards Myanmar. The 
grant of membership gave the regime a greater sense of international legitimacy although 
there was a strong outcry from several media and human rights advocacy groups. Not 
surprisingly therefore, ASEAN’s move was perceived as an official authorization for 
regional approval to an international pariah.447 
 
The admission of Myanmar has revealed two major implications for ASEAN’s norms 
concerning with non-interference. The policy of ‘constructive engagement’ was 
compliant with this norm but the events leading and following to ASEAN’s admission of 
Myanmar periled the political and diplomatic, if not economic, costs of maintaining this 
norm. The loss of international goodwill for ASEAN was the major damage whereas the 
European Union’s denial to negotiate a new economic treaty with ASEAN was an 
economic cost. Moreover, the intra-ASEAN debate surrounding the admission of 
Myanmar showed that ASEAN’s consensus on the inviolability of this norm was 
corroding, especially as a result of democratization within some of its member states. For 
instance, Thailand and the Philippines, the two most open polities in the ASEAN today, 
were also the least enthusiastic supporters of Myanmar’s admission shows how changes 
in domestic politics can affect regional norms in ASEAN. Upholding the norms of non-
interference and regional autonomy occupies a more central place in ASEAN’s approach 
to regional order than attempting to obtain a more positive international image and 
developing a regional effort to promote human rights and democracy. The advocates of 
constructive engagement argued that such a policy would improve Myanmar’s economic 
position and thereby finally bring about a peaceful domestic political change. But this 
argument still remains to go a long way to be further proven.448 
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The case of Myanmar underscored the spillover effects of the political stalemate in a 
member country of the ASEAN damaging the image of the organization as well as 
inviting mounting international pressure originated from the concerns of human rights 
and democracy.  After having a hard time with Myanmar, ASEAN toned down its policy 
of non-interference and decided to intervene though it is very slightly in form.  In the 
middle of the 2000, it had become conspicuous that all measures taken so far like 
economic sanctions from the US and the EU, Japan’s quiet diplomacy and the ASEAN’s 
constructive engagement failed to bring about tangible improvement in human rights and 
democracy in Myanmar.  When the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Razali 
Ismail as a UN special envoy to Myanmar  who is a Malaysian career diplomat and a 
close associate of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, ASEAN decided to halt 
its principle of non-interference and started to actively mediate between the opposing 
sides.  It openly urged the military leaders to hold talks with the opposition leader Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi and to speed up the democratization.449 
 
The open rhetoric of the ASEAN’s retreat from its non-interference policy was in 2003 
when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that Myanmar might have to be 
expelled if it continued to defy international pressure to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.  
Such a sanctioning tone had arisen shortly after the Myanmar military government 
detained again the opposition leader on May 30, 2003.  Pressure from the US and the EU 
to Myanmar junta has also been amounting because of its stubborn denial for the 
immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and implementing democratic reforms.  
The EU’s diplomatic bickering with the ASEAN over Myanmar descended to a new 
acrimonious low in June 2004 when the biennial Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit 
planned to be held in October in Hanoi had been put at risk over the EU’s insistence that 
military-ruled Myanmar should not be allowed to attend that summit.  The ASEAN 
countered that if Myanmar could not participate, neither could the EU’s 10 new member 
countries.  An ASEM Finance Ministers’ meeting scheduled in July and ASEM 
Economic Ministers’ meeting planned in September had already been cancelled over the 
dispute, which had threatened to cast a near-permanent shadow over diplomatic ties 
between the ASEAN and the EU.450 
 
Although the EU’s threat of boycotting to the Summit before, the fifth ASEM Summit 
was held in Hanoi as scheduled from 8-10 October 2004 and representatives of 
Myanmar’s junta were allowed to attend for the first time. Myanmar was also formally 
inducted into ASEM along with other new members of Laos, Cambodia from the 
ASEAN and EU’s 10 new member countries. In its final communiqué, ASEM expressed 
a vague hope that Myanmar regime’s spurious national reconciliation process would 
succeed and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions on political parties. Neither 
it did mention the plight of Myanmar’s detained pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San 
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Suu Kyi nor condemn the junta’s continuing egregious abuses of human rights. Much of 
the blame for this outcome may be laid on leading Asian countries, particularly China, 
which maintains normal political and trade relations with Myanmar. Japan’s Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi also said that ASEM membership would encourage 
Myanmar in a positive direction. The EU, on its side, has called for a common position 
by saying that present situation in Myanmar is unacceptable. However, differences on 
how best to proceed, influenced by commercial considerations and disagreements on 
tactics, also undermine for taking effective actions against the Myanmar’s junta. For 
instance, France doesn’t support any additional EU sanctions imposing on Myanmar 
because it fears that its investments in Myanmar, including those of Total Oil, may be 
hurt with more sanctions.451  Ironically, all of these behaviours are counterproductive for 
the goal of democratic reforms in Myanmar and only reinforce the junta’s attempt to 
obtain legitimacy in the international community. 
 
Soon after receiving the admission into the ASEM, Myanmar’s military government 
made a major political shake-up on 19 October 2004 by ousting the Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt who is one of the less unpleasant faces in the authoritarian regime 
and also known as a relative moderate among die-hards of the junta.452  It suggests that 
hardliners in the junta are tightening their grip on power and this shake-up also shatters 
the ASEAN’s expectation of national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar 
before Myanmar takes over the ASEAN’s rotating presidency in 2006.  In other words, 
ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement failed again in preventing Myanmar’s 
retrogression.453  
 
Before holding the ASEAN Summit on 29-30 November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos, some 
ASEAN members like Indonesia (then chair of the ASEAN), Malaysia and Thailand 
expressed their concerns about Yangon’s latest developments. As a sign of showing 
interest to the increasing pressure from its fellow members of the ASEAN, Myanmar 
government released some political prisoners before that Summit.  Many critics, 
however, are still skeptical to this gesture and suggested that this prisoners’ release could 
be intended for buying more time in relaxing some international pressure. Some also 
suggest that ASEAN Troika mechanism should be reactivated in tackling with Myanmar 
junta as well as signaling more intense pressure. Troika is categorically comprised of 
representatives from the past, present and future ASEAN chairs and it played a useful 
role to some extent in resolving the Cambodian conflict in 1990s.454  The ASEAN foreign 
ministers formally approved Thailand’s concept of an ASEAN Troika in 1999. Partly 
modelled on the EU Troika, the Southeast Asian version is an ad hoc body at the 
ministerial-level comprising the past, present and future chairmen in order to address and 
cooperate more effectively on issues affecting regional peace and stability.  Even though 
the Troika has yet to prove its effectiveness, the proposal can be considered as one of 
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ASEAN’s most important attempts at the institutionalised management of regional order 
and a clear indicator of a changing security culture.  Before its official launch, Troika 
approach was used successfully to end the political impasse over the 1997 coup in 
Cambodia.  However, Cambodia is not an ASEAN member at that time.  Therefore, it 
will be more difficult for ASEAN to intervene in a member country because agreement to 
accept the device of Troika is required by the target state.  Myanmar will be the test case 
for ASEAN Troika and ASEAN Way itself.455 Bowing to the immense pressure given by 
fellow ASEAN members as well as international community, Myanmar decided in mid-
2005 to relinquish its rotating chairmanship of the ASEAN for 2006. By employing all 
possible means to achieve the political reform in Myanmar, the ASEAN should engineer 
itself to find the best approach in dealing with its most intransigent member of the group 
in near future. 
 
4.2.4 East Timor Crisis and the ASEAN 
 
ASEAN’s response to the East Timor crisis in 1999 raised serious questions about the 
capacity of ASEAN for effective preventive diplomacy in solving the intraregional and 
intrastate conflicts. It revealed a severe testing of the ASEAN way of conflict 
management and also intensified the damage to the credibility of the ASEAN.  As 
Sebastian and Smith remarked, ‘East Timor became ASEAN’s millstone when the 
Association failed to speak up and stop the rampage.’456  More important is that initial 
failures of the key ASEAN member-states to respond early and collectively to the 
bloodshed in East Timor have not only cost the Association’s international standing but 
also stipulated the external powers like Australia to manage the problem of regional order 
in Southeast Asia.457  
 
Geographically, East Timor is half of a small mountainous tropical island in the 
Indonesian archipelago, about 400 miles north of Australia.  Historically, first settled by 
the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, the island was divided in 1859, with Portugal 
taking the eastern half and the Dutch the western. While the Dutch pulled out soon after 
the Second World War, leaving West Timor to Indonesia, the Portuguese remained in the 
east. After centuries of Portuguese rule, the 800,000 people of East Timor, though 
ethnically similar, were distinguished from the West Timorese by their strong 
Catholicism and their use of the Portuguese language. With the overthrow of fascism in 
Portugal in 1974 by the Armed Forces’ Movement, East Timor’s independence became 
an issue and Portugal made it clear that it would no longer rule the colony.  Seizing the 
opportunity of power vacuum, Indonesia stepped up preparations for a full-scale invasion 
of East Timor and duly annexed in December 1975.  From that period until 1999, East 
Timorese resistance carried on and almost one-third of the population died under the iron 
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fist rule of the Indonesia.458  During the period of Indonesian occupation of East Timor, 
ASEAN countries generally supported Indonesia for its claims to the tiny island state and 
regarded the issue as an internal affair of Indonesia in compliance with the norms of the 
ASEAN.   
 
After the fall of Indonesia’s dictator General Suharto, his successor President B. J. 
Habibie offered to let the United Nations organize a referendum in East Timor allowing 
East Timorese to vote on whether they wish to establish an independent state or to remain 
within Indonesia. Indonesian military leaders were unwilling and unhappy for such a kind 
of offer.  A UN supervised referendum on this issue was held on 30 August 1999.  
Indonesian military paid local Timorese to join armed militias for collaborating with the 
army in support of the anti-independence side. In a ruthless campaign of violence and 
intimidation, they first tried to influence the result of the UN referendum and then 
launched a frenzy of terrorism when voters chose in favour of independence. In five 
months of excessive destruction in 1999, troops and militias looted and torched tens of 
thousands of private homes and public buildings, smashing electricity generators and 
sabotaging or stealing equipment. Eighty-five percent of the country’s schools and three-
quarters of its health infrastructure were destroyed.459  The situation of brutal killings and 
massive violations of human rights called for the international condemnation and finally 
the Indonesian government conceded to accept the intervention of the UN peacekeeping 
force. 
Meanwhile members of the ASEAN were reluctant to spearhead the multinational 
peacekeeping force to stop the violence that was unleashed by the pro-Jakarta militia and 
ensure that the wishes of the people of East Timor were implemented, partly because they 
did not want antagonise the big brother in the region whose active involvement and 
support is indispensable for the very existence of ASEAN. The ASEAN’s genesis and 
survival since 1967 have been predicated on the informal cardinal principle of non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs. Like in so many occasions in the past, 
ASEAN once again lost a golden opportunity to take the lead in sending a multinational 
force under UN auspices. This underscores the strong signal to the outside world that 
ASEAN was incapable of managing the affairs of Southeast Asia.460 
Therefore events in 1999 created dilemmas for ASEAN with regard to the East Timor 
crisis.  ASEAN continued its support for Indonesia for various reasons.  Most of ASEAN 
members were afraid of the success story from the case of East Timor’s claim for 
independence will lead to the disintegration of Indonesia and will also encourage 
secession movements in other ASEAN countries.  They also concerned about the possible 
refugees outflows to neighbouring states which can instigate regional instability.  After 
the NATO’s bombings in Yugoslavia in 1999, ASEAN was also very sceptical that 
Western states are using human rights concerns as a pretext for external intervention in 
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the affairs of the third world developing countries.  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad was the most outspoken in this kind of scepticism and he also accused the 
West for its duplicitous use of intervention on the grounds of human rights violations.  
The major concern was who would determine when the use of force against a sovereign 
state was justified and such a view was generally accepted in the region.461  He argued 
that that humanitarian intervention could wholly undermine the region’s principle of non-
intervention and weaken political and social cohesion and empowering the Western 
countries to call into question the legitimacy of governments and regimes which disagree 
with them.462 
 
When plans for the establishment of an international peacekeeping force under Australian 
command were underway, Indonesia set the conditions to have troops from other ASEAN 
states joining the force with the apparent purpose of minimizing Australian control.  
Some ASEAN members like Thailand and Malaysia showed their interest to contribute 
some troops if the UN approved its mandate.  The International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET) was formed and authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  It 
became later United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to 
which some ASEAN members like Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore 
have contributed civilian and military personnel.   
 
The new members of the ASEAN didn’t provide any logistic or military assistance to 
UN-sponsored East Timor operations.  At this case, it can be apparently seen that 
ASEAN was divided on this issue of UN-mandated intervention.  Myanmar opposed 
advertently to any external intervention not only in East Timor but the whole of Southeast 
Asia while Vietnam was also unwilling for supporting any role of UN intervention in the 
region.  As Haacke remarked, “the participation of ASEAN members in an intervention 
force clearly marked a significant moment in the evolution of the ‘ASEAN Way’ even if 
it is important to recognize that only some ASEAN members participated, and even then 
only as individual states”.463 
 
In reality, the participation of ASEAN states in the UN-led peacekeeping force has 
several underlying reasons.  First of all, they wanted to rescue the abrupt downfall of 
Indonesia’s international standing which would also affect directly to the reputation and 
image of the ASEAN itself.  The Nation newspaper of Thailand reminded that any 
treatment to Indonesia as a pariah state would greatly damage a wounded ASEAN which 
has been trying to recoup its losses since the admission of Myanmar two years ago.464  
Secondly, they would like to demonstrate a measure of solidarity with Indonesia by 
participating in the force which was led by Australia as the external power and to show 
the potent capacity of addressing regional problems on their own terms. Thai Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra desperately called for the immediate action 
against the external intervention by saying “We in ASEAN have been saying since 1971 
                                                 
461 Narine (2002): “Explaining ASEAN”, pp. 172-173. 
462 Alan Dupont (2000): “ASEAN’s response to the East Timor Crisis”, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 54, no.2, p. 165.147 
463 Haacke (2003): “ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture”, p. 68. 
464 K. Chongkittavorn (1999): “ASEAN peace-keepers must go to Timor”, The Nation, 13 September. 
  
 
158
that we want the region to be free from outside interference.  Now a problem has arisen 
that can lead to outside interference in regional affairs.  So we must do something about 
it.  We cannot logically stand still and do nothing – we must put our words into 
action”.465  Thirdly, some of participating countries had their own visions in the context 
of intra-ASEAN regional politics.  For example, Thailand and the Philippines, the most 
ardent supporters for changing version of ASEAN Way, were the members of the 
ASEAN who sent larger numbers of contingent to East Timor.  Thai government also had 
the aim of playing as an important regional actor by actively committing for peaceful 
solutions of conflicts in Southeast Asia.  For these reasons, Thailand not only contributed 
the largest number of troops apart from Australia but also assumed the responsibility of 
deputy commander of the INTERFET. 
 
Even though some ASEAN countries sent their troops to participate in the INTERFET, 
none of these governments believed that such participation will set a new norm of 
humanitarian intervention as a transformation in the ASEAN Way.  Rather they worried 
for the outsiders’ interference in regional affairs at the expense of surrendering their 
sovereignties and therefore took actions by themselves in collaborative way with UN and 
Australia.  In spite of the fact that Thai government supported a more proactive role of 
the ASEAN in regional affairs, it also questioned about the capacity of the ASEAN to 
pursue the new norm of intervention without having the assistance of major powers or 
consent from the UN.466  Like then Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid 
Albar said, Kuala Lumpur was wary of new concepts which might compromise 
sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism.467  Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas also suggested that any new norm of humanitarian intervention should be based on 
the principles of legitimacy and universal applicability.468  The Philippines, another 
country which supported the intervention, also stated two conditions for humanitarian 
intervention: first, a UN Security Council resolution and, second, an invitation from the 
country to be intervened in.469 
 
ASEAN countries rebuked with strong resentment to the assertive claim of Australia to 
manage regional order in Southeast Asia when Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
formulated his so-called Howard Doctrine, which envisioned a more proprietary role for 
Australia to act as America’s deputy in the regional affairs.  Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi said that there is no need for any country to play as a leader, 
commander or deputy for this region.  Concurrently it also reflected the reluctance among 
ASEAN countries for supporting humanitarian intervention and the development of a 
peacekeeping force in the region even if mandated by the United Nations.  In this context, 
ASEAN countries have been careful not to aggravate Indonesian government further.  
For instance, the Philippines voted against the UN Human Rights Commission resolution 
whether to launch an international inquiry into human rights violations and brutal 
atrocities committed by Indonesian Army and militia men in East Timor (though the 
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resolution was passed).  Manila explained to justify its vote by claiming that it followed 
the ASEAN policy of non-interference in other members’ internal affairs.470 
 
In sum, East Timor reveals the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention for ASEAN.  Its 
case was widely regarded among ASEAN members as a special case and not as a 
precedent for the resolution of intrastate conflicts in Southeast Asia notwithstanding that 
some member states contributed troops and participated in INTERFET and UNTAET.  It 
can be argued that ASEAN is still far away from the undertaking of collective 
responsibility on its own for managing a regional conflict through the norm of 
humanitarian intervention.471 The ineffectiveness in handling the crisis and paralysis over 
East Timor have further reduced the credibility of ASEAN in its leading role in the ARF 
(ASEAN Regional Forum).  It highlighted the notion that external powers like Australia 
were able to interfere at a time for enforcing the regional order and security.  The 
situation may also have encouraged China to test its influence in the region and insert 
dominance of its foreign policy.  Indeed, ASEAN countries are not able to accept such a 
precedent that allowing intervention into one member state invites intervention into all.472  
The problems was that ASEAN’s fixation with keeping a tone of unity and avoiding to 
offend one another has made itself incapable to take decisive action in such a regional 
crisis.  Still, ASEAN will need to find a way for taking a more proactive approach for 
resolving future crises.  Otherwise, it may well suit for external powers intervening again 
in regional affairs and the ASEAN will be itself falling into the category of irrelevance. 
 
 
4.2.5 ASEAN Way and Non-Interference Policy 
 
The weak socio-political cohesion of the region’s new nation-states, the legitimacy 
problems of several of the region’s postcolonial governments, interstate territorial 
disputes, intra-regional ideological polarization and intervention by external powers were 
marked features of the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. These conflicts posed a 
threat not only to the survival of some of the region’s new states, but also to the prospects 
for regional order as a whole. Some critics pointed to the persistence of intra-ASEAN 
disputes and ASEAN’s failure to develop concrete institutional mechanisms and 
procedures for conflict resolution.473 
       
ASEAN was the institutional product of regional conflict resolution or more precisely 
conflict management. The institutional form chosen by ASEAN’s members was strictly 
intergovernmental and informal. Its founding document was a multilateral declaration 
and not a treaty nor was it a legal regime embodying a commitment to some form of 
political integration. ASEAN’s institutions developed slowly; a modest increase in 
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obligation and precision was not accompanied by any increase in delegation from 
member states to the organization, however.474 
       
The institutional design and procedures of ASEAN − the ASEAN way − are normally 
described as starkly different from the formal legalism of most Western international 
institutions. Relations among ASEAN’s members emphasize “informality rather than a 
legalistic framework, adopting the principles of accommodation and consensus in 
decision making and non-interference in the domestic affairs of its members, and 
accommodating the needs of members at different levels of economic development.” 
Two principles lie the at core of ASEAN’s official ideology and standard operating 
procedures: musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus). These two terms are 
taken to characterize decision making in village society in Southeast Asian countries. The 
first defines a process of decision making that involves painstaking and lengthy 
discussion and consultation in which decisions emerge from the bottom up. That process 
aims to achieve eventual consensus − unanimity or near-unanimity − as a much-valued 
result. This alleged transfer of a domestic decision-making style (clearly informal and 
antilegal ) to international negotiation implies a strong cultural components in the choice 
of international institution, at least in the rhetoric of ASEAN’s members.475 
       
ASEAN’s tendency to deal with intra-mural conflicts by ‘sweeping them under the 
carpet’, rather than resolving them, and its slow pace and modest record in developing 
economic cooperation, could be cited as further testimony to the limitations of the 
ASEAN Way. Moreover, in the late 1990s, ASEAN had been criticized for not dealing 
effectively with human rights issues, or transnational problems such as the forest fires in 
Indonesia that have caused severe air pollution among neighbouring states. In the wake of 
the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN’s critics have also highlighted its inability to provide 
a united front in dealing with the challenges of globalization. Intra-ASEAN differences 
over long-standing norms such as non-interference, evident in the wake of the expansion 
its membership to include all ten countries of Southeast Asia, have aggravated 
perceptions of ASEAN’s weaknesses. The ASEAN Way of soft institutionalism and 
dialogue process seemed ineffective in laying the foundations of an Asia Pacific regional 
order.476 In short, the ASEAN, one of the most successful regional organizations in 
developing world after its three decades of existence, now needs to reassess its 
institutional structure and formulate appropriate transformation to be in conformity with 
the new challenges and opportunities arising in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
 
4.3 ASEAN: Understanding policy processes and political cultures in Southeast Asia 
 
The origins of the ASEAN cannot be understood without examining the history of 
Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in the pre-colonial period was occupied with internal 
conflicts among its countries with each other and interference of external powers. 
Geographical locations made communication difficult between the states of the region. 
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However, there were interactions between the divergent parts of the region and it could 
even be argued that there were the beginnings of a weak sense of regional community.477 
       
Regional societies in Southeast Asian countries were heavily influenced by Indian and 
Chinese cultures. European colonialism also strengthened divisions within the region by 
orienting the colonized states toward their colonizers. After the Second World War, many 
Southeast Asian countries regained their independence and returned to normal status to 
overcome many barriers for a sense of regional identity. The experience of colonialism 
deeply affected the Southeast Asian countries in their perception of regionalism and to 
external environment. More or less differing degrees, many leaders of Southeast Asian 
countries view the international system as predatory, with powerful states waiting to 
exploit the internal weaknesses of weaker states. The suspicion and concerns of Southeast 
Asian states to external powers overwhelmingly prevail through out the Cold War period. 
This perception of external threat played a crucial role in shaping and building of a 
regional community in Southeast Asia.478 Therefore, predominate mode of political 
culture in Southeast Asian countries can be simply described as the overcautious dealing 
with external threats to their national security whereas accommodating with major 
powers for their survival.       
 
The policy process in the ASEAN is the pure product of competition and cooperation 
between member countries, which are firmly in the driver seats of decision-making. 
Supranational institutional structure is very fragile and the ASEAN is very loosely 
institutionalized comparing with the EU. Almost all of decision-making patterns in the 
ASEAN are clearly intergovernmental and formal rule and procedures taken place at the 
highest level of the member state governments. However, there are multiple issues 
embedded in the policy process and it occurs sometimes conflict of interests among 
member countries in dominating policy agenda of the ASEAN to benefit for their 
national interests. 
       
It can be argued that the concept of an ASEAN identity was to be derived substantively 
from its socialization process while identity is normally thought of originating from its 
traditional cultural heritage. The ASEAN Way itself stemmed not so much from 
preordained cultural sources like Javanese or other else but from incremental 
socialization. It emerged not merely from the principles of interstate relations agreed to 
by the founders of the ASEAN, but also from a subsequent and long-term process of 
interaction and adjustment. Hence, in the case of ASEAN, it is evident that culture 
created norms and norms also created culture. Then Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Badawi pointed out that ASEAN’s norms have become very much part of the 
ASEAN culture.479 
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) was founded in 1967 to 
“accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the 
region” and to “promote regional peace and security.” The founding countries of the 
ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.480 At its 
inception, the ASEAN was an association based upon the political motivation to present a 
united front to the perceived threat of communist expansionism based in Indochina. At 
that time, a co-ordinated response to communist underground movements posing similar 
threats to their existing governments and social systems was seen as necessary for their 
survival. It was the means to prevent states being picked off one by one as predicted by 
the then generally accepted ‘Domino Theory’. Brunei acceded in 1984 and later Vietnam 
in 1995. The latter’s membership finally put an end to the ‘communist threat’ chapter of 
ASEAN’s history. With that hurdle cleared, the way was opened for the membership of 
Laos and Myanmar in 1997. At least, war-torn Cambodia became the last and 10th 
member state of the ASEAN in 1999.481  
             
The inclusion of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia into the ASEAN represents a 
marked enlargement in the type of state within the organization and fulfils the long-term 
objective of the ASEAN founding fathers – to represent as an effective regional 
integrative organ for the whole region of Southeast Asia and to transform from ASEAN 6 
to ASEAN 10. This integration can be labelled as the unity in diversity. It is because its 
member states are quite variant in their political and economic structures. ASEAN is the 
combined organization of different political systems – democratic countries like 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand together with communist centralized 
governments of Laos and Vietnam as well as autocratic ruling machinery running 
countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Cambodia and also one military dictatorship land 
like Myanmar and finally feudal monarchical Brunei. 
             
Looking behind to the historical development of the ASEAN, its founding Bangkok 
Declaration states the organization’s objectives as being practical cooperation in the 
‘common interest areas’ of economies, science and administration. The viability of this 
economic cooperation objective was at the time met with scepticism because the region 
lacked internal cohesion since its principal countries suffered from internal instability or 
were only nascent states. Several members of ASEAN were involved in territorial claims 
against one another and the instability of the external environment, primarily due to the 
Vietnam War, was not conducive to cooperation of the region.482 
             
In the 1970s economic growth within the region began to accelerate and economic 
concerns began to gain priority over politics. But up to the 1980s the ASEAN had 
achieved little economic integration. Its main role was, therefore, redefined: its new focus 
was on increasing economic cooperation and coordinating common economic interests. 
The ASEAN was not institutionalised and there was no creation of central organization 
whose policies were legally binding upon members. Some criticized the ASEAN as being 
distinguishable from other regional integrated organizations in that it is a flexible 
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agreement. This flexibility reflects the preferences of its members. It can be characterized 
as a loosely connected association based upon decentralized and consensus decision-
making. The sovereignty and independence of each member are respected. The ASEAN 
did not emulate the western concept of regionalism based on certain rules and regulations 
for integration; instead, a ‘club of principles’ was constructed which encompassing broad 
standards of behaviour under a relatively weak system of monitoring and enforcement.483 
             
Recently the ASEAN has successfully lowered some of the tariff and trade barriers that 
existed between its member states, but as is the case with all integrated organizations, 
demands for national sovereignty have lessened the effectiveness of the ASEAN. This 
was well-demonstrated in 1992 when the leaders of the ASEAN agreed to form a free 
trade area known as AFTA (the ASEAN Free Trade Area), but because of concerns over 
national sovereignty and domestic politics, decide not to implement it for 15 years. Thus, 
even in the absence of great power rivalry, the functioning of an integrated regional 
organization has been impaired by states’ claims for sovereignty. On the other hand, 
unlike other integrated organs, the ASEAN only rarely has been accused of being a tool 
used by one of its members to achieve a national objective.484 Compared with newly 
admitted member states to old members of the ASEAN, it exhibits broad differences in 
levels of development, population, economic organization, development strategies, 
resource endowments and political institutions. However, their combined strength 
presents a dynamic force in the Asian economy.485 
             
Some kind of disagreements exists about the degree to which ASEAN policies served as 
the catalyst that fuelled the region’s impressive economic growth during the 1970s and 
1980s. Although some opponents of the ASEAN assert that the organization played little 
or no role, whereas the ASEAN supporters claim that it played a major role in regional 
affairs. At a minimum, it appears that the ASEAN did help establish a climate of 
confidence about the region that helped attract external investment to Southeast Asia. 
This was an impressive achievement, especially because it came on the heels of the U.S. 
defeat in Vietnam when confidence in the stability of the region was at low ebb. ASEAN 
states also played a significant role in bringing about Vietnam’s 1989 withdrawal from 
Cambodia. At that time, the six ASEAN countries presented the Vietnamese with a 
relatively unified non-communist Southeast Asian perspective on the conflict, and they 
worked behind the scenes to set up conditions to aid the Vietnamese withdrawal.486  
             
Despite its successes, all is not perfect within ASEAN. Some ASEAN states have 
occasionally expressed concern about the intention of their fellow members. For 
example, before Vietnam joined ASEAN, Indonesia expressed concern that Thailand 
wanted to use the organization as a tool to provide its security from Vietnam. Similarly, 
despite Vietnam’s political and economic reforms that have moved it away from 
doctrinaire communist practices, some quarters in ASEAN remain concerned that 
Vietnam’s different political, economic, and social structures could worsen strains within 
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ASEAN. And most ASEAN states are concerned that Indonesia’s sheer size will allow it 
to dominate ASEAN.487 The ASEAN, whose economic success was once the envy of the 
world, is struggling to lure back foreign investment which has largely been going to the 
Northeast Asia. Even among ASEAN members, investment has spread unevenly with 
Singapore and Malaysia receiving most of its shares while countries such as Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia languishing on the sidelines. 
             
After decades of presenting a public face of solidarity, the ASEAN is grappling with a 
number of internal disputes, including how to deal with military-ruled Myanmar and 
differences over reducing trade barriers. The most striking one is the problem arising 
after the admission of Myanmar into the organization. The military regime of Myanmar 
has been sharply criticized by the West for denying political rights to pro-democracy 
opposition party and its overwhelming victory in 1990 general election. This junta is also 
being severely denounced for its violation of human rights and the continuation of 
practices about forced labour within the country. Even within its orbit, some ASEAN 
members are also unease and suspicious about Myanmar’s participation in the 
organization. Some analysts regard that Myanmar tried to refrain the political pressure 
from the Western powers by activating under the integrated shield of the ASEAN.  
            
Whatsoever, Myanmar issue also jeopardized ASEAN’s relationship with the EU. 
Myanmar’s dilemma about its political stalemate has begun to poison ASEAN’s relations 
with the EU, not merely complicated it. According to its records, the EU was the 
ASEAN’s second largest export market and the 3rd largest trading partner after Japan and 
the United States. EU exports to ASEAN were estimated at US$ 45.7 billion in 1997, up 
from US$8.9 billion in 1987. EU imports from ASEAN were valued at US$ 46 billion in 
1997, demonstrating a balanced EU-ASEAN trade. But after the 1997 financial crisis, 
European exports to ASEAN decreased by 40% in 1998 producing a US$ 21 billion 
deficit for Europe, a trend that has continued until low.488 The turnout also clearly 
illustrated the chilly relations between the two integrated blocs since the ASEAN 
admitted Myanmar’s membership in 1997, shortly before the region was battered by the 
economic crisis of 1997. 
              
It will be an interesting question why the ASEAN accepted Myanmar as one of its 
member states although there were rising objection from the Western democratic powers 
for its admittance. There is no attractive incentive from Myanmar for the ASEAN in 
economic and political aspects. In its history, Myanmar persistently exercised a strict 
isolation policy from the world economy. Present military dominated government has 
also been unable to formulate a consistent development strategy for the country. 
However, some leading countries of the ASEAN especially Malaysia and Indonesia 
strongly advocated Myanmar’s membership to the organization. Their main reason is to 
create the association with the participation of all Southeast Asian countries for 
implementing effective cooperation in the region and representing with one common 
voice of the ASEAN 10 in the international arena. They also argued that some political 
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and economic issues can be resolved through the constructive engagement after 
integration. 
              
Latest developments about the ASEAN’s reconciliation attempts with the relations to the 
EU occurred on the 13th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting held in December, 2000 in 
Laos. At this meeting, the EU insisted to continue its pressure on the ASEAN to shift its 
stance on Myanmar. Although the ASEAN has a code of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member states, some member countries notably Thailand and the Philippines to 
some extent, are becoming frustrated by the impact of Myanmar’s membership in the 
organization. These ministers from both organs reviewed the ASEAN-EU relations and 
agreed to enhance and deepen the existing cooperation to the mutual benefit of the 
ASEAN and the EU and all their peoples. They also committed themselves to promote 
and protect all human rights, including the right to development, and fundamental 
freedoms. As a remarkable achievement of this meeting, the intransigent military 
government of Myanmar bowed to the pressure and agreed to make a dialogue with the 
opposition political party for future compromise. 
              
In spite of its economic discrepancies and some internal problems, the cohesive strength 
of the ASEAN 10 should be acknowledged as a synergic force in Asia as well as in the 
world politically and economically. To be more effective and efficient in its 
multifunctional aspects, the predominant issue of the ASEAN will be how to reconcile 
itself, its positions and its role with the ever-changing global economy, particularly after 
the Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997. In the past, the economic growth of the 
ASEAN was the outcome of good management upon its resource endowments, good 
fiscal discipline and the outward-orientated economic policy and development strategy of 
the ASEAN 6. To rebuild such a kind of prosperity in future, the ASEAN and its 
participating member states will be necessary to redefine their policy focus and agenda 
for further development. In order to strive with the evolution of the Asia-Pacific region 
and repercussions of the globalization, the ASEAN must develop a ‘multi-dimension 
faceted and outward oriented economic and political strategy. Otherwise, the region will 
not be resilient enough and will be increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks and its 
impacts occurred in the global economy. 
 
4.3.1 Behavioural Norms 
 
All of the states in the world rely on norms of behaviour, which are the basis of their 
actions to reach their own national interests. There are various definitions and functions 
of norms in scholarly presentation. According to a widely used definition, norms are 
‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’. The chief function of 
norms in this sense is to prescribe and proscribe behaviour. Norms help actors to 
distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour and ‘to coordinate expectations 
and decrease uncertainty, to influence decision making, and to legitimate their actions 
and the actions of others’. Norms contribute to international order by forbidding actions, 
which are subversive of collective goals, by providing a framework for dispute 
settlement, and by creating the basis for cooperative schemes and action for mutual 
benefit. Moreover, norms not only establish expectations about how particular actors will 
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behave, they also ‘teach’ states, which are exposed to norms, new interests and 
identities.489 
 
Norms have an independent effect on state behaviour, redefining state interests and 
creating collective interests and identities. This is key to understanding the constructivist 
claim that agents ( states ) and structures ( international norms ) are mutually reinforcing 
and mutually constituted.490 Norms help to coordinate values among states and societies. 
By making similar behavioural claims on different states, norms do create parallel 
patterns of behaviour among states over wide areas. This helps ensure that the principles 
and practice of peaceful conduct and war avoidance are shared among states and 
contribute to the development of a sense of community. Moreover, the existence of an 
integrated community implies that the norms of the given group of states have already 
had a constitutive effect, by transforming the identity of states from being that of egoistic 
and sovereignty-bound actors to members of a social group sharing a common habit of 
peaceful conduct.491      
       
In Southeast Asia, the norms that underpin ASEAN regionalism include both the legal-
rational and social-cultural variety − the two may be differentiated in terms of their 
primary sources. The most common sources of legal-rational norms in international 
relations are the universal principles of the Westphalian state system, which constitute the 
basis of modern international law. All international and regional organizations are based 
on the Westphalian norms of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, 
non-use of force in interstate relations and the pacific settlement of disputes. Socio-
cultural norms, on the other hand, are usually more specific to a group ( in the sense that 
they are more likely to reflect the historical and cultural milieu of the actors ), which may 
explain why they may be effective even as informal instruments.492  
       
As Michael Leifer pointed out, the origins of ASEAN were mainly concerned with the 
political and security role to be based on a common adherence to conventional 
international norms, which consists of respect for justice and the rule of law in the 
relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United 
Nations Charter.493 Distinct from these legal-rational norms, the ASEAN process was 
also distinguished by the principle of consensus, which has meant that policy initiatives 
can only arise on the basis of a common denominator. What enables the ASEAN 
members to assert the ‘unique’ character of their own brand of regionalism, especially 
when compared with the legal-rational institutionalism of Western regional institutions 
(such as the European Union), is not just their adherence to the legal norms of non-
interference and non-intervention, but the principle and practice of consensus that is 
‘justified with reference to a regional cultural style which has enthroned consensus as the 
modus operandi of the Association’.494 
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4.3.2 Identity Building 
 
For realism and most liberal theories, state interests are shaped by material forces and 
concerns, such as power and wealth; perceptual, ideational and cultural factors derive 
from a material base. According to constructivists, intersubjective factors, including 
ideas, culture and identities, play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign 
policy interactions. Like norms, collective identities can make and redefine state interests 
and move them beyond the logic of power politics. The collective identity of a social 
group, like the notion of culture, is not a given that is derived exclusively or even largely 
from fixed or preordained material sources. Identity is an intersubjective notion. Simply 
stated, it refers to the ‘basic character of states’. Identity formation entails developing a 
collective sense of not only ‘who we are’, but also ‘how we differ from others’. It also 
involves securing outside recognition of the community’s own distinctiveness.495   
       
Karl W. Deutsch viewed the development of integrated communities as an exercise in 
identity building, defined as ‘some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty’. He 
also pointed out that ‘identification’ as one of the instruments of integration, with 
‘identification’ being defined as ‘the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of 
mutual identification, loyalties, and ‘we’-feelings.’496 The construction of identity is 
central to the kind of ‘we feeling’ that Deutsch identified as a key factor of integrated 
communities. The notion of identity runs deep into the heart of constructivist approaches 
because of its central claim that the development of a collective identity can ameliorate 
the security dilemma among states.497 
       
Just as norms ‘are contested and made and remade through politics’, collective identities 
are made and remade through interactions and socialization, rather than being exogenous 
to those processes. For example, until recently, our understanding of the idea of ‘region’ 
relied heavily on such immutable or preordained features such as geographic proximity, a 
given physical location, cultural and linguistic similarities among the peoples, and a 
common historical experience. Today, there is a much greater tendency among scholars 
to define regions as imagined communities, created by processes of interaction and 
socialization which may lead to different conceptions of what constitutes a given region 
at different points of time.498 
       
The question of collective identity of a social grouping can be examined from several 
points of reference. One is to look at the overlapping ambit of the national identities of 
individual member states, and their respective constitutive norms. In the context of 
ASEAN, for example, this would mean ascertaining the compatibility and overlap 
between the national identity and preferred norms of one member country, say Thailand, 
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and those of another, say Myanmar. A second point of reference is the collective identity 
of a group taken as a whole, for example the notion of the ASEAN Way, which is 
developed through socialization and which forms the basis of its collective action. The 
two points of reference can reinforce each other, but may evolve separately. In other 
words, a group can develop an identity and approach of its own even if their national 
identities and constitutive norms remain different. The ASEAN Way, in other words, can 
develop and function despite differing kinds of national identity prevailing among its 
members.499                        
       
While there can be several indicators of collective identity, three are especially important. 
The first is a commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to place an expanding 
number of issues on the multilateral agenda which have been previously tackled through 
unilateral or bilateral channels. A second measure of collective identity is the 
development of security cooperation, including collective defence, collaboration against 
internal threats, collective security and cooperative security measures. Third, identity 
formation can be sensed from the boundaries and membership criteria of the group.500 
       
In this respect, ASEAN regionalism in general, and the expression ‘ASEAN Way’ in 
particular, may be viewed as a continuing process of identity building which relies upon 
conventional ‘modern’ principles of interstate relations as well as traditional and culture-
specific modes of socialisation and decision making prevalent in the region. The founders 
of ASEAN had little conception of a regional identity. But they clearly hoped to develop 
one through regional cooperation. ASEAN came to play a critical role not only in 
developing a sense of regional identity, but also laying down the boundaries of Southeast 
Asia as a region. It drew upon the indigenous social, cultural and political traditions of ist 
members and borrowed, adapted and redefined principles and practices of cooperation 
from the outside world. Sometimes, supposedly foreign principles and models of 
regionalism, after having been rejected for lacking ‘relevance’ in the Southeast Asian 
context, have been subsequently incorporated into the ASEAN framework after being 
redefined and adjusted so as to conform to the needs and aspirations of ASEAN’s 
member.501  
       
Moreover, the supposedly cultural underpinnings of ASEAN regionalism have been 
developed and refined in a self-conscious way through years of interaction since 
ASEAN’s formation. All these remain very much part of an ongoing process. ASEAN 
regionalism began without a discernible and pre-existing sense of collective identity 
among the founding members, notwithstanding some important cultural similarities 
among them. Whether such an identity has developed after more than thirty years of 
interaction is debatable. But this should not detract from the serious nature of the efforts 
by ASEAN members to overcome their security dilemma and establish a security 
community through the development of norms and the construction of an ASEAN 
identity that would be constitutive of their interests.502 
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4.3.3 Characteristic features of ASEAN Policy Processes 
 
Characteristic features of ASEAN policy can be derived from its organizational set up, its 
decision-making procedures, and its limited institutionalization. ASEAN was created 
with a relatively loose institutional structure. The Annual Minister Meeting (AMM) of 
the ASEAN foreign ministers can be called the organization’s main decision-making 
body. The AMM was further supported by ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), which 
handled the daily affairs of the organization. The ASC rotated between members annually 
and was chaired by the foreign minister of the host nation and comprised of the 
ambassadors of the respective ASEAN states stationed in the host nation. ASEAN 
National Secretariats were created as part of the Foreign Ministries of the ASEAN 
countries.503 After the Bali Summit in 1976, the ASEAN was restructured and 
reorganized structure has the following features: 
 
(1) ASEAN Summit Meeting (ASM) is the supreme decision-making body of the 
ASEAN. Up to 2002, there have been eight ASMs since 1976 when the first 
ASM was held in Bali. 
(2) The AMM is the de facto governing body of ASEAN and is held regularly once a 
year in the capital cities of the member countries in alphabetical and rotational 
order. The AMM is the highest decision-making body for ASEAN to formulate 
policy matters for all forms of intra-regional cooperation, the coordination of 
policy implementation and also to make final decisions on proposals submitted 
by the Standing Committee (SC). In addition to the SC, the AMM is also 
supported by a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), which is made up of senior 
officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member countries. The Post 
Ministerial Conference (PMC) is held immediately after the AMM and it is the 
most important forum for consultation with ASEAN’s dialogue partners, which 
comprise the foreign Ministers of ASEAN and all dialogue partners. 
(3) ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEMM) was instituted in 1976 to manage 
regular meetings and activities relating to ASEAN economic matters. The 
AEMM is responsible for formulating policy guidelines; accelerating ASEAN 
economic cooperation; monitoring and reviewing previously agreed projects; and 
consultations between member states regarding economic cooperation. The 
meetings are held every six months or on ad hoc basis. 
(4) The Meeting of Other Ministers, which was established after 1976, is a forum for 
the ministers to formulate policies and accelerate activities on matters other than 
economic.  
(5) A Standing Committee (SC) was created to carry out the day-to-day business of 
the ASEAN and to follow up on the projects agreed upon at annual AMMs. 
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(6) The ASEAN Secretariat takes direct responsibilities for all matters directed to it 
by AMM and SC. The Secretary-General has held the rank of minister since the 
Summit Meeting in 1992.504  
 
The ASEAN’s tendency to limit institutionalization has been evident in its informality of 
decision-making and aversion to formal institutions. The ASEAN Way is featured by the 
concept and practice of consensus building. Consensus building is a common 
characteristic of decision-making in the ASEAN and its origin traced back to a particular 
style of decision-making within Javanese village society. This process has two 
intertwined components: musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus). The 
principle of consensus in decision-making is a safety device to ensure member states that 
their national interests will not be compromised and nothing will be done against their 
will. In this sense, the ASEAN Way may be portrayed as a pragmatic and highly 
deliberate attempt to gloss over national differences that could not be reconciled within a 
multilateral regional framework.505 
 
 
4.3.4 Determining Factors of ASEAN policy processes: National or Community 
Interest? 
 
The ASEAN is the basic foundation of a meaningful regional identity in Southeast Asia. 
However, that identity is not shared equally by all of the member states because the level 
of commitment to the ASEAN identity differs from one country to another. This 
differentiation reflects both circumstances of individual member states and the level of 
socialization to ASEAN that a state has undergone.506 At this stage, it should be 
questioned which factor is more important in determining ASEAN policy processes: 
national interest or community priority? The answer is simple: ASEAN is highly 
intergovernmental regional organization and that’s why most of policy processes 
emphasize for enhancing national interests of individual member states instead of giving 
priority to regional community building. 
       
ASEAN’s fundamental norms are aimed for protecting and fostering the sovereignty of 
its members. Sovereignty is again the foundation on which ASEAN is constructed, is the 
generative institution from which all of other norms and practices of the ASEAN derives. 
In other words, it means that the ASEAN regional identity does not hinder the ASEAN 
states from putting narrow national interests above regional community interests. Even 
though ASEAN members have adopted organization’s norms, a strong sense of regional 
community is not the inevitable result. Therefore, common interests and objectives that 
are crucial to the formation of a strong regional institution are often missing in the 
ASEAN.507       
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4.3.5 Policy Variances in the ASEAN 
 
Different policies vary in the ASEAN along the lines of different forms of regional 
cooperation namely; political and security cooperation; economic cooperation and finally 
functional cooperation. ASEAN’s political and economic cooperation significantly 
improved after the fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992 in Singapore. Indeed, ASEAN was 
formed to bring about regional reconciliation after the end of the Indonesian 
confrontation with Malaysia. The main idea was for regional states to put aside their 
quarrels, improve the atmosphere and substance of regional relations, and focus on 
economic development.508 In addition, the ASEAN played a crucial role in resolving 
Cambodia’s conflict during the period from 1979 to 1991. In terms of political 
cooperation, it can be argued that the major achievement of the ASEAN is the avoidance 
of conflict and improvement of political relations among and between member states. 
Peace between member states enables them to focus their energies and resources on 
economic and social development. Economic cooperation of the ASEAN is wide-ranging 
and covers many areas like trade, investment, food, agriculture, forestry, transport and 
communications, tourism and etc. Functional cooperation of the ASEAN includes areas 
like culture and information, environmental protection, rural development and poverty, 
science and technology, social development, and the ASEAN University Network. The 
ASEAN’s functional cooperation has always been overshadowed by its political, security 
and economic cooperation. It is expected that the ASEAN will have more active 
cooperation in functional areas in near future although it is still not yet a priority 
comparing with political, security and economic arenas.509 
 
 
4.3.6 ASEANization as a Precondition for successful regional integration 
 
Deriving from the communicative approach, the concept of ASEANization can be best 
understood both as a milieu-goal and a struggle for the full respect of the ASEAN and its 
member states’ identities by great powers. Regarding with the first point, the recognition 
by the regional powers of principles and norms of international society such as 
sovereignty, non-intervention, non-interference, the peaceful settlement of conflict 
provide and guarantee a better chance to strengthen national resilience, and thus to 
safeguard ASEAN members’ security, political independence and political autonomy. 
For example, the historic proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) represented such a political rather than strictly legal initiative. Likewise, 
successful economic and social development would also enhance the legitimacy of 
regimes and reinforce national resilience. Certainly, ASEAN’s attempts to extend its 
diplomatic and security culture to the wider Asia represents a scale of endeavour to win 
full recognition of its standings as a successful diplomatic community. The everlasting 
desire for recognition of ASEAN form of regionalism, its way of crisis management like 
ASEAN Way, members’ identity though different political and economic systems and 
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respect from major powers has been strengthened by the impressive economic growth 
patterns most ASEAN economies achieved in the 1980s and early 1990s. It has been 
becoming a yardstick of the ASEAN for assessing the true extent of the recognition it 
earned for its role in regional politics by the way how much it can draw regional powers 
into its orbit of ASEAN-proposed institutional and normative frameworks.510 
       
ASEAN still lacks internal progress in its management of ASEANization among its 
member states. ASEAN is quite successful in engaging with major powers by 
participating in regional forums like ASEAN plus Three (APT), ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). However, the ASEAN still lagged 
far behind in its own management of adaptation and imposing positive changes on its 
member states, that is, no progress of internal ASEANization. It has achieved to some 
extent in external dimension for imposing ASEANization on non-member states like the 
US, the EU, three powers of East Asia: Japan, China and Korea to join several regional 
forums in which the ASEAN is acting like a prime mover. However, the ASEAN itself 
couldn’t manage to reconcile and transform some less progressed member countries for 
positive changes in recent years. The vivid example is the ASEAN’s encounter with the 
uncompromising member state: Myanmar. 
 
Having said that, the ASEAN has indeed partially achieved ASEANizing regional order 
in East Asia. The use of force to settle unresolved territorial conflicts has been largely 
averted and further delegitimized. Moreover, ASEAN has managed to extend some of the 
principles of its own intramural model of political and security cooperation to regional 
institutions like ARF or APT. However, a full extent of successful ASEANization 
process in regional matters will still need tacit understanding and consent from major 
powers like the US or China in settling multilateral issues. Therefore, it is still difficult to 
conclude how it will turn out with the process of ASEANizing regional order in East Asia 
in the period of new century.511 
 
 
4.3.7 Unity in diversity alias a mere regional group of heterogeneous entities 
 
ASEAN was founded on 8th August, 1967 in Bangkok by five non-communist Southeast 
Asian countries namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
Their founding motto is an impressive one: to “accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress, and cultural development in the region” and to “promote regional peace and 
security”.  Since its establishment from 1967, the ASEAN invited all of the remaining 
countries in the region to join the Association.  However, it was almost impossible to 
achieve this ambitious goal due to the Indochina conflict which directly affected to 
Vietnam and Laos and at the time Myanmar (previously known as Burma) and Cambodia 
were members of the Non-aligned movement so afraid to participate in the ASEAN 
(which was informally known as Pro-West and anti-Communist organization in the 
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region) at the cost of their neutral posture.  Brunei joined the ASEAN in 1984.  
Henceforth the decade long ambition was successfully implemented only after the end of 
the Cold War and countries that stood outside the orbit of the ASEAN finally joined the 
Association: Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 
respectively. 
 
The inclusion of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia into the ASEAN represents a 
distinct enlargement in the type of states within the organization and fulfils the long-term 
objective of the ASEAN founding fathers – to represent as an effective regional 
integrative organ for the whole region of Southeast Asia and to transform from ASEAN 6 
to ASEAN 10. This kind of combination can be labelled as the ‘unity in diversity’ since it 
is a project to be implemented in a region of heterogeneous entities. It is because its 
member states are very diverse in their political and economic structures. ASEAN is the 
combined organization of different political systems – democratic countries like the 
Philippines and Thailand together with communist centralized governments of Laos and 
Vietnam as well as semi-democratic or autocratic ruling machinery running countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Cambodia and also one military dictatorship country 
like Myanmar and finally traditional form of monarchical government in Brunei.512  
Indeed, the general scene of Southeast Asia at the outset of ASEAN formation was 
deeply divided in many ways and not conducive to effective regional cooperation.  
Therefore, the viability of the ASEAN at its inception was largely doubted.513 
 
After Cambodia became the tenth member country of the ASEAN in April 1999, the 
long-term objective of the ASEAN founding members to encompass the whole region of 
Southeast Asia into the circle of organization was finally fulfilled before the end of the 
twentieth century.  Nevertheless, this fulfilment of long-term objective also leads to new 
challenges that the ASEAN must address for its compatibility with the new century.  Due 
to vast differences in political, economic and institutional development of the new 
members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam: CLMV) comparing with the old 
members: ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), the enlargement of the ASEAN will have major political and economic 
impacts and implications for both sides.514 
 
After the enlargement, ASEAN-10 economies are widely varied in their categories.  It 
consists of 4 High-Performing-Asian Economies (HPAEs) namely Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia (World Bank’s dubbing before the Asian financial crisis), 3 Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, together oil-rich small 
sultanate of Brunei and two other developing countries namely the Philippines and 
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Vietnam.  The economies of the new ASEAN members are much smaller compared with 
the older ones, although Vietnam has larger gross domestic product (GDP) than Brunei, 
the smallest economy in the ASEAN-6.  In 2000, GDP of Vietnam, the largest of the new 
members, was US$31.3 Billion, compared with that of the Philippines, the smallest of the 
ASEAN-5, which was US$75.9 Billion (see Table 4).   
 
GDP of Laos was only US$1.7 Billion in year 2000, which was the lowest among 
ASEAN-10.  Including new members, therefore, it increases the divergence and 
disparities of the size of the ASEAN economies.  Table (4) also shows the grave 
differences in per capita income between ASEAN-6 and CLMV countries.  Laos’s per 
capita income in 2001 was US$ 300, which was big less than half of Indonesia’s per 
capita and only one-seventh of Singapore. 
 
GDP growth rates of the ASEAN member countries were quite high compared with other 
developing countries as shown in Table (5).  As can be seen in Table (4), the average 
GDP growth rate of Malaysia, for example, was 8.7% from 1991 to 1996 before the 
Asian financial crisis and a deep low 3.2% from 1997 to 2002 after the crisis.   Data also 
showed Indonesia and Thailand are still struggling to recover from the hardships of the 
Asian financial crisis.  The growth rates of the new members were satisfactory although 
they were not as high as those of some old members before the Asian crisis but perform a 
lot better in the period after the crisis. 
 
While the sizes of the economies of CLMV countries are relatively small, their 
populations are not negligible.  Vietnam and Myanmar have a large number of 
populations like Thailand and Philippines.  The population in the ASEAN-10 is 39 
percent larger than the ASEAN-6, amounting to 527 Million populations.  Regarding the 
structure of production in the ASEAN economies, agriculture is the dominant sector 
among the new members.  In 2001, the share of agriculture in GDP is as high as 50.9% 
for Laos, 42.2% for Myanmar and 36.9% for Cambodia as shown in Table (6).  The share 
of agriculture in GDP in Vietnam was only 23.6% though it is still higher than those of 
the ASEAN-6.  Among the old members, the Philippines’ agricultural share to GDP 
makes up of 15.2%, the highest among ASEAN-6, followed up by Indonesia at 16.4% 
and Thailand 10% respectively. 
 
Looking into the selected social indicators, it shows that Vietnam has better scores of 
education and healthcare among new members.  Adult literacy rate in Vietnam was 94% 
in 1995, the same ratio as those of old members: the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Singapore.  Myanmar also has a high adult literacy rate.  Life expectancy at birth of Laos 
and Cambodia are lower than that of Myanmar and Vietnam.  From these indicators, one 
may conclude that Vietnam is not much different from some old members of the ASEAN 
while other new members are still lagging behind.  However, the infrastructure in 
Vietnam is much less developed comparing with ASEAN-6.515  At the same time new 
members are expected to continue moving towards greater economic openness, a process 
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encouraged by trade liberalisation through AFTA.  Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are 
poorest countries of Southeast Asia and have great difficulties in fulfilling their ASEAN 
obligations comparing with other members.  It will have implications for ASEAN’s 
pursuit for deeper regional integration and it will also reflect the genuine nature of the 
ASEAN, which is a mere regional group of heterogeneous entities.516     
 
Table (4): ASEAN-10: Selected Economic and Social Indicators 
 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
Countries Area 
Sq 
Km 
(‘000) 
GDP 
(US 
Dollar 
Billion) 
in 2000 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
2001 
1991-
1996 
1997-
2002 
Population 
(million)  
2001 
Life 
Expec
-tancy 
(yrs) 
Adult 
Literacy 
Rate 
in 1995 
Rural 
Population 
in poverty 
1980-95 
Brunei 5.7 6.5 18,600 2.0 1.4 0.3581 74.3 88 n.a 
Malaysia 330 90.0 3,330 8.7 3.2 23.3 70.9 83 22 
Indonesia 1,905 145.3 690 7.9 2.0 209 63.0 84 27 
Singapore 1 91.5 21,500 8.5 4.2 4.0 74.9 91 0 
Thailand 513 122.6 1,940 8.0 0.7 62.4 69.2 94 34 
Philippines 300 75.9 1,030 2.8 3.3 81.2 66.5 95 54 
Cambodia 181 3.4 270 6.2 4.1 13.0 51.9 35* n.a 
Laos 237 1.7 300 6.5 5.9 5.2 51.3 57 85 
Myanmar 677 4.0 n.a 5.9 6.3 51.1 57.9 83 40 
Vietnam 332 31.3 410 8.4 6.1 77.7 65.5 94 60 
n.a= not available / *1993 data 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2003; Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU); ADB, 
Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific countries, 1996; and World Bank, Social 
Indicators of Development, 1996; CIA World Fact Book for Brunei. 
 
Table (5):  GDP Growth Rate in ASEAN member states from 1991 to 2002 
(in percentage) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Cambodia 7.6 7.0 4.1 4.0 7.6 7.0 1.0 1.5 6.9 5.4 5.3 4.5 
Laos 4.0 7.0 5.9 8.2 7.1 6.9 6.5 4.0 7.3 5.9 5.6 5.8 
Myanmar -0.7 9.7 5.9 6.8 7.2 6.4 4.0 5.7 5.8 10.9 6.2 5.4 
Vietnam 6.0 8.7 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.3 8.8 4.4 4.7 6.8 5.8 6.2 
Thailand 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.8 5.5 -0.4 -10.5 4.4 4.6 1.8 4.1 
Malaysia 8.6 7.8 8.4 9.3 9.4 8.6 7.7 -7.4 6.1 8.3 0.4 4.2 
Indonesia 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 4.7 -14.2 0.8 4.8 3.3 3.8 
Singapore 7.3 6.2 10.4 10.5 8.9 7.5 8.5 0.1 5.9 9.9 -2.0 3.0 
Brunei 4.0 -1.1 0.5 1.8 3.0 3.5 2.2 -4.0 2.6 2.8 1.5 3.0 
Philippines -0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.7 5.9 5.2 -0.6 3.4 4.4 3.2 4.1 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Outlook 2002; International Monetary Fund; Regional 
Outlook Southeast Asia 2002-2003 & 2003-2004, ISEAS; Economic Intelligence Unit; 
ASEAN Secretariat; CIA: The World Fact Book. 
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Table (6): Sectoral Share in GDP: ASEAN Countries, 2001 
 
Countries Agriculture Industry Services 
Brunei 2.8 44.4 52.7 
Cambodia 36.9 21.9 41.2 
Indonesia 16.4 46.5 37.1 
Laos 50.9 23.4 25.7 
Malaysia 8.5 49.1 42.4 
Myanmar* 42.2 18.1 39.6 
Philippines 15.2 31.2 53.6 
Singapore 0.1 31.6 68.3 
Thailand 10.0 44.2 45.8 
Vietnam 23.6 37.8 38.6 
 
* Data for Myanmar pertain to year 2000, instead of 2001. 
Sources: World Development Indicators 2003. 
 
 
4.3.8 Regional Integration, Civil Society, and democratization in Southeast Asia 
 
Regional integration and community building efforts in Southeast Asia over decades 
bring some positive results in the region like democratization in some countries, 
reinforcing civil society and improvement of human rights situation. The major impact of 
democratization cannot be denied in the region and the ASEAN agenda also includes 
human rights and democracy. Although partly responding to pressures from outside 
(mainly the Western countries), this is also the result of the growing realization of some 
ASEAN members that meaningful cooperation between the ASEAN and the international 
community would require narrowing the gap between them on the understanding of 
human rights and democracy. Previously, some ASEAN policy-makers and scholars 
rejected the Western style liberal democracy on the grounds that Western pressure to 
promote democracy would undermine the foundations of regional order in Southeast 
Asia, which is based on the inviolability of state sovereignty and the doctrine of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states. One of the effects of democratization 
can be labeled that the ASEAN’s consensus on human rights and democracy, which is 
widely perceived to be a justification for authoritarian rule in the region, has since 
unraveled.517 
       
Civil society means those institutions and groupings that are outside of government. 
There are some nuances in different definitions, but the essential characteristics of civil 
society lies in its autonomy from the state. It is also vivid that such independence is 
relative, and as no individual can be isolated, so no institution within a societal 
framework stands completely alone. If civil society is strong and if citizens band together 
for the common good based on a sense of community or programmatic trust and efficacy, 
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then this trust and efficacy somehow and in someway translate into overall trust in the 
political process of democracy or democratization and lead to the diffusion of the 
centralized power of the state. Civil society is therefore seen as an essential characteristic 
of political pluralism.518 Indeed, regional integration efforts increased the transnational 
transactions and opened the eyes of general public that in turn strengthen the civil society 
institutions in Southeast Asia. 
 
 
 
4.4 Building a regional community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's experience in a new 
century 
 
 
ASEAN was one of the most dynamic regional cooperative schemes in the world prior to 
the Asian financial Crisis of 1997-1998.  Since then after the Asian financial crisis, 
ASEAN leaders have been aware of the increasingly competitive global environment 
especially because of the tremendous challenge from China in trade and investment.  
They also became realized to bridge the growth gaps between old member states 
(ASEAN-6: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei) and 
new members (CLMV: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) for remedying a two-
tiered ASEAN.519  The Asian Crisis has also significantly stagnated the economic growth 
experienced by the ASEAN countries (mainly ASEAN-6) in the past decades.  
Simultaneously it highlighted the institutional weaknesses and ineffectiveness of loose 
cooperation in the ASEAN and pointed out the necessity of rebuilding the association to 
be a more effective and efficient regional organization. 
 
 
4.4.1 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC): Is a real Community or Imagined 
Community for enhancing regional cooperation in Southeast Asia 
 
At the ASEAN Summit in November 2002, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
proposed the idea of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  From then onwards, there 
has been an intense discussion and debates about this proposal for real implementation 
among national governments, think tanks and the ASEAN Secretariat.  Like any other 
ideas newly introduced, its vision and acceptance in the region will mainly be assessed in 
terms of prospective costs and benefits to be paid by all member states of the ASEAN.  In 
principle, ASEAN leaders agreed to explore the possibility of transforming ASEAN into 
an AEC by 2002.  Henceforth, the proposal is welcome in the region as a logical next 
step of the ASEAN integration based on the existing regional programs like the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and also in consistence with the implementation of 
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the Hanoi Plan of Action towards ASEAN Vision 2020.  The proposed AEC could also 
offer a pragmatic ASEAN roadmap to strengthen ASEAN’s effectiveness in trade and 
investment creation in dealing with the growing interdependence of all ASEAN 
economies.520 
 
Finally all ASEAN leaders at the Summit held in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia 
approved this ambitious proposal of the AEC by signing the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II).  Bali Concorde II revealed that the AEC would be the 
realization of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 
2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in 
which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, 
equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in 
year 2020.  It also laid out AEC should be based on a convergence of interests among 
ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing 
and new initiatives with clear timelines.  Moreover, it emphasized the interdependence of 
the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member countries to adopt “Prosper 
Thy Neighbour” policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the 
ASEAN region.521 
 
Southeast Asian economic cooperation through the institutional mechanism of the 
ASEAN has not been much impressive in the past decades.  Many will be sceptical to the 
realization of the AEC because it is considered ambitious but a lot of difficulties and 
challenges waiting ahead and beyond horizon for successful implementation.   
Whatsoever the AEC would be a real vision or an illusion in paving the way for the 
successful Southeast Asian regional integration, ASEAN countries have seen now a more 
comprehensive and deepening way of regional cooperation as a necessary and inevitable 
process which would also bring substantial benefits and big challenges to them.   
 
4.4.2 Is Community concept relevant for the ASEAN? 
 
A regional community refers to an imagined community of states adhering to the 
peaceful process of resolving conflicts among them and pursuing cooperative measures 
with one another to achieve common goals and benefits.   It is an imagined community522 
because despite the complex diversities of players in the region of Southeast Asia, there 
is a general perception, or shared imagination, so to speak, that relative peace, prosperity 
and security may be attained by cooperating with each other and by ruling out the threat 
or the actual use of force in settling their disputes. This kind of 
political/security/economic community may be in the form of a formal organization of 
states with a permanent secretariat or an informal grouping of states with no permanent 
secretariat but with a regular process of constant dialogues and consultations.  Since such 
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a community may be viewed as an imagined community, it is also socially constructed, 
which takes time for its own evolutionary process.523 The existence of a regional 
community, however, will not necessarily mean the extinction of conflicts among 
nations.  The occurrence of disputes is a reality in every community but the essence of 
community building is to find peaceful solutions of these disputes and to maintain 
prevalence of peace among members of the community. 
 
The concept of collective identity is a requisite to the notion of community building.  
While there can be several indicators of collective identity, three are essentially 
important. The first paradigm is a commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to 
place an expanding number of issues on the multilateral agenda that have been previously 
tackled through unilateral or bilateral channels. A second measure of collective identity is 
the development of political, economic and security cooperation: including an agenda for 
political coordination and cooperation for ensuring peace and stability in the region; 
collective security and collaborative defense against internal and external threats; and 
economic interdependence, meeting multilateral interests and collaboration for achieving 
prosper-thy-neighbour principle.  Thirdly, identity formation can be perceived from the 
boundaries and membership criteria of the group like defining what constitutes a region 
and who is included and who is excluded in that group.524 
 
Among the sub-regional groupings in the Asia Pacific, only the ASEAN experienced a 
relative success in regional cooperation.  Originally ASEAN did not envision the creation 
of a political or economic or security community in the region. Its main goal was to 
achieve economic, social and cultural cooperation and to reduce tensions among 
Southeast Asian’s non-communist states.  In the Bangkok Declaration, the five founding 
fathers affirmed their determination to “ensure their stability and security from external 
interference” and to “preserve their national identities”.525  Throughout 36 years of its 
existence until Bali Concord II for envisaging an ASEAN Regional Community in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN evolved only as a regional association through its loose 
cooperation and different institutional strategy.  To become a real effective regional 
community, ASEAN still needs a long way to go for more transformation, 
institutionalization and changing of its regional code of conduct. 
 
Its main principle of conflict management – the ASEAN Way – is consultation and 
consensus building and non-interference in internal affairs.  The process is characterized 
by informality and it serves to forge a general consensus that accommodates the differing 
views of all participants before a formal final decision is made. Those norms are unique 
to ASEAN and therefore constitute an identity marker that can be seen as an indicator of 
community.  With regard to the community concept, the code of regional conduct 
enshrined in the Treat of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which set out behavioural norms 
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for regional relations: respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in 
internal affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and the non-use of force, has also united 
the ASEAN members.  It can be regarded as the strongest identity marker so far to define 
the ASEAN community.526   
 
Despite the existence of various disputes among its members, ASEAN has prevented the 
occurrence of serious armed confrontation among them.  Its success in handling the 
Cambodian Crisis enhanced ASEAN’s credibility as a diplomatic and security 
community in Southeast Asia whereas its failure in tackling Asian Financial Crisis and 
East Timor Crisis also witnessed weaknesses of a regional organization.   ASEAN is 
steadily evolved to become a security community because its members have ruled out the 
threat or the use of force in settling their disputes.527  The enlargement of ASEAN by 
admitting Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar as new members further strengthened 
‘One Southeast Asia’ concept as an indicator of regional community encompassing all 
ten countries of the region. 
 
4.4.3 Community Building as a change of tendency from Cooperation to Integration 
 
For realism and most liberal theories, material forces and concerns such as power and 
wealth usually shape state interests.  In their way of interpretation, perceptual, ideational 
and cultural factors are derived from a material base. According to constructivists, 
intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities, play a determining, rather 
than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions. Like norms, collective identities can 
make and redefine state interests and move them beyond the logic of power politics. The 
collective identity of a social group, like the notion of culture, is not a given that is 
derived exclusively or even largely from fixed or preordained material sources. Identity is 
an intersubjective notion. Simply stated, it refers to the ‘basic character of states’. Identity 
formation entails developing a collective sense of not only ‘who we are’, but also ‘how 
we differ from others’. It also involves securing external recognition for the community’s 
own distinctiveness and sheer existence.528   
 
Karl W. Deutsch viewed the development of integrated communities as an exercise in 
identity building, defined as ‘some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty’. He 
also pointed out that ‘identification’ as one of the instruments of integration, with 
‘identification’ being defined as ‘the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of 
mutual identification, loyalties, and ‘we-feelings.’529 The construction of identity is 
central to the kind of ‘we-feeling’ that Deutsch identified as a key factor of integrated 
communities. The notion of identity runs deep into the heart of constructivist approaches 
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because of its central claim that the development of a collective identity can ameliorate 
the security dilemma among states.530 
 
Just as norms ‘are contested and made and remade through politics’, collective identities 
are made and remade through interactions and socialization, rather than being exogenous 
to those processes. For example, until recently, our understanding of the idea of ‘region’ 
relied heavily on such immutable or preordained features such as geographic proximity, a 
given physical location, cultural and linguistic similarities among the peoples, and a 
common historical experience. Today, there is a much greater tendency among scholars 
to define regions as imagined communities, created by processes of interaction and 
socialization which may lead to different conceptions of what makes up of a given region 
and its boundary lines at different points of time.531  Some argued that regions are not 
natural entities – they are, at a very fundamental level, socially intertwined and 
constructed.  Put another way, they are imagined communities or at least putative 
imagined communities.532 
 
The question of collective identity of a social grouping can be examined from several 
points of reference. One is to look at the overlapping ambit of the national identities of 
individual member states, and their respective constitutive norms. In the context of 
ASEAN, for example, this would mean ascertaining the compatibility and overlap 
between the national identity and preferred norms of one member country, say Thailand, 
and those of another, say Myanmar. A second point of reference is the collective identity 
of a group taken as a whole, for example the notion of the ASEAN Way, which is 
developed through socialization and which forms the basis of its collective action. The 
two points of reference can reinforce each other, but may evolve separately. In other 
words, a group can develop an identity and approach of its own even if their national 
identities and constitutive norms remain different. The ASEAN Way, in other words, can 
develop and function despite differing kinds of national identity prevailing among its 
members.533                        
 
While there can be several indicators of collective identity, three are especially important. 
The first is a commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to place an expanding 
number of issues on the multilateral agenda that have been previously tackled through 
unilateral or bilateral channels. A second measure of collective identity is the 
development of deeper economic cooperation, including collective norms through 
interdependence; meeting multilateral interests and collaboration for achieving prosper 
thy neighbour principle.  Third, identity formation can be sensed from the boundaries and 
membership criteria of the group.534 
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In this respect, ASEAN regionalism in general, and the expression ‘ASEAN Way’ in 
particular, may be viewed as a continuing process of identity building which relies upon 
conventional ‘modern’ principles of interstate relations as well as traditional and culture-
specific modes of socialization and decision making prevalent in the region. The founders 
of ASEAN had little conception of a regional identity. But they clearly hoped to develop 
one through regional cooperation. ASEAN came to play a critical role not only in 
developing a sense of regional identity, but also laying down the boundaries of Southeast 
Asia as a region. It drew upon the indigenous social, cultural and political traditions of its 
members and borrowed, adapted and redefined principles and practices of cooperation 
from the outside world. Sometimes, supposedly foreign principles and models of 
regionalism, after having been rejected for lacking ‘relevance’ in the Southeast Asian 
context, have been subsequently incorporated into the ASEAN framework after being 
redefined and adjusted so as to conform to the needs and aspirations of ASEAN’s 
member.535  
 
Moreover, the seemingly cultural underpinnings of ASEAN regionalism have been 
developed and refined in a self-conscious way through years of interaction since 
ASEAN’s formation. All of these will remain very much part of an ongoing process. 
ASEAN regionalism began without a discernible and pre-existing sense of collective 
identity among the founding members, notwithstanding some important cultural 
similarities among them. Whether such an identity has developed after more than thirty 
years of interaction is debatable. But this should not detract from the serious nature of the 
efforts by ASEAN members to overcome their dilemma and obstacles of effective 
integration and establish a genuine regional community through the development of 
norms and the construction of an ASEAN identity that would be indispensable of their 
interests.536 
 
4.4.4 Intra- ASEAN Trade as a parameter of Regional Integration 
 
Intra-regional trade flows are a major parameter of the region’s cooperation in trade.  In 
ASEAN, a relatively low level of intra-regional trade can also be seen despite the 
increase in the share of exports and imports within the region during the last decade.  
Merchandise exports within the region as a share of the group’s total exports increased 
from 20.1 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 2002. There was also favourable increase in 
intra-ASEAN imports between 1990 and 2002 from 16.2 percent to 23.6 percent.  Intra-
regional imports and exports account for about one fifth of ASEAN’s total trade in year 
2002 (see Table 7).  As shown in Figure (3) and (4), Singapore accounts for one third of 
the region’s intra-regional imports and exports in 2002, while Malaysia accounts for 
virtually one quarter of intra-regional trade. 
 
In 2002, exports from the ASEAN countries to the world (including intra-regional trade) 
reached $406.6 Billion.  The major exporting countries are Singapore ($128.5 Billion), 
Malaysia ($93.4 Billion), Thailand ($66.9 Billion) and Indonesia ($58 Billion).  
Simultaneously, these four countries are also the principal importing members of the 
                                                 
535 Ibid., p. 28. 
536 Acharya (2001): “Security Community”, p. 28. 
  
 
183
ASEAN group by representing Singapore $110 Billion, Malaysia $75 Billion, Thailand 
$63.4 Billion and Indonesia $34.8 Billion.  Regional imports from the world (including 
intra-regional trade) reached $341 Billion, yielding a positive trade balance of $65.6 
Billion (see Table 10 and11). 
 
However, intra-ASEAN trade flows between 1990 and 2002 is not significant in 
comparing with the amounts and growth ratio of total trade and extra-ASEAN trade flows 
as shown in Figure (3).  Import dependence in the ASEAN has been less than export 
dependence in most of these years (see Table 7, 8 and 9).  Consequently, the ASEAN-6 
have depended on imports and machinery and materials from the industrialized countries 
for production; and ASEAN does not provide major markets for the old members, 
although intra-ASEAN trade has been rising.537  Table (8) shows ASEAN countries’ 
direction of exports comparison between 1990 and 2001 with their major trading 
partners.  ASEAN's biggest export market continues to be the US with the European 
Union coming in second and Japan a close third. 
 
Compared with the ASEAN-6, new members (i.e. CLMV countries) depend more on the 
ASEAN market as illustrated in Table (12).  For Cambodia, the share of trade to ASEAN 
market was 33.9 percent; while it was 48 percent, 29.8percent, and 22.2 percent for Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam respectively.  It shows that Cambodia and Laos keep stronger 
trade relations with ASEAN than Myanmar and Vietnam.  The share of imports of the 
ASEAN new members was higher than that of exports while ASEAN-6 accounts for 
more export dependence (see Table 10 and 11). 
 
For many ASEAN countries China has become a major trading partner and also an 
important market in the last two decades.  As shown in Table (13), major changes in 
ASEAN countries’ trade dependence on East Asia and other fellow ASEAN members 
over the period from 1985 to 2001 are remarkable.  For a number of ASEAN countries 
the market shares of Singapore and Malaysia have been declining most rapidly.  This 
does not necessarily mean that China or other countries have overtaken their important 
position in various ASEAN markets.  Intra-ASEAN trade has traditionally been 
dominated by Malaysia and Singapore and by the bilateral trade between these two 
countries.  Singapore and Malaysia are also the two largest exporters in ASEAN.  Their 
combined exports accounted for 54.6% of total ASEAN exports in 2002 while the exports 
of the older ASEAN members (ASEAN-6) amounted to 94.7% of total ASEAN exports.  
Exports of CLMV (new ASEAN members) only accounted for about 5% of total ASEAN 
exports in 2002.  Nevertheless, the growth of exports from the CLMV countries has been 
very dramatic and this is in large part because of their low cost base.  Exports of 
Vietnam, for instance, increased from a more $407 Million in 1985 to close to $17 
Billion in 2002.538 
 
                                                 
537 Nattapong Thongpakde ( 2001 ): “Impact and Implications of ASEAN Enlargement on Trade”, p. 50. 
538 Hadi Soesastro (2003): “ASEAN Economic Community: Concept, Costs and Benefits”, Singapore: 
ISEAS, pp. 6-7 (Paper presented at the ASEAN Roundtable 2003 Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic 
Community 20-21 August 2003 Singapore). 
  
 
184
All members hailed the establishment of AFTA among ASEAN countries as an engine 
for the promotion of regional competitiveness and economic efficiency.  In mid-1990s, 
the ASEAN shares of the CLMV’s trade were 35%, 54%, 58% and 21% respectively.  
During the period from 1998 to 2000 (see Table 12), these shares declined along with 
intra-ASEAN trade.  For Cambodia and Vietnam, these shares recently declined 
significantly because both countries signed bilateral trade agreements with the United 
States and therefore, their exports to the United States have expanded substantially.  
Generally it may indicate that Laos and Myanmar might gain a rather large welfare 
benefit from joining AFTA since trade creation would considerably outweigh trade 
diversion.539   
 
Although there has been more differentiation in the commodities produced in these 
economies and thus creating more scope for greater complementarity between them, the 
increased size and greater diversity in terms of political orientation, economic 
development and readiness towards economic liberalization within the grouping have 
made the decision making process more time consuming and therefore slowed down the 
progress of economic integration.  The effectiveness of AFTA as a preferential trading 
arrangement could be undermined with the proliferation of bilateral FTAs initiated by 
some ASEAN member countries.540 
 
Recently Singapore has already concluded an FTA with New Zealand, Japan, Australia 
and the US.  Negotiations are currently under way to forge FTAs with other countries.  It 
has also been reported that the Philippines and Thailand are negotiating with the US 
while Malaysia and Myanmar are also on the way to FTA with Japan and India 
respectively.  Although these extra-ASEAN FTAs could bring some indirect benefits for 
the ASEAN countries, they could also present some risks and challenges for ASEAN as a 
preferential economic grouping.  These FTAs could be perceived by other ASEAN 
countries as providing “backdoor” entries for non-ASEAN countries to the region and 
thus as undermining the effectiveness of AFTA.  Critics have alleged that Singapore’s 
FTA partners will be able to gain tariff-free access into ASEAN markets through 
Singapore, without providing reciprocal access to the ASEAN countries.  Whether this 
perception is baseless or not, it could hinder intra-ASEAN trade relationships.  Parallel to 
this problem is the risk that increased extra-regional trade could occur at the expense of 
intra-regional trade.  There is a strong possibility that trade diversion effects will be 
significant resulting from the bilateral free trade agreements, as many of the goods and 
services traded within ASEAN will be substituted by similar goods and services produced 
by the extra-ASEAN partners.541       
 
The increased intensity of trade within ASEAN member states can also lead to enhance 
interdependence with each other.  Some also concluded that increase in intra-ASEAN and 
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extra-ASEAN trade in the last decade has been witnessing the increased competitiveness 
of ASEAN countries by supplying for the regional markets.  However, intra-ASEAN 
merchandise trade now accounts for nearly 25% of ASEAN’s total trade, slightly up from 
21.4% in 1993.  This may seem relatively low and some academics have argued that the 
1997 Asian financial crisis had adversely affected intra-regional trade more than trade 
with the rest of the world.  Moreover, there still exist a substantial number of non-tariff 
barriers to intra-ASEAN trade.  Nevertheless, the implementation of the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area should lead to a pick-up in intra-ASEAN trade from 2002 onwards.542  
Fostering a stronger intra-regional trade through the AEC can help enhancing the growth 
performance of member countries.  Trade expansion leading to higher growth may help 
the less developed countries in the ASEAN catch up with the income per capita levels of 
the more advanced economies in the region.543 
 
 
 
Table (7): Intra-ASEAN Trade in 2002  
                        (Billion Dollars and percentage)  
           
 
 
Value 
Share in total 
exports/imports (%) 
            
 
Annual percentage change 
  
 2002 1990 1995 2000 2002  1995-00 2001 2002 
ASEAN (10)          
Total exports 405 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  6 -10 5 
Intra-exports 97 20.1 25.5 24.0 24.0  5 -12 8 
Extra-exports 308 79.9 74.5 76.0 76.0  6 -9 4 
Total imports 353 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  1 -8 5 
Intra-imports 83 16.2 18.8 23.7 23.6  5 -12 9 
Extra-imports 270 83.8 81.2 76.3 76.4  -1 -7 4 
 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
542 ISEAS (2003): “Concept Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community”, Singapore, 26 February 2003, 
p.4. 
543 Interview with Dr. Jutamas Arunanondchai (Senior Researcher, Fiscal Policy Research Institute, 
Ministry of Finance, Bangkok, Thailand) on 20-21 August 2003 in Singapore at the ASEAN Roundtable 
2003 Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
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Table (8): ASEAN countries’ Direction of Exports comparison between 1990 and 2001  
( % of Total ) 
 
DMCs China Japan United 
States 
European 
Union 
Others To 
From 
1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 
Southeast 
Asia 
29.1 34.1 1.9 4.5 18.3 13.4 19.6 18.2 15.8 15.0 15.3 14.9 
Cambodia 82.9 6.3 0.4 1.3 7.6 1.0 0.0 64.2 5.0 24.8 4.1 2.3 
Indonesia 18.4 28.9 3.2 5.5 42.5 20.9 13.1 15.3 12.0 13.8 10.6 15.7 
Laos 69.0 45.0 9.1 1.6 7.1 1.5 0.1 0.9 9.4 25.6 5.3 25.4 
Malaysia 40.0 35.5 2.1 4.3 15.3 13.3 16.9 20.2 15.4 13.6 10.3 13.0 
Myanmar 49.0 48.4 8.1 4.4 6.9 3.4 2.3 16.6 6.9 14.5 26.8 12.7 
Philippines 14.2 24.0 0.8 2.5 19.8 15.7 37.9 28.0 18.5 19.3 8.9 10.6 
Singapore 34.7 43.4 1.5 4.4 8.8 7.7 21.3 15.4 15.0 13.4 18.7 15.8 
Thailand 19.3 28.0 1.2 4.4 17.2 15.3 22.7 20.3 22.7 16.1 17.0 15.9 
Vietnam 25.3 20.0 0.3 6.8 13.5 17.5 0.0 7.6 6.8 26.8 54.1 21.3 
 
DMCs = Developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank 
 
Source: Asia Development Outlook 2003. 
 
 
 
Table (9):  Intra-ASEAN Trade from year 1990 to 2002 (Value amount in Billon Dollars) 
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Intra-
Exports 
29 35 39 47 65 82 87 88 72 80 103 90 97 
Extra-
Exports 
115 130 147 165 197 239 254 265 258 279 325 296 308 
Total-
Exports 
144 165 186 212 262 321 341 353 330 359 428 386 405 
 
             
Intra-
Imports 
26 32 37 44 55 67 74 75 63 68 87 77 83 
Extra-
Imports 
136 152 164 187 226 288 303 297 216 232 281 260 270 
Total-
Imports 
162 184 201 231 281 355 376 372 279 300 367 337 353 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 
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Figure (3): Intra-ASEAN Trade potential Graph from 1990-2002 ( Billion Dollars ) 
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Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 
 
Table (10): ASEAN Countries Merchandise Exports (in Billion of US $) 
 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Brunei 2.593 2.662 1.891 2.539 3.904 3.643 3.708 
Indonesia 50.188 56.298 50.371 51.242 65.406 57.364 57.971 
Malaysia 76.88 77.561 71.85 84.097 98.429 87.981 93.364 
Philippines 20.543 25.228 29.496 34.210 37.295 31.243 34.383 
Singapore 129.552 129.757 110.271 116.629 139.747 124.505 128.519 
Thailand 54.667 56.725 52.878 56.801 67.889 63.190 66.886 
        
Cambodia 0.644 0.862 0.816 1.016 1.396 1.525 1.717 
Laos 0.317 0.313 0.337 0.302 0.33 0.31 0.312 
Myanmar 0.938 0.975 1.065 1.14 1.644 2.322 3.012 
Vietnam 7.255 9.185 9.361 11.54 14.448 15.027 16.706 
        
ASEAN-6 
Total 
334.423 348.231 316.756 345.516 412.671 367.926 384.832 
CLMV 
Total 
9.154 11.335 11.579 13.998 17.818 19.184 21.747 
ASEAN 
Total 
343.577 359.565 328.335 359.514 430.489 387.110 406.579 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit Database) 
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Table (11): ASEAN Countries Merchandise Imports (in Billion of US $) 
 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Brunei 2.345 2.015 1.314 1.25 1.047 1.125 1.48 
Indonesia 44.24 46.223 31.942 30.598 40.366 34.669 34.824 
Malaysia 72.862 74.131 54.169 61.452 77.575 69.598 75.043 
Philippines 31.885 36.355 29.524 29.252 30.377 28.496 33.975 
Singapore 123.9 125.092 95.925 104.642 127.457 109.752 109.920 
Thailand 70.815 61.349 40.643 47.529 62.423 60.665 63.433 
        
Cambodia 1.072 1.092 1.179 1.49 1.935 2.052 2.311 
Laos 0.690 0.648 0.553 0.554 0.535 0.523 0.522 
Myanmar 1.869 2.107 2.451 2.188 2.169 2.595 2.323 
Vietnam 10.03 10.432 10.35 10.568 15.387 14.546 17.76 
        
ASEAN-6 
Total 
346.047 345.165 253.517 274.723 339.245 304.306 318.106 
CLMV 
Total 
13.661 14.279 14.533 14.8 20.026 19.716 22.916 
ASEAN 
Total 
359.708 359.444 268.05 289.523 359.271 324.022 341.022 
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit Data 
 
 Figure(4):  ASEAN member countries Intra-regional Imports in 2002  
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit Database) 
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 Figure (5):  ASEAN member countries Intra-regional   Exports in 2002  
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit Database) 
 
 
Table (12): Total Trade Share of CLMV (%) from 1998 to 2000. 
 
 Cambodia Laos Myanmar Vietnam 
Cambodia - 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Laos 0.0 - 0.0 0.4 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 
Vietnam 10.9 2.7 0.0 - 
ASEAN 33.9 48.0 29.8 22.2 
ASEAN+3 44 72.4 59.0 51 
 
Total Trade = Sum of imports and exports. Table shows as total trade share of a country 
in the top row with a partner in the left-hand column. 
 
Source: Sakakibara, Eisuke and Sharon Yamakawa (2003): Regional Integration in East 
Asia: Challenges and Opportunities, World Bank working paper No. 3079, Washington 
D.C., Table 4.1. 
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Table (13): Major Changes in ASEAN’s Trade Dependence on East Asia, 1985-2001 
 
 Export markets increasing in relative 
importance 
 Largest Second Largest 
Largest declining 
market share  
Brunei Korea China Singapore 
Cambodia Thailand Hong Kong Vietnam 
Indonesia Malaysia China Korea 
Malaysia China Hong Kong Singapore 
Laos Thailand Vietnam China 
Philippines Taiwan China Malaysia 
Singapore China Vietnam Malaysia 
Thailand China Indonesia Malaysia 
Vietnam China Taiwan Hong Kong 
 
 
Source: Ng, Francis and Alexander Yeats (2003): Major East Asian Trade Trends, World 
Bank working paper No. 3084, Washington D.C., Table 6.1. 
 
 
4.4.5 AFTA: A Scheme to adjust uneven economic development in Southeast Asia and 
promoting effective governance 
 
Though ASEAN was established as an organization of political security project544 in 
1960s, it gradually transformed itself into an effective regional mechanism through 
constructing a sense of regional community intertwined with closer economic 
cooperation in the region.  The recent proliferation of regional trading blocs is distinctive 
with the signing of numerous new and overwhelmed preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) since 1990.  There remains, however, an ongoing debate between economists and 
politicians as to whether regional trade agreements (RTAs) represent “building” or 
“stumbling” blocks545 to the prosperity of world trade.  The welcome for the 
opportunities of this new wave of regionalism is supposed to bring broad in scope or 
content while some fear that kind of regional economic integration will undermine 
progress towards global free trade expounded by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and more recently the World Trade Organization (WTO).  However, there 
are also some positive outlooks to these regional arrangements and see any trade 
                                                 
544 Franz Nuscheler (1999): “Entwicklungssprünge, Disparitäten und Konflikpotentiale im 
südostasiatischen Tigergehege”, in: Werner Kreisel (eds): “Perspektiven für eine zukunftsfähige 
Regionalentwicklung im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum”, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, p.22. 
545 J. Bhagwati (1991): “The World Trading System at Risk”. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 
77. 
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liberalization as good whatever its source and PTAs as a second best means of achieving 
trade liberalization when multilateral negotiations stall.546 
 
One of the more recent and trade-related regional developments was in the Southeast 
Asian region where members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreed in 1992 to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) that currently has a 
membership of ten countries and a population of over 500 million.  Moreover, the recent 
emergence of China as an economic power in the region following its membership of the 
WTO has led to a renewed vigour among ASEAN nations to pursue the goal of regional 
cooperation.   
 
In an overall view, the last thirty years has witnessed a strong economic performance 
from ASEAN countries.  One reason for this vivid success was that the prime engine of 
growth was rather extra-regional trade than intra-regional and questions, therefore, arose 
about the need of Southeast Asian regional grouping to intensify their synergy.547 
Krugman introduced the notion of a “natural trading block” based on geographical 
proximity that could be both efficient and welfare increasing.  He also noted however, 
that an RTA based on being a member of a political club could induce regional bias to 
trade patterns that can be welfare reducing if trade diversion is greater than trade 
creation.548  This raises the question of whether ASEAN has any real economic 
rationality over its mere political and symbolic meaning. 
 
Economic cooperation among ASEAN members produced mediocre results until the 
formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992.  ASEAN’s pattern of 
economic cooperation and the reasons for its limited achievements are familiar: inward-
looking economic policies and economies at different levels of income and 
industrialization.  The absence of formal regional institutions and the failure to negotiate 
precise and binding obligations reflected those shortcomings rather than creating them. 
Although the ASEAN economies were among the most successful in the developing 
world by the 1990s, very little of that success could be attributed to intra-regional trade 
liberalization.549 
 
ASEAN’s interest in intra-regional trade cooperation increased in the early 1990s, in 
response to several developments.  The changing orientation of ASEAN economies 
towards manufacturing provided scope for greater intra-ASEAN division of labour.  In 
addition, the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area and the advent of the 
EU Single Market raised fears within ASEAN of rising protectionism.  This fear was 
compounded by the stalemate in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks towards the late 
1980s, a stalemate blamed by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, on the two 
                                                 
546
 World Bank (1999): “Trade Blocs”, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 104-105. 
547 Robert J.R. Elliott and Kengo Ikemoto (2003): “AFTA and the Asian Crisis, Help or Hindrance to 
ASEAN Intra-Regional Trade?”, Manchester: School of Economics, the University of Manchester, p.4. 
548
 Paul. R. Krugman (1991): “Is Bilateralism Bad?”, in :E. Helpman and A. Razim E (eds.): “International 
Trade and Trade Policy”, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 9-23. 
549 Miles Kahler (2000): “Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case”, in: International Organization, 
Volume. 54, Number. 3, Summer 2000, p. 553. 
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largest economic powers in the world, the USA and the European Union, who could 
‘hold the entire multilateral trading system to ransom’ over a ‘single issue like 
agriculture’.  ASEAN also feared a declining flow of investment from the West as the 
collapse of communism led to the opening up of East European economies.550 
 
In response to these developments, ASEAN leaders in January 1992 at their Fourth 
Summit announced plans to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within fifteen 
years.  In fact the formation of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) in 1989 had 
also been an important stimulus to the ASEAN to establish its own free trade area.  In so 
doing, a number of initiatives to promote regional economic cooperation were adopted.  
These included cooperation in securing greater foreign investment through creating an 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), liberalization of the service sector including tourism, 
maritime transport, air transport, telecommunications, construction, business and 
financial services, and cooperation in intellectual property matters encouraged through 
creating an ASEAN Patent System and an ASEAN Trademark System.551  
 
The evolution and scope of AFTA and these other measures suggested the influence of 
the ASEAN Way, including a preference for informality, non-adversarial bargaining, 
consensus building and non-legalistic procedures for decision-making.  Therefore, some 
argued that AFTA was to be based ‘more on networks of personal contacts and social 
obligations than on formal institutions and legal commitments’. The negotiations leading 
to AFTA could be described as one of developing ‘a vaguely worded statement which did 
not violate any of the participants’ basic interests and, therefore, to which all participants 
could agree’.  This allowed AFTA to be moved forward at a ‘pace with which all 
governments felt comfortable’.  In a similar way, disputes were to be settled through 
informal discussions behind closed doors and without resort to formal dispute-settlement 
mechanisms as found in the EU or NAFTA.552 
 
AFTA was to be realized within fifteen years from 1 January 1993.  The main instrument 
to reduce tariffs imposed by members on all manufactured and processed agricultural 
products to 0 to 5 per cent by 2008 was the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT).  As such, the CEPT largely determines the pace (through normal and fast-track 
reduction of tariffs) and scope of trade liberalization within the group; and it provides for 
a phased reduction of tariffs. The CEPT consists of four lists.  First is the Inclusion List 
(IL), which is composed of goods that are subject to immediate tariff reduction so as to 
fulfil the 0 to 5 per cent tariff target by the specified target date.  Second is the 
Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) which permits a temporary exclusion of specified goods 
from tariff reduction, but they are to be transferred to the IL in stages, in five annual and 
equal instalments between January 1996 and January 2000, and reduced to the 0 to 5 per 
cent target range in the accelerated package by 2000.  Third is the Sensitive List (SL) 
which is composed mainly of unprocessed agricultural products that are to be phased into 
                                                 
550 Acharya (2001): “Security Community”, p.142. 
551 Interview with Dr. Ramonette B. Serafica (Research Advisor, Regional Economic Policy Support 
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the IL between 2001 to 2003 and reduced to the 0 to 5 per cent target range by 2010. 
Fourth is the General Exception List (GEL), which is consistent with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regulations. It permanently excludes from tariff reduction those 
goods that are of concern for national security, protection of public morals, health, 
human, animal and plant life, and protection of art, culture, environment, historical and 
archaeological heritage.553 
 
The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance the competitiveness of the ASEAN in the 
world market. It also aims to expand intra-ASEAN trade and to gain economies of scale 
and specialization to further deepen economic cooperation.  In other words, AFTA can 
also be regarded as the most visible sign of tendency changing from loose cooperation to 
closer and effective regional integration in Southeast Asia.  Moreover, it is anticipated 
that greater foreign direct investment will flow into the region as a result of ASEAN 
economic integration.554  AFTA was designed in part to deflect competitive pressure 
within the region, particularly China and India.  Widespread economic liberalization in 
Asia had removed both the distinctive policy and cost advantages of ASEAN.  
Substantial unilateral liberalization in ASEAN member economies and the prospects of 
greater intra-regional trade argued for accepting more binding obligations to liberalize 
trade.555   
 
In 1997, although the ASEAN members were facing the devastating regional economic 
crisis they decided to speed up the CEPT timetable.  At the Hanoi Summit in 1998, the 
six original ASEAN members agreed to accelerate the CEPT schedule for the products 
under the normal track by one year from 2003 to 2002, and set a target to achieve a 
minimum of 90 percent of tariff lines within 0-5 per cent by 2000.  Owing to the 
difference in their economic structure from the original members and the later date of 
membership accession, the four new members presented different deadlines for the CEPT 
scheme.  Originally the deadline for the reduction of CEPT tariff lines to between 0-5 per 
cent was 2006 for Vietnam and 2008 for Laos and Myanmar.  With the agreement at the 
Hanoi Summit, the CEPT program for the new member countries was also accelerated to 
2003 for Vietnam and to 2005 to Laos and Myanmar. Cambodia, the latest ASEAN 
member, submitted its CEPT package on 1 January 2000, and will complete its AFTA 
commitment in 2010.556 
 
In an overall view, AFTA may contribute to ASEAN’s collective competitiveness and 
expand the appeal of ASEAN’s internal market to foreign investors, and prevent the 
diversion of investment to other areas such as China and India.  For ASEAN, the 
economic liberalization programs of the new members provide new economic 
opportunities at a time when traditional Western markets are turning protectionist.  An 
expanded ASEAN also helps the competitiveness of the original ASEAN-6 by providing 
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them with a cheaper source of raw materials and production locations, an important 
benefit out of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).557 
 
In particular, ASEAN-6 stand to benefit from the GSP privileges of the new members 
(except Myanmar which does not enjoy GSP privileges as a result of Western sanctions) 
by using them as export platforms to the rest of the world for textiles, garments and the 
electronic assembly industry.  It also enables them to free their resources for developing 
more sophisticated industries in keeping with their evolving comparative advantage.  The 
new members are also expected to derive major benefits from expansion although they 
will suffer from a loss of customer revenues.  It will end their economic isolation (a 
common feature of all of them, albeit for different reasons).  They benefit from 
investments from the original ASEAN-6, especially in their labour-intensive 
manufacturing sectors as well as in infrastructure.  Moreover, the new members can take 
advantage of ASEAN’s collective bargaining system; membership will mean that their 
access to world markets can be negotiated multilaterally, rather than individually.558  
Through their participation in a free trade area, it will increase transnational production 
among members in a more and more globalized economy as well as it will also foster 
greater economic interdependence in the area which is a major aspect of regional 
integration. 
 
 
4.4.6 Still a long way to go and whither the ASEAN 
Nowadays, the concept of region and regionalism in Southeast Asia is becoming a major 
theme to be discussed in accordance with the rapidly changing events in countries of the 
region as well as concerning with their relations to other major powers of Asia-Pacific 
region. Actually this concept is still vaguely defined and not yet strongly rooted in the 
minds and souls of people of the region even though the ASEAN exists more than three 
decades as representative association of Southeast Asia.  Focus should be given to the 
studies of regional cooperation and conflict resolution, which are more promising for 
achieving effective solutions to occasional crises of the region as well.  Studies of 
regional cooperation and conflict will continue to be hot spots of international politics 
notwithstanding a new millennium of globalization with rapid technological change and 
war against international terrorism.   
It can be argued that regional cooperation was possible among sovereign states, but only 
when it was to fulfill their different national interests; member states were quick to halt 
regional cooperation or reverse integration when it no longer met their needs.  ASEAN’s 
community building efforts will still need to go a long way and it must reinvent itself and 
be more flexible in dealing with member nations’ internal problems if it is to remain 
relevant with changing global situation.  Recent discussions within ASEAN about 
Myanmar’s military government showed that the regional association was relaxing its 
widely criticized policy of non-interference in its members’ internal affairs.  As former 
Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas pointed, the informal adoption of the principle of 
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enhanced interaction in 1998 by ASEAN should continue to be honoured and further 
refined.  This principle calls for the group to comment on domestic issues that portray all 
member states in a negative light.  Alatas also added that ASEAN should be able to 
develop an agreed mechanism through which member states could work together to help 
a member country in addressing internal problems with clear external implications.559  If 
the development of a regional community is a gradual and evolutionary process, then 
there can have some optimism about ASEAN’s future prospects of identity-building 
because ASEAN has some of its own community indicators as well as failures and 
successes in the past of its experience.  However, any failure of ASEAN to reach at a 
consensus on more extensive and effective rules of behaviour and regional code of 
conduct will hinder the regional association from making any further progress. 
 
 
4.5   ASEAN’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Region      
 
Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN seek to engage in an active agenda for political 
and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. By collaborating with major powers 
in the region, ASEAN attempted to exploit its unique advantage by taking the formal 
political initiative to advocate its own model of multilateralism. ASEAN was able to play 
a central diplomatic role in promoting and defining the new multilateral structure for two 
reasons. First, the Association was an acceptable interlocutor to all the major regional 
powers. Neither the United States nor Japan wished to take the lead in the undertaking, 
while China would have been most reluctant to join any multilateral venture formally 
initiated by either power. China’s problematic relations with the US and Japan were 
based in part on the suspicion that they were engaged in a tacit policy of containment at 
China’s expense. Second, the ASEAN model was particularly appropriate for the post-
Cold War era in which regional tensions were no longer expressed in a tangible and 
imminent common threat that called for a countervailing military coalition. To that 
extent, the undertaking made no unpalatable political or economic demands on potential 
members.560 
 
ASEAN also supported the concept of an Asia-Pacific community premised on US 
strategic, political and economic engagement, and on recognition of China as a major 
power in the region. It played a leading procedural role in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and endorsed the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
The enlargement process of the ASEAN also allowed to maintain its diplomatic centrality 
and to speak for ‘one Southeast Asia’ by representing its 500 million people.561 Recently 
ASEAN has taken another important step by deciding to pursue the establishment of an 
East Asian economic community. This initiative was motivated in part by disillusionment 
with the perceived lack of U.S. support for countries affected by the 1997 financial crisis. 
Moreover, the ASEAN nations wish to further integrate China while securing from it a 
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greater commitment to the regional affairs. But the idea of a regional economic 
community still faces powerful obstacles. Long-time rivalry between China and Japan is 
not amenable to ASEAN's mediation efforts and ASEAN members and China disagrees 
over the participation of non-East Asian nations. Due to intensive lobbying by Japanese 
and Singaporean leaders, Australia, India, and New Zealand were invited to participate in 
the East Asian Summit. But this does not reconcile the geographic scope of the East 
Asian Community, as China still desires the group to keep out non-East Asian nations, 
including the United States.562 Within the Asia-Pacific, there is no other historical 
example of a group of lesser states assuming such a diplomatic centrality in fostering a 
multilateral security arrangement that involved all major regional powers. That centrality 
would also seem to be at odds with the experience of the nineteenth-century Concert of 
Europe, since the very notion of a concert is based on the role of major powers as 
defining members. In fact, ASEAN can take such a crucial role in shaping regional 
cooperation because the major Asia-Pacific powers have been incapable of forming a 
concert arrangement among them.563 
 
4.5.1 The ASEAN and the Rising China 
 
The rising power in Asia-Pacific as the twenty-first century approaches is definitely 
China. China’s successful post-Cold War economic reforms have provided it with a 
historic opportunity to realize a sense of national destiny, which many regional states 
view with a careful recognition. It has also modernized its economy by opening up to the 
capitalist world, including that of the Asia-Pacific, which has reciprocated by opening up 
to China.564 In any part of the globe, small and fragmented states direct their attention 
towards larger neighbours who would, by their presence alone, become a source of 
apprehension. The states of Southeast Asia are only too well aware of the disparity that 
exists between themselves and a populous and relatively homogenous state with a long 
tradition of centralized rule. Size, organization and resources distinguish China from its 
southern neighbours who remain ethically and politically divided and, in some cases, 
beset by the kind of mutual suspicion that prevent cooperation among them. The 
observation of one critic wrote that “In Southeast Asia the realization of the fact of the 
new powerful China ... is causing the nations of the region to explore the possibility of 
closer cooperation, but still dividing them as to whether this should be directed against 
Chinese influence, or seek to accommodate with it.”565 
 
China welcomed the enlargement of the ASEAN and stated that it would be more closely 
connected to China. China’s claims in the South China Sea made it the only major power 
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to pose a direct challenge to the territorial interests of Southeast Asian countries, and the 
ASEAN expected to emerge from enlargement better able to command the attention and 
respect of its massive neighbour. However, while enlargement increased ASEAN’s 
weight in terms of population, as well as economically, this would not automatically gain 
Beijing’s respect. Expansion, together with economic crisis and upheaval in Indonesia, 
make it more difficult for the ASEAN to present itself as a cohesive force, and 
complicate its efforts to forge a common approach to China.566 In admitting Myanmar 
without a guaranteed way of weakening its reliance on Beijing, the ASEAN gambled 
with the organization’s capacity to reach consensus on response to Chinese assertiveness 
in the South China Sea. Myanmar does not have claims there, diminishing its right to 
speak on the issue. Given Beijing’s support for the Yangon regime, Myanmar could be 
reluctant to join any ASEAN consensus to censure China, or could be pressured by 
Beijing into not doing so. Laos and Cambodia, as non-claimants with positive but less 
dependent relationship with China, would be unlikely to challenge the positions of 
claimant states.567  
 
The ARF, as an annual occasion, appears to have had some moderating influence on 
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, but not necessarily through any intrinsic 
institutional qualities, so far. China has been willing to put its assertiveness on hold to 
engage in a united front strategy with the ASEAN as a tacit diplomatic partner to resist 
pressures from the US and Japan. On the other hand, China as the rising regional power, 
has attracted the most attention in exploring the merits of the new-found multilateralism 
in Asia-Pacific, and in the degree to which that multilateralism may be capable of 
inducing members into the canons of good regional citizenship.568 
 
China initially opposed multilateralism in Asia-Pacific security relations. It was fearful 
that the ARF could be manipulated by larger powers like the USA to apply pressure on 
China to compromise on its territorial claims and constraint its legitimate geopolitical 
role. Moreover, China was suspicious that the ARF might develop into a tool in the hands 
of the Western powers for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Asian member states. 
Furthermore, the possibility that the ARF could develop into an anti-Chinese bandwagon 
of its smaller neighbours was, and remains, unsettling to many Chinese strategists who 
see engagement in multilateral security cooperation as a novel enterprise with no 
precedent in Chinese history. Concerning with Chinese attitudes towards multilateralism, 
one concluded that the Chinese expect that bilateral relations and the balance of power 
among the major powers will continue to be the primary factors affecting stability in the 
Asia-Pacific, not a multilateral security structure. The majority of Chinese specialists 
portray multilateralism as largely irrelevant − or potentially damaging − to efforts aimed 
at solving or managing most of the key disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.569 
 
But after being a reluctant player in multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific 
region, China too came to take a more supportive role in the ARF. Chen Jian, the Chinese 
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Assistant Foreign Minister, stated that China would support ARF ‘as a new approach to 
regional security, an approach different from Cold War mentality, an approach which 
seeks to strengthen peace through dialogue and cooperation. China supports the ASEAN 
Way of seeking cautious and incremental progress in the ARF’s security agenda, in 
contrast to the fast-track approach favoured by the ARF’s Western members. In China’s 
view, the primary aim of the ARF should be ‘to explore political dialogue and pursue 
confidence-building’. While it has opposed a role for it in conflict resolution, China does 
accept that the ARF ‘can only move in a progressive way and make incremental progress’ 
which includes preparing ‘the groundwork for future cooperation’. China has come to 
acknowledge the usefulness of the ARF as the only multilateral venue available to it 
where it can discuss and share its security concerns and approach with Asia-Pacific 
countries. However, China is unlikely to embrace multilateralism in near future whenever 
that approach conflicts its interests and its role as a rising power in the region.570 
 
 
4.5.2 The ASEAN and Japan   
 
In the new century, the ASEAN-10 could become an experimental field − or possibly 
even a breakthrough − for Japan’s diplomacy, which so far has been used mainly to 
extend financial and technical assistance to developing nations. Japan’s participation in 
the ARF causes little concern with regard to its determination to play a more active role 
in regional security. Together with the ASEAN, Japan can allay the fears of its 
neighbours, even China and South Korea, which are also members of ARF.571 While 
supporting US strategic, political and economic engagement in Asia, the ASEAN has 
seen itself as a potential kingmaker, prodding Japan towards political and economic 
leadership. Tokyo’s readiness to assume such a role is a precondition for any pan-Asian 
grouping. Japan has, however, recognized the potential conflict between Asian leadership 
and its support for the US in Asia, complicating efforts to respond to ASEAN’s 
overtures.572 
 
ASEAN’s enlargement laid the basis for closer relations, given Tokyo’s explicit and, 
among the Association’s Western partners, unique, encouragement of ASEAN-10. Japan 
did not ask the ASEAN to exclude Myanmar, and its bilateral approach to the Yangon 
regime is less punitive than that of other Western powers. For example, it provides aid on 
the basis of case-by-case approval. Myanmar’s admission into the ASEAN has not 
disrupted Tokyo’s dialogue partnership with the Association in any respect. While Tokyo 
has asked ASEAN countries individually to press Myanmar to reform, it has not used 
Japan-ASEAN fora to do so. Tokyo’s efforts to normalize Cambodia’s international 
status also were consistent with its encouragement of ASEAN-10. Ironically, Japan’s 
proposal, which paved the way for elections in Cambodia, was an example of Japanese 
leadership in Asia − but on a matter which it was ASEAN’s responsibility to manage. As 
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a result, Tokyo did not receive widespread recognition for its initiative, either from 
within Southeast Asia, or from outside it. Japan encouraged ASEAN to admit Cambodia 
at the Summit in December 1998, before all ASEAN members had agreed on the 
timing.573 
 
Meanwhile, a continued constructive engagement approach toward some of the regional 
states, especially Myanmar and Cambodia, is essential. Japan, though it basically follows 
ASEAN’s policies, has its own position in dealing with these countries. For example, 
Tokyo decided in 1998 to resume financial assistance to Yangon after ten years of 
suspension. Financial assistance of approximately US$ 20 million will be extended to 
Myanmar, criticism form inside and outside Japan notwithstanding.574 Japan defended its 
new policy as serving the basic human needs of Myanmar citizens like assistance for 
repairing the superannuated Baluchaung hydroelectric power plant and Yangon 
International Airport. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said: “This is not a 
simple ODA (Official Development Assistance ) project. It is a emergency humanitarian 
project for Myanmar citizens. At the same time, it has a strategic significance. We want 
to encourage dialogue between Suu Kyi’s NLD and the SPDC through ODA like this. In 
the case of Myanmar, we are keeping in mind that democratization more strongly than in 
the case of any other Asian country when we use ODA.”575 
 
Simultaneously ASEAN’s stance between Japan and China (two economic giants of 
Asia) is also important for the development of its regional integration. A reform-oriented 
China should be welcomed not only by ASEAN but also by Japan. Engaging China in 
regional as well as international affairs peacefully and incrementally benefits enormously 
both ASEAN and Japan. Both must take the lead in engaging China with the world, 
thereby building stable and constructive relationships not only in the bilateral context but 
also among all the Asia Pacific nations.576 
 
As Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, stated ASEAN’s relations 
between China and Japan that a reorientation of Southeast Asia’s economic linkages  
toward China is inevitable. But Japan is still the world’s second largest economy. Japan 
still leads the world in many manufacturing industries. China’s economic weight is 
catching up with Japan, but it will take China much longer to overtake Japan in 
innovation, efficiency and technology. China’s progress, at the same time, will encourage 
Japan to reform in order to maintain influence in the region. This competitive dynamic is 
already visible.577 For ASEAN, Japan is an easy-to-manage partner because its political 
influence is minimal and its economic aid is substantial. Japan’s declining economic 
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power might create friction, but that will be managed easier than China’s growing but 
less predictable influence in politics and economics of the Asia-Pacific region.578 
 
4.5.3 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)       
          
The ARF, which held its first working session on 25 July 1994 in Bangkok, was the first 
intergovernmental multilateral security initiative that covered the entire Asia-Pacific 
region. Its heterogeneous membership includes the ten members of the ASEAN and 
thirteen other governments.579 It is the only ‘regional’ security framework in the world 
today in that all the major players of the international system (including the USA, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU) are represented. Wide membership has been matched by a thin 
institutional framework, which is deeply influenced by the ASEAN model. As one 
observer remarked, the ARF was “so underinstitutionalized and therefore the members 
don’t even call themselves members.” The ARF began (and continues) without a 
secretariat (ASEAN provided the services of a secretariat) and with no clear obligation to 
convene between the forum’s annual meetings. Its operational conventions resemble 
those of ASEAN: consensus (and nonvoting); progress at a pace comfortable to all 
participants.580   
 
ASEAN countries are well aware that they cannot depend just upon the soft constraints of 
the ARF for their future security. Hence some form of balance of power in the Asia-
Pacific with an American military component is regarded as essential, though this may 
not be articulated often or by all publicly, and there may be different emphases on the 
nature and mode of management of this balance.581 No ASEAN country sees the ARF as 
a substitute for balance of power mechanisms in the short term. But because the ASEAN 
states cannot individually or collectively aspire to defense self-reliance, a policy of 
military balancing would amount to increase dependence on external security guarantees. 
To prevent this, a balance of power approach has to be supplemented by multilateral 
security dialogues and cooperation. To this end, multilateral diplomacy may be used to 
enhance the prospects for a more predictable and constructive relationship among the 
major powers.582  
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The ASEAN acts as a caucus within the ARF, and so ist ability to reach consensus on 
strategic issues is important to how they are treated within the Forum at large. ASEAN’s 
expansion has political and operational implications for the regional security dialogue 
because the Association’s greater diversity of strategic outlook could make it more 
difficult to reach agreement on issues of substance. At an institutional level, ASEAN’s 
enlargement has rekindled the issue of its capacity − and right − to chair the ARF. New 
members intend to take up their chairing responsibilities when alphabetical rotation 
begins in 2001, with Cambodia assuming the ASEAN chair in 2002, and hosting the ARF 
in 2003. While the admission of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos into the ARF was 
accepted without reference to their domestic political situations, membership and 
chairing are not equivalent functions.583 
 
The limited organizational capacity of ASEAN’s new members means that they may be 
unable to ensure that progress is made during their year as chair. The chair of the ARF’s 
1997 meeting, Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi, was instrumental in obtaining 
agreement for the ARF chair could facilitate preventive diplomacy but, given the 
resource limitations and credibility questions concerning some of ASEAN’s new 
members, this is unlikely to succeed. The region will need to confront the irony that, at 
least nominally, its weakest and least stable nations may assume responsibility for 
guiding the security dialogue, while its strongest and most stable ones cannot.584 
 
The ARF’s approach to regional security cooperation is the cautious and incremental one 
derived from the ASEAN Way and ASEAN’s security culture.585 This was evident from a 
document entitled ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper’ circulated by 
ASEAN at the second ARF meeting held in Brunei on 1 August 1995. The paper, which 
has served as a blueprint for the ARF, envisaged three categories of security cooperation: 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (later changed to 
‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts’ as a concession to China which did not want 
multilateral action to resolve territorial disputes and also warned against rapid 
institutionalization of the ARF.586 The model of a weakly institutionalized and continuing 
dialogue on security in the Pacific is regarded by some as the principal achievement of 
the ARF. Although China’s deep suspicion of precise and binding multilateral 
commitment threatened the ARF, its supporters claim that China’s “comfort level” has 
shifted over time with participation in the forum and that China’s incorporation in such a 
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framework, however loose and imprecise, is valuable for regional cooperation and 
conflict management.587 
 
From the very beginning, the ASEAN members sought to ‘dominate and set the pace’ of 
ARF, and occupy ‘the driver’s seat’ while recognizing ‘the concerns and interests of 
outside powers’.588 The non-ASEAN states within the Forum had conceded the title 
‘ASEAN Regional Forum’ as a transitional measure only, expecting that in time the 
structure would become known as the Asian Regional Forum, reflecting its true scope 
and membership. That prospect has become a source of tension within the ARF as 
ASEAN insists on retaining the central diplomatic role, supported by China, which fears 
that US interests might dominate the enterprise.589 
 
As a severe criticism, Michael Leifer mentioned the ARF to be a ‘highly imperfect 
diplomatic instrument for coping with the new and uncertain security context’.590 
According to him, the prerequisite for a successful ARF may well be the prior existence 
of a stable balance of power. The central issue in the case of the ARF is whether, in 
addition to diplomatic encouragement for a culture of cooperation driven partly by 
economic interdependence, the region shows the markings of a stable, supporting balance 
or distribution of power that would allow the multilateral venture to proceed in 
circumstances of some predictability. The ARF’s structural problem is that its validity 
seems to depend on the prior existence of a stable balance, but it is not really in a position 
to create it.591  
  
Meanwhile one critic argued that the cooperative security measures undertaken by the 
ARF conformed to the ‘Asian Way’ because their design and development has been in 
accord with the ‘Asian Way’ − i.e., they have involved evolutionary developments from 
extant regional structures rather than the importation of Western modalities or the 
creation of new structures; decisions are made by ‘consensus after careful and extensive 
consultations’ rather than by voting; and the implementation of particular measures 
eschews legalism and is left to voluntary compliance.592   
 
While espousing the norms of multilateralism and cooperative security by participating in 
the ARF, the ASEAN countries do see a stable balance among the major powers of the 
Asia Pacific region as a key ingredient of regional order. Regional security requires an 
‘equilibrium among them [ the major powers ] and between them and Southeast Asia’. 
On the other hand, their recognition of the need for a balance among the major powers of 
the Asia Pacific region is a qualified one. A careful reading of the ASEAN states’ 
position would suggest that a distinction is made between balance of power as an 
outcome and balance of power as an approach. For the ASEAN states, the balance of 
power as an actual situation or state of affairs is certainly preferable. On the other hand, a 
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multilateral forum like the ARF may also be able to help create a ‘situation of 
equilibrium’ among the major powers through the creation of norms and habits of 
cooperation.593 
 
 
4.5.4 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)        
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been one of the institutions 
established in the post Cold War period for the purpose of regional dialogue and 
cooperation. APEC predates the ARF and it is also a product of the end of the Cold War, 
the decline in the economic confidence of the United States, and the relative shift of 
economic power to East Asia. APEC is not a security organization but indirectly it plays 
an important role for regional security. Rapid economic growth and interdependence 
underpin security in East Asia. Conflicts within and between states can arise if economics 
go wrong. It is in everyone’ interest to see the present virtuous circle of prosperity 
leading to more guaranteed security which in turn contributes to more continuous 
prosperity.594  
 
In November 1989, at Australia’s initiative, a new form of multilateral economic 
structure, APEC, had emerged which has since been sustained in institutional from 
through a small secretariat based in Singapore. APEC assumed a political significance in 
November 1993 when, following a proposal by US President Bill Clinton, annual 
meetings of heads of government were added to those of its economic ministers. APEC’s 
formation reflected regional concerns about developing restrictive trading blocs outside 
Asia, as well as the burgeoning sense of self-confidence among Asia-Pacific states that 
came from their astounding economic achievements which the World Bank was to 
describe, somewhat less than accurately, as the ‘East Asian Miracle’.595 APEC currently 
has 21 members: Australia; Brunei; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; 
Japan; South Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; the 
Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Taiwan; Thailand; USA; Vietnam.596  
 
Unlike the ARF, APEC does not rely on ASEAN as its ‘driving force’. APEC is not 
chaired exclusively by ASEAN countries, nor does the ASEAN consensus necessarily 
determine the position which its memebers take in APEC. Strains within the Association 
are thus less likely to slow APEC’s agenda. ASEAN’s enlargement has underscored the 
loose relationship between the Association and APEC since Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar will not be admitted before 2007 at the earliest. As a result of enlargement, the 
ASEAN is divided in APEC between accepted countries − the ASEAN-6 and Vietnam − 
and non-accepted ones.597 
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Nonetheless, APEC has played an important role in promoting trade and investment 
liberalization in the region. As a result of these efforts, APEC markets are considerably 
more open today than they were ten years ago, creating new opportunities for all 
participant countries. APEC has also played a complementary role to the International 
Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions in fostering a rapid Asian 
economic recovery.598 APEC encourages its members to pursue appropriate 
macroeconomic policies that stimulate domestic demand, and microeconomic polices to 
promote financial and corporate restructuring and attract investment. On the other hand, 
APEC is promoting increased transparency, openness and predictability based on the rule 
of law. APEC seeks to eliminate impediments to trade and investment by encouraging 
member economies to reduce barriers, adopt transparent, market-oriented policies and 
address such issues as unequal labor productivity, restricted mobility of business persons 
and outdated telecommunications regulatory practices.599 
 
In its first years APEC emphasized consultation and dialogue, rather than binding 
commitments, a trajectory that clearly placed it in a nonlegalized mold that resembled 
other regional institutions. This pattern matched the preferences of ASEAN and of China, 
the two key constraints on the ARF’s construction as well. APEC’s institutional design 
has included a prominent role for informal advisory groups, such as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, the Eminent Persons Group, and the APEC Business Advisory 
Council, but it remains an intergovernmental group. Its small secretariat relies heavily on 
working groups to arrive at consensus.600  
 
As the name of APEC itself indicates, its precise character as an institution has been a 
matter of debate since its foundation. One defends APEC as a process that constraints and 
informs governments through ongoing dialogue, a process that also explicitly engages the 
private sector, which has been the source of Pacific economic integration. Another 
labeled APEC as an ‘open economic association that represents economic integration 
without formal institutions’. Unlike the ASEAN, whose members were all Asian 
developing countries, or the ARF, in which sovereignty costs produced a broader 
consensus against legalization, APEC contained what one critic calls two “competing 
logics” that coalesced around the dimensions of legalization: Asian preferences for “lack 
of specificity in agreements” and “an informal, incremental bottom-up approach to 
regional cooperation” were juxtaposed with Western models based on “formal 
institutions established by contractual agreements.”601 
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4.5.5 ASEAN Plus Three (APT): Strategy of Engagement to Major Regional Powers 
 
The meetings between ASEAN and three Northeast Asian countries: China, Japan and 
South Korea were started in 1996 as part of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) and later 
they become known as ASEAN Plus Three (APT).  Due to the 1997 Asian financial 
Crisis and the failure of the existing Asia Pacific regional institutions to manage the 
crisis, APT became the premiere forum for financial regionalism in East Asia.  Moreover, 
the development of APT has been fuelled by regional antipathy toward the IMF’s 
handling of the crisis, and the willingness of Southeast Asian countries to engage their 
economies with the more robust economies of Northeast Asia.  Difficulties in the 
development of international trading agreements and the regional desire to integrate 
China into East Asia have also fostered the APT process.602 
 
In the aftermath of the 1997 Crisis, ASEAN has been left weakened by paramount 
internal diversities and failure to deepen ASEAN integration.  It was under immense 
pressure to prove its relevance with the changing regional situation.  In order to remedy 
this weakness, APT provides a great opportunity for ASEAN to improve its credentials as 
a regional actor.  Some successes and shows of goodwill in APT context at the initial 
stage have been indeed easier to achieve than substantial progress in the various long-run 
projects of ASEAN integration.  In addition, APT process vividly provides a chance for 
ASEAN countries to confront the trend of increasing bilateralization and diversification 
of its members’ relations with the two poles of East Asia – China and Japan – and 
therefore represent and coordinate interests of Southeast Asia vis-à-vis these two poles 
more effectively.603 
 
As APT grouping is getting more and more institutionalized, there is a possibility that in 
the future the thirteen countries may be holding ministerial meetings in all areas, ranging 
from the social to the cultural and environmental fields.  There are some suggestions that 
APT forum may one day replace ASEAN as the pre-eminent locus for regional 
cooperation.604  A process similar to the European cooperation would probably arise 
across the region, though the idea of a constructing a larger union is still far beyond the 
horizon of East Asia.  Like participating in ARF, APT also encouraged ASEAN countries 
to contend with a rising China, hoping to benefit from the enormous Chinese market.  On 
the other hand, China needs indeed stability – both internally and externally – for its 
continuous growth and progress.  Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, engaging and 
stabilizing ASEAN is also very important.605 
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APT can bring several tangible benefits not only for ASEAN countries but also for the 
three Northeast Asian bigger participants.  APT has a combined population and market of 
almost two billion people, with more than 1.45 billion in Northeast Asia and more than 
500 million in Southeast Asia.  The purchasing power of the East Asian countries and 
ASEAN differ from the very high end in Japan, South Korea and Singapore to the lower 
end in pockets of China and in many areas in Southeast Asia.  This giant market has, 
however, high potential for growth, growing consumer demand and increasing 
purchasing power.  Potential for economic synergies abounds in terms of establishing 
production and manufacturing chains across the whole region, which could take into 
account the comparative advantages and the economies of scale of these diverse regional 
countries.  Therefore, cooperation through APT process carries the perspective of 
common growth and prosperity throughout the region.  Strategically, ASEAN needs a 
bigger Asian entity to regain its former momentum of regional growth.  A larger and 
more diverse market would definitely stimulate the growth of ASEAN through exports 
and foreign investments as well.  It would also accelerate an impetus for the laggard 
countries within ASEAN as a bigger and liberalized market would provide both pressure 
and incentive simultaneously.606 
 
Many of APT members favour more to a pro-Western Asia-Pacific tendency for East 
Asian cooperation than exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism.  Rather China prefer 
to the latter typology due to its foreign policy paradigm of multipolarity.  Concerning 
with economic integration in APT, China’s proposed Free Trade area with the ASEAN 
led to a dividing line for the ongoing APT.  It has triggered fierce competition between 
Japan and China for influence and Japan is stepping up its political and economic 
stronghold in the region to balance the rise of China.  It looks like that Japan and China 
become strategic opponents rather than harbingers of community building in East Asia 
because of their contending behaviour vis-à-vis ASEAN.  In spite of its divisions and 
uncertainties, the dynamic of APT has already had an impact on the political and 
economic arena of East Asia.  Meanwhile, ASEAN members can be comfortable with the 
North Asian giants, which are struggling for influence in the region and also competing 
with each other to accommodate their Southeast Asian neighbours at the best they can.   
ASEAN members should be able to enhance its political stature in relation to China and 
Japan by advantaging politically and economically from their strategic rivalry.607 
 
 
4.5.6 ASEAN’s cooperation and efforts in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia 
 
In the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks in America, the Bombings in Bali and 
Marriot Hotel in Indonesia, the threat of terrorism has become a dominant theme in the 
ASEAN’s agenda of cooperation in countering transnational crime in the region.  The 
ASEAN leaders formulated a strong declaratory position on the issue of terrorism at their 
summit in November 2001.  Terrorism was denounced in ASEAN’s press statements as a 
formidable challenge not only to regional and international peace and stability but also to 
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economic development of countries.608  The ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to 
Counter Terrorism was approved by the heads of states and governments at this summit.  
It declared their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all kinds of terrorism in 
compliance with international law and the UN Charter.   It called for regional efforts to 
combat terrorism and to introduce counterterrorism measures, which include the 
improvement of national mechanisms to fight terrorism, the ratification of all anti-
terrorist conventions, more cooperation among law enforcement agencies and better 
exchanges of information among countries.609  However, the real implementation of all 
these broad recommendations was still in question because no concrete steps were taken 
since then after that summit. 
 
Moreover, it can be argued that the ASEAN’s declaration on terrorism was not derived 
from a real consensus among the member countries because of diverse interests between 
Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore on the other.  
This situation made efforts difficult for the attainment of a regional agreement and the 
formulation of tangible measures in combating terrorism.  Malaysia’s Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad and the Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo quickly 
supported the American war on terrorism by using it as an excuse for domestic political 
benefits.  Mahathir described the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) as a party 
of Islamic extremists by taking advantage of September 11 scenario.  Arroyo also 
responded without hesitation in countering domestic Islamic insurgent group called Abu 
Sayyaf as an international terrorist organization and took US military assistance in 
fighting against that group on Basilan Island.  Singapore feared the consequences on its 
business confidence and economic progress from a possible terrorist attack on its island 
so took vigorous measures encountering terrorism.  Meanwhile, Indonesian President 
Magawati Sukanoputri had more difficult situation than its neighbours in countering 
terrorism in the country in light of domestic opposition from numerous Islamic groups 
against the US.  Initially, Indonesia gave unconditional support for the US after 
September 11 attacks but later backtracked from the position because of opposition from 
domestic Muslim organizations whose support the government also requires in its 
political arena.  Indonesia’s ambivalent stance and lack of political will in combating 
terrorism sometimes made annoyed to the US and also frustrated its other neighbours.  
For example, Singaporean Senior Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in February 2002 said 
that city-state would be at risk of terrorist attacks as long as leaders of regional extremist 
cells were still at large in Indonesia.610 
 
The US and the ASEAN signed a joint declaration on counterterrorism at the 35th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2002 in Brunei.  The agreement was a political 
statement that confirmed ASEAN’s commitment to the war against terrorism.  Still, it 
failed to include concrete measures against terrorism and the declaration was a non-
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binding agreement that might also be similar to the Anti-terrorism Accord reached by 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in May 2002 and later signed by Cambodia and 
Thailand.  The US-ASEAN declaration did not include significantly military operations 
or the deployment of American troops in Southeast Asia.  Before this statement, 
Indonesia and Vietnam rejected any clause that might allow the involvement of American 
forces in the region on the ground that will undermine the principles of national 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of other states.  Having shown from bomb 
attacks in Indonesia and recent arrests of terrorist ringleaders throughout the region, it 
comes to believe that Southeast Asia has become a second front in the war against 
terrorism.  However, the ASEAN’s response against terrorism was limited and sometimes 
not effective in overall view.611 
 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
 
ASEAN has achieved some positive images during its four decades long existence. 
Firstly, there has been no major armed confrontation or war among ASEAN fellow 
members since 1967 despite occasional border skirmishes such as between Myanmar and 
Thailand in 2001 as well as political tensions arising from bilateral territorial disputes 
notably between Malaysia and Singapore.  Secondly, ASEAN played a very crucial role 
as a regional interlocutor in solving the years long Cambodian conflict by bringing the 
disputing parties to the negotiating table in 1989 and reaching a peace accord in 1991. 
Finally, ASEAN built up itself as Asia’s only multipurpose regional organization since 
the end of the Cold War by providing the platform that engages a rising China and other 
major players from East Asia. It should be noted that China might not have joined the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) unless there is neutral facilitating role of the ASEAN as 
China is deeply suspicious of the US participation in the Forum.612  
 
However, the ASEAN is also not exempt from hindrance for accelerating its efforts to 
accomplish a greater regional cooperation. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought a 
series of setbacks for the ASEAN. This crisis severely crippled the economies of three of 
ASEAN's founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, which were defenseless 
in coping with the crisis. Even after recovering from the crisis, ASEAN nowadays has 
many new challenges to tackle. It is still far away to match effectively the enormous 
economic dynamism of China and India. Its policy of constructive engagement in dealing 
with Myanmar has been unable to bring any positive political changes in that military 
ruled country. ASEAN has also been incompetent in facing with severe air pollution in 
Southeast Asia skies caused by annual forest fires from Indonesia. Critics have argued 
that the organization is becoming increasingly irrelevant due to its ironclad commitment 
to national sovereignty and a longstanding policy of noninterference. Responding to 
criticisms that the old ASEAN way no longer works, the association is trying to reform 
and strengthen itself. The ASEAN Charter, a constitutional document that will be ready 
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by the end of 2007, plays a major role in this process. The nongovernmental Eminent 
Persons’ Group (EPG), which is composed of old hands of the ASEAN, is responsible for 
formulating that ASEAN Charter. EPG brought some bold ideas and recommended a 
formal dispute-settlement mechanism in all arenas of regional cooperation, especially 
regarding with economic and political issues; decision-making by majority vote rather 
than consensus in areas other than security and foreign policy; and steps to monitor 
compliance with ASEAN's objectives, principles, decisions, agreements, and timetables. 
Contrary to the ASEAN’s present principal rules of engagement, the EPG even proposed 
sanctions against members who are in "serious breach" of any of these terms of the 
charter, including loss of membership rights and privileges or, in extraordinary 
circumstances, expulsion from the organization. Nevertheless, it would still be difficult to 
reach that end point of sanctions mechanism recommended by the EPG because member 
governments might turn it down without hesitation when they got their hands on the EPG 
report. But ASEAN is in some ways reinventing itself and it will continue to play an 
influential role in the region. Despite its shortcomings, ASEAN remains the most 
successful regional organization in the developing world and the hub of multilateral 
diplomacy in Southeast Asia.613 
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V. Critical Assessment of Governance in the EU and the ASEAN: A 
Comparative Analysis 
 
This study is a comparative analysis of different approaches to regional integration 
between the EU and the ASEAN as well as their changing modes of governance resulting 
from these approaches respectively.  For the comprehensive understanding of politics and 
policy-making in the EU and the ASEAN, an analytical study of institutional designs, 
structures and organizational developments was carried out.  Categories of analysis 
consist of macro, meso and micro levels of observations relating to policy interests, 
decision-making processes, institutional and structural changes of both organizations. 
Focus is to explain the major differences between the EU and the ASEAN and also to 
study internal factors and major processes, which determine the achievements, failures 
and stagnations of both organizations in the past decades. For analysis of policy-making 
and governance in the EU and the ASEAN, case studies on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, 
ASEAN political and security cooperation, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) have been done. 
       
The term of governance is synthetic and can be seen everywhere in the current EU 
literature: it comes out of a mix of factors, including political leadership, institutional 
decision-making and competition, state-society relations, electoral politics, and etc.614 
Simplest definition is that governance is the imposition of overall direction or control on 
the allocation of valued resources.615 Major questions are: how valued resources are 
legitimately allocated and dispersed in the EU and how do these ways and means of 
allocation, that is, the governance of the EU, impose upon the member states? Why 
sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to coordinate their core 
political and economic policies by surrendering and pooling their sovereignty within an 
international institution? Further critical question, therefore, centers on whether the EU is 
in fact a system of governance with its own sui generis polity or whether it is just a useful 
instrument of its member states. 
 
This study attempts to give a comprehensive view of the governance approach that has 
played an important role in the vitalization of regional integration studies in the recent 
years. Governance can be roughly understood as the intentional regulation of social 
relationships and the underlying conflicts by reliable and durable means and institutions, 
instead of the direct use of power and violence. In this way, governance is to regard as 
the ability to make collectively binding decisions. Reviewing the governance in the EU is 
                                                 
614 Promoting new form of European Governance is a strategic objective of the EU Commission and for 
that purpose the Commission published a White Paper on European Governance on 25th July 2001 for 
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Governance. As a remedy to eradicate the democratic deficit in the EU, the White Paper proposes opening 
up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU 
policy. In short, this White Paper mainly concerns with proposals suggesting how effective the EU can be 
in using the powers given by its citizens.  
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not a competing approach to classical integration theory but a complement itself. Both 
integration theory and governance approach inquire two different but complementary 
questions: the former on the causes and outcomes of polity development while the latter 
on forms, outcomes, problems and development paths of governance in the EU polity. In 
the first case, the shape of the EU polity is the dependent variable while it is the 
independent variable for the governance approach.616  
 
The governance agenda in international relations mainly emphasizes on the structuring of 
state behaviour by international institutions so international regimes play a leading role in 
explaining the cooperation of actors. In comparative politics, however, it is more related 
to the growing segmentation of both society and the state resulting from socio-economic 
dynamics. Even though both approaches differ in their origins and emphases, both have 
one thing in common that they stress new process of governing somehow in the absence 
of a central authority. All in all, governance is particularly concerned with the structured 
ways and means in which the divergent preferences of interdependent actors are 
translated into policy choices to allocate values, so that the plurality of interests is 
transformed into coordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved.617 
 
 
EU 
 
If international politics is no longer based on the core principle of sovereign statehood, 
how are governance and its changing different modes being conducted in the 
contemporary globalizing world?  But it cannot be argued that it is the beginning of the 
demise of state because the persistence of state sovereignty will continue to exist in 
parallel with a new structure of governance in respective forms. 
  
There are some key arguments to European integration and its dimensions of changing 
modes of governance. Most relevant ones are (1) Supranational governance, (2) 
Intergovernmental governance, (3) Multilevel governance, and (4) Network governance. 
 
( 1 ) Major argument of supranational approach to European integration and its 
governance is that regional integration evolves as a gradual process and supranational 
institutions are political actors in their own right in that process. Supranational 
governance involves the loss of sovereignty from member states to some extent and 
gradual development of own authority for the EU itself. It maintains that the emergence 
of a new polity above the level of the state can be seen although states still exist as major 
actors. Integration is to some extent driven by institutional dynamics and supranational 
laws that provide constraints for member states.618 
                                                 
616 Markus Jachtenfuchs (2001): “The Governance Approach to European Integration”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 245-257. 
617 Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch. (1999): “Introduction: Network governance in the European 
Union”, in: Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (eds.): “The Transformation of Governance in the 
European Union”, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 4-5. 
618 Thomas Christiansen (2001): “European and regional integration”, in: John Baylis and Steve Smith 
(eds): “The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations”, New York, 
Oxford University Press, p. 500. 
  
 
212
 
( 2 ) Intergovernmental approach poses that the EU is controlled by governments of 
member states which are working with each other as partners.  This state-centric model 
holds that states are ultimate decision makers, delegating limited authority to 
supranational institutions to achieve specific policy goals. It looked at European 
integration as a series of ‘bargaining’ among national governments of member states 
which will reflect own national interests. To some extent, supranational institutions arise 
but they only serve the utmost aim of national governments by assisting and facilitating 
negotiations among states.619 Intergovernmentalists formulate the EU as the framework 
for the execution of inter-state politics by different means and supranational laws that 
reflect the interests of powerful member states.620 
 
( 3 ) Multilevel governance concept rested on two essential points. First, the national 
central governments could no longer monopolize the contacts between the country and 
the EU levels of policy-making.621 Decision-making competencies are shared by actors at 
different levels rather than monopolized by states. Still, national governments play an 
important role but the independent role of European-level actors like European 
Commission and European Parliament must also be considered to explain European 
policy-making.622 Secondly, the engagement and participation at the European level 
created an opportunity to reinforce a phenomenon of regionalization in parallel with 
Europeanization.623 It will have the implication that domestic polities of member states 
were being partially reshaped as a consequence of EU policy-making.624 Subnational 
actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational 
associations in the process. In this point, complex interrelationships in domestic politics 
do not stop at the national state but extend to the European level.625 
 
( 4 ) The core idea of a network type of governance is that political actors consider 
problem-solving as the essence of politics and that the setting of policy-making is defined 
by the existence of highly organized social sub-systems.  Therefore, such a setting 
requires efficient and effective governing which has to pay tribute to the specific 
rationalities of these sub-systems. The state is vertically and horizontally segmented and 
its role has changed from authoritative allocation from above to the role of an activator in 
the EU network governance structure. As a result, the level of political action ranges from 
the central EU level to decentral sub-national levels in the member states. The dominant 
orientation of the participant actors is towards the upgrading of common interests in the 
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pursuit of individual interests. Important in this concept is the idea that interests are not 
given but that they may evolve and get redefined in the process of negotiations among the 
participants of the network.626 
 
A broader view of network governance is characterized by consociation as the basic 
principle of organizing political relations on one hand and the pursuit of individual 
interests as the constitutive logic of the polity.627 It is a kind of micro-constitutionalism of 
the EU by assuming that society constituted by a number of sub-systems that broadly 
function depending on their own autonomous logic. For maintaining the efficiency of its 
operating system, the autonomy of these sub-systems should be respected.628 
 
Some critics question the assumption that intergovernmental and supranational 
approaches are the two extremes of a continuum, which means, they are a zero-sum game 
(one balances or cancels out the other) and therefore they cannot exist together. However, 
such a very stark contrast of two approaches is coexisting together in the EU polity. It can 
be argued, for instance, that governments cooperate out of their own need, and that this is 
not a matter of surrendering sovereignty, but pooling as much of it as is necessary for the 
joint performance of a particular task for seeking their own interests. Major changes in 
EU policy and policy-making structures emerge from the convergence of national 
governments’ preferences rather than external or internal pressure.629 EU is moving 
toward further institutional changes in parallel with the increasing Europeanization of the 
institutional set up in the member states after its eastern enlargement. The interaction and 
exchanges between national and European institutions have become increasingly 
intensive and closely interconnected. National institutions of member states have to adapt 
their structures and procedures to be consistent with the activities at the EU level. 
 
The EU can be described as an experiment of regional integration in pooling sovereignty 
through its sui generis forms of multilevel and network governance, not in the way of 
transferring it directly from states to supranational institutions. In other words, the EU 
governance lies at a point somewhere between supranational-intergovernmental 
dichotomy by combining the elements of multilevel and network governance. It is 
possible to conclude that cooperation among European states has changed the system of 
state interaction and produced a new mode of governance but it has not eliminated state 
sovereignty. Integration occurs when sovereign states pursue their national interests by 
negotiating cooperative agreements and bargaining the maximum gains. 
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ASEAN 
 
The fact that ASEAN regional cooperation mostly remains under state-centric model 
underlines the necessity for more reconciliation between regional and national interests to 
promote effective governance in the ASEAN. There also exists a lack of consensus 
among the ASEAN member states on how the ASEAN should restructure its own 
identity. Major obstacle in that matter is the perceived relationship between state 
sovereignty and regional integration. Governance in the ASEAN can be understood as an 
elite-driven intergovernmental approach comparing with the EU’s multi-tiered 
governance structure. An important question emerges as to whether the EU and the 
ASEAN member states can learn from each other’s experience in developing their 
approach to regional governance. How do the EU and the ASEAN proceed in their ways 
about reconciling state-centric views of sovereignty with regional integration? 
 
Although political systems in the ASEAN range from democracies to semi-democracies 
and authoritarian regimes, most of the ASEAN countries share the basic characteristics of 
elite governance political systems where political power was largely in the hands of elites 
despite there exists some level of citizen participation.630 In order to maintain elite rule 
and its legitimacy, political elites usually rely on two key policy instruments – growth 
and distribution. On the one hand, political elites require the support of citizens to uphold 
their right to rule and ensure political order by creating material wealth for citizens – the 
notion of performance legitimacy, which remains prevailing phenomenon in many 
ASEAN member states. On the other hand, elite rule is sustained by means of unity and 
accommodation between members of the elite or governing coalitions. Therefore, 
political elites selectively distribute economic benefits to their elite partners as a primary 
means to achieve elite unity.631 
 
The ASEAN’s formation and development is mainly driven by a sovereignty-obsessed 
politics of regional security and influence, not particularly by a politics of economic 
interdependence and deep aspects of regional integration project like the EU.632 The 
ASEAN pattern of regional integration is a bottom-up principle without much paper work 
and legal bindings. It is a kind of elite-driven, flexible, informal and non-binding and 
therefore leading to less competing capacity compared with the EU. However, it can still 
produce some economic outcomes if it succeeds in lowering its transaction costs for 
ASEAN free trade area. To some extent, this pattern is more suited to invite extremely 
heterogeneous states to become new members and therefore does not lead to political 
exclusion. Yet, it cannot largely improve collective bargaining power of regional 
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organization relative to the individual bargaining power of countries. Such a scenario can 
clearly be seen during Asian financial crisis.633 
 
First major steps of the ASEAN towards economic regional integration were only 
initiated in the early 1990s by implementing AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and 
formulating the 1996 Protocol concerning the establishment of an economic Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms. The former requires member states to fulfill the commitment of 
ambitious tariff reductions according to a scheduled timetable and the latter represents the 
first ever institutionalization of non-consensual ASEAN decision-making. Nowadays, the 
ASEAN is under tremendous pressure to move forward by launching more binding and 
legalized economic integration for attracting more foreign direct investment as well as 
finding external markets for their exports. If regional economic liberalization within the 
ASEAN is to progress beyond its present status, it will be necessary for a further change 
of policy from the ASEAN Way which is still the organization’s modus operandi. 
However, such a development is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future due to 
overriding sovereignty concerns of member states. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to remain 
as a weakly institutionalized intergovernmental organization with limited effectiveness 
due to the member states’ overcautious preservation of internal and external sovereignty. 
In terms of the current studies of contemporary regional integration and governance, the 
ASEAN case suggests that the European experience has limited relevance outside 
Europe.634 It can also be argued that the most fundamental beliefs underpinning ASEAN 
like the ASEAN Way actually hinder against successful implementation of an effective 
mode of regional governance and the creation of a strong regional community. 
       
According to John Dosch and Manfred Mols, integration as a process means tight 
ramified and multiple interactions between involved actors on a broad span of policy 
issues and concerns. Integration as a product or condition refers to the existence of a new 
centre of decision-making with all its legal and institutional consequences, including a 
new focus of political loyalty and identification beyond the original non-states. Taking 
both aspects into account, integration means continued, intensified, and hardly reversible 
cooperation which leads finally to a noticeable transfer of national sovereignty to a new 
power centre, respectively to an appropriate institutional structure. In principle, regional 
integration is also based on the process of ‘a point of no return’.635 To be in conformity 
with this definition, the important question is whether the ASEAN is ready to leave a sort 
of reversible cooperation and go for deeper integration among its members. It has never 
been easy for the ASEAN to answer this central question related to its present and future. 
In fact integration efforts in the ASEAN are responses to both internal and external 
forces.636 The question of how regional integration should be enhanced and performed 
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successfully in the ASEAN is directly related to its good governance throughout the 
region as well as its effective and efficient institutional structure.  
       
Comparing the European Union with the ASEAN, political integration was always in the 
background of economic integration in Europe. In this respect, economic integration 
served as a vehicle to tie members of the European Union to each other and thus facilitate 
the shift in political sovereignty to the supranational level, as it is envisaged today by a 
common foreign and security policy. The ASEAN, on the other hand, never had political 
integration or confederationist fine-tuning on its agenda. Nor is it likely that the ASEAN 
member countries will be prepared to surrender politcal sovereignty in future.637 In order 
to improve political cooperation among its members, the ASEAN may require a 
paradigmatic change in its style of integration. So far, ASEAN mainly focused on the 
liberalization of trade and economic cooperation as a moderate level of integration. 
Institutional-building or political coordination have still played a subordinate role and 
institutionalization or positive integration may contribute to internal cohesion.638 
Hopefully, an intensification of intergovernmental cooperation and economic 
interdependence in the region will gradually lead to the formation of a new, supranational 
political system which also results in the transformation of the nationa states of the 
association.639 
 
 
 
Reading and rethinking the ASEAN: A Regional Community or Not. 
 
 
There are three dominant theoretical interpretations of the ASEAN: 
 
 
Constructivist perspective 
 
( 1 ) ASEAN conforms the basis of a regional community of Southeast Asian States 
because it embodies fundamental norms, values, and practices that have, over time, 
socialised the ASEAN states into adopting a shared regional identity.  This community 
consists of states that share common norms and values.  These norms include both 
regulatory norms (by laying out the rules and specifying the criteria by which states can 
pursue their interests ) and constitutive norms ( by defining the roles and identities that 
determine how a state understands its own interests ).  They reflect a common approach 
to regional conflict solution and community building.640 
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Constructivism takes into account the importance of culture, ideas, ideology and 
socialization.  State leaders are key actors in international politics, but cultural norms, 
values and identities (embedded in specific historical contexts) can shape or define their 
policy preferences.  Constructivism rests on the basic assumption that the international 
system is socially constructed.  Ideology, history and socialization matter.  For example, 
material capabilities do not explain why 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening 
to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons.641   
 
Realist point of view 
 
( 2 ) ASEAN is an instrument of its member states.  The organization is designed to 
pursue the narrow self-interests of its member states.  From this perspective, any sense of 
community within Southeast Asia is illusory and impractical.  ASEAN had never been 
more than an intergovernmental entity with a strong disposition against any supranational 
tendency. ASEAN’s regional identity was largely the by-product of members’ interests 
that were shared but rarely held truly in common.  Even though ASEAN practised the 
politics of consensus, but this practice has never entailed full uniformity in foreign 
policies of member states.  Therefore, the utility of realism is still relevant in ASEAN 
whose policy mix is closer to the realist than the institutionalist pole.642  
 
# The reality of the ASEAN lies between these polar positions and that, in practice, the 
second positions is slightly closer to reality while the association is also trying to extend 
their capacity of community-building in Southeast Asia.   The norms and ideals that 
ASEAN embodies are important to its members but they emphasize the independence 
and sovereignty of states.  As such, the most fundamental beliefs underpinning ASEAN 
actually mitigate against the creation of a strong regional community.643 
 
Neoliberal institutionalism (NI) 
 
( 3 ) NI is an approach that has received a great deal of attention in Southeast Asian 
regional studies.  As a distinct theoretical perspective and a challenger to realism, this 
theory was first advanced by Robert Keohane, whose work stresses the importance of 
rationalism in explaining international regime formation and the existence of institutional 
institutions.  This rationalist perspective draws on insights from economics in its 
emphasis on the virtue of transaction-cost reduction.  Neoliberal institutionalists argue 
that the benefit of institution building as a more effective way to cope with uncertainty 
rationally by helping states to achieve their objectives more efficiently.  Institutions are 
significant; they provide information, which could help states overcome their worst-
scenario assumption of each other’s intentions in an uncertain, anarchic world.  
Information concerning the economic gains to be achieved from cooperation can help 
settle distribution conflicts and assure member states that gains are evenly divided over 
time.644 
                                                 
641 Alexander Wendt  (1998) op. cit. 
642 Shaun Narine 2002; Michael Leifer 1989, 1996, 2000; Jürgen Rüland 2000; N. Ganesan 1995. 
643 Narine 2002. 
644 Keohane and Martin (1998) op. cit., pp. 390-391. 
  
 
218
 
N-I shows some relevance in the study of ASEAN regionalism based on economic 
cooperation manifest in the institutionalisation and implementation of the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA). However, realists and constructivists alike have seen little utility in 
neoliberal institutionalism, which have not been very relevant in explaining ASEAN’s 
successes or failures especially in the political and security arena.  And they also pointed 
out that the emergence and consolidation of ASEAN took place with fairly low levels of 
intra-mural transactions and interdependence.645 
 
 
 
 
 Non-interference and Non-intervention 
 Consensus-based decision-making originated from Musyawarah (consultations)   
Mufakat (consensus) practised in kampong (village) spirit of togetherness 
 Informality and organisational minimalism  
 National and regional resilience 
 Respect for national sovereignty 
 Renunciation of threat or use of force 
 Peacful settlement of differences, disputes and conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
645 Sorpong Peou (2002) op. cit. 
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Figure (6): Anatomy of ASEAN through its  intra-/inter-  regional cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
 
Intraregional cooperation =  Two and more individual actors within a same region  
                                               Cooperate with each other in political, economic and 
                                               security arena. 
 
Interregional cooperation =  Two collective actors from two different regions ( like the 
                                               EU and the ASEAN ) plus more other actors (like China, 
                                               US, Japan and etc) cooperate with each other in political, 
                                               economic and security arena.646   
                                                 
646 Sebastian Bersick (2004): “Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung?: Zur Politik der interregionalen 
Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses”, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 53. 
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Table (14): “Brief Outlook of the ASEAN’s successes & failures throughout 
its 40 years existence” 
 
Achievements 
 
( 1 ) ASEAN was instrumental in bringing the 
decade-long Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict to the 
negotiation table in 1988 and reaching a peace 
agreement in 1990. Vietnam, then seen as an 
obstacle to regional stability, is now a valued 
member of the ASEAN. 
 
( 2 ) Since the time of its establishment in 1967, no 
ASEAN members has engaged a fellow ASEAN 
member in major armed confrontation despite 
occasional border skirmishes (notably between 
Thailand and Myanmar in 2001) and bilateral 
territorial disputes and political tensions among its 
some member states.    
 
( 3 ) ASEAN was able to survive as Asia’s only 
multipurpose regional organization even though 
regional powers like China and India failed in their 
own attempts at regional institutional building. 
 
( 4 ) ASEAN is successful in providing the platform 
for building broader regional mechanisms like 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT) to engage a rising China and other 
major players in East Asia. Without ASEAN’s 
neutral facilitating role, China might now have 
joined the ARF, established in 1994 as the only 
official multilateral security forum. 
 
( 5 ) ASEAN did successfully organize a regional 
response (including China) for containing the deadly 
contagious Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak in 2003.    
Setbacks 
 
 
( 1 ) Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 severely 
crippled the economies of three of ASEAN’s 
founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand. ASEAN failed to respond the crisis 
effectively by giving its members a helping hand 
and it highlighted political and economic fragility 
of Southeast Asia. 
 
( 2 ) ASEAN’s policy of “constructive 
engagement” with Myanmar (a member of the 
ASEAN) has failed to bring tangible positive 
results of political reforms in military-ruled 
country. Its main principle of “ASEAN Way” 
and non-interference policy effectively stands in 
the way for this failure in dealing with 
Myanmar’s ruling junta. 
 
( 3 ) ASEAN still lacks effective dispute 
settlement and enforcement mechanism (with 
sanctioning authority) for handling bilateral 
political and territorial issues among its member 
states.  
 
( 4 ) ASEAN is powerless and not yet succeeds 
in tackling severe haze pollution in Southeast 
Asian skies caused by Indonesia’s annual forest 
fires.       
 
  
 
 
Sources: Acharya 2007, 1-3; Author’s own. 
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Therefore, the EU and the ASEAN governance pattern will continue to develop 
along the lines of assumptions as follows: 
 
 Changing mode of EU governance through its policy and policy-making structures 
emerges from the convergence of national governments’ preferences based on 
their own interests. By pooling sovereignty of member states through its sui 
generis EU polity, EU governance will continue to transform along the lines of 
supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy combining the elements of multilevel 
and network governance. 
 
 ASEAN still remains as a weakly institutionalized intergovernmental organization 
with limited capacity and effectiveness because of its member states’ 
overcautious preservation of their own interests and sovereignty. ASEAN’s most 
fundamental principle like the ASEAN Way actually hinder against implementation 
of an effective mode of regional governance and the creation of a strong regional 
community. 
 
  EU is moving toward further institutional changes in parallel with the increasing 
Europeanization of the institutional set up in the member states after its eastern 
enlargement. The interaction and exchanges between national and European 
institutions have become increasingly intensive and closely interconnected. 
National institutions of member states have to adapt their structures and 
procedures to be consistent with the activities at the EU level. 
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 Cooperation among European states has changed the system of state interaction 
and produced a new mode of governance that has partially eliminated state 
sovereignty. Integration occurs when sovereign states pursue their national 
interests by negotiating cooperative agreements and bargaining the maximum 
gains.  
 
 
 
Table (15): Differences between mode of governance through regional 
integration and mode of governance through regional cooperation 
 
Parameters Regional Co-operation 
(ASEAN) 
Regional Integration 
(EU) 
Institutional Characteristics Reliance on purely 
intergovernmental forms of 
decision-making 
Presence of autonomous 
supranational institutions 
that initiate and enforce 
common policies 
Forms of decision-making Consensual decision-
making (i.e. states have veto 
over decisions) 
Extensive use of qualified 
majority voting (i.e. states 
have no veto over decisions) 
Degree of legal integration Arbitration and dispute 
settlement of individual 
cases  
Permanent court system 
developing a supranational 
legal order 
Extent of political 
integration 
Concentration on economic 
cooperation among states 
Development of a political 
union with a system of 
economic, social and 
political rights for citizens 
Range of issues covered  Emphasis on trade, 
investment, and related 
economic issues 
Expansion of competences 
into much wider areas 
(single currency 
environment like Euro zone, 
JHA, etc.) 
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Presence of democratic 
procedures 
Minimal, if any, 
involvement of parliaments 
and citizen participation 
Establishment of a 
democratic process, based 
on a directly elected 
parliament 
Foreign policy co-operation Co-ordination of external 
relations limited to 
participation in multilateral 
trade negotiations 
Development of a common 
foreign, security and 
defence policy 
Dominant approach Bottom-up Top-down 
Dominant mode of 
governance 
Intergovernmental and 
Elite-driven 
Act of competition between 
Supranational and 
Intergovernmental 
governance combing with 
the network and multilevel 
elements  
 
 
Source: Heavily leaned on Thomas Christiansen (2001): “European and regional 
integration”, in: John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds): “The Globalization of World Politics: 
An Introduction to International Relations”, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 515. 
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